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ABSTRACT 
Property taxes and their role in local government finance has recently 
within a number of countries been subject to wide debate. The pros 
and cons of the property tax over its nearest competitors, local 
income tax, sales tax, poll tax are all well versed. Whether a particular 
country uses a tax based on property depends upon a number of 
factors, many of which will be unique to that country, therefore to 
implement one country's property tax in another could prove to be 
disastrous. Having said that the role and importance of the property 
tax is increasing in many developed and under developed countries. 
There is evidence to show that property tax systems are being refined 
or re-introduced, since the alternatives have not been as successful 
as initially thoughts The term property tax can have a wide definition 
and can be taken to include all elements of property taxation incorpo-
rating, capital gains tax, development land tax, stamp duty, and other 
property sales taxes. However the theme of this work focuses atten-
tion on one aspect, namely, the taxation of property to raise finance 
to fund local authority expenditure for the provision of local services. 
Local property tax in many countries is usually the single most 
important source of revenue for local authorities. It gives an element 
of autonomy and to some extent financial independence from central 
government. The potential revenue can be substantial, and if the 
relationship between taxpayers and exempt property is carefully 
managed the system can have positive and significant allocative and 
distributive effects. 
The property tax is the single most important local government tax in 
developing countries. It is, however, not necessarily the best revenue 
raising Instrument for a city because It is very difficult to administer 
effeciently, can have undesirable land use effects, and is very un-
popular with taxpayers. Yet local governments often have few other 
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sources of revenue, and important strides have been made toward 
Improving the fairness and revenue productivity of property taxation. 
This study is essentially a fiscal exercise in economic growth. It is 
concerned with an analysis-both theoretical as well as applied, of the 
role of property taxation as an effective instrument of economic 
growth in a developing economy with spcial reference to India. 
Property here includes urban real estate taxed by the urban local units 
of government. In this connection it is important to point out that since 
we have followed English practice, local units in India have confined 
themselves to the taxation of immovable property alone. Taxation of 
immovable property consisting of land and buildings not only forms 
the chief source of revenue in the budget of the local bodies in India 
but also in UK, USA South Africa and in many other developed and 
under-developed countries of the world. 
If the foundations of responsible and democratic urban local govern-
ment are to be strengthened, it is necessary that these problems of 
urban local bodies must be tackled quickly by raising the standard of 
education and by providing the urgent utility services to the urban 
dewellers. The important thing at present is consequently, to ensure 
that the urban local bodies are able to play an effective role in the 
economic development of a developing country like India. 
The Property tax occupies the central place in the system of local 
taxation and the whole system of local finance has to be developed 
on the assumption that this tax will continue to be the principal source 
of revenue. The property tax must be the most unevenly administered 
and most maligned of all taxes but is also the most durable. It has 
financed the major part of municipal expenditures since the municipal 
councils were first established in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras in the 
early part of the eighteenth century. But the unfortunate thing is that 
the potentials of this tax have not been fully utilised because the 
existing system of valuation and assessment of property is extremely 
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unsatisfactory and at the same time enforcement of collections has 
been thoroughly neglected. It is being realised now that undervalua-
tion of land and building and poor collection of taxes have put many 
of the municipalities into financial trouble. In general, it is levied more 
as a source of revenue than as an instrument for regulating land use.^  
It is not then surprising that there is an increasing level of concern 
expressed about its efficacy as a revenue measure since there has 
been increasing evidence over recent years that the property tax has 
not been a very buoyant source of revenue. 
The property tax occupies the central place in the system of local 
taxation and the whole system of local finance has to be developed 
on the assumption that this tax will continue to be the principal source 
of revenue. But the unfortunate thing is that the potentials of this tax 
have not been fully utilised because the existing system of valuation 
and assessment of property is extremely unstisfactory and at the 
sametimeenforcementof collections has been thoroughly neglected. 
It is now being realised now that undervaluation of land and building 
and poor collection of rates and taxes have put many of the munici-
palities into financial troubles. 
The role of taxes on immovable property in financing lower levels of 
government is being reviewed in many of the 24 member countries of 
the OECD. All of the mediterrean countries are now committed to 
placing a greater reliance on property taxes, though a few countries, 
notably the United Kingdom intend to phase out domestic property 
taxes. In most countries with these taxes a major effort has been 
made to improve their admenistration. Hence, it is being realised in 
India too that in order to strengthen subnational governments its 
ervices, it is must that property tax is revitalised through redesigning 
and restructuring it. 
One reason for this upsurge of interest in India is that the relationship 
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between central, regional and local governments is changing. Gov-
ernment is committed to decentralise expenditure and revenue 
fuctions. 
Main focus of this work is on two issues. The first is the defferent ways 
in which land and buildings are taxed and the need for more coordi-
nation. The second issue is the very broad question of how govern-
ments can improve taxapayers perception of property and other taxes 
by improving the "service" that the tax administration provides to the 
taxpayers. In this work we have tried to address certain Important 
questions. These questions are : 
a What are participants view on the feasibility and desirability of 
having a consistent and cordinate approach to the valuation of 
immovable prop for all tax purposes ? 
• Should the tax base used for all taxes on immovable property be 
market value and how should this be calculated (e.g. capital 
versus rental values) ? 
• Is it useful to separate out questions of valuation, assessment, 
control and collection of property taxes. Or should all (most) of 
these functions be carried out by the same level of government? 
• How can one overcome the conflict between the need for local 
property taxes to be fully visible and the fact that this visibility 
makes property tax systems very prone to criticism ? 
• What measures are to be undertaken to improve relations 
between property taxpayers and the tax administrations ? 
Data Sources 
Our study is based exclusively on secondary data. Data for the 
sample states were collected from the state-level municipal director-
ates. This set of data represents state aggregates which comprise 
aggregate revenue and expenditure, tax revenue, non-tax revenue 
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and grants in respect of all municipal bodies in the respective 
municipal bodies in the respective states. For a few states, namely 
Kerala, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, local government share in 
state taxes is also available. One major problem with this set of data 
is that states which do not report shared taxes separately club them 
with tax revenue or grants. 
The second source of data is Annual Statistical Abstracts of the 
central statistical organisation. This source reports data in respect of 
selected municipal corporations under the following heads : tax 
revenue service charges, non-tax revenue with grants. Here again 
shared tax is either aggregated with tax revenue or grants. The third 
source of information is various reports by the National Institute of 
Urban Aggairs. These reports is the single source of information that 
gives most disaggregated data on property tax. Data are available in 
aggregate terms for individual states which are further disaggregated 
Into municipal corporations and municipalities. The fourth source is 
individual state government budgets, which provide data on local 
share in state taxes and compensation and assignments to local 
bodies. A comparative picture of the latter data Is also reproduced in 
Combined Finance Accounts, an annual publication of the office of the 
comptroller and Auditor General; Indian Economic Statistics - Part II 
Public Finance, published by the ministry of Finance and Reserve 
Bank of India monthly bulletins. For data on individual municipal 
corporations, their annual budgets and administration reports consti-
tuted the major data source. 
Depending on the availability of data, comparable data have been 
prepared in three forms state aggregates, aggregates of rriunicipal 
corporations and aggregates of municipalities. 
For international comparative study, the data are drawn from many 
different sources. The most important, we relied on World Bank 
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decuments. We added to this the results of a number of case studies 
carried out by World Bank. We also benefited from the results of a 
number of cross-country analyses done both inside and outside the 
World Bank. World Bank documents include economic reports, back-
ground papers for loan negotiations, appraisals, and so forth. Be-
cause these are official documents of the Bank, they may not be cited-
even though the data they draw on are a matter of public record. The 
source notes for data from these documents thus simply read "World 
Bank data". 
Scope. Method, and Limitations 
Unfortunately, there is a shortage of good secondary data; a 
compendium of local government finances in developing countries 
does not exist. The newcomer to this area of analysis might expect 
that one of the international agencies would have begun to gather 
such data by now, at least for the World's Largest Cities. This guess 
would be incorrect. The best comparable data on international public 
finance are in the International Monetary Fund's Government Finance 
statistics year book, but this source reports only aggregate, nation 
wide data from state and local governments. Even in this source, 
aggregate statistics for subnational governments are not presented 
for many countries and are incomplete for others. Neither the United 
Nations nor the World Bank gathers comparable data on local public 
finance. 
Case studies of various cities carried out under a variety of auspices, 
using different methodologies, covering different years, but asking 
similar questions - provide the other basic source of information. The 
statistics in these studies suffer from some lack of comparability, and 
the supporting details on fiscal operations are not always available 
still, when carefully used they can add significantly to what we know. 
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There are also important caveats. Some of the data are not compa-
rable inform, different years are used in the comparisons, much of the 
information is dated, and the sample of cities is not random. We have 
tried to remedy some of these problems by updating the information 
where possible and by augmenting the sample where particular types 
of cities seem under represented. 
This work also is limited by what we have chosen to study. Many 
important subjects - budgeting, financial accounting, personnel man-
agement, interval organisation, political structure - are not covered. 
We also say for too little about the urban economic base which 
underlies the potentialities of the property tax studied here. 
Scheme of the Studv 
This study has been divided into seven chapters. 
1. Analytical Framework and Basic Issues : An attempt has been 
made to analyse the theoretical aspects of the property tax. Besides, 
possibility of optimal property tax structure explored, a discussion 
about emerging issues and changing perspectives, current trends in 
use of property tax and pin pointing main issues in urban property 
taxation in India. 
2. Performance of property taxation in India: This chapter is major 
chapter of this work as it includes : property taxation in, the tax 
structure of urban local bodies in India, relative position of property 
tax in different states, growth of the tax potentials of growth of the tax 
potentials of the property tax, per capita revenue, total tax revenue 
and property tax revenue in major municipal corporations; growth rate 
of property tax in major municipal corporations. Buoyancy and elas-
ticity of property tax and revenue importance of property taxes in 
generating revenue to finance Urban Public services in India vis-a-
atsTimcT 
vis other cities of developed and developing nations. 
3. tRate structure : This chapter deals with the problems of rate 
structure. In view of the operational difficulties in a tax-price charging 
system of a combined basic tax with a number of service taxes, 
possibility of a family of property tax systems for various categories 
of properties having different base-rate structures coupled with an 
adequate system of user charges for urban services explored. Fur-
ther, standardisation of property tax rates among various size-cat-
egories of municipalities considered. And finally possibility of intra 
- state equalisation of rate structure and distributive effects of rate 
structrure and administration studies. 
4. Alternative basis of property taxation : This chapter surveys the 
whole problems of alternative basis. Erosion in the base and legal 
interpretation of the base studied. Further, site value taxation, area 
detail system and area based scheme Vs annual rental value ap-
proach studied at length. And finally a review of Rent Control Laws 
and reforming the annual rental value system discussed. 
5. Valuation of the property : Valuation practices in property 
taxation are major concern. Detail examination of the legal problems 
of valuation has been done. A detail analysis of the existing admin-
istrative procedure of valuation and assessment and a discussion on 
the organisational aspects of a central valuation agency. This chapter 
underlines the difficulties in determining the structure and functioning 
of a central valuation agency. 
6. Property Tax Administration: This chapter examines the admin-
istration of tax collection and makes specific suggestions for im-
provement. An analysis of experience in Delhi of an attempt to 
mechanise its property tax administration. This chapter focusses on 
steps to be taken for tax management improvement. And finally, what 
can be done for improving taxpayer's perceptions and relations 
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between the taxpayer and the administration, has been answered. 
7. Conclusion : obviously this is the last chapter in which a sort of 
summary of work done has been made. Further, suggestions has 
been given to reconst^ uct the property taxation In India. 
Conclusion 
Local governments do play an important part in the develop-
ment of cities. Despite handicaps - population growth, inflation, and 
resource constraint-real per capita expenditure of local governments 
and autonomous agencies increased during the 1960s and the first 
half of the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, many cities saw real 
expenditure levels decline signifying fiscal problems and a deteriora-
tion of civic services. 
In general, city governments meet about 70 percent of their expendi-
ture out of locally raised revenues. There has however been a decline 
in the share of local revenues in the1980s reflecting greater depen-
dence on external sources usually controlled by higher level govern-
ments. 
Average based on available data show that about 50 percent of the 
local revenues is derived from taxes, the rest from self-financing 
services but again the pattern in far from uniform. A variety of taxes 
are drawn upon by local governments the property tax being the most 
common and often the dominant tax source. 
Property tax and octroi are the most important components of the tax 
income of the selected municipal bodies and together account for 
nearly 90 percent of such income. Although octroi has been an elastic 
and bouyant source of revenue its future is clouded by uncertainty. 
Octroi has not been considered as a source of further tax income 
owing to the central governments commitment to do away with it. In 
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this context, we have to basically rely on property taxes for mobilising 
the existing resources within the framework of the Municipal Acts. 
Atleast 70 percent of the income of the municipalities comes from 
taxes, i.e., tax on property, house tax, water tax, lighting tax, drainage 
and conservancy tax, etc. Property tax is not as important in small 
municipalities as in big ones due to a variety of factors. Whatever may 
be the policy impasse, it is shere incompetence in the system that the 
per capita property taxis no more than Rs. 2.60 per capita per month 
even in million plus cities. This is in cities where even one room 
apartment in an ordinary localities can cost up to Rs. 1000 per month. 
In smaller municipalities per capita per month property tax is just one 
quarter of a rupee. 
Though the property tax is one of the major sources in the 
municipal revenue. The share of property tax in the total municipal 
revenue is on decline. 
There has been a very increasing evidence over recent years that the 
property tax has not been a buoyant source of revenue. Growth in 
property tax revenue has not been commensurated with the potential 
that it has, keeping in mind the increases in market values of property 
over the same period. Further, the tax is not elastic to increasing 
service costs and is not related to demand for services emanating 
from different land uses. 
Other criticisms of the existing system of property tax are based on 
broader issues of rising land values which it is unable to keep pace 
with and serve any urban development objectives. Thus, it is neither 
serving as a tool of resources mobilisation for meeting the increasing 
demand for services nor as an instrument for promoting the urban 
development objectives with the result the property tax has become 
an inefficient and inequitous tax instrument. 
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Thus, increasing dormant fiscal role of property tax apart, it is no 
longer an elastic source of revenue. Whereas the elasticity of prop-
erty tax at constant price to propulation is weak in the case of Bombay, 
Delhi and Madrass, it is inelastic in Ahmedabad and negative in 
Calcutta. In Calcutta, it was found inelastic to capital investmjent at 
the city level and the number of holdings. A recent study of property 
tax in per capita terms has fallen behind that of land prices, rents and 
general cost of construction. The buoyancy of property tax per capita 
with respect to average land price was around 0.5, with respect to 
cost of cosntruction it was around 0.8. It was about 0.7 with respect 
to rents (Delhi Administration 1990 : 22-23). 
In addition to declining revenue performance and inelasticity and 
disparities, serious inequities have come to characterise the property 
tax system in India. These shortcomings of the present property tax 
system are the result of a combination of inherent infirmities in the 
system itself. These infirmities as also the evolution of declining role 
of property tax, its inelasticity, disparities and inequities can be better 
understood and appreceated by looking at the basic feature of 
property tax system in India. 
There exists four types of rate structure as provided for in the various 
statutes. These are (1) flat rate system, (2) slab system, (3) gradu-
ated slab system, and (4) straight line system. 
The corporations of Delhi and Calcutta practice discriminating tax 
rates between residential and non-residential properties. In Delhi, the 
marginal rates of general tax for these two types of properties vary 
from 10 and 15 percent respectively on the lowest slab to 20 to 25 
percent respectively in the slab of Rs. 10-20 thousand. The Corpora-
tion of Calcutta imposes surcharge on non-residential properties to 
the extent of 50 percent of the consolidated rate. It gives tax conces-
sion upto 45 percent of the consolidated rate to the newely con-
structed properties for a period of three years. 
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Relatively high tax rate in Bombay and Ahmedabad (including service 
taxes) has been brought about by the compulsions of a depressed 
base. Ever increasing local public expenditure commitments and the 
depressed tax base are compelling factors for the enhancement of tax 
rate. However, the corporations of Madras and Trivandrum seem 
oblivious to such a situation. In the latter, the rate structure has not 
been revised since 1967. In the former, it is still pegged at 1972 
levels. 
A great deal of variation is found in the tax rates not only between 
different states but also amongst the various municipalities of same 
state. Thus, there is inter-state variation as well as intra - state 
variation in rate structure. The consolidated rate (consisting of prop-
erty tax and other service taxes) varies from a minimum of 6.25 
percent of the ARV in Alwar in Rajasthan to a maximum of 20 percent 
in Ghaziabad in U.P. It thus, indicates interstate variations. 
In Haryana all the municipal bodies levy the tax at a uniform rate of 
12.5 percent of the ARV except for the municipal bodies at Faridabad 
and Rohtak. These towns apply a lower rate of 10 percent of ARV. The 
reason for such a lower rate is attributed to the fact that in Rohtak the 
rates have not been revised since 1935 whereas in Faridabad the 
existing rates are the same as in the years prior to 1971. 
In U.P., there exist variations in the general house tax rates as well. 
These vary from a minimum of the 5 percent in Hapur to 10-12.5 
percent in Meerut. There are two reasons for such variations in the 
property tax rates in Uttar Pradesh. Firstly, the U.P. Municipality Act 
does not provide for a fixed limit of property taxes. Secondly the 
revisions have not been made in an uniform manner. Except for 
Ghazibad all other towns belonging to U.P. have not revised their 
rates for several years. 
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It is equally important to note that there is a positive relationship 
between the property tax rates and the per capita yield. Ghaziabad 
which has the highest rate of this tax (24%) also happens to be the 
town with the highest per capita yield. As against this, in Alwar the 
yield is the lowest as the prevaling tax rate happens to be only five 
percent of the ARV. Hence there is scope to rationalise the rate 
structure of property taxes. 
In certain cases, there appears to be a variation in the rate structure 
of property taxes. For instance, the rate structure in U.P. towns varies 
substantially from one town to other. Similarly from among the 
Haryana towns, Faridabad and Rohtak apply a rate lower (10% of 
rateable value) than all other towns (12% of rateable value). The main 
reason for such variation has been the inability of the municipal 
bodies to pass a resoultion and request the state government to issue 
a notification for modifying their rate structure in accordance with 
their eligibility. 
Though rental value of land and building constitutes the base of 
property tax, the enabling legislations in all the states have only 
vaguely defined the base. Lack of clarity in the definition of property 
tax base has led to considerable erosion in the base with all its 
accompanying consequences for elasticity and buoyancy of property 
tax. Almost all the enactments for constituting the municipal authori-
ties in various Indian states define the base as the "gorss annual rent 
of land and building at which they may reasonably be expected to let 
from year to year". Deductions varying from 10 to 15 percent of the 
gross annual rental value are provided for in various enactments 
towards repairs and maintenance so that the properties could be in a 
state to command that rent. 
Only in Gujarat, the Municipal Acts and Rules provide for the "rent 
actually realised" as the basis for levying of property tax. But it also 
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lays down that if the rent realised Is a collusive rent, the tax Is to be 
assessed on the basis of "reasonable rent". Some of the Acts provide 
for determination of annual rental value by taking some proportion of 
the capital value of land and buildings. The enactments in the states 
of Tamil Nadu and Kerala provide that for government and railway 
properties are any other type of property which are not rented and 
therefore the rent can not be estimated, rental value is to be computed 
at 6 percent of the price of land and the estimated cost of construction 
at the time of assessment. The law provides for depreciation on 
construction cost varying from 10 to 15 percent. 
The Calcutta Corporation Act provides for 5 percent of the capital 
value of properties used as hospitals, educational institutions, places 
of worship etc. as the gross rental value. However this is 7.5 percent 
for other types of properties for which rental value can not be 
estimated. The Act has an innovative provision in so far as it has 
included also "service charges" within the purview of rentals. 
Property tax apparently, consists of rentals which a property could be" 
reasonably expected" to fetch in the market. Application of such an 
abstract concept in a real live situation has been one of the major 
problems afflicting the property tax in India. 
There is found to be an erosion in the property tax base owing to the 
operation of rent control laws. The operation of rent control laws has 
considerably depressed the base of this tax. The "reasonable annuals 
gross value" is not the market value but the standard rent as deter-
mined according to the provisions of the rental laws. 
The determination of the base of this tax, that is, the gross annual 
value at which the property is" reasonably let from year to year" is a 
highly subjective exercise and hence is riddled with corrupt practices. 
This could be minimised by making the valuation objective and 
explicit. This requires the standardisation of rents on a per sq. ft. 
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basis by taking into account some of the attributes of the property 
such as location, quality and type of construction, land use, age of 
building and so on which are instrumental in raising property values. 
The municipal corporation of Delhi already follows this method in a 
crude manner by evolving what they call the "rental data". Further 
sophistication has been brought into it in Bombay, Bangalore and in 
all the Urban areas in Kerala. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
has introduced valuation on the basis of carpet area which takes into 
account attributes such as location access to infrastructure, use and 
structure of the properties concerned. 
Proposals have been made to replace the base of ARV by alternatives 
like capital value, or site value, or composite bases determined by the 
summation of a number of selected variables, (e.g, location, type of 
building, age of structure, etc.) each with a predetermined weight. It 
is necessary to mention that several countries including Canada, 
U.S.A. some Latin American countries and a few other, have the 
capital value base. In U.K.,fromwhichoursystem was borrowed, the 
Layfield Committee of 1976 recommended a change over from ARV 
to capital value, but this recommendation has not been accepted by 
the British Government. 
Although capital value base has advantages like easy determination 
than ARV; flexibility in adjusting rates; inducing better land use by 
bringing unimproved land under taxation; attaining the desired 
allocative effects in regard to the use of land; and becoming more 
responsive to the economic changes and have an objective valuation 
of property; in Indian situation because of the imperfect property 
market, the system cannot work. Unlike Europe and America where 
CV system is in vogue, we do not have a well developed real estate 
market in our country, where properties could be sold frequently. Even 
when the properties are sold, the amount mentioned in the sale deed 
is understated. The valuation exercise in the absence of a well 
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developed real estate market will prove to be highly subjective. Local 
Finance Enquiry Committee 1951 and Taxation Enquiry Commission 
1953-54 were all against the CV system. 
Will it then be worthwhile to switch over to Site Value (SV) system ? 
The SV system of property taxation besides serving as an instrument 
of revenue mobilisation, also serves the urban development objec-
tives. Under this system the tax is imposed only on the value of the 
site, leaving out all structures. It is, argued that if building are'derated' 
then building activity will be encouraged and unutilised areas fully 
utilised. 
However, the basic problem of valuation, still remains intact. If there 
is no open and free land market, the determination of site value 
presents the same dfficulty as that of capital value. Leaving the 
buildings out will mean serious discrimination against the owners of 
residential accommodation or small structures. 
This then leaves the scope for reforming the property tax limited to a 
system of imposing the tax on the basis of certain area details. 
Suggestions have been made for the replacement of all direct valu-
ation whether of rental, or of capital worth, or of site, by some 
objective criteria, like the area of land, the plinth area, the floor area 
and so on. A more developed variant of this 'composite base' or the 
'points system' under which the tax is payable is determined by the 
summation of a number of selected weighed variables. In fact, the 
single criterion schemes also include weightage for a few other 
variables and therefore, all this can be discussed together. 
One suggestion has been to levy a land tax and also a building tax, 
both on the basis of area measurement. The rates would vary 
according to zones and there would be additional charges for non-
residential use and also to meet development cost where applicable. 
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A second suggestion is that in addition to land and plinth areas, other 
factors like location, type of construction, nature of use and age 
should be compounded into a standardised formula. 
The system adopted in Orissa had come somewhat nearer to this 
system. However if the property tax is continued with the system of 
area characteristics and valuation of assessment is formalised on the 
basis of the few most important factors giving rise to property values, 
it may not withstand scrutiny by the courts of law after the enactment 
of new rent control law, if it does not delinkthe property valuation from 
the provision of rent control law. The fair rent or the hypothetical rent 
to be fetched by a property has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court as the standard rent determined according to the Rent 
Control Act. 
The alternatives suggested reveal.that there hardly exists any scope 
for changing base. The remedy lies in improving the ARV system 
within the existing system itself, by either computing the rateable 
value on the basis of area of land and built-up value there on or with 
the application of appropriate factors taking into account the.location 
and standard of construction. 
A workable suggestion towards reform in specifying the basis of the 
levy of property tax would be to substitute the Municipal Act, the term 
"standard rent" for "reasonable rent". The following factors are to be 
taken in the calculation of standard rent-the user, percentage of cost 
of land and cost of construction. The system of assessment on the 
basis of actual rent should be abandoned and the rates as per the 
PWD schedule be revised according to a new base year. 
Yet another constraint is the valuation and assessment procedure. 
Firstly, a substantial proportion of additions and alterations brought 
about in the properties are not properly reported. Secondly, the 
distortion of the rental market because of underhand practices of 
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pugree (Key money) and advances does not allow an assessment of 
the real rental values of properties. The base of this tax thus gets 
depressed further. Thirdly, the valuation and assessment of 
the property tax is not revised as stipulated in the relevant acts and 
by - laws. 
The crux of the problem in resource mobilisation from this tax lies in 
capturing, as far as possible, the market value of the land and building 
so that increases in property values are constantly mopped up. This 
calls for periodical valuation and assessment as provided for in the 
relevant laws and bye-laws. 
In view of the fact that it is politically as well as administratively 
difficult to revise the property tax demand in retrospect, it is better if 
the selected municipal bodies exercise their powers of quinquennial 
assessment of property tax demand well in time. This has substantial 
potential for the mobilisation of municipal resources. 
The attempt to improve the buoyancy of the property tax collection 
through a better method of valuation of the properties can be seen in 
the suggestions of CVB. The method suggested by CVB and, imme-
diately accepted by some of the municipalities indicates that the 
rateable value of properties has increased substantially. In contrast, 
the property tax of the other municipalities, which continue with the 
old method of valuation, remains at a much lower level. It will be 
useful to point out that the difference in the property tax yield between 
these two groups of municipalities is statistically significant. 
There exists a host of administrative deficiencies in the management 
of financial resources. These deficiencies are : 
1. There is vertually no management information system for an 
effective and efficienttaxadministration. For example, information on 
the various property attributes which are very important for property 
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tax administration does not exist even in rudimentary form. This 
makes it difficult to identify the problem areas. 
2. The current accounting and budgeting practices do not include 
the factual and actual resource position. 
3. The collection machinery has been lethargic and inefficient with 
the result that the tax arrears have been mounting year after year. 
Further, delay and backlog infinalisation of valuation is on rise. There 
are about 6 lakh properties within the jurisdiction of the MCD and this 
number is increasing every year due to the process of suburbanisation 
and urban growth. The assessment department, however, is not able 
to cope with this magnitude. Thus valuation and assessment is not 
finalised for a very large number of properties. According to a recent 
study of procedures relating to fixation of reteable value of property 
in MCD, the backlog of properties is increasing year after year. 
Non-availability of data on the extent of current demand, arrears and 
collection of current demand as well as arrears do not permit an 
objective analysis of tax collection. 
There has been a progressive increase in the arrars. Hence, much is 
desired to tone up the collection of property tax. 
Thus, yet another factor adversely affecting revenue performance of 
property tax in India is poor collection efficiency of the property tax 
administration. Whatever tax is assessed on a deficient and de-
pressed base by applying the rate structure which itself is not 
rationalised and reviewed frequently, is not collected effectively. The 
ratio of collection of total tax demand in the case of Ahmedabad has 
declined from around 40 in 1980-81 to about 18 in 1990-91. During the 
same period, its accumulated arrear demand has increased from 
about two-third of the total tax demand. Trivandrum municipal corpo-
ration is able to collect less than one-third of the total property tax 
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demand. Only the municipal corporation of Madras is able to collect 
around 70 percent of the total tax demand. But the arrears to be 
collected have mounted to about one fourth of the total demand. 
No amount of perfection in the base, VAP and rate structure will 
increase the yield from property tax unless the increased demand 
arising out of these packages of reforms are collected (Dillinger 
1988). Collection efficiency presently is very low. Enhancing of 
efficiency in tax collection will call for application of ABC analysis for 
concentrating the collection efforts on the high value properties which 
involve very high demand. Generally, such properties are less in 
number but account for a high proportion of the total demand. 
Exempting the low value properties will also go a long way in 
enhancing administrative efficiency as it will save the frittering away 
of energies in realising a small proportion of total demand from a very 
large number of such properties. Other areas of reform pertain to 
penalties to be inflicted for non-compliance and incentives for prompt 
payment, in all the enactments, there is a provision to collect property 
tax as arrears of land revenue. If the assessess default in payment of 
tax. This provision culminates in attachment of immovable properties. 
The municipal authorites hardly take recourse to this provision. MCD 
has, however, innovated an interesting practice of attachment of bank 
accounts. This has proved much more effective in promoting tax 
collection than the complicated procedures involved in attachment of 
immovable property. Charging a penal rate of interest is yet another 
strategy which could be profitably used for ensuring tax compliance. 
Raising of exemption limit to Rs. 1000 per annum and a package of 
incentives given in Delhi byMCD led to doubling of property tax 
collection from Rs. 180.96 million in 1978-79 to Rs. 379.52 million in 
1983-84 (Sharma 1991 : 34-68). Incentives included a rebate of 25 
percent in tax for SOPs and properties constructed after 31 March, 
1985 if the tax was paid within the due date. This for the partially self-
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occupied properties was 15 per cent. The municipal staff engaged in 
collection work were given cash awards for enhancing the collection 
ratio. This provided a built-in incentive for the employee to be 
motivated. If these Incentives did not work, the penalty included 
attachement of bank account as also the immovable property. Litiga-
tion is minimised by providing for in the law itself for payment of tax 
before moving a court for legal intervention. 
Generalization About Property Tax Policv 
1. The property tax should be kept as simple as possible. Exemp-
tions should be kept to a minimum and rate structure kept as 
uncomplicated as possible. Reform should emphasize improving the 
general property tax administration rather than adding special fea-
tures to affect resource allocation or income distribution. 
2. The property tax needs to be viewed as a system, and reforms 
need to be coordinated by all parties involved in structuring and 
administrating the property tax. Decisions about assessment and 
collection practices, exemption policy, and rate structure design may 
be the responsibility of different offices but must not be made 
independently. 
3. In general, a flat rate property tax on all real estate is not likely 
to be regressive in either the short or long run. 
4. The distribution of property tax burdens will be more progressive if the 
preferential treatment granted to owner-occupants is eliminated. 
5. The exemption of low-value properties or, better yet, granting all 
taxpayers a deduction from assessed value will make the property 
tax more progressive, favour low-income housing development, 
and ease property tax collection problems. The revenue costs will 
be small. 
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6. On balance, it is preferable to tax land more heavily than im-
provements. Therefore, if increased revenues are to be raised from 
an existing capital value tax, it is worth considering raising the tax rate 
only for land, rather than for land and buildings alike. 
7. If a special tax is to be levied on vacant urban land to speed up 
its development, this tax instrument should be explicitly linked to a 
land use development plan rather than applied indiscriminately to all 
vacant property in the metropolitan area. 
8. A property transfer tax is likely to interfere with the efficient 
operation of urban land markets and should be replaced by more 
effective administration, and possibly a higher rate, for the general 
property tax. 
9. A land value increment tax is not likely to be effectively adminis-
trated in developing countries. Efforts to raise property tax revenues 
would do better to focus on improving the administration of existing 
property tax systems. 
10. The four facets of property tax administration - identification of 
properties, record keeping, assessment, and collection - must all be 
improved to make the property tax more productive. Improving collec-
tion efficiency alone will increase revenues in the short run but will not 
provide the broader base necessary for long-run growth. 
Suggestions for Reconstruction of Propertv Taxation in India 
As the contraints in the existing practices inhibit the optimum 
utilisation of the property tax base, the resources from this source can 
not be substantially mobilised unless these constraints are removed. 
In view of this a set of measures is suggested which can help in 
removing these constraints. 
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Nature of Base 
a) Buoyancy of property tax could be restored by restoring the 
competitiveness of the rental market by, among other things, explic-
itly defining the base and delinking the dampening effects of RCLs on 
property valuation. 
b) The abstract concept of 'reasonable rent' needs to be explicitly 
defined In terms of "rent actually received" or "the prevailing rent" so 
that there does not exist any amendment about it. It will have to be 
accomanied by amendment in the RCLs. 
c) Sustainable reform for refurbishing of the base requires to 
amend the RCLs in one of the three ways viz. (i) complete delinking 
of provisions of the RCLs from municipal assessment; (ii) restructing 
the scope of the RCLs for providing protection to the target group for 
which these laws were enacted; and (iii) indexing of Standard Rent. 
Valuation and Assessment Practices Timely Revisions 
d) With a view to exploit fully the revenue raising potential of 
property taxes, an attempt should be made to capture the rising 
market values of urban properties by a regular and timely review of 
property tax assessment. In other words, efforts should be made to 
have a timely revision of assessment of urban properties. 
e) To dispense with the existing favourable and liberal assessment 
of SOPs; to review the exemption of Union properties which are not 
let and hence for which there does not exist a rental evidence, by 
applying certain ratio on the market value of land and buildings. 
f) Collusive rent and concealing of rent could be dealt with by 
restoration of market rent as the norm for assessment of RV. If, 
however, it is not effective. Rent Standarisation could be put in to the 
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law itself so that the rent per unit of floor area could be related to the 
prevailing rent. 
g) With a view to enable the municipal authorities to have services 
of qualified valuers as also to insulate property valuation from local 
politics, it would be advisable to set up CVO at the state level. 
Rate Structure 
h) The existing diverse type of rate structure (step system, gradu-
ated slab system, and straight line system) need to be reviewed. 
Equity consideration and the ability to pay princi pie of taxation do not 
have much of relevance at the local level. Hence, the progressive 
rates' need to be replaced by a differentiated flat rate for residential 
and non-residential properties. 
j) Increases in the costs of services calls for charging separately 
for financing of specific services. Charging through service taxes is 
simple to administer as they are levied along with property tax on the 
same base. However, as the base of property tax is depressed due to 
a host of administrative and legal factors, service taxes have to be 
delinked from the property tax base. 
Tax Collection 
j) Collection efficiency needs to be improved by using punitive 
measures like charging a penal rate of interest and attachment of 
bank account and also by taking recourse to the existing punitive 
measure like attachment of immovable properties. 
k) A package of incentives has been found to be much more 
effective in promoting tax compliance. Hence, the incentives as tried 
recently in Delhi by the MCD need to be emulated by other munclpal 
authorities. 
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Thus special drives to Improve the collection efficiency Is warranted 
which will Include variety of steps: (i) Introducing the collection 
through Identified banks. This include issuing a passbook, giving the 
detailed breakup of tax demand and collection; (ii) attractive rebates 
and incentives for prompt payment; (ill) penalising the defaulters by 
a penal rate of Interest on arrears; (Iv) solving the huge accumulated 
arrears on the basis of informal discussions with property holders 
rather than taking the mater to court. 
Rationalisation of Propertv Tax Administration 
information System for Revenue mobilisation 
I) A comprehensive information system needs to be developed as 
a management aid for mobilisation of resources and management 
and financing of civic services. Details of properties in terms of their 
number, use, assessed value, location, type of construction, tax 
demand, tax collected and arrears, and so on need to be brought Into 
the ambit of such an information system. 
Mid - Career Training to the Municipal Staff 
m) Improvement In the tax administration (as mentioned earlier 
under mobilisation from property taxes) as also In the Information 
system will require a multi-level orientation/training for the municipal 
staff employed In the financial management wing. This training 
should cover methods of building a strong information base, tech-
niques for proper budgeting and performance evalauatlon and launch-
ing effective collection drives. 
Computerisation 
n) One of the modern means to handle tax collection system is to 
undertake Its computerisation. In the case of metropolitan centres 
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and large cities it would be advantageous to resort to it, thereby 
saving time and labour required for handling the various procedures 
involved as well as for providing varied data quickly for policy 
formulation with a view to augmenting tax collection. The experiences 
gained by some municipalities in the proper use of computers should 
be shared by other to augment financial resources. 
Improving Taxpayer's Perceptions and Relations Between the 
Taxpayer and the Administration 
o) This important step will include : -
The political dimension ; 
Avoiding complexity ; 
Improved communication with the taxpayer; 
Contact points and contact staff; 
Improving taxpayers rights ; 
Decentralising the administration of property taxes ; 
The introduction of new information technology . 
In the end It is to be stressed that property tax structure and admin-
istration go together and must be viewed as such while undertaking 
reform and, adminstration of property tax has four critical aspects, 
viz, property identification, record keeping, assessment, and collec-
tion. Attention must be paid to all of them if the taxation of property 
is to show better results. Thus, there is need to view property tax as 
a system and not merely as a set of independent activities. There is 
no doubt a lot of merit in approaching property tax administration as 
a system with four interrelated dimensions call for concerted 
attention. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC ISSUES 
INTRODUCTION 
Property taxes and their role in local government finance has 
recently within a number of countries been subject to wide debate. The 
pros and cons of the property tax over its nearest competitors, local 
income tax, sales tax, poll tax are all well versed. Whether a particular 
country uses a tax based on property depends upon a number of factors, 
many of which will be unique to that country, therefore to implement one 
country's property tax in another could prove to be disastrous. Having 
said that the role and importance of the property tax is increasing in many 
developed and under developed countries. There is evidence to show that 
property tax systems are being refined or re-introduced, since the alter-
natives have not been as successful as initially thought^ The term prop-
erty tax can have a wide definition and can be taken to include all elements 
of property taxation incorporating, capital gains tax, development land 
tax, stamp duty, and other property sales taxes. However the theme of this 
work focuses attention on one aspect, namely, the taxation of property to 
raise finance to fund local authority expenditure for the provision of 
local services. Local property tax in many countries is usually the single 
most important source of revenue for local authorities. It gives an 
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element of autonomy and to some extent financial independence from 
central government. The potential revenue can be substantial, and if the 
relationship between taxpayers and exempt property is carefully man-
aged the system can have positive and significant allocative and distribu-
tive effects. 
The property tax is the single most important local government tax 
in developing countries. It is, however, not necessarily the best revenue 
raising instrument for a city because it is very difficult to administer 
effeciently, can have undesirable land use effects, and is very unpopular 
with taxpayers. Yet local governments often have few other sources of 
revenue, and important strides have been made toward improving the 
fairness and revenue productivity of property taxation. 
This study is essentially a fiscal exercise in economic growth. It is 
concerned with an analysis-both theoretical as well as applied, of the role 
of property taxation as an effective instrument of economic growth in a 
developing economy with spcial reference to India. Property here in-
cludes urban real estate taxed by the urban local units of government. In 
this connection it is important to point out that since we have followed 
English practice, local units in India have confined themselves to the 
taxation of immovable property alone. Taxation of immovable property 
consisting of land and buildings not only forms the chief source of 
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revenue in the budget of the local bodies in India but also in UK, USA 
South Africa and in many other developed and under-developed countries 
of the world. 
If the foundations of responsible and democratic urban local 
government are to be strengthened, it is necessary that these problems of 
urban local bodies must be tackled quickly by raising the standard of 
education and by providing the urgent utility services to the urban 
dewellers. The important thing at present is consequently, to ensure that 
the urban local bodies are able to play an effective role in the economic 
development of a developing country like India. 
The Property tax occupies the central place in the system of local 
taxation and the whole system of local finance has to be developed on the 
assumption that this tax will continue to be the principal source of 
revenue. The property tax must be the most unevenly administered and 
most maligned of all taxes but is also the most durable. It has financed the 
major part of municipal expenditures since the municipal councils were 
first established in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras in the early part of the 
eighteenth century. But the unfortunate thing is that the potentials of this 
tax have not been fully utilised because the existing system of valuation 
and assessment of property is extremely unsatisfactory and at the same 
time enforcement of collections has been thoroughly neglected. It is 
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being realised now that undervaluation of land and building and poor 
collection of taxes have put many of the municipalities into financial 
trouble. In general, it is levied more as a source of revenue than as an 
instrument for regulating land use.^ It is not then surprising that there is 
an increasing level of concern expressed about its efficacy as a revenue 
measure since there has been increasing evidence over recent years that 
the property tax has not been a very buoyant source of revenue. 
It is strongly believed that vast amount of potential resources can 
be generated if structural and administrative changes are brought about 
with regard to this tax. The rich potentialities of the urban property tax 
are clearly revealed by the fact that Mrs. India Gandhi, while presenting the 
budget proposals for 1970-71 had included urban housing for fresh taxation. In 
the developing coxmtries the process of economic development tends to be 
accompanied by an investment boom in housing in lu^ban areas. 
An accelerated process of economic development tends to pro-
mote urbanisation leading to large profits being earned from investment 
in housing. Investment in real estates also serves as a hedge against 
inflation and in those underdeveloped countries where economic devel-
opment is associated with mounting inflationary pressures, a sizable 
volume of resources tends to flow into investment in housing especially 
luxury housing. 
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As a matter of fact, an uninterrupted flow of resources into real 
estate would not be conducive to the promotion of a high rate of eco-
nomic growth in these countries. In the initial stages of development of 
an underdeveloped country, there is an extreme scarcity of resources and 
as a result these resources must flow into sectors with maximum growth 
potentials. Investment in housing is not as productive as investment in the 
formation of plant and equipment and other forms of physical capital. 
Besides, such investment in housing tends to generate a large multiplier 
effect as compared to its sigma effect, consequently, it generates infla-
tionary tendency in the economy. In view of these facts a stiff taxation of 
property in urban areas is urgently needed in the interest of promoting the 
flow of resources into high priority developmental sectors of the 
economy. 
Policymakers rarely consider reform of the entire property tax 
system, that is, rate and base structure, valuation principles, and admin-
istration. As a result, reform measures, sometimes have offsetting ef-
fects or unintended side effects and do not lead to the expected increase 
in revenue second, governments have adopted a wide array of property tax 
practices, and there seems little by way of a pattern to help us understand 
the determinants of this variation. Third, policymakers tend to overload 
the property tax with policy objectives-for example to effect the distri-
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bution of land use to'change the distribution of income or to reward 
homeownership. Not only does the property tax fail to meet such objec-
tives, but the overload compromises its more basic mission : to raise 
revenue. Fourth, it is more the quality of administration than the struc-
tural form chosen that determines the success of the property tax. Fifth, 
while the property tax is often a source of revenue for local government, 
it is almost always controlled to some extent by the state government. 
The importance of the property tax as a source of financing is often 
overlooked because fiscal analysis usually focuses on central govern-
ment finances, and in that context the property tax is truly a minor source 
of revenue. For example, chelliah (1971) reported that the average ratio 
of property and wealth tax revenues to gross domestic product (GDP) 
among fifty-two developing countries was less than 1 percent. More than 
a decade later Tanzi (1987) reported that property taxes on land and 
buildings accounted for no more than 0.2 percent of GDP and 1.2 percent 
of total tax revenues in forty-nine developing countries. According to 
these analysis, the property tax is neither an important nor a growing 
component of aggregate revenue mobilization in developing countries. 
We do not have enough data to test regorously the determinants of 
intercity variations in the level of property taxation. We can, however 
offer some basic hypothesis that appear to be supported by these data. 
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The property tax will be a less important source of finance under four sets 
of circumstances. The first is that local governments are unimportant 
relative to the central and state governments in providing services, that is, 
where the fiscal system is highly centralized (for example, in Kingston 
and Cartagena local governments accounted for less than 20 percent of 
urban area financing). The second is that expenditure responsibility has 
been decentralized but heavy use is made of grants and shared taxes. The 
third is that expenditure responsibility has been decentralized but the 
local government finances a major share of its expenditure responsibilites 
with locally raised nontax revenues (Bagota and Seoul) or with another 
local tax (Ahmedabad). The fourth is that the national government col-
lects the property tax and returns a portion of receipts as transfers to 
local authorities (Jakarta). Since relatively few cities fall under the latter 
to explain one might generalize that where local government taxes play a 
major role in financing urban public services, the property tax will be an 
important source of revenue. 
One would like to use these data to infer whether the property tax 
has been increasing or declining as a source of local government finance. 
Such comparisons, however, are difficult and depend on the sample of 
cities and the time period chosen. Still the median share of the property 
tax in total local taxes fell from 54.7 percent in the pre-1979 period to 
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42.4 percent in the post 1979 period. Yet it is worth noting that the cities 
for which we have comparable data for the 1970s and 1980s werea s likely 
to increase as decrease their property tax shares. 
A reasonable hypothesis, again supported by data, is that the 
property tax had a rougher time of it in the 1980s. This was attributable 
to several factors:(a) the financing pressures on local governments, 
which forced the search for new revenue sources (b) the inelastic 
response of property tax revenues to income growth and inflation; (c) the 
legal and administrative difficulties associated with increasing property 
tax revenues through discretionary actions, and (d) the special difficul-
ties posed by high rates of inflation. The last two factors may be particu-
larly important since discretionary changes in sales tax rates and some 
user charges are less visible than changes in the property tax and are 
therefore politically more feasible. 
Concept of Property Tax 
As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give a systematic concep-
tual growth of property taxation but as far as Indian tax system is 
concerned, property tax in its early phase was specific and not general. It 
means some specific types of property were taxed and rest had been 
exempted. In course of time, a transition from specific to general was 
seen but in recent years it has again become more or less specific i.e., 
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real property is virtually the sole target of taxation. 
Originally there were two main principles of taxation. Firstly, that 
the property tax should be universal. That is to say, all types of property, 
due to their being possessed of exchange value and capable of private 
ownership, should bear the burden of taxation, the second emphasised 
full value taxation at equal rates.^ 
Thus, it was due to this reason that property taxation was called the 
general property tax. But, in recent years, the character of property has 
substantially changed. Consequently, universality and uniformity as char-
acteristics of property taxation have disappeared from the fiscal dynam-
ics of today. 
The Kinds of Property Taxed 
The first basic type of property to be taxed, is the real estate. The 
word-real comes from the Latin word 'res', which means 'thing'. In 
ancient times, land was the thing, which later on was regarded as the first 
type of property. 
Real property is technically defined to include not only land in the 
strict sense of the word but also permanent improvements to land such as 
buildings, fences and irrigation system.'* Its essential feature is that it is 
immovable and at the same time fixed in location. Real property is not 
CHAPTCA - 1 10 
only the major item of revenue raiser in Indian local tax structure, but in 
almost all countries of the world. 
In addition to this, there are countries like India and England where 
only real estate is taxed and none else. 
Personal Property 
There is another basic type of property which has intrensic value, 
but is readily movable meaning thereby that it is not permanently attached 
to real property.^ It is popularly known as personality. The best examples 
are jwellery, clothing, automobiles, furniture, etc. Sometimes it so hap-
pens that it becomes difficult to draw a line of distinction between realty 
and personalty, because immobility and mobility are relative matters. 
In some of the states in America where both realty and personalty 
are subjected to taxation at equal rates, the line of distinction between the 
two carries little weight. However, where rates and the limits of exemp-
tions are different, it is definitely significant. Ultimately both these 
items of taxation are distinguished by the courts. 
Personal property falls into two main classes : tangible and intan-
gible. Tangible personal property is that type of property which has a 
physical substantive existence in its right.^ It is under the (ownership) 
possession of a person subject to be movable or transferable from one 
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place to another. The instances of tangible personal property are automo-
biles, clothes, furniture, and many other personal effects. Some of them 
are consumption goods and some are production goods, and most of them 
can be hidden and concealed from the eyes of the assessors. 
The second main division is intangible personal property. This 
division may further be broken down into representative and non-repre-
sentative intangibles. Representative intangibles are, in fact, bundles of 
legal and contractual rights usually in the form of paper instrument. It is 
an evidence of interest in other forms of property. If the latter is 
destroyed, the former would loose its value immediately. Notes, mortages, 
hundis etc are most suitable examples of representative intangibles. 
Since the same property is viewed in two different ways, there is every 
likelihood of its being taxed twice. 
The last form of intangible property is non-representative in 
nature. There is incorporal rights which do not diminish the rights of 
other material things.^ The best examples of it are patents, royalties, 
trade marks, franchises etc. Although there is no case of double taxation, 
chance of evasion is however fairly wide. 
Thus, it is quite obvious that both tangible and intangible are 
insignificant from revenue point of view. Moreover, these are very easily 
concealed and this evade taxation. This is the reason why in certain 
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countries local units have given up the idea of taxing personal property. 
Classification of Property Taxes 
So far as the classification of property tax is concerned, it can be 
broadly divided into the following headings : 
(i) First classification is done between periodical (perpetual) and 
occasional (temporary) property taxes. Periodical tax is being paid 
by the owner of the property at regular intervals. The house tax in 
India and the British rates are the best examples of this tax. In case 
of occasional property taxes, it is generally paid at the time of the 
change of ownership of property. Death duties may be considered as 
one of the special variety of occasional property taxes. 
(ii) Second classification is between taxes levied on physical persons 
(households) and juridical persons (corporate business in particu-
lar). Household taxation is quite popular in England, India, Switzer-
land and other countries while the taxes imposed onjuridical person 
can be seen in West Germany. Property taxes are further distin-
guished between general and particular taxes. When the taxes are 
imposed in such a way that they cover almost all possible objects of 
wealth owned by the tax payer, it is called general property tax. But in 
case of taxes which hit any specified object such as, real estate or real 
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property, it is simply said property tax or rate as it is a case in England. 
(iii) Another distinction is made from the stand point of fax base. With 
periodical general property taxes, the tax base will usually be the 
net wealth of the tax payer although exemption to this rule is found 
in case of West Germany. The same basis is, sometimes, seen in 
case of periodical taxes like death duties. But special periodical 
property taxes (viz. real estate) with the gross value as the tax base 
may also be found. 
(iv) As regards the rates of property taxes, they are both proportional as 
well as progressive. The examples of proportional rates are found in 
Netherlands and West Germany Whereas progressive rates are 
imposed in Scandinavian countries.^ 
The "In Rem'* Character of the Property Tax 
It is generally believed that property tax is levied on the things or 
business or transactions. These are looked upon as impersonal in nature. 
These taxes, the impact of which, is upon the things, business and 
transactions-are usually looked upon as impersonal. Hence property tax 
is said to be impersonal or in rem in character. This tax can very well be 
contrasted with the poll or personal income taxes which are highly 
personal in nature. Some evidences are given to suggest that property tax 
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is impersonal or in rem rather than personal in nature. First is that 
property tax is levied only within the municipal jurisdiction or in the 
district or its location. Secondly, assessment of property, is done on the 
basis of listed property and legal discription of lots rather than by the 
names of the owners. In Bihar particularly holding number is recorded 
rather than the name of the person. Thirday, property serves as the 
security for the payment of tax. Fourthly, legal owners of property are 
made liable for tax payment and if the true or legal owner is not traced 
out, the occupants are asked to pay the tax. And lastly, the owner is not 
permitted to off-set his debts and mortgage against the assessed value of 
his property.^ 
The greatest defect of the in rem character of property taxation is 
that it is opposed to the principle of equity. In the economics of taxation, 
the in rem character of the tax means that there is no effort to tax net 
equities. The legal title holder to the property must pay taxes on the full 
value of the property in spite of the fact that his equity may be only a 
fraction of the full value. In many states of America the mortgagees 
interest is also taxed-a situation which may result in double taxation. The 
in rem approach, thus completely disregards ability principle and taxes 
the mortgagor on a value that he does not possess.'" 
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Equity or Ability as the Basis of Property Taxation 
Property tax existed in some form or the other from the most 
premitive time and the main principle which existed that time was, of 
course, ability to contribute. 
The idea of contributing according to ability was advanced by 
Greek and Roman writers and in medieval times this concept emerged 
more clearly. Thus the requirement that the distribution of tax payment 
should be just is very old. This principle predates the benefit doctrine.'^ 
J.S. Mill had argued that equity should be defined as requirement 
that each tax paper should suffer an equal sacrifice. To this he added that 
such a solution "is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasional or the 
w h o l e " . 12 
Mills classical version of ability to pay rejected the benefit 
approach. The term faculty, or ability as used in the Elizabethan poor law, 
refers to property, and the same was the case in the early legislation of the 
American Colonies.'^ 
With the rise of the modern constitutional Government in Europe, 
the concept of ability as a criterion of Justice was definitely enunciated. 
Canan, for example, speaking about local taxes in England, observes, "it 
seems to be quite clear that in the 14th and 15th century the acccepted 
view was that each inhabitant should pay according to his ability or 
CHAPTCfl - 1 16 
substance for in those days ability and substance meant much the 
samething, the man who has the large income without having a large 
capital is a product of modern civilization"'''. 
It seems clear, therefore, that throughout the early period of its 
development property taxation was conceived in the minds of both 
legislatures and tax payers as resting definitely on the principle of 
ability. The dominance of this principle throughout the early period was 
occasioned mainly due to the fact that government's activities were very 
few and far between. It was, of course, a period of police state and so that 
ordinary individual anticipated no benefits from his government and was 
happy if he were unmolested by it. It is generally found reasonable that 
other things being equal, a person should be taxed heavier the larger is his 
net wealth. A number of arguments are given to justify this tax on equity 
grounds. First of all it is pointed out that apart from income flowing from 
property, property in itself, contributes strength and security through the 
safety which it grants against economic risks, loss of income in case of 
sickness, old age, unemployment and other sorts of economic calami-
ties. ^ ^ 
Secondly, property is valuable because it can cither earn income or 
in case of house as a form of consumption goods can save income. It also 
represents wealth in the form of past accumulated income. Property, 
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thus, possesses the tax paying potential and future spending power. 
Seligman conceived the term ability to pay comprised of two elements-
sacrifice and faculty. While the former is a psychological concept the 
latter concerns itself with instrumentalities (personal and impersonal) 
that are capable of meeting the tax bills. Since property has exchange 
value it indicates that it is capable of rendering economically productive 
services. Thus ability to pay as faculty can be attributed to property or 
possession of property as such.^^ 
Thirdly property owner has the advantage over another who owns 
no property but entirely depends upon his working power for acquiring 
income. In that case the former possesses more capacity to pay than the 
latter with lesser amount of effort. ^ ^ 
Moreover income flowing from property is not adequately taxed. 
Even the progressive rate of income tax many fail to tax property's 
income to the desirable extent. If it so happens, discrimination is bound 
to take place. Property owners would be placed in a most advantageous 
position. This can be remedied if supplementary taxation in the form of 
property tax is independently imposed. 
There is a widespread belief that income from property is earned 
with lesser and lesser effort than the income from work. In course of 
getting income from property, property owners get more leisure and 
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comfort than a man who is absolutely dependent upon his working power. 
In addition to this, property or wealth is a symbol of social 
prestige, power, strength and influence in the community. It also gives 
happiness to the miser.'^ 
It is further contended that income from property is more stable 
than the income from work. In case of income accured from working 
potentiality, although increases initially, ultimately discreases and fi-
nally ceases, when the earner dies. But such is not the case with the 
property owner where only the fruits of property are taxed whereas the 
sources thereof, i,e the item of property, remains unaffected. 
If these two sources are to be taxed on equity basis, it is desirable 
that either the proceeds from income should be reduced or the proceeds 
from property should be increased to the point where similarity of 
sacrifice is achieved. Even if it is assumed that property does not yield 
any fruits there is sound reason for differentiating the tax burden in the 
personal sphere according as owned property is present in addition to 
income. 
Another facet of property which gives it a special fisical position 
for taxing separately is the better consolidation that it commands. Prop-
erty acts as reserve for future spending and this strengthens the position 
of property owner in the labour market. Property is made instrumental in 
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collection of cash and it also gives better preparedness for life than 
would be possible without owning property. Thus a tax which is based on 
property is preferable to that on income from work. 
These arguments suggest not only a higher taxation on income 
from property but also the necessity of an independent tax on property 
along with the general income tax.'^ 
An argument against taxation of property income is that the low 
yielding property will be hit le ss hard than the high yielding property. For 
this it is sometimes, desired that there should be general property tax. 
Moreover, the rate of property tax should not be so high that it might not 
be given out of property's income. Care should therefore be taken so that 
capital aspect of property is not injured.^" 
It has already been said that since income from property stands on 
a better footing and so, it requires higher taxation. But the difficulty is as 
to how to differentiate such types of income. Sometimes it so happens 
that part of the income is consolidated and the part is unconsolidated. An 
analytical income tax which imposes higher tax on income from property 
than on other items of income, further, has a number of drawbacks of 
practical nature. In accordance with its object it would have to impose 
higher tax on the actual income from the property according as such 
income is better consolidated, that is acquired with less efforts and less 
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risk. This can not, in general, be inferred from the nature and the size of 
the items of income from property themselves. If one starts moving along 
the road of such a differentiation with the sphere of income from 
property, the question arises whether one is not to go on and is to proceed 
to differentiated taxation according to the amount of effort made for 
acquiring the income within the sphere of income from work as well. And 
indeed, the difficulty then presents itself to determine the tax position of 
the half consolidated income from enterprise. Needless to say that such 
a method of differentiation is not feasible and that further more, a 
differentiation which stops halfway and in many cases can not avoid that 
items of income are transferred from a highly taxed category to a less 
highly taxed category will convey to tax payers the impression of just 
taxation. In such situation the task of differentiation seems to be diffi-
cult. But this drawback may not be present if the consolidation is related 
to the property itself 
On the basis of these arguments it can be safely concluded that it 
is desirable on the grounds of equity and generality to make both total 
income and total property form the basis of separate taxes. If this be 
combined with the general consumption taxes, it will constitute as broad 
a basis as possible for a taxation in which the various factors of individual 
taxable capacity are done the fullest possible justice. On these grounds 
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a general income tax, and in addition a yearly tax on property has been 
levied in Netherlands, since 1914.^^ 
It is frequently argued that superiority of a tax on income from 
property to income from work is losing ground in the developed coun-
tries due to the active employment policy, extension of social insurance 
scheme and privilages of pension facilities. But in the case of underde-
veloped countries like ours, property is still a very important basis of tax 
paying capacity. 
The case for property taxation on grounds of equity has met with 
increasing criticism on account of the following reasons : 
In case of urban residential estate, it is complained that there is 
very poor correlation between the value of property and the income of its 
owner. Evidence to this fact is provided by the fact that the owner of a 
house who has the burden of mortgages hardly gets any credit for his 
liability under this tax. 
It is also argued that the inflation of recent years has reduced their 
real income and, therefore, the ability to pay taxes but no cooresponding 
reduction has taken place in the property tax. 
The Netherlands Government considers it as the most suitable 
taxation to safeguard a socially and individually just division of the 
unavoidably high tax burden. This tax has been founded on the two aspects 
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of taxable capacity, namely of the property itself, independent of the 
proceeds from it, and of the consideration of income from property as 
compared with income from work ^^ . 
But if a careful consideration is given to this problem, it willbe 
obvious that the real villain of this problem is inflation rather than the 
property taxation. Even the personal income tax becomes enormous when 
the inflation pushes up prices high. 
Another criticism of this tax is that it hits hard such an item of 
consumer's budget which has a very strong sentimental attachment. That 
is to say, majority of the families consider this as the symbol of social 
prestige. Such families prefer to forego other items of their expenditure 
rather than to give up thier houses in which they live. It is, therfore 
seggested that sale tax would be preferred because their decreased 
expenditure on goods would enable them to avoid sales tax. 
But it is not necessary that every person should have an inelastic 
demand for houses. There are persons who prefer to maintain their 
standards of living with respect to other commodities rather than housing 
and such persons wouldbe penalised if sales tax is imposed. 
Thus the reduction of the general property tax as a solution to the 
hardships overlooks the probability that the incidence of this tax is to a 
considerable extent diffused among all items of consumption.^' 
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In case of tenant occupied residential real estate, a good part of the 
tax is passed on to the tenant and hence it becomes a levy on the 
consumption of housing. It is also a fact that the percentage of income 
spent on housing diminishes with a rise in income. Thus the property tax 
on residenteal real estate is obviously regressive. It is, therefore sug-
gested that if the sales tax is substituted in place of property tax, it would 
reduce the regressive effect of property tax. Sales tax not only affects 
occupants but also merchants and manufacturers. 
Over and above, it is traditionally believed that part of the residen-
tial real estate tax which is levied on the basis of site value of the land 
tends to be capitalised. To the extent to which the buyer is sucessful in 
anticipating and thus discounting, it does not affect the net rate of returen 
on his investment on property and consequently that part of tax is not 
shifted to the tenant. The present occupant is not burdened with all the 
property tax. This idea shows substantial doubt on the propsition that 
consumers of housing will be relieved by less regressive sales taxes (the 
incidence of which is all or nearly all conceded to be on the consumers). 
To cite an extreme case obviovsly a highly regressive tax need to be of 
small concern to consumers if they only bear let us say 1 percent tax. '^'. 
Some taxes are like taxes on dividends which are imposed and paid 
on the basis of success. But there are certain other taxes including 
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property taxes, which are like taxes on interest. In a world of free 
contracts, it does not matter whether the tax is borne by debtor or 
creditor, occupant or owner as long as some creativity is taxed only once. 
Some objections are, however offered to this approach. 
Even though sales value and, in case of property earning a cash 
income, capitalised earnings measure the economic productivity of the 
property, it may be argued that assessment techniques lay insufficient 
stress on sale value or capitalised earnings. To the extent that this is true, 
of course, property tax can not be justified as a levy on the economic 
productivity of property and if such a justification is acccepted assess-
ment techniques might have to be modified accordingly." 
It is further contended that although the value of property repre-
sents its economic productivity, taxes can not be paid in terms of 
economic productivity but in cash. Some forms of property such as 
owner occupied homes, yield services but no cash income to the owner. 
However, the property is not less productive because the ovmer chooses 
to be owning land. 
It is further argued that property tax loses all validity because 
much of the levy of the property tax is shifted to tenants. But this is not 
true because it is not sure that property taxes can be shifted. The risk 
associated with prices is one that goes with the responsibility of 
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ownership. The property tax, in this respect is like other non-contingent 
cost and conditions of business. 
Another objection is raised that since taxes are paid by individuals, 
impersonal taxes and impersonal criteria are at best fictions and at worst 
dangerous illusions about the nature of the tax system. In this regard, it 
can be argued that incentive and inadequacies of administration (particu-
larly local administration) make it inexpedient to load all the burdens of 
government on personal income tax. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be safely concluded 
that "the tax culprit have sometimes been exaggerated. And the analysis 
further suggests that property tax relief by the substitution of certain 
other regressive levies may be a case of jumping from bad to worse. "^ ^ 
Benefit Theory of Property Taxation 
As a matter of fact ability theory was never abandoned and it is still 
recognised as an effective tool of justice in the field of property taxation. 
But towards the middle of the 19th century, there was remarkable resur-
gence of benefit theory and a surprising recognition of its pertinence 
and validity mainly because both English and American courts had 
been accustomed to speak of benefits as the justification for taxation 
in general.^^ 
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The reason for the wide spread recognition of benefit theory was 
that there was spectacular growth of cities and towns and this has 
continuously increased the pressure on local bodies to improve and 
expand amenities and services to the communities in respect of health, 
education higlighting, water, roads, markets and safety against fire etc. It 
is all the more pressing in case of urban local bodies.^^ 
Urban local bodies thus provide mainly two types of services 
which benefit the urban real estate 
(1) Direct services rendered to urban real estate 
(2) Indirect services which produce desirable influence upon the 
urban real estate. 
There are certain services performed by the urban local bodies 
which directly benefit property as such included in the first category are 
garbage collection, sewerage system, street maintenance and such other 
service s.^ ^ 
A tax levied according to the principle of benefits received has 
three major characteristics.^° 
(1) It is compulsory contribution exacted from the individual or group 
by the government. This characteristic is common in case of all 
taxes; 
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(2) There is absence of direct quid-pro-quo; and 
(3) The revenue from the tax is spent in such a way that measurable 
benefits proportionate to his payment are received by each tax 
paper.^ ^ 
Property tax becomes benefit tax because there is a positive 
correlation between the value of a unit of property and the municipal 
services rendered to that property.^^ 
Now one important question arises, should the government 
recognise such benefits, adopt the procedure and impose separate fees 
for its services upon all benefitted persons? should the goal be to make 
as municipal activities self-supporting as possible? 
As for as social necessities and justice are concerned, it would be 
extremely undesirable. Because in this situation individual interests 
would be fulfilled at the cost of the common good.^^ 
It would imply that one might refuse the benefits and therefore pay 
no fees. This would amount to great injustice particularly in the light of 
prevailing inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. It is vital 
to recognise that the broad collective interest with respect to such 
services is paramount, even though in some instances there is present a 
clear element of individual benefits. In other words the principle of 
taxation should be retained even though it is a benefit tax.^" 
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Naturally the poor persons who are the major partners or the vital 
limbs of the community's interest will virtually be deprived of those vital 
municipal services.^^ 
So even if it is felt that some services are more beneficial to 
certain classes of property than to others and that each class is equally 
able to carry its respective tax bruden, the principle of classified taxation 
might be further extended. 
Thus rising land values which are recognised from time to time 
could be subjected to an increment tax; or land, which is the chief 
beneficiary in rising reality values could be exposed to heavier tax rates 
than those chargeable to improvement values.^^ 
A building tax might be justified for supporting the greater part of 
the burden of fire protection or a sewer tax might be added to the water 
bill in terms of flow accomodation received." 
Moreover, considerable portion of local government activity di-
rectly benefits property in a sense that if these services are not provided 
by urban local bodies, the property owners would have to provide them-
selves, because these services are so vital and urgent that in their absence 
no civilised life can be imagined.'* 
It may be that the benefits fi-om these services are not necessarily in 
proportion to the value of property but it can be roughly presumed to be so. 
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In this situation, two important conditions of Benefit theory are 
fulfilled. First it is that the benefit is to a large extent measured; because 
so long as the expenditures made are kept at such levels that the burden 
of the tax is in close promixity to incomes, no serious inequality would 
be apprehended, as for as economic effect of this tax with regard to the 
business firms is concerned, it is all the more advantageous.^^ 
Optimum allocation of resources in the economy requires that the 
cost to society of rendering the services should also appear as costs to 
the business firms which are responsible for the need to them and thus 
enter into the prices of the finished product.'*' 
Suppose that a new factory is built. It will immediately require 
some of the essential amenities like the new streets, road lights, garbage 
collection, provision for water and additional fire and police protection. 
If these services are not provided by the urban municipal bodies, the 
factory would have to provide them at its own expense.'*' In that case the 
cost of these services become real cost of the society which arise out of 
the particular business activity. Thus the assessment of the charges 
against the firm or the factory is perfectly justified in terms of the best 
use of the resources.''^. 
There are certain other services provided by the urban local bodies 
which indirectly influence the value of the urban real estate. Induced in 
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these are the maintenance of schools, playgrounds, parks, hospitals 
libraries, and such other services. To some extent a correlation between 
property values and government services does, of course, exist. If these 
services are withdrawn, it would definitely reduce the value of urban 
property in that case urban property becomes less desirable and its value 
in the market would tend to fall abruptly. In order to prevent the reduction 
of value of the urban real estate, the property owners would have to 
establish these services on private basis^^ It is, of course, obvious that 
these municipal services are not the only factors which determine value, 
there are certain other factors like business conditions, age of structure 
etc. But municipal services are undoubtedly the very dominant factor and 
on the basis of this correlation between the value of the unit and munic-
ipal services, benefit principle of property taxation is justified. 
This sort of correlation is possible if other things remained equal 
but things generally do not remain equal. Consequently it becomes very 
difficult to measure directly the benefits of government services to 
property. But it can be argued that benefit could be measured 
indirectly by using the cost of services, that is, by defining cost and 
services as equal."'' 
The benefit principle is more applicable in local taxation. The 
main function of the urban local bodies is to provide civic amenities and 
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the principle that the cost should be distributed among consumers of the 
amenities-according to the satisfaction they have derivaed, seems very 
convenient for municipal taxation"* .^ Erik lindahl has expounded a model 
where revenue expenditure process for the satisfaction of social wants is 
determined by a competitive process similar to that in a private market. 
Assuming two tax payers, the equilibrium output and relative cost shares 
are determined at the inter-section of their respective demand relating 
different units or amounts of social goods to the cost share they are 
willing to bear. The demand schedule of one tax payer becomes the supply 
schedule for the other. With a large number of tax payers, only the 
mechanical difficulty of determining expenditures and tax shares is 
increased but the argument is not affected. Each tax payer must place his 
demand for each service. The government must solve for the equilibrium 
output for each of the social goods and realize or bill each citizen in 
accordance with his offer prices for these equilibrium outputs. This may 
be very well compared to a trial and error process of trading in the market, 
with continual reconstructing until an equilibrium is reached. Actually 
all this does not have to be repeated in case of every budget period, rather 
the process of choosing and providing for social goods is constant and 
only marginal adjustment need to be made from time to time."^ The voting 
behaviour of representatives brings about this outcome. But there are 
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serious difficulties with this model in both the partial and general 
equilibrium settings. If there are large numbers, preferences will not be 
revealed and if the numbers are small, the solution need not be optimal."*^ 
As regards the operational aspect of property tax in case of our 
country it is broadly of two types viz., general and special. Special levies 
also known as service taxes which are mainly based on quid-pro-quo 
principle. However, the benefit principle is relevant in so far as the 
benefits from the services rendered by the local bodies can be approxi-
mately identified. For instance, it is true to say that property value or 
rental is a fair indication of the several civic amenities enjoyed. Such a 
presumption can be applied in levying general rates like house tax, a 
general conservancy, a sanitary tax or a tax to meet the expenditure of 
fire brigade."*^ 
Regarding water, however, a special tax is desirable and this tax 
should be based not on the size of connection, but in proportion to the 
water consumed which is measured through meters. There are certain 
advantages associated with a general water tax based on rental value or a 
tax based on size of connection, there will always be dissatisfaction 
among consumers that they pay more than what they should. Conse-
quently, there will be a tendency to waste water provided they get enough 
water to waste and there is no way open to the local body to recover the 
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cost of entire water thus used. It is, therefore, desirable that water tax 
should be charged as special levy mainly with a view to prevent waste of 
water and thus satisfy the consumers of water at large in the locality.''^ 
The Benefit principle of property taxation is based upon the 
principle of compensation. Every property owner who pays property tax 
receives compensation in lieu thereof. In this connection the New York 
Court of Appeals aptly remarked, "A property tax for general purpose of 
the government is regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is 
obvious. It apportions the burden according to the benefit more clearly 
than any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives 
more benefit from taxation in the protection and improvement of his 
property than a poor man and ought therefore to pay more"^''. Thus, every 
species of taxation is based upon an idea of advantage, benefit or compen-
sation. If any tax is at variance with the idea of benefit, it would be grossly 
unjust and thoroughly unprincipled. 
The supreme court of Michigan declares "Taxation not based upon 
any idea of benefit to the person taxed, would be grossly unjust, tyranni-
cal and oppressive and might well be characterised as public robbery"^^ 
This inverse correlation between benefits and taxes clearly shows 
that the present day theory of property taxation is distinctly different 
from the benefit principle. Property taxation is now-a-day s hard to define 
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on the basis of ability to pay or the benefits received from the govern-
ment. Its persistence in tax system must be accounted for largely on 
grounds of expediency. The pronoimcementofthe Federal Court of America 
justifies the modem principle of expediency in the field of property taxation 
where it declares that "the district was a governmental body and could finance 
its governmental services through general taxation fi^om which appelant could 
receive as much benefit as does an aged or dying bachelor from the tax he 
pays for the education of school children. It is therefore, safe to con-
clude that the theory of property taxation in present time rests on no 
particular theory but on the fiscal necessity of government. 
Property Taxation ; What is Good and What is Bad About it 
As men and women of good will seek ways to improve the commu-
nities in which they live and for which, as members of the body politic 
they have ultimate governmental responsibility, the reform of property 
taxation deserves their attention-and action. Achievable reforms in this 
area can yield substantial results. We would like here to outline, perhaps 
all too briefly, some of these reforms which we consider the more 
importtant ones. For this discussion we shall assume that the aim of these 
reforms is to produce a tax instrument yielding about the same total 
revenue as is currently collected plus that derived from "normal" growth 
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in the tax base from new construction. 
To start with can we not agree that property taxation will continue 
as a major revenue source? 
At times in the last few years the casual observer having little 
knowledge of public finance and the options really open to politicians 
might have had some excuse for dreaming of drastic reductions in 
property taxation. Press summarises seemed to say that the courts were 
about to force sweeping change in school financing. Revenue sharing 
might pour even larger amounts of federal income tax revenue into local 
treasuries. State legislatures might step up their financing of local 
functions to reduce the pressure on property taxation. 
But as of mid-1973, what do we see? clearly, property taxation will 
continue as a source of substantial revenue. It will continue as an 
important element (direct and indirect) of family expenditure, as a 
significant item of cost for some businesses, and as an influential 
determinant of capital investment and land use. 
Note that in this listing of factors which make property taxation 
important I have included two distinguishable aspects-revenue and non-
revenue. We do so because the tax affects behaviour in ways beyond those 
involved in exacting funds. Individuals and businesses will take account 
of property taxes in decisions involving property and its use. In preparing 
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for the future, therefore, we would make a determined effort to reform 
property taxation into as good a revenue source as possible. States and 
localities that work intelligently, deliberately and courageously to struc-
ture property taxation to get the best nonrevenue effects and the least 
damaging ones can hope for generous rewards. 
This reform would build upon a vital difference in the two ele-
ments of the property tax base. Economically, the property tax is two 
markedly different levies : (1) a tax on land and (2) one on manmade 
capital - buildings, machinery, and the inventories of business. 
Property taxation comes in for lots of criticism in this period. 
These result largely from decisions about spending. Somehow, costs of 
government have risen so much that any means of paying for them would 
arouse objections. But property taxation has merits and strengths. Let us 
examine them. 
FAVOURABLE FEATURES 
1. Viability of Local Government 
The tax now helps to finance local activity, enough to make local 
government as meaningful and as viable as it remains. Cities, towns, 
countries, and school districts do at times fail to meet our aspirations for 
good government. And state and national government are also less than 
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perfect. So is the world of business and of non-profit, organizations. Be 
reality as it may, the use of localities, as distinguished from state and 
nation, to get some of the things we expect from collective (governmen-
tal, political) action has merit. 
Property taxation offers people in different localities an instru-
ment by which they can make truly local choices significant. People in 
one locality are not forestalled, inexorably, by the decisions of voters 
elsewhere. Who among us would want to limit his children to a level of 
education which might satisfy, say, a majority of voters in a state? This 
tax helps to provide freedom and opportunity to do things differently-
not to be held down to a level set by others who may live in areas 
which are quite different. 
2. Voter Influence on His Taxes-and Government Spending 
Either an increase in assessed valuation or a boost in the tax rate 
requires a positive act. Such tax-raising action can lead to more voter 
resistence than will an automatic rise in income tax from established 
rates which applying to growing income. Voters have an opportunity to 
relate (a) budget proposals which will require higher taxes, (b) to the 
desirability of more government spending. Is not the ability to reject 
more spending and taxes a desirable element of "the good society?" 
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3. Benefit and Justice 
The equity which we seek in public finance consists of various 
forms. One feature associates costs with benefits (in the making of 
decisions and in the results). Fairness of this type is evident as property 
taxation does adjust the payments for different quantities of services 
from one community to another to local burdens. 
Generally, the localities in which burdens are highest are those 
providing residents the most services. Here is an element of justice in a 
basic sense, a quid pro quo. Within communities the relation of benefits 
received per family to tax paid will be crude. Families with relatively 
large property holdings pay more tax than others who get equal services. 
Yet the intercommunity aspect commands respect. 
4. Fairness-Capturing Some of Socially Created Values ; 
"Unearned Increments" 
Socially created increments in property values are sometimes 
substantial. The Property tax can capture a portion for financing govern-
ment. Considerable property value increases (above general inflation) 
have appeared in the last two decades. Nationwide, land prices have risen 
substantially. 
In my view, more of the increment would better have gone to local 
government treasuries. Property taxation could capture more of values 
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due to (a) social growth and (b) local government spending for financing 
local services. Is this not almost the epitome of fairness in taxation? We 
shall say more about this potential-one which makes property taxation 
the very opposite of the customary assertion that it is the most unfair tax. 
To some extent, I submit, it can be a most fair tax. 
5. Equity - New Measures ("circuit Breakers") to Relieve 
(Some of) the Poor. 
With rapidity unusual in tax policy, states have enacted provisions 
for granting property tax relief for the aged poor and some other groups. 
Experience indicates that this one defect can be largely eliminated 
without undue loss of revenue. 
6. Good Results of Age 
"An old tax is a good tax" this is an ancient proverb, and it is not 
completely true, of course. Nevertheless, property taxation has worked 
its way through the economy, especially the portion represented by rates 
other than the most recent increases. Some elements have been capital-
ized, and other adjustments have been made as owners and users have 
taken the tax into account. Inequalities and crudities lose some of their 
sting as men adjust over the years. 
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7. Some of the Tax is No Real Burden 
Part of the tax is no current burden on the present owner or user. 
In many communities probably 15 to 20 percent of the property tax 
represents (a) tax on land values (b) at rates which have existed for such 
a long time that most present owners allowed for it in the price they paid. 
The annual payment of this portion constitutes no true burden on the user. 
Part of what the owner pays over to the local treasury each year 
does not really leave him worse off, compared with what would have been 
his situation if the tax had not applied when he bought the property. 
8. Administration and Compliance. 
To include administration under favourable features may seem at 
best an act of faith. Through much of the country property tax assessment 
continues to be shamefully bad. Yet good administration is achievable. 
And compliance burdens on taxpayers can average as very low. In combi-
nation they probably cost less per rupee of yeild than any alternative 
source of large revenue for state-local government. 
9. Revenue Yield 
Property taxes are the most important source of sub-national 
government revenue. 
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10. Resource Allocation - Good And Bad 
Property taxation exerts some forces for better resource alloca-
tion. But other allocation results of present taxes are undesirable. Before 
discussing them - and weaknesses generally-a vital point about the 
economic foundations should be repeated. 
Economically, the tax is two instruments. A long evolution has 
blended elements which in basic respects differ fundamentally. 
(1) Land has been created by nature. It is immobile. The quantity is largely 
fixed and will not rise or fall depending on the height of tax. Value 
depends upon forces other than cost of production (2) Manmade capital 
- buildings and machinery-must be created by labour and materials. The 
weight of tax will affect the quantity and quality of such capital to be 
expected in any locality. 
The economic distinction presents challenges to analysis, to 
statesmanship, to citizen leadership, and to public administration. One 
offers a positive opportunity for strengthing the finances of local 
government. The other promises relief from adverse non-revenue 
effects of taxes on manmade capital Needless excess burdens now 
impose quite unnecessary losses of well-being moreover, a reformed 
tax could exert pressure for higher and better land use, yielding 
positive advantages. In any case, some present defects result from 
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the failure of framers of our taxes to take account of the basic economic 
difference in the elements of the tax base. 
DEMERITS AND WEAKNESSES 
1. High Effective Tax Rates Affect (Distort) Behavionr 
Although property tax rates when expressed as percentages are 
usually small numbers, they apply to capital values, comparison with 
taxes on income or sales can be very deceiving. For example a 3 per cent 
property tax equals 33 per cent of the pre-tax net income- and 50 per cent 
of that after tax-from a property which yields 6 per cent to the owner. The 
tax frequently exceeds 25 per cent when expressed on the same basis as 
a retail sales tax. 
Any tax that brings in large revenues will alter behaviour and 
not just because people have less to spend and save. Individuals and 
businesses alter the ways they carry on their affairs to adjust to the tax. 
When rates of tax are high, and when differences in tax burdens are large 
(eg. from one area type of property, or activity to another), the non-
revenue results can be substantial. Economic distortion can be produced 
by the affects. 
2. Ineguilities ; Elements of Unfairness. 
As ultimately shifted, is the tax (or are the taxes, for we insist that 
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economically "the" property tax is two (levies) fair? 
Critics say that the property tax runs counter to the concept of 
fairness by burdening low-income groups more heavily in relation to 
income than those with larger incomes. (Families with higher incomes, 
of course, do pay very much more than those with less) A regressive 
element does exist. However, if as much as half of the tax on business 
utility and rental residential property is assumed to remain on the 
supplier of capital-only half being shifted to the consumer-then picture 
is one of substantial inequality against the middle and upper income 
groups. Yet there is regressivity, and it is generally believed to conflict 
with vertical equity. Nevertheless, for the families with incomes cover-
ing most of the population in a community, the property tax is probably 
roughly proportional with income. But our firm knowledge is inadequate. 
Still another criticism lies in "horizontal inequity : Taxpayers in 
about the same circumstances do not receive essentially similar tax 
treatment. Where this criticism is valid, the chief culprit is the poor 
quality of assessment and review. 
3. Perverse Character of Burden in Relation to 
Costs of Government 
New well constructed, high quality buildings are taxed more 
heavily per unit of space than are slums and junk. Is it not stupid for 
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society to decree that if a family or a company supplies more and better 
capital facilities it must also pay more toward the costs of government? 
can justification for such burden discrimination be found in the cost 
differences which the two types of property impose on local government 
(per unit of occupied space or machine used)? Most probably, no. The 
badly run-down and less heavily taxed buildings are more likely to be 
associated with the greater costs per unit of usable interior space. 
4. New for Obsolete ; Obstacles to urban Renewal. 
Cities which need to replace obsolete, decayed, degrading build-
ings nevertheless put tax impediments in the way of progress. No one 
tried deliberately to base local finance on a tax that would favour holding 
on to the decrepit structures while penalizing the new. Nobody planned to 
set up a tax system to discourage improving productive facilities. 
The persons who wishes to shift from poorer to better quality 
housing, or business property can not do so without also paying 
more toward the costs of government. Is this not both irrational and 
self-defeating? 
5. Maintenance versus Deterioration. 
The tax on buildings discourages maintenance and modernization. 
Partly because of the realities of assessments as made, and partly 
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because of what people believe the assessor long somewhat. Whatever 
the amount of such retardation, it represents on unfortunate result. 
6. Inducement to Smaller Structures Sacrifice of 
Potential Benefit 
The property tax on buildings produces a rarely recognized effect 
which imposes what economists call excess burden. 
The expense per cubic foot of construction decline as the size of 
the house, office, display area, apartment, or other unit increases (within 
varying limits). In terms of one of the major things generally desired-
cubic contents-unit cost drops as room size increases. Content rises 
more than proportionately to floor, wall and ceiling area. Moreover, 
much the same plumbing, wiring, kitchen, heating, and other facilities can 
serve larger as well as smaller rooms and buildings through a range of 
sizes. The general public welfare can be served best (within a range) by 
the construction of rooms, houses, and buildings of larger as opposed to 
smaller, size. Resource allocation in the economic sense will be more 
effecient when labour and raw material go into more commodious or less 
cramped housing, office, and other use. 
Not observably from one year to the next but unobtrusively and 
mixed with many changes, the property tax on buildings will lead to the 
construction of rooms, apartments and buildings somewhat smaller than 
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would be built in the absence of tax. The public unknowingly deprives 
itself of opportunity to exploit fully the potential benefits from the "law 
of the cube". 
7. Tax Islands and Central City Difficulties 
This and the next criticism apply to local taxation and not in any 
necessary sense to property taxation as such (applied on a wide scale). 
Tax rates much above average in one locality will reinforce incentives for 
creating "Islands" ofrelatively low tax rates nearby. Among the indepen-
dent governments in a general area a few with tax bases which are much 
above average in relation to service obligations can get by with lower 
rates. They can attract capital for new structures and become low-tax 
enclaves. Per unit of output or sales, businesses operating there incur 
below-average property tax. 
The actual extent of this force may have been quite exaggerated in 
the literature. But some communities, perhaps by the use of zoning power 
and building codes, are able to exclude types of property associated with 
high governmental expense. 
As regards buildings, not land, lower tax rates here and there on the 
fringe of an urban area encourage dispersal and the development "far 
out" of activities, including housing, which in a full economic sense 
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"ought" not to be so distant. Property nearer. The center will be subject 
to high tax rates, and unless the services provided improve each increase 
in tax rate will reduce the value of the property and the tax base. The land 
can not leave. Improvements can, and will, shift location. 
Tax differences can aggravate the troubles as (effective) city 
rates rise, due in some cases to lag in downward assessments. The 
self-reinforcing destructive process may be scarcely perceptible from 
one election to another yet over the years cumulative harm will mount. 
As applied to structures (not to land) this pattern of taxation 
arbitrarily favours horizontal over vertical growth in metropolitan areas. 
The resulting land use then imposes higher costs on the whole society. 
These higher costs appear in the time and money cost of traveling greater 
distances from home to work and for recreation and perhaps schooling, 
higher expense of supplying water, sewer, and utility services farther 
from central locations; and reduction in the economic and social benefits 
from population concentration. 
8. Localization of large units of Business Property 
Small taxing districts sometimes contain concentrations of busi-
ness buildings, machinery, and inventory. Local residents can, in fact, get 
some of the cost of services paid for by outsiders-consumers and 
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suppliers of capital, depending upon the ultimate incidence of the tax on 
manmade capital. The results, it seems to me, can be inexcusable inequi-
table. Reform lies within our power without reducing the use of this 
revenue source. 
9. Property tax as a Business Tax 
As the property tax falls on business it affects decisions about 
when, where, how much, and in what forms to operate and to invest in 
productive facilities. The influences that grow out of property tax con-
siderations will rarely help companies grow or to produce more effi-
ciently. In general, tax-created additions to business operating expense 
are undesirable. Businesses are overwhelmingly the source of income 
and product. They provide most of our jobs. In taxes, however, businesses 
encounter impediments-costs for which there are usually no identifiable 
aids to production. 
The significance of property tax for business will depend in part 
upon the relation between the tax and the governmental services provided 
for business as such. Some companies, of course, are firmly attached to 
a location eg. those providing a local service. They will not leave if the 
tax rate goes up, but their growth or decline will be affected. Firms which 
deal in highly competitive markets can not afford to incur avoidable 
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costs which do not, in return, either yield a saleble output or reduce 
other costs. 
Each rise in property tax on structures and machinery useless 
matched by improvements in local services to business as such will tend 
to reduce the business use of manmade capital. The amount of production 
in the locality will fall below what would otherwise be the case, perhaps 
not observably, or grow more slowly than otherwise. 
10. Pressures for "Socialization" and Exemptions 
High Property tax rates stimulate somewhat the expansion of the 
scope of governmental activity by giving misleading signals of the 
relative desirability of governmental as compared with private, owner-
ship eg. public housing and governmental ownership of utilities. 
Property tax exemptions have properly been getting attention. The 
higher the tax rates the greater the incentives for some groups to 
press for exemptions. 
Problems of Property Taxation 
Of all the problems of property taxation, the problem of assess-
ment is most vital and at the same time a highly complicated affair. 
Property assessment consists opf three basic functions : (a) the discov-
ery, (b) the recording, and (c) the valuation of the property. ^ ^ 
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Problem of Choosing the Base of Property Taxation 
In most countries of the world where the system of local govern-
ment has for its main source of finance the proceeds of a property tax, the 
existing basis of the tax is being questioned. In the United States of 
America where the basis of taxation is the capital value of both land and 
building, there is interest in and investigation of the site value method' as 
an alternative. In Great Britain where the local government taxing base is 
annual rental value of property, there is an active consideration for 
capital value as an alternative base of taxation. In New Zealand too, there 
has been a questioning of the basis on which local government taxation 
is levied but unlike the United States and Britain, its legislation has 
provided for three alternative systems on which the real property tax or 
rates in Newzealand terminology may be levied. These systems are (a) 
capital value, (b) unimproved value, and (c) annual rental value. ^ ^ Simi-
larly in other countries also, there is a serious search for a suitable base 
of taxation of all the different bases, annual rental and capital value base 
are most popular. 
Administrative Problems of Property Taxation 
Of all the important taxes of the world, property taxation is the 
most poorly administered. Consequently, there is not only loss in poten-
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tial revenue but it also breeds gross inequality in the distribution of 
burden. This defect in administration arises due to two reasons. 
(1) The first is that the defect is partly inherent in the tax arising out 
of the use of a base which does not involve a market transaction and 
therefore requires administrative discovery of the taxable items 
and establishement of value figures. In addition to this there is also 
the failure to establish suitable administrative organisation and 
procedure for the purpose. 
(2) Secondly, the assessment of property is often highly unsatisfac-
tory with a wide range of variation in the ratio of assessed values 
to reasonsable appraisal figures. A number of studies have been 
made of the assessment patterns, frequently by comparing as-
sessed values with actual sale prices of property sold during the 
year; university, they have shown a wide variation in the ratios. One 
of the most complete studies was made in conjunction with the 
1957 census ofgovernment.^'^Forthe purpose of measuring varia-
tion, a co-efficient of dispersion was developed, this is the per-
centage which the average of the deviations from the Indian ratio 
of the assessment ratios of properties sold during the periods 
bears to the Indian ratio. Only eight percent of the cases studied 
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had co-efficients under 15,and over halfhad figures overSO; l/6th 
had figures in excess of 50 percent". 
Property Taxation Exemption 
There are several possibilities for improving the quality of the 
property tax, one of them is of granting exemption to certain forms of 
property. The theory behind the property tax exemption is that some types 
of property have special characteristics which make it socially advanta-
geous to exclude them from taxation. There are many justifications 
offered for exemptions. These include economic, social, political, ethi-
cal and administrative aspects.^^ 
Problem of Delinqnencv of Collection 
Property tax delinquency is another grave problem. The extent of 
delinquency may sometimes be measure of administrative efficiency. 
The main reasons responsible for widespread delinquencies are 
economic distress, poor administration, loose legislation, excessive 
burden on the property, intentional delinquency and negligent delinquen-
cies. A good deal can be said about all these causes, but it will be better 
if their problems are analysed and up-to-date methods are sought for 
their prevention. 
If the amount of delinquencies accumulates to gigantic propor-
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tions, it raises serious fiscal problems for the local units of government. 
Consequently, essential city services curtailed, salaries are reduced or 
unpaid, workers are retrenched, and the functions of local units of 
government are severely impaired. Because of delinquencies the burden 
on tax paying properties becomes progressively heavier. Not only this, 
pyramiding of burdens upon the tax paying land drives successively the 
less able tax payers into delinquency. Thus the effective tax base shrinks 
more and more." Naturally, it becomes difficult to enforce collection. 
Nonpayment of taxes will eventually force the tax authorities to proceed 
against the property. This may take the form of offering the taxes for sale 
at public auction. When the delinquent property is posed in the market for 
sale, it would further shatter real estate markets for many communities. 
In such a period of economic distress, very few buyers with ready cash are 
available. Usually only the better properties are picked up on tax sale and 
the remainder still continue delinquent. 
In view of the seriousness of this problem it is essential to bring 
drastic improvement. More efficient administration would lessen short 
term delinquency and would prevent its prolongation into long term 
delinquency. Existing law, machinery and procedure seem to be inadquate. 
Merely putting teeth in delinquency under control, although this will 
help. At first, it is desirable to educate the public in order to appreciate 
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the gravity of the problems. If avoidable delinquency is brought under 
control by more effective tax administration and other methods, much of 
the long term delinquency will be prevented. 
The Classification of Property 
Classified property taxes are a deliberate departure from the 
theory of general property tax and are an open confession of its inadquacies 
and unequal distribution of tax burden. ^ ^ 
In early days it was believed that since properties were homoge-
neous in nature, the taxes should be imposed uniformly. But with the rapid 
growth of the economic system, old beliefs were belied and economic 
characteristics of the property differ widely. These differences have in 
turn made attempts at uniform taxation not only inequitable but also 
impracticable. The main objects of the classification of property are to 
give considerations to different types of property, to promote greater 
administrative expediency through diminishing evasion, to promote com-
plete assessment and obtain more revenues, to create greater equity 
through better adjustment of the tax to the earning power of the property 
and the ability to pay of the owners and to encourage desirable economic 
efforts as for example, giving special classification and tax treatment to 
improvements and residential property.^^ Classified property taxation is 
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a major step towards toning up the administration of the property tax. 
Our main concern is to analyse the classified property taxation in 
the field of Urban real estate. In this context Spengler's suggestion is 
quite remarkable - while different forms of tangible and intangible 
property have been classified in great detail and the real estate has been 
differentiated into timber, mining, agriculture and town plots, little 
progress has been made thus far in the extension of the idea of classifi-
cation to Urban land use. In the direction of progressive Urban planning 
and local tax reform, sound principles of land use classification should 
be developed so that social aims and tax policy might go hand in hand. 
This would go far towards the elimination of unwise 'hit' or miss methods 
of granting subsidies through tax exemption, and substitute therefore a 
carefully worked out plan of graduated burdens based upon economic and 
social considerations.^" 
Property Taxes ; Emerging Issues and Changing Perspectives 
The role of taxes on immovable property in financing lower levels 
of government is being reviewed in many of the developed and developing 
countries. In most countries with these taxes a major effort has been 
made to improve their administration. 
One reason for this upsurge of interest is that the relationship 
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between central, regional and local governments is changing. Some 
governments are committed to decentralising expenditure and revenue 
functions; many countries have recently implemented major reforms to 
the way in which local government is financed. In very next chapter, we 
will discuss two important issues. The first is the different ways in which 
land and buildings are taxed and the need for more coordination. The 
second issue is the very broad question of how governments can improve 
taxpayers perception of property and other taxes by improving the "ser-
vice" that the tax administration provides to the taxpayer. 
Property tax reforms in India are a very complex legal and proce-
dural issue. With rising demand for urban services, there is no choice but 
to raise more local resources. Therefore, a major reform in the property 
tax system is long overdue. However, without major amendments to rent 
control act not much change can be implemented. Rent control Act 
should be so amended that property markets can function more effec-
tively.^^ Along with these changes, establishment of a more objective 
method of assessment would aid in the property tax system. The proposed 
system based on area, use and zonal rates could be one of the alternatives 
for the present method. Lessons from experience of the case study in 
India are perhaps true for various other cities in the developing countries. 
All of the mediterranian countries are now committed to placing 
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greater reliance on property taxes, though a few countries, notably the 
united kingdom, intend to phase out domistic property taxes. In most 
countries with these taxes a major effort has been made to improve their 
administration. 
One reason for this upsurge of interest is that the relationship 
between central, regional and local governments is changing. Some 
governments are committed to decentralising expenditure and revenue 
functions many countries have recently implemented (e.g., Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain) major reforms to the way in which local 
government is financed. 
Current Trends in the Use of Property Taxes 
A number of European Countries have recently reviewed the role 
of the property tax in financing local government. In some cases, this has 
been in the context of a policy to decentralise government expenditures 
and revenues. In other cases, it has been part of a wider review of property 
taxes. Some governments have decided to reinforce the role of the 
property tax, whilst others have eliminated them. 
In most countries, the relative yield for these taxes has declined, 
though in some (eg. Netherlands and New Zealand) they have increased. 
There has also been a tendency to shift the burden from households to 
companies. 
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A number of European Countries have recently reviewed their 
methods of financing local governments and concluded that property 
taxes should be eliminated or substantially reduced. Thus, the United 
Kingdom is now committed to replacing the local property tax by a poll 
tax which will take the form of a fixed levy for each adult in a household. 
Ireland abandoned its property tax onresidential property in 1978, 
mainly because of criticisms of the fairness of the tax (rural areas 
contributed very little and valuations were very much out of date the last 
full scale valuation took place in 1850). Nevertheless, the need for a viable 
local tax source led the government to introduce in 1983 a new residential 
property tax which took the form of a tax on imputed income from residential 
property. A major review of local finance is currently under review. 
Some of Swiss cantons (e.g. Zurich) decided in the early 1980s to 
abolish the property tax. The main reasons given were that these taxes 
were very costly to administer in relation to the yield, which tended to be 
small in comparison to other cantonal taxes. 
It is of interest to note that countries where property taxes have 
been abandoned are usually countries which have not achieved regular 
revaluation of property values. 
A second group of countries has decided to introduce new prop-
erty taxes or to substantially modify existing taxes on immovable prop-
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erty. In almost all cases, this has been part of a policy of devolution. Thus 
Spain has now completed its goal of decentralising many expenditure and 
revenue functions to newly established regional governments. As part of 
this process, the methods of valuing properties were reviewed and local 
authorities given greater autonomy over the tax rate. Regional govern-
ments were given a share of VAT and an attempt was made to provide local 
authorities with a share of income taxes. Portugal is also reviewing its 
local finance system and, it appears that modernised system of property 
taxation will become the main source of financing local governments. 
The new tax will be based upon the capital value of properties determined 
on the basis of updated cadastral values. Greece is also in the process of 
decentralising and it appears that taxes on property will become the main 
source of finance for local government, though it is unclear whether the 
base and rate will be centrally determined. 
Main Issues in Urban Property Taxation 
In principle, property taxation is an ideal way to finance many 
urban services. The property tax base, that is, the value of urban real 
estate, grows rapidly with urbanization and can be objectively assessed; 
it reflects the value of many urban services to the extent that they provide 
site-or area-specific benefits; and ownership of real estate tends to be 
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more concentrated than the distribution of income, thus making the tax 
generally progressive. Moreover, if properly administrered, a property 
tax will result in only minor distortions in the allocation of resources. 
Finally, it can be argued that property taxes are most appropriately 
administered at the local level, because local government will have a 
better knowledge base for assessing property values and a greater moti-
vation for collecting the property tax than do higher-level governments. 
The property tax is the most common and generally the most 
important of the taxes collected by urban governments in developing 
countries like India. However, urban property tax revenue have generally 
not kept pace with the growth of urban incomes or property values, and 
often note even with the growth in urban population. Urban property tax 
systems vary widely among developing countries, but the systems seem 
to suffer from a number of common problems : assessment practices are 
inadequate, professional expertise for valuing urban properties is in 
short supply, the necessary data base to support assessment and enforce-
ment is not in place, collection and enforcement problems abound, and 
taxpayer resistance is a universal obstacle to more effective property tax 
administration. Some of these problems can be attributed to the limited 
technical and administrative capabilities of urban governments. Just as 
important, however, are a number of other factors : landownership and 
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tenure conditions are often uncertain; higher-level governments inter-
fere with, or limit the use of, property taxes (for example, through the 
imposition of rent control or limits on tax rates); and higher effective tax 
rates on urban property are often successfully opposed. 
Notwithstanding these practical obstacles, the urban property tax 
is clearly among the few main sources of local public revenue that can 
carry a significant share of the financing requirements for urban expen-
diture. Substantial efforts and ingenuity, however, are required to mobi-
lize the technical and administrative resources to develop accurate urban 
property registration and property tax valuation rolls, to update them at 
regular intervals, and to bill and collect property taxes effectively. In 
order to be politically acceptable, these improvements must be intro-
duced gradually and fairly, and they need to be linked with a major effort 
to educate the public about the relationships between the provision of 
essential urban services and the collection of the property tax. 
Problems of Property Tax in India 
Property tax, unfortunately, has not been fully utilised partly 
because the existing system of valuation of property for assessment is 
extemely unsatisfactory and partly because enforcement of collection of 
even the partly assessed tax has been very slow; in some cases, the 
property tax for assessment purposes is wilfully under-valued while in 
CHilPTCR - 1 62 
Other cases, the locally elected councillors by their training and experi-
ence are unable to cope with the complicated problems of valuation or 
property. This is very sad commentary upon the unsatisfactory state of 
the system of property tax assessment, and collection in India. 
Problem of Valuation 
The first major problem in administering the property taxes is the 
determination of the rateable values. This is difficult task and poses 
various problems for the assessment administration. The most serious 
objection to real estate is the use of out-of-date valuation. This is partly 
due to the limited financial resources of the local bodies particularly 
where their jurisdictions are small. 
In India most of the municipalities are too poor to employ well 
qualified and well paid men for the purpose. Generally the task of 
valuation is performed by the revenue officers lent by the state govern-
ment during the early years of the introduction of local government, but 
that practice as pointed by Taxation Enquiry Commission has been 
rendered ineffective." 
Problem of Collecting Property Taxes in India 
Assessment by itself does not serve any useful purpose unless the 
taxes which are levied are also promptly collected. Lady Hicks is quite 
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justified when she says that "even when the hurdles of valuation and 
assessment have been safely crossed, there remains the trouble of 
collection.^^ 
In India, unfortunately, the tax machinery employed for collection 
of taxes is inefficient and inadquate for the purpose and as a result heavy 
arrears are accumelating every year. Apart from this, there is a lack of 
effective enforcement of coercive methods as prescribed under the 
Municipal Acts. In many cases tax collectors have not been discharging 
their duties effectively and cases of large scale embezzlement of tax 
revenues collected by the tax collectors have also affected adversely the 
municipal finances and these are referred to extensively in the Audit 
Reports of the Municipal Bodies. There have also been taking place large 
scale remissions of tax revenues without sufficient reasons and these 
were being done by municipal commissioners in utter disregard of their 
adverse effect on the municipal finances. Thus, due to the lack of 
promptness in collection of revenues, large arrears have been accumulat-
ing and in many cases they have become time-barred involving huge 
financial loss to the municipal authorities concerned. 
Problem of Rate Structure of Property Tax in India 
Another controversial point centres round the rate structure of 
this tax. We have already seen that in most cases in India, property taxd 
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is imposed at a flat rate and hence incidence is predominantly regressive. 
There are, however, some instances in which property taxes are 
levied at progressive rates. They are mainly Calcutta, Poona and Madras 
City Corporations. In Calcutta, the rate of levy varies from 15 to 17 
percent under section 165 read with section 166 of the Calcutta Munici-
pality Act. The local Finance Enquiry Committee was generally in favour 
of a progressive rate to be imposed at the discretion of the municipality 
concerned.*'* 
The reasoning of the Taxation Enquiry Commission that high 
exemption limit caused due to the introduction of progression will entail 
substantial loss of revenue might be correct in case of smaller local 
bodies but not in case of bigger municipalities and gaint corporations. 
The Taxation Enquiry Commission has also agreed in its conclusive 
remarks that an element of progression in rates may be adopted by bigger 
municipalities and municipal corporations. But special care should be 
taken to keep the total exemptions within limit and the minimum rate 
should be adequately high. In addition to this corrective shouldbe pro-
vided to prevent the imposition of high rates on industrial housing, 
cooperative housing etc.*^ 
Another hurdle in the way of making the rate structure progressive 
is consessional rate beyond a certain limit of income. This provision 
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tends to introduce further element of regression. 
It can thus, be concluded that in a growing economy for effecting 
a more equitable distribution of wealth and for larger resource 
mobilisation, the introduction of progression into property tax at the 
municipal level appears to be highly desirable. In this connection the idea 
of classified property tax, is of paramount importance. The grant munici-
pal corporation of India can very well adopt the scheme of classified 
property taxation and thus can have a diversified tax structure. This is, of 
course, not a novel scheme for our country. 
But, in the absence of specific instructions and principles, the 
municipal authorities exercise a good deal of discreation in determining 
the rateable values of self-occupied properties. The exercise of this 
unfettered discretion can lead to the distribution of favours which is not 
a healthy practice so far as the revenue collecting departments of the 
municipal bodies are concerned.^^ 
One of the serious defects of the local rate is that it lacks the 
quality of built-in-flexibility as a result of which the revenue from it does 
not grow with the growth of income. It is very necessary to make this tax 
flexible specially for two reasons. Firstly, a flexible tax system acts as an 
automatic stabliser in a developing economy and secondly, it accelerates 
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the process of mobilising resources for financing local developmental 
projects. 
This work of mine has examined a wide range of issues and rather 
than attempt to summarise them, it seems more useful to list a number of 
questions which could be usefully addressed : 
* What is the feasibility and desirability of having a consistent and 
coordinated approach to the valuation of immovable property for 
all tax purposes ? 
* Should the tax base used for all taxes on immovable property be 
market value and how should this be calculated (eg. capital versus 
rental values) ? 
* Is it useful to separate out questions of valuation, assessment, 
control and collection of property taxes. Or should all (most) of 
these functions be carried out by the same level of functions ? 
* How can one overcome the conflit between the need for local 
property taxes to be fully visible and the fact that this visibility 
makes property tax systems very prone to criticism ? 
* What measures are to be undertaken to improve relations between 
property taxpayers and the tax administrations ? 
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Data Sources 
Our study is based exclusively on secondary data. Data for the 
sample states were collected from the state-level municipal director-
ates. This set of data represents state aggregates which comprise aggre-
gate revenue and expenditure, tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grants in 
respect of all municipal bodies in the respective municipal bodies in the 
respective states. For a few states, namely Kerala, Karnataka and Madhya 
Pradesh, local government share in state taxes is also available. One 
major problem with this set of data is that states which do not report 
shared taxes separately club them with tax revenue or grants. 
The second source of data is Annual Statistical Abstracts of the 
central statistical organisation. This source reports data in respect of 
selected municipal corporations under the following heads : tax revenue 
service charges, non-tax revenue with grants. Here again shared tax is 
either aggregated with tax revenue or grants. The third source of informa-
tion is various reports by the National Institute of Urban Aggairs. These 
reports is the single source of information that gives most disaggregated 
data on property tax. Data are available in aggregate terms for individual 
states which are further disaggregated into municipal corporations and 
municipalities. The fourth source is individual state government budgets, 
which provide data on local share in state taxes and compensation and 
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assignments to local bodies. A comparative picture of the latter data is 
also reproduced in Combined Finance Accounts, an annual publication of 
the office of the comptroller and Auditor General; Indian Economic 
Statistics - Part II Public Finance, published by the ministry of Finance 
and Reserve Bank of India monthly bulletins. For data on individual 
municipal corporations, their annual budgets and administration reports 
constituted the major data source. 
Depending on the availability of data, comparable data have been 
prepared in three forms state aggregates, aggregates of municipal corpo-
rations and aggregates of municipalities. 
For international comparative study, the data are drawn from many 
different sources. The most important, we relied on World Bank 
decuments. We added to this the results of a number of case studies 
carried out by World Bank. We also benefited from the results of a 
number of cross-country analyses done both inside and outside the World 
Bank. World Bank documents include economic reports, background 
papers for loan negotiations, appraisals, and so forth. Because these are 
official documents of the Bank, they may not be cited-even though the 
data they draw on are a matter of public record. The source notes for data 
from these documents thus simply read "World Bank data". 
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Scope, Method, and Limitations 
Unfortunately, there is a shortage of good secondary data; a com-
pendium of local government finances in developing countries does not 
exist. The newcomer to this area of analysis might expect that one of the 
international agencies would have begun to gather such data by now, at 
least for the World's Largest Cities. This guess would be incorrect. The 
best comparable data on international public finance are in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's Government Finance statistics year book, but this 
source reports only aggregate, nation wide data from state and local 
governments. Even in this source, aggregate statistics for subnational 
governments are not presented for many countries and are incomplete for 
others. Neither the United Nations nor the World Bank gathers compa-
rable data on local public finance. 
Case studies of various cities carried out under a variety of 
auspices, using different methodologies, covering different years, but 
asking similar questions - provide the other basic source of information. 
The statistics in these studies suffer from some lack of comparability, 
and the supporting details on fiscal operations are not always available 
still, when carefully used they can add significantly to what we know. 
There are also important caveats. Some of the data are not compa-
rable in form, different years are used in the comparisons, much of the 
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information is dated, and the sample of cities is not random. We have 
tried to remedy some of these problems by updating the information 
where possible and by augmenting the sample where particular types of 
cities seem under represented. 
This work also is limited by what we have chosen to study. Many 
important subjects - budgeting, financial accounting, personnel manage-
ment, interval organisation, political structure - are not covered. We also 
say for too little about the urban economic base which underlies the 
potentialities of the property tax studied here. 
Scheme of the Study 
This study has been divided into seven chapters. 
1. Analytical Framework and Basic Issues: An attempt has been made 
to analyse the theoretical aspects of the property tax. Besides, possibil-
ity of optimal property tax structure explored, a discussion about emerg-
ing issues and changing perspectives, current trends in use of property 
tax and pin pointing main issues in urban property taxation in India. 
2. Performance of property taxation in India : This chapter is major 
chapter of this work as it includes : property taxation in the tax structure 
of urban local bodies in India, relative position of property tax in 
different states, growth of the tax potentials of growth of the tax poten-
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tials of the property tax, per capita revenue, total tax revenue and property 
tax revenue in major municipal corporations; growth rate of property tax 
in major municipal corporations. Buoyancy and elasticity of property tax 
and revenue importance of property taxes in generating revenue to 
finance Urban Public services in India vis—a-vis other cities of devel-
oped and developing nations. 
3. Rate structure : This chapter deals with the problems of rate 
structure. In view of the operational difficulties in a taK-price charging 
system of a combined basic tax with a number of service taxes, possibil-
ity of a family of property tax systems for various categories of proper-
ties having different base-rate structures coupled with an adequate sys-
tem of user charges for urban services explored. Further, standardisation 
of property tax rates among various size-categories of municipalities 
considered. And finally possibility of intra - state equalisation of 
rate structure and distributive effects of rate structrure and 
administration studies. 
4. Alternative basis of property taxation : This chapter surveys the 
whole problems of alternative basis. Erosion in the base and legal 
interpretation of the base studied. Further, site value taxation, area detail 
system and area based scheme Vs annual rental value approach studied at 
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length. And finally a review of Rent Control Laws and reforming the 
annual rental value system discussed. 
5. Valuation of the property: Valuation practices in property taxation 
are major concern. Detail examination of the legal problems of valuation 
has been done. A detail analysis of the existing administrative procedure 
of valuation and assessment and a discussion on the organisational 
aspects of a central valuation agency. This chapter underlines the 
difficulties in determining the structure and functioning of a central 
valuation agency. 
6. Property Tax Administration: This chapter examines the adminis-
tration of tax collection and makes specific suggestions for improve-
ment. An analysis of experience in Delhi of an attempt to mechanise its 
property tax administration. This chapter focusses on steps to be taken 
for tax management improvement. And finally, what can be done for 
improving taxpayer's perceptions and relations between the taxpayer and 
the administration, has been answered. 
7. Conclusion : obviously this is the last chapter in which a sort of 
summary of work done has been made. Further, suggestions has been 
given to reconstruct the property taxation in India. 
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PERFORMANCE OF PROPERTY TAXATION IN INDIA 
The Importance of Property Taxation 
The importance of the property tax as a source of Financing is 
often over looked because fiscal analysis usually focuses on central 
government finances. For example, Chelliah (1971) reported that 
the average ratio of property and wealth tax revenues to gross 
domestic product (GDP) among fifty-two developing countries was less 
than 1 percent. More than a decade later, Tanzi (1987) reported that 
property taxes on Land and buildings accounted for more than 0.2 
percent of GDP and 1.2 percent of total tax revenues in Forty-nine 
developing countries. According to this analysis, the property tax is 
neither an important nor a growing component of aggregate revenue 
mobilization in developing countries. 
A reasonable hypothesis, again supported by data, is that the 
property tax had a difficult time of it in the 1980's. This was attributable 
to several factors : (a) the financing pressures on Local Governments, 
which forced the search for new revenue sources, (b) the inelastic 
response of property tax revenues to income growth and inflation, (c) 
Legal, and administrative difficulties associated with increasing proper-
ty tax revenues through discretionary actions, and (d) the special diffi-
culties posed by high rates of inflation. The Last two factors may be 
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particularly important since discretionary changes in sales tax rates and 
some user charges are less visible than changes in the property tax and 
are, therefore, politically more feasible. 
Does the Property Tax Generate Adequate Revenue ? 
The property tax, it is alleged, does not generate enough revenue 
to satisfy public expenditure demands at any given point in time, nor does 
it grow as rapidly as do expenditure requirements. This problem is more 
forceful in cities which do not have recourse to other taxes or where inter 
governmental transfers play an important role in social finances. To 
examine the adequancy of revenue, we make cross-city comparisons of 
the level of property tax effort and of the income-elasticity of the 
property tax comparisons of property tax effort as a first approximation 
to whether there is room to raise additional revenues through discretion-
ary actions. An analysis of the elasticity of the property tax in various 
cities may also identify international norms, as well as suggest possibili-
ties for improving the responsiveness of the tax to income and population 
growth in the Local areas. 
Importance of Property Taxation as a Revenue Source 
The ratio of property tax collection to total local (national) 
revenue shows the degree of importance attached to this tax. For 
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example, in India where the property tax was introduced in 1793, the 
average ratio was 57. From 1966 to 1990. The republic of China (Taiwan) 
was another country which relied heavily on the property tax. The average 
ratio was 44.4 per cent from 1968 to 1970. Which reduced to 30 per cent 
a decade ago. In Japan, there has been a decline in the average ratio of 
collections from this tax to total revenues. A decade ago, collections 
accounted for 22 percent, from 1968 to 1970, the ratio was only 15.6 per 
cent. In Philipines the ratio was 18.6 per cent from 1970 to 1972. The 
ratio was 17.6 per cent 10 years ago. Pakistan had an average ratio of 14.3 
per cent from 1966-1969. South Korea, 9.2 per cent (1967-1969). It is 
a minor revenue source in Thailand, the ratio being only about 4.9 per 
cent in 1968.^ 
The ratio of collections to total revenue in Indonesia and Laos is 
rather insignificant. However, in some Asian countries, there are revenue 
sources at the local level which are even more productive in yield than the 
real property tax. This is exemplified by Thailand, where the collection 
from the property tax by the Local Government is only half of the 
proceeds from another Local Tax - the business tax. The property tax is 
also exceeded in Japan by the municipal Inhabitant Tax which contributed 
614,079 million yen to total local revenue in 1970 as against 489,968 
million yen fi-om the property tax. In Pakistan (1966-1969), this tax ranked 
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third in importance. While it is fourth in South Korea (1967-1969). 
The Local units are now beginning to depend more and more on 
property taxation in meeting the increasing needs of rapidly growing 
population which has characterized the countries of Asia in the post 
World War II period. 
Experience in Selected Countreis 
Evaluation of the effects of property taxation is faced with 
great difficulties due to lack of basic facts. Data on revenue .yields in 
various countries are seriously inadequate. Figures for local Government 
finances are often even less complete than those for national Govern-
ment. Taxes with similar names may be quite different. Nevertheless, it 
is fairly clear that nowhere does property taxation play a role as a 
constructive force in economic development commensurate with its 
underlying economic potential. 
In countries where revenue yields are now about as high as would 
have been desirable (if such a conclusion reached for a locality, a 
larger area, or a whole economy), the structure of the tax frequently 
had defects. Adverse non revenue results that might have been avoided 
must then occur. 
Some Current Practices 
The introduction to the U.N.'s manual of Land Tax Administration^ 
CHflPTCR - 8 83 
reads as follows : 
Interest in the Land tax has been flagging for some time owing to 
the low productivity of the tax (which in turn resulted from the difficulty 
of revaluation in a generally inflationary climate) and to the risk of major 
new tax sources (especially income and profits taxes). Recently, howev-
er, more and more tax authorities have been turning their attention to the 
potentialities. The ever increasing population pressure combined with 
the expansion of infra-structure facilities and general economic devel-
opment have pushed land values constantly upward, recent technical 
innovations in survey and valuation methods and tax procedures make it 
much more feasible than before, also for a developing country, to instal 
a modern land tax and keep assessments up to date, and thus obtain 
worthwhile tax revenues at a reasonable cost. 
Land taxation today is seldom very important in the total of 
Government revenue. It may, however loom very large in the revenue of 
local (municipal or state) Governments. 
Existing land taxes in many developing countries often produce 
too little revenue. Effective tax rates, in relation to land market value's 
or to the income from land, are so low in some cases that the administra-
tions and taxpayers alike do not take the tax too seriously. Exemptions, 
frequently given by developing countries as an incentive to certain kinds 
of investment, are in effective because the tax is too small to make any 
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real difference in the calculations of potential investors. 
Some use of property taxation is found in most countries, but the 
actual amounts collected differ greatly in relation to other magnitudes. 
Moreover, actual yields clearly differ by more than a reading of descrip-
tions of laws would lead one to expect, and effectiveness of administra-
tion varies substantially. 
Among selected Asian nations studies in the 1960s, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Laos, and Thailand made only small use of Urban 
property taxation. The taxes noted below are chiefly Local, those of 
Indonesia and laos are levied and collected by the national government. 
The tax in the Philippines is imposed by the central government and used 
locally. In terms of yield as a percentage of local government revenue, 
property taxes are most important in India, whereas, in Malaysia, Paki-
stan, and the Philippines, they yield less than 20 percent of local revenue. 
In most Indian states, urban property tax is a substantial source of 
local government revenue. The tax rests on annual rental value. Rent 
controls, however, have been in effect for many years and have frozen 
values used for tax purposes. Therefore, the tax has been less responsive 
to revenue needs than might have been expected since, partly because of 
inflation, the price of property has risen markedly. The legal restrictions 
on rents are not the only reason for the lag in the growth of yield. Local 
governments do not possess sufficient staff and other resources needed 
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to revise the assessment rolls promptly and fully at the five years 
intervals generally called for by law. Owners of property have reason to 
use their influence to delay the updating of assessments. In addition, the 
collection has suffered from deficiencies of administration. 
There has been a very increasing evidence over recent years that 
the property tax has not been a buoyant source of revenue. Between 1970-
71 and 1976-77 total property tax receipts in 51 sampled bodies were 
found to increase at about 15 percent per year^. This growth in revenue 
has not been commensurate with the potential that it has, keeping in mind 
the increase in market values of property over the same period. This is 
also reflected in a study of sampled local bodies. Per capita property tax 
income decreased from Rs 23 in 1979-80 to Rs. 19 in 1983-841 
Property Taxation in the Tax Structure of Urban Local 
Bodies in India 
Property tax including the service taxes dominates in the tax 
structures of the municipal bodies in a large number of states in India. 
There are two main forms of taxes levied by these bodies : direct and 
indirect taxes Direct taxes include property tax, service taxes and profes-
sion tax where as, indirect taxes are constituted by Octroi, terminal and 
toll tax. States mainly dependent on direct taxes are Andhra Pradesh 
(96%), Assam (95%), Bihar (99%), Kerala (86%), Madras (99%), Orissa 
(74%), West Bengal (96%) and Delhi - a centrally administered area 
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(71%), while states mainly dependent on indirect taxes are Gujarat 
(79%), Jammu & Kashmir (98%), Madhya Pradesh (77%), Maharashtra 
(53%), Mysore (52%), Punjab (81%), Rajasthan & Uttar Pradesh 
(79%). Out of these states there are three states namely Maharashtra, 
Mysore and Orissa which levy both direct and indirect taxes while in 
other states the emphasis is either on direct or indirect taxes. 
It is true that profession taxes are a direct tax and terminal tax 
together with toll tax are a form of indirect tax levied by municipalties in 
different states, but they are quite insignificant in relation to the volume 
of tax revenues raised by these bodies. As a matter of fact property tax 
including service taxes in most of the states and octroi in other states are 
the chief sources of revenue for urban local bodies. It is obvious from the 
data that property tax together with service taxes is being levied almost 
in all the states except in Jammu and Kashmir, where it is Levied by 
Notified Area committee only and where it is a minor source of revenue, 
whenever octroi is levied property tax is of lesser importance. In Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, for instance, the 
property tax and service taxes constitute less than 15% of the total tax 
revenues of urban local bodies. This happens because of the fact that 
some municipalities are not at all levying these taxes and even where they 
are levied, the rates are quite low. It will not be out of place to mention 
here that 79% of municipalities in Gujarat, 49% in Madhya Pradesh, 44% 
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in Punjab, 85% in Rajasthan and 55% in Uttar Pradesh were not at all 
levying general tax on lands and buildings*. 
In case of service taxes also, 47% of municipalities in Gujarat, 
42% in Madhya Pradesh, 69% in Punjab, 95% in Rajasthan and 65% in 
Uttar Pradesh are not levying any of the service taxes^. 
The neglect of property tax including service taxes is further 
revealed by the fact that 35% of municipalities in Gujarat, 18% in Madhya 
Pradesh, 38% in Punjab, 83% in Rajasthan and 40% in Uttar Pradesh are 
neither levying property tax nor any of the service taxes^. From the 
analysis of property tax it can be inferred that either the municipalties are 
not providing any of the services or they are not charging any separate tax 
for them. 
It is thus obvious that vast resource potentialities from the impo-
sition local of property and service taxes are not being exploited by the 
urban local bodies at all. 
Relative Position of Property Tax in Different States 
In the foregoing analysis, position of property tax has been ex-
plained on all India basis. This, therefore, did not give a full idea of the 
relative importance of the property tax in the tax structure of Urban local 
bodies in Individual states. It is necessary, however, to examine the 
relative position of the property tax in the tax structure of differents 
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States separately. 
Property tax holds the highest place of importance in the tax 
structure of urban local bodies in the states levying this tax. Property tax 
along with service taxes constitutes the chief source of tax income of 
Bihar. Out of the different taxes levied by urban local bodies in Bihar, the 
percentage of property tax along with service taxes is about 96% which 
is, in fact, the highest in relation to other states in India. 
From the tax structure of Individual local bodies, it is evident that 
all the municipalities levy holding tax but service taxes like water tax, 
lighting tax and laterine tax are being levied by 33%, 11% and 77% of 
them respectively. The percentage of water tax and lighting taxes is lower 
because these amenities are not being provided in most of the municipal 
bodies in Bihar. 
Tax on animals and vehicles which ranks next contributes only 
about 3 percent and profession tax which is levied by hardly 15 percent 
of the municipal bodies is quite insignificant. This tax, however, accounts 
for 3 percent of tax income in the Patna municipal corporation^ 
It is, thus, evident that except property and service taxes, the 
exploitation of other taxes is quite insignificant. 
The next state where property tax dominates is Assam. The per-
centage of property tax along with service taxes to total tax income is 
more than 93 %. Other taxes like tax on animals and vehicles, tax on trades 
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and ceilings and other miscellaneous taxes are also levied but their 
position in the urban tax structure is quite insignificant. This is because 
of the fact that these taxes are not levied by all the urban local bodies of 
the state. Like property tax, tax on animals and vehicles is levied by all 
the municipalties and as such this tax ranks next in importance. But 
the tax receipt accrued out of this source is, however, hardly 4% of 
the total tax revenue. 
Tax on trades and belongings is levied by only 50% of the munic-
ipalities. Not only this, 33% of town area committees do not impose any 
tax on animals and 33% and 66% of them are not levying property tax and 
service taxes respectively and thus vast tax potentials go untaxed within 
the jurisdiction of Urban local bodies in this state. 
Property tax including service taxes and profession tax; in West 
Bengal is being levied by almost all the municipalities. It is strange, 
however, that education cess is being levied by 3 out of 87 municipalties 
and the percentage of municipalties which levied total tax was about 34%. 
The profession tax, ranking next in importance, contributes 7.5% and the 
remaining 2% is being accounted for by toll, animals and vehicles tax and 
other miscellaneous taxes. It is, thus, obvious that urban local bodies rely 
mostly on property tax along with service taxes which constitutes about 
91 percent of the total tax income of the urban local bodies. 
Orissa is a state where almost all possible sources are exploited by 
CHAPTCR - a 90 
urban local bodies but none of them satisfactorily. Tax on animals and 
vehicles is the only tax levied Universally by the municipalities. Property 
tax, profession tax, octroi, and service taxes are being levied by 
89% ,17% and 89% of them respectively. Notified area committiees 
do not levy octroi but property tax, service taxes and profession tax 
are being exploited by 90%, 70% and 30% of them respectively 
Urban local bodies of this state drive over 3/4th of their tax income 
from property and service taxes and octroi accounted for 1/lOth only. 
The tax on animals and vehicles contributes 9% while other tax sources 
are quite insignificant. 
Urban local bodies are quiet retant in exploiting the tax potential 
of property tax along with other taxes. This fact is revealed by the report 
of the Committee relating to urban local bodies. According to its 
findings "the councils have been generally found to be unwilling to use 
the power of taxation given to them by law, apparently with a view to gain 
cheap popularity. Whenever, they have taken recourse to taxes which are 
required to be levied on a percentage basis on the annual value of the 
holding, the percentage of tax imposed has been found to be invariably 
low as compared to the maximum prescribed under the Act".^ 
Like Orissa, Maharashtra also levies property tax as well as octroi. 
In the tax structure of urban local bodies, property tax and service taxes 
dominated over the other sources of tax income which together consti-
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tuted more than 68% of the total tax income. Octroi ranks next as a source 
of income contributing about 25.5% of the total tax income. Tax on 
animals and vehicles and tax on trades and callings contribute 3.1% and 
0.4% respectively and thus, obviously, are insignificant sources of 
income from taxes. 
Andhra Pradesh also levies both property tax and octroi but while 
the former is levied universally by urban local bodies the later is restrict-
ed to municipal corporations only and contributes l/4th of the tax 
income. Service taxes are levied by 52% of the municipalities and only 
one town area committee levies this tax. There is, thus variation in the 
relative importance of property tax including service taxes in the tax 
pattern of corporation. Municipalities and Town Area committees. In 
municipalities, it accounts for 75% of the total income, in municipal 
corporation 55% and in Notified/Town Area committee only about 35%. 
Property tax including service taxes, however, constitute the main 
item of revenue ie about 68% of the total tax income. 
Property tax along with service taxes are universally levied by 
urban municipalities in Kerala. Other taxes are partially levied, profes-
sion tax is levied by 27 out of 28, municipalities advertisement tax by 
about 57 and entertainment tax by about 89% of the municipalities. 
Property tax including the income from service taxes continues the chief 
source of tax income contributing about 70% of the total tax revenue. Tax 
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on trades and callings occupies next place in order of importance and 
accounts for about 15%, miscellaneous taxes are also levied which 
include entertainment tax, advertisement tax on animals and vehicles etc. 
But out of these entertainment tax is important and rest are insignificant 
from the revenue point of view. 
Last but not the least is the state of Madras which is having a multi-
tax base and the reliance is most on direct taxes. From the study of the tax 
structure of urban local bodies, it is significant to note that all the taxes 
assigned to municipalities are levied by all of them. Property tax along 
with service taxes constitutes the primary source tax revenues urban 
local bodies contributing about 60 per cent. 
In other states like Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Mysore, Punjab, Rajasthan, Octroi holds the highest position contribut-
ing 98.2%, 72%, 60%, 46.4%, 80% and 82% of the total tax revenues 
respectively. In Jammu & Kashmir where the percentage of Octroi is the 
highest in respect to total tax income within the orbit of urban local 
bodies, property tax contributes the lowest percentage (2.8) as compared 
to other tax sources. 
In Rajasthan, though property tax is levied in a graduated manner & 
contributes quite an insignificant amount. The reason for this is that, 
though house tax is obligatory it is levied by 16% of the municipalities 
only the service taxes are levied by 10 out of 133 municipalities.^ 
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Property tax including service taxes accounts for about 6.7 
percent in the tax structure of the urban local bodies in Punjab. In this 
state also tax accrued from this source is quite meagre mainly because 
the levy of this tax is not universal like octroi. Property tax in this state 
is levied by 51 percent and service taxes by about 23 percent of the 
municipalities only. 
Over and above urban property tax is also levied by the state 
government which also reduces the scope of this tax. 
The yield from house tax in Madhya Pradesh is 2.5 percent of the 
total municipal tax revenue which is, of cause, least important. The main 
corse of low yield from this source is that only 56 percent of the 
municipalities exploited this tax source. Service tax though next to 
Octroi in respect of raising tax revenue, is levied by 62 percent of the 
municipalities and it is mostly confined to conservancy tax. It is evident 
from the tax pattern that municipalities in the state are not utilising the 
tax on property to the desirable extent and instead are relying heavily on 
indirect taxes viz.. Octroi and terminal tax. 
Property tax, though universally levied in Mysore, is yielding 
lesser tax revenue as compared to octroi and service taxes which are 
being levied partially within the framework of urban municipalities. This 
shows that like Madhya Pradesh, municipalities are not tapping the tax 
potential of property tax in this state. 
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The importance of property tax and service taxes in the state of 
Gujarat has been subordinated by octroi mainly because of the fact that 
the former two taxes are levied by 22 percent and 56 percejit of the 
municipalities respectively while the later is levied by practically all the 
urban local bodies of the state. 
On the basis of foregoing analysis, one obvious conclusion 
follows that wherever octroi has been levied, property tax and also 
service taxes have not been exploited satisfactorily. It may be due to 
partial application of the tax or more emphasis on actroi or low rates or 
loose administration or other reasons allied to them. 
Importance of the Urban Property Tax in the Total Revenues of 
Urban Local Bodies 
The structure of the municipal revenue and the role of the property 
tax is shown in Table 2.1 for the year 1960-61 for all urban local bodies 
and 20 corporations of India. 
This table represents revenues from property tax which is inclu-
sive of service charges which are levied on the same basis as the urban 
property tax. 
It is remarkable to note that the lower share of property tax has 
been caused due to the fact that octroi occupies the second line of 
defence in the tax structure of the local bodies. Although octroi is the 
second traditional source, it has been subjected to scathing criticisms. 
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TABLE - 2.1 
Proportion of Revenue from Property Tax in tlie Finances 
of Some of tlie Municipal Corporations in India 
( Per cent) 
Year Proportion of Revenue from PT 
Dellii Bombay Calcutta 
TR IR TRR TR IR TRR TR IR 
1980-81 67.02 55.16 27.15 
1981-82 - 50.30 26.63 
1982-83 63.55 49.33 24.90 
1983-84 63.21 50.27 32.58 
1984-85 74.14 58.96 27.48 
1985-86 74.38 54.22 33.13 
1986-87 80.88 69.28 46.21 
1987-88 77.65 55.39 36.24 
1988-89 70.52 55.58 35.44 
1989-90 77.97 57.10 38.67 
43.76 
42.09 
39.20 
36.78 
36.60 
34.92 
34.43 
34.84 
35.45 
33.07 
-
-
-
-
93.94 
79.21 
86.90 
86.48 
88.73 
76.66 
-
-
-
-
74.21 
61.53 
67.42 
67.55 
69.16 
61.56 
94-A 
Year 
Ahmedabad 
1 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
Source : 
TR 
IR 
TRR 
TR 
11 
30.61 
31.77 
30.05 
31.24 
30.10 
41.90 
26.60 
30.26 
32.07 
29.22 
Computed 
IR 
12 
70.49 
29.00 
25.57 
23.57 
21.22 
26.87 
21.49 
26.58 
27.47 
25.97 
Madras 
TRR 
13 
24.46 
25.66 
24.22 
21.38 
90.10 
23.93 
19.43 
23.66 
22.62 
22.30 
Proportion of Revenue from PT 
TR 
14 
80.01 
90.98 
86.05 
83.05 
80.91 
85.40 
90.71 
9.180 
98.06 
90.51 
Trivandrum 
m 
15 
67.00 
76.26 
59.01 
65.21 
63.44 
64.13 
64.23 
69.46 
71.17 
63.99 
TRR 
16 
41.57 
43.49 
39.72 
38.35 
40.91 
36.13 
35.82 
38.48 
36.06 
65.73 
on the basis of data collected from the re 
Total Tax Revenue 
Internal Revenue 
Total Revenue Receipt 
TR 
17 
-
-
-
-
46.57 
47.20 
43.23 
50.36 
38.90 
43,52 
IR 
18 
-
-
-
- • 
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
spective municipal budget. 
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TABLE - 2.2 
General Purpose (Property) Tax, Service Taxes and Cesses Levied by the 
Municipal Authorities in the States of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala as also by the Major Municipal Corporations 
in other Mega Cities in India 
s t a t e / L o c a l Authortt ie General Fire Water Water Sewerage Swerage Scavenging 
purpose tax tax benef i t tax benefit tax 
tax tax tax 
8 
1. Gujarat 
a) Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal 
2. Tamil Nadu 
a) Madras Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal Councils 
3 . Kerala 
a) Trivandrum Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal Councils 
4. Maharashtra 
Municipal Corporation 
of Greater Bombay 
5. West Bengal 
Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation 
6. Delhi 
Delhi Municipal 
Corporation 
C O N S O L I D A T E D 
95-A 
s t a t e / L o c a l A u t h o r i t i c D r a i n a g e C o n s c r . E d u . G e n e r a l E d u . T r e e 
t a x t a x t a x S a n i t a r y c e s s c e s s 
c e s s 
10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Gujarat 
a) Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal Councils 
2. Tamil Nadu 
a) Madras Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal Councils 
3. Kerala 
a) Trivandrum Municipal 
Corporation 
b) Municipal Councils 
4. Maharashtra 
Municipal Corporation 
of Greater Bombay 
West Bengal 
Calcutta Municipal 
Corporation 
Delhi 
Delhi Municipal 
Corporation 
R A T E 
Source : Municipal Statutes and the Municipal Authorities. 
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Sir Charlis Trevelyan describes it as "the remains of a barbarous 
system of universal taxation" Sir Joshia Stamp describes it in the follow-
ing words, "in my judgement, both theoretical and on the result of 
experience, no country can be progressive that relies to any extent upon 
octroi which has nearly every vice. 
Both the Taxation Enquiry commission and the local Finance 
Enquiry commission have referred to the evils inherent in the octroi 
system. 
As compared to property tax, the future of octroi is extremely 
gloomy unless desired reforms are not introduced. However, the proper-
ty tax along with octroi accounts for about 82 percent of the total tax 
revenues in all local bodies as against only 53 percent by only property 
tax. The share of the two together is 84 percent in all the corporations. 
Table 2.2 further reveals that other taxes like terminal tax, taxes 
on trades and callings, tax on animal and vehicles and other miscella-
neous taxes are extremely insignificant in respect of financing local 
bodies in India. Thus urban property tax is the only stable source of 
revenue for the local bodies in India. 
Property tax when viewed in the context of octroi, is less impor-
tant in India. Its role in India is much less as compared with the role which 
property tax plays in the American system. 
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Growth in the Tax Potentials of the Property Tax 
In the foregoing pages it has been discussed that on the one hand, 
there is the declining trend of property tax and on the other, a rising ratio 
of grants-in-aid particularly in some of the financially handicapped 
states of the country. Nowthe question is why has this tendency emerged 
? Is it due to the fact that the potentialities of the property tax have 
declined or that the tax potentials have multiplied abruptly during the 
recent years of planning but the tax machinery has failed to mobilise the 
additional rise in the resource potentials of this tax due to its multiple 
defects ? 
The inelasticity of local taxes coupled with the continued growth 
of expenditure due to steep increase in the wages has naturally led to poor 
financial position of the local bodies. This is aggravated by the fact that 
the local bodies are not exploiting their existing taxation power in an 
adequate manner. There is a wide gap between the needs and the resources 
of local bodies. 
The financial administration is also weak. Discrimination in the 
assessment of taxes and inefficiency in their collection, complete disre-
gard for budgetry principles, diversion of Government grants for specefic 
purposes corruption and embezzlement are, unfortunately, common fea-
tures of several local bodies. New sources of revenue so disperately 
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needed by the local bodies are to be found not so much in new taxes as in 
more equitable assessment and in restoring to the assessment rolls of 
those categories of prosperities which are grossly underassessed or not 
assessed"'. 
As a matter of fact, a large number of factors have been working in 
the Indian Economy during the plan period which have significantly 
contributed to the growth of the resource potentials of this tax, but the 
increase in the potentials of this tax has not been effectively utilized. 
Growth of Popnlation and Urbanisation 
The first factor which contributed to raising the tax potentials of 
this tax is the growth of population and urbanisation. It is a well known 
fact that the growth of population in urban areas and increase in the tempo 
of urbanisation are inevitable concomitants of accelerated economic 
development. As a result of the implementation of development schemes, 
j ob opportunities have been created in urban areas thus attracting surplus 
labor force from the rural areas to urban centres. The abolition of 
Zamindari system has also caused to ex-zamindars and big land lords to 
move to the cities and they have found investment in housing and land in 
urban areas more and more attractive. 
But the increase in population and the tempo of urbanisation has 
increased the resource potentials of the municipal bodies not only 
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through construction of new houses and development of urban lands but 
also through the fact that the increasing pressure of population has 
exceeded the rate of construction of new houses. 
This has led to overcrowding and large demand for housing space 
and thus rental value of old houses has gone up to a remarkable extent 
which has meant an increase in the resource potential of the municipal 
bodies. It is also a fact that demand for urban land has increased abruptly 
and thus the annual values of empty urban plots of Land which are fit for 
housing construction have soared up substantially resulting in an in-
crease in tax potentials. 
The rise in the levels of income has also contributed to the rise in 
the resource potentials of this tax because people have preferred to live 
in better houses. 
Increase in the Number of Rate Payers 
The increase in population and urbanisation would not contribute 
to add the resource potentials alone unless there is simultaneous rise in 
the number of rate payers. 
The increase in the number of rate payers depends upon two things: 
(a) Firstly, an increase in the number of new houses, and 
(b) Secondly, an increase in total number assessed holdings caused by 
bringing such houses which were not being assessed previously. 
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Even if the number of rate payers increases it may not be 
necessarily associated with a substantial increase in the holdings and 
construction of high cost buildings and as a result the resource potentials 
of the municipal bodies may not increase to a substantial extent. The new 
rate payers may be people with low income and property. If, on the other 
hand, the rate payers are such that they possess substantial porperty and 
have made investments of a large magnitude in housing construction, it 
will result in a large expansion in the tax potentials of the municipal 
bodies. A survey of five muncipal bodies of Bihar conducted by the 
planning commission, Government of India have has concluded that a 
very large proportion of such houses has meant substantial investment in 
housing and the annual value of such hosues is very high. Therefore the 
increase in the number of rate payers associated with the increase in the 
number of holdings and construction of new houses has meant a large 
expansion in the tax potentials of the municipal bodies". 
Implementation of Schemes of Improvement and Development 
Another contributing factor for the growth of the resource poten-
tials of the property tax has been the implementation of development 
projects within the jurisdiction of the local bodies. During the course of 
the five year plans, local bodies have undertaken the schemes of con-
struction and implementation of land, roads, drainage, parks and many 
100-A 
TABLE - 2.3 
Percentage of Property Tax to Total Tax 
Revenue in Selected Local Bodies 
60-61 65-66 70-71 75-76 80-81 85-86 88-89 89-90 
(1) Abmedabad 39.28 
(2) Baroda 0.00 
(3) Bangalore 31.55 
(4) Gwalior 13.64 
(5) Indore 15.51 
(6) Raipur 0.00 
(8) Bombay 43.72 
(9) Nagpur 10.75 
(10) Pune 27.95 
(11) Solapur 18.66 
(12) Kanpur 28.32 
(13) Lucknow 23.81 
(14) Varanasi 31.11 
(15) Calcutta 90.78 
(16) Chandranagar 33.11 
(17) Calicut 43.09 
(18) Cochin 0.00 
(19) Madras 60.31 
(20) Delhi 38.04 
43.44 35.31 31.29 25.59 19.31 30.36 13.75 
0.00 27.69 33.00 23.93 19.61 23.01 17.04 
28.13 33.67 28.93 32.95 32.36 84.26 ERR 
14.7 7.91 0.19 9.30 13.96 14.75 14.10 
18.93 9.08 0.13 30.93 16.16 17.39 167.03 
0.00 10.16 5.15 10.48 17.47 19.82 24.60 
37.38 36.16 29.01 25.11 16.11 12.58 ERR 
12.14 15.64 11.16 10.05 8.19 7.55 ERR 
31.16 29.14 24.05 17.60 16.11 18.87 15.16 
15.88 23.45 17.56 12.24 10.58 10.94 13.30 
29.87 40.98 48.92 34.23 17.88 19.77 ERR 
41.18 29.22 25.08 28.20 37.30 35.65 29.26 
27.55 38.23 31.15 13.87 16.63 10.14 9.97 
89.51 88.91 86.86 62.92 51.69 ERR ERR 
56.07 25.85 19.32 14.74 61.23 46.12 ERR 
30.32 30.34 28.49 28.56 37.09 37.94 47.07 
0.00 54.09 45.91 55.12 50.05 49.68. 40.09 
55.25 54.51 62.71 49.92 44.91 40.75 42.54 
43.61 20.32 44.46 34.61 45.60 ERR ERR 
Source : Central Statistical Organisation : Statistical Abstract (Various Issues) 
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Other schemes in some form or the other. On account of implementing 
these schemes the resource potentials of the property tax have increased 
many fold. This is because of the fact that these schemes have tended to 
promote the improvement of housing and also construction of new 
houses and this has led to increase the tax potentials of the property tax. 
Secondly, implementation of such schemes has attracted the population 
towards developed areas and has resulted in increasing the rental value of 
the existing housing. Thirdly, the rental value of the house has also 
increased because of the extension of facilities in the shape of sanitation, 
improved roads, parking etc. Thus the implementation of schemes of 
improvements and development has not only resulted in an investment 
boom in housing but also to an increase in the annual rental value of the 
houses which have expansionary effects on the tax potentials of these 
bodies. 
Rise in Asset Prices During the Five Year Plans 
Apart from these factors, there has been a growing tendency of 
rising prices and income in the recent years and this has also contributed 
in the growth of the potentials of the property tax. If the prices go up, 
property values also are bound to have a simultaneous tendency to go up. 
It is also a fact that under inflationary conditions, there is a 
growing tendency for larger investment by the private sector in luxury 
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housing construction as a hedge against inflation. This is born out by a 
number of surveys carried out by the economists of the united nations in 
many undeveloped countries.^^ This fact has also been emphasised by 
Prof. Phillips that with the investment in housing a hedge is made 
against inflation. '^  
This tendency is also widely marked in case of the urban cities and 
towns of India. In case of urban areas of Bihar also rising prices during the 
plan period have been associated with a large outburst of investment in 
housing construction partly as a very attractive channel of investment in 
precance to other forms of investment and partly as a hedge against 
inflation. This outburst of housing construction in urban centres has 
contributed heavily to the growth of the resource potential of the prop-
erty tax. 
In this connection it will not be out of place to point out here that 
the increase in the value of property may take in two forms. One form of 
increase may be of uncarred nature which happens due to the process of 
economic development and rise of prices and the other form of increase 
in value of property is brought about by the investment and efforts of the 
owners of the property themselves. The process of uncjirred increments 
in property values has been especially marked during the five years plans 
in India. 
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Growth of Resource Potentials of the Service Taxes 
As regards the resource potentials of the service taxes like water 
and laterine taxes it is sufficient to say that the tax potentials have 
increased due to those very factors which have been operating in case of 
the resource potentials of the property tax. During the five year plans, the 
municipal bodies have been given substantial grants and loans for the 
extension and improvements of the municipal services and thus the 
resource potentials of these services have increased. 
The resource potentials of other taxes of the municipal bodies 
have also increased due to the same or the other factors but their tax 
receipts are so insufficient and insignificant that they hardly bring any 
substantial difference in the total tax receipts of the municipal bodies. 
Thus it canbe observed that the urban property tax possess very 
high resource potentials. If these potentialities are effectively and also 
equitably mobilised and utilised, it will create an effective independent 
base for financing the schemes of municipal development and will also 
protect their autonomy. 
An impoprtant study has been done by Dr. N.K. Rao. It throws light 
on the working of Town municipalities, in North Kanara District. 
Excepting Sivsi municipality the study covers the municipality 
Bhatkal, Honavar, Kumta, Karwar and Haliyal which are the oldest 
CHAPTCR - S 103 
municipalities in district. The collective analysis of munnicipal 
Finances rendired itself difficult for the author as all the concerned 
munnicipalities did not respond to the questionaire satisfactorily and 
uniformily. The author therefore felt it nesassary to study each 
munnicipality individually though some sort of a summary has been 
produced in the last chapter of the book '^*. Let us have a look at the main 
findings of this study. 
The utter inadequacy of local finance in India as of any other level 
of government has been a long admitted fact. Even in its limited form, 
property tax is not fully exploited in the counrty. The residential and non-
residential establishemnts continue to be undertaxed inspite of a general 
rise in the land value and house rents. A recent study but confined upto 
1956 blames the rent restriction legislative Acts for keeping down the 
rental values and also causing straineds relations between the' landlord 
and the tenants. "The static character of rents and the consequent in 
elasticity of property taxes are more due to government intervention 
rather than any neglect on the part of local bodies." '^  a very poor argument 
in defence of the inactivity of municipalities. The local public never 
allows any upward revision of the tax even for new constructions. The 
costs and rental returns are always underestimated. A strong municipal 
administration alone can stand up against this local pull. The municipal 
councillars instead of pacifying must persuade the property owners to 
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submit to a higher rate of revision. There are one or two practical 
difficulties for the administration in this. In simple terms there is no 
relation between the rental earnings and tax assessment. 
Property Tax is one of the most important sources of revenue for 
urban local bodies in India. In 1991-92, it accounted for 28.5 percent of 
total municipal revenue (Table A). 
TABLE - A 
Composition of Municipal Tax Income In India 1991-92 
Percentage to Total Income 
Population class 
Size 
1 million and above 
100,000 to 1 million 
50,000 to 100,000 
20,000 to 50,000 
Less than 20,000 
Property 
tax 
34.6 
9.7 
10.0 
6.8 
5.5 
Octroi 
33.8 
46.0 
26.6 
23,4 
24.7 
Others 
6.3 
14.5 
16.4 
19.5 
18.5 
Total 28.5 35.3 8.4 
Source : Nature and Dimension of Urban Fiscal Crisis in India, National 
Institute of Urban Affairs, 1992. 
In most places total property tax consists of two components -
general or house tax and service taxes. Service taxes include water tax and 
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lighting tax and are generally, levied on the basis of rateable value. All 
states have provision for a periodic reassessment of annual reteable 
value. The reassessment period is usually four to five years. But this is 
not carried out in most of the cases. 
There has been a very increasing evidence over recent years that 
the property tax has not been a buoyant source of revenue. Between 1970-
71 and 1976-77 total property tax receipts in 51 samples bodies 
were found to increase at about 15 percent per year^^. This growth in 
revenue has not been commensurated with the potential that it has, 
keeping in mind the increases in market values of property over the 
same period. This is also reflected in a study of sampled local bodies. 
Per capita property tax income decreased from Rs. 23 in 1079-80 to 
Rs. 19 in 1983-84'^ 
Analysis of data on revenue performance of property tax in the 
municipal corporations of Ahmedabad, Madras and Trivandrum as also in 
three other major municipal corporations of Bombay. Calcutta and Delhi 
reveals that except in Delhi and Madras the role of property tax in the 
total tax revenue is declining (Table A). Decline is much more dramatic 
in Calcutta where its share in total revenue has declined from about 94 
percent in 1984-85 to about 77 percent in 1989-90. 
In Ahjnadabad, it has only marginally declined From from about 31 
percent in 1980-81 to about 29 percent in 1989-90. A some what 
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pronounced role of property tax in total revenue in Trivandrum and a 
dominating role in Madras is because of absence of octroi in these 
corporations. Only the municipal corporation of Delhi (MCD) seems to 
be an exception to this trend. MCD already has a Terminal tax which is a 
variant of octroi levied on the same base. Dominant role of property tax 
in total revenue notwithstanding a look at table 1 shows a marked decline 
in the contribution of property tax to total internal revenue (IR) and total 
revenue receipts (TR) in all the municipal authorities except the munic-
ipal corporation of Delhi (MCD). A massive land development programme 
and the consequent construction activities in the wake of the first master 
plan for Delhi (1961-81) has led to dramatic increase in the number of 
total holdings assessed by MCD. Marked decline is, however, discernible 
in Trivandrum, Calcutta and Bombay. 
Now, we deal with MCD in detail,and where ever possible, we 
make comparative study of MCD andNDMC,whichis counterpart of it. 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi Resource Structure 
Municipal corporation of Delhi (MCD) derives its income 
(non-plan) mainly from two sources, namely (1) internal sources 
and (2) external sources, whereas internal sources consist of Taxes 
and Non-Tax income, the Assigned taxes and grants-in-aid form 
part of the external sources. Beside these sources the MCD is also 
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taking loans / assistance from government in the form of ways and 
mean's to meet the rising expenditure on maintenance of civil 
serivices and establishment costs such as additional sources al-
lowances, revised pay scales, Bonus and so on. Although MCD has 
improved its revenue base from domistic sources over the years to 
a great extent, it is heavily dependent on traditional sources of 
revenue such as property taxes and so on, which have a limited 
scope for additional resources mobilization. 
In absolute terms, the income from property taxes has gone 
up substantially (210%) during the period 1983-84 and 1989-90. 
However, no definite trend in its proportion to the total revenue 
income over the years (Table 2.4). The low collection ratios of 
property taxes in some years and comparatively higher ones in 
other years seems to be the basic reason for this irratic trend. This, 
however, could not be said with certainty owing to lack of data on 
demand and collection ratios (current and arrears) in diffirent 
years of the reference period. 
Among the various components of taxes, property taxes and 
duty on transfer of property are the mainstay of the revenue base of 
MCD. Together they account for anywhere between 80 and 90 
percent of the total tax income. It may be noted that from property 
taxes' alone MCD raised almost 75 percent or even more of its 
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total tax income. Duties on transfer of properties come next and 
taxes on sale or supply of elasticity and on advertisements occupy 
third and fourth positions respectively in the taxation hierarchy of 
MCD (Table 2.5). Property tax has not proved to be a bouyant and 
elastic source of revenue due to the operation of the Delhi Rent 
Control Act 1958. There is a provision in this Act for determina-
tion of standard rent for a property after the fifth year of its 
construction, which is determined on the basis of the price of land 
at the time of construction and cost of construction. The rateable 
value is to be determined at 8.25 percent of the cost thus arrived at. 
This provision was extended to even those properties for which the 
standard rent has not yet been determined by a rent controller. 
According to a judgement delivered by the Superme Court the base 
of the tax will be the standard rent as determinable according to the 
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. '^  This had led to depress-
ing of the base of property tax in Delhi particularly with respect to 
the old properties. An attempt was made to do away with this 
provision by amending the Delhi Rent control Act. However, the 
operation of the Amended Act has been suspended in view of a spate 
of protests from the assessees. It is perhaps due to this depressing 
effect of Rent laws on property valuation that the yield from this 
tax is not found to be elastic to the indicators of urban development 
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like manufacturing activities, trade and commerce, capital invest-
ment by the DDA, per capita income and above all the augmentation 
in housing stock. ^^  Its elasticity, according to recent study, to the 
housing stock was found to be 0.7090. Elasticity to manufacturing 
activities, trade and commerce, capital investment by the DDA and 
the per capita income was found to be 0.5352, 0.4443, 0.1605, and 
0.6092 respectively. This is also corroborated by a lower average 
assessed value per holding and average property tax per holding in 
Delhi as compared to other municipal corporations in the metro-
politan cities.^" 
Table 2.6 shows the per capita revenue receipts at current and 
constant prices of MCD. With the help of this table we can know 
that whether per capita property tax in real terms is rising or not. 
Further, we can compare the position of property tax with other 
components of the tax revenue as well as non-tax revenue. In 1983-
84, per capita property tax at current prices was Rs. 50.56 then it 
rose ultimately to Rs. 165 in 1989-90. Table makes it clear that per 
capita has risen with every successive year. But, when we observe 
the behaviour of property tax per capita at constant price, we find 
that there is no continous rise in it with successive year. For 
example in 1983-84, per capita property tax at constant price was 
Rs. 12.37 it rose to Rs. 22.46 and fell to Rs. 21.49. Thus, we note 
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that judging per capita property tax in real terms, does not show 
satisfactory performancfe. Further, when growth of per capita prop-
erty tax is compared with other components of tax revenue and non-
tax revenue, we observe that performance of property tax is not 
satisfactory rather property tax has performed worse than many 
components of tax revenue and non-tax revenue. In the end we can 
say that per capita property tax does not cut a satisfactory picture. 
Although MCD derives a significant proportion of its reve-
nue income from internal sources, the proportion does not com-
pare favourably with the NDMC which happens to be a much smaller 
municipal body compared to the MCD. The following table gives 
the picture. 
T A B L E - B 
Revenue Income of the MCD/NDMC 
From Internal and External Sources,1989-90 
(Rupees in Lakhs) 
Municipal 
Body 
Total income Internal 
Sources 
(% to total) 
External 
Sources 
(% to total) 
MCD 24370.61 65.41 34.59 
NDMC 10961.81 92.91 7.9 
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The table shows that the dependence of NDMC on external 
sources of revenues i smuchless than that of the MCD. In 1989-90, 
NDMC raised 92.91 percent of its revenue from internal sources, 
mainly in the non-tax sector and a very nominal proportion from 
external sources. As against this more than 34 percent of MCD's 
total revenue income has been derived from external sources by 
way of Grants-in-aid and share of assigned taxes. NDMC is thus in 
a much better position as compared to MCD as far as its financial 
autonomy is concerned. 
As mentioned earlier, the internal sources consist of taxes, 
non-taxes and other sundry municipal revenues. The analysis of 
MCD revenues indicates that MCD derives a major share of its 
income from internal sources which is a welcome trend. It would 
be significant to examine the components of domestic municipal 
incomes to find out their elasticity under various heads. MCD had 
introduced various incentives for fast recovery of property tax 
arrears and also of current demand. As a result the receipts on 
account of property taxes; which was only Rs. 3248.19 lakhs in 
1983-S4 jumped to more than Rs. 8757 lakhs in 1986-87 which 
marks an increase of more than 169 percent within a period of just 
three years. 
Although MCD has improved its revenue base from domestic 
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sources over the year to a great extent, it is heavily dependent on 
traditional sources of revenue such as property taxes and so on, 
which have a limited scope for additional resource mobilisation. In 
the case of NDMC, the situation is quite different.^^ NDMC's 
dependence on taxes has declined from about 7.2 percent in 1984-
85 to a mere 4.6 percent in 1989-90. Even though the total revenue 
income has increased by more than twice during this period, whereas 
in MCD the proportionate income from non-conventional sources 
such as rents and prices, fees and fines and so on has declined 
roughly from 14 percent in 1984-85 to even less than 10 percent in 
1989-90, in NDMC the increase under this head is significant. 
NDMC's declining dependence on the traditional sources of rev-
enue has been more than compensated for by the argumentation of 
revenues from non-conventional sources. 
NDMC is generating resources from its non-tax sources 
which are many such as sale of electricity, water, shopping 
complexes, five star hotels, commercial blocks, parking plots, 
and so on. 
Now, let us analyse the componsition of revenue recipts at 
current and constant prices. Property tax was Rs. 322.55 lakhs at 
current price in 1975-76, which rose to Rs. 427.5 lakhs in 1989-
90. If we work out the annual increment of property tax at current 
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price, we find that increase is quiet moderate. Further, property tax 
was Rs. 203.21 lakhs at constant prices in 1975-76, which fell to 
Rs. 107.2 in 1989-90. It shows that property tax has not been 
keeping pace with time, rather property tax has fallen in real terms. 
Besides, when performance of property tax is compared with other 
components of tax revenues and non-tax revenues, we find that 
comparatively, performance of property tax is unsatisfactory. What 
reasons have been responsible for it will be analysed in the later 
chapters. It is important to state here that so far as state of the 
property tax is concerned it is almost identical in case of both 
MCD and NDMC. 
One final analysis, which we are going to make is in respect 
of per capita property tax in two municipalities that is MCD and 
NDMC. For this analysis, we have been making use of Table 2.6 and 
Table 2.7. In MCD per capita property tax at current price was Rs. 
66.4 in 1985-86, while the same was Rs. 127.11 in NDMC. Taking 
1985-86 as the base year, we see that NDMC has performed better 
than MCD so far as per capita property tax is concerned. What 
factors are responsible for it can be analysed later. Now let us see 
that what is the position in real terms ? In MCD, per capita property 
tax at constant price was Rs. 57.76 in 1985-86. While the same was 
Rs. 39.42inNDMCFurther, per capita property tax was Rs. 118.80, 
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Rs. 100.87, Rs. 125 and finally Rs. 165 in 1986-87,1987-88, 1988-
89, 1989-90 respectively, all at current price, while the same was 
Rs. 95.04, Rs. 74.64, Rs. 101.1 and finally Rs. 110.03 respective-
ly. Now let us compare it with the NDMC. In NDMC, per capita 
property tax was Rs. 114.87, Rs. 135.26, Rs. 150.1 and finally Rs. 
165.01 in 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 respectively , 
all at current price. While the same was Rs. 32.17, Rs. 35.17, Rs. 
38.02 and Rs. 38.03 in 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 
respectively at constant price, this analysis does not lead to any 
clear trend. But, one thing is clear that performance of property tax 
has not been satisfactory in both the municipalities that is MCD 
and NDMC especially, when we compare it with other components 
of the tax revenues and non-tax revenues. Comparatively property 
tax has performed slightly better in NDMC. 
Next in order to have a much broader picture of property tax, we 
take up 20 municipalities which include not only big municipal corpora-
tions like Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras but small municipalities 
like Baroda, Gwalior, Ujjain etc. Moreover, time duration is quite wide 
i.e. from 1960-61 to 1989-90. This analysis will give us complete 
picture of state of property tax in India. 
First, we consider, the significance of property tax in total tax 
revenue of 20 municipalities that is percentage of property tax to total tax 
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revenue. Analysis of this table shows that, out of 20 municipalities 9 
municipalities have experienced decline in their property tax, these 
municipalities are Ahmadabad, Baroda, Bombay, Pune, Solapur, Varanasi, 
Calcutta, Cochin and Madras. This shows that property tax of round about 
50 percent of municipalities considered here are declining instead of 
keeping pace with other taxes of municipalities. Besides, Five municipal-
ities depict stagnation in property tax revenue. These municipalities are 
Banglore, Gwalior, Indore, Nagpur and Calicut. There are three munici-
palities : Ujjain, Kanpur, and Lucknow where property tax first rose, then 
declined. And there is only one municipality out of twenty, which has 
experienced an increase in the ratio of property tax and this is Raipur. 
In Ahmadabad, percentage of property tax to total tax revenue has 
declined from 39.28 percent in 1960-61 to 13.75 percent in 1989.90. In 
Baroda, First it rose from 27.69 percent in 1970-71 to 33.00 percent in 
1975-76 and then declined to 17.04 percent in 1989-90 in Banglore, it 
has been stagnating, in Gwalior, it was 13.64 percent in 1960.61 then 
declined to very low level of 0.19 percent in 1975-76. It picked up fast 
in 1980-81 to 9.30 percent and reached to 14.10 percent in 1989-90 i.e., 
the same level as in 1960-61. In Indore, it was 15.51 percent in 1960-61, 
declined to dismal level of 0.13 percent in 1975-76. Then experienced 
a jump to 30.93 percent in 1980-81 and ultimately fell to the level of 
16.7 percent. Raipur is the municipality, showing fall to being with then 
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TABLE - 2.9 
Percentage of Service Tax to Total Tax 
Revenue in Selected Local Bodies 
(1) Ahmedabad 
(2) Baroda 
(3) Bangalore 
(4) Gwalior 
(5) Indore 
(6) Raipur 
(7) Ujjain 
(8) Bombay 
(9) Nagpur 
(10) Pune 
(11) Solapur 
(12) Kanpur 
(13) Lucknow 
(14) Varanasi 
(15) Calcutta 
60-61 
19.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
38.31 
31.35 
12.45 
35.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
(16) Chandranagar 45.78 
(17) Patna 
(18) Calicut 
(19) Cochin 
(19) Madras 
(20) Delhi 
91.54 
46.87 
0.00 
0.00 
1.33 
65-66 
12.8640 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1536 
0.000 
0.000 
29.5435 
32.2582 
9.3951 
30.1626 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
85.2459 
902755 
30.1893 
49.4038 
0.000 
1.2411 
70-71 
12.95 
27.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
11.20 
0.00 
23.20 
26.55 
8.76 
14.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.81 
44.39 
83.48 
34.62 
25.95 
0.00 
0.54 
75-76 
12.50 
33.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
5.12 
0.00 
32.70 
20.70 
8.29 
17.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.68 
33.92 
72.98 
35.26 
9.58 
0.00 
0.77 
80-81 
3.26 
23.93 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
7.32 
0.00 
31.65 
19.44 
5.99 
16.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.29 
27.18 
81.75 
27.80 
10.09 
0.00 
0.48 
85-86 
11.76 
19.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.25 
11.19 
0.00 
29.47 
24.64 
6.70 
18.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.86 
0.00 
69.89 
45.88 
8.05 
0.00 
0.44 
88-89 
0.60 
23.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
13.18 
0.00 
34.95 
25.36 
19.14 
20.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
ERR 
0.00 
0.00 
46.89 
6.62 
0.00 
ERR 
89-90 
16.63 
17.04 
ERR 
0.00 
2.11 
13.53 
0.00 
ERR 
ERR 
27.14 
20.140 
ERR 
0.00 
0.00 
ERR 
ERR 
ERR 
0.00 
21.67 
0.00 
ERR 
Source : Central Statistical Organisation : Statistical Abstract (Various Issues) 
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rise to the level of 24.60 percent in terminal year. Ujjain, first experi-
enced a decline to very dismal level of 0.70 percent in 1975-76 and then 
a significant rise to the level of 46.44 percent in 19^9-90. Bombay, a 
cosmpolitancity shows very poor performance of property tax. To begin 
with it was 43.72 percent in 1960-61, since then it has been experiencing 
a steady decline to 12.58 percent in 1988-89. Even inNagpur, picture is 
not good. Pune has also experienced a steep decline from 27.95 percent 
in 1960-61 to 15.16percent in 1989-90. Solapur too shows normal trend 
of decline. Kanpur shows the trend of decline from 28.32 percent in 
1960-61 to 19.77 percent in 1988-89. Lucknow first experienced an 
improvement from 23.81 percent in 1960-61 to 41.18 percent in 1965-
66 and then to a decline to 29.26 percent in 1989-90. Varanasi municipal-
ity has also experienced a steep decline from 31.11 percent in 1960-61 
to 9.97 percent in 1989-90. Calcutta has experienced a very dramatic 
decline. Madras, we have already seen that has also been showing a 
decline. 
Next, we take up the behaviour of service tax in the form of 
percentage of service tax to total tax revenue. Tabje 2.9 analysis of 
service taxes of 21 municipalities shows that picture is far from satisfac-
tory. Many municipalities does not impose service taxes at all out of 21 
municipalities, 6 municipalities do not impose property tax. In Ahmadabad 
service taxes contributed 19.70 percent of total tax revenue, it fell to 
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16.63 percent in 1989-90. This is similar to the behaviour of percentage 
property tax to total tax revenue. In Baroda, there was no service tax uptil 
1970. In 1970-71 it was 27.69 percent reached its maximum in 1975-76 
to 33.00 percent and subsequently fell continiously to 17.04 percent 
1989-90. In Indore, there, is slight improvement from 0.16 percent in 
1960-61 to 2.11 percent in 1989-90, Despite the fact that its share is too 
meagre. In Raipur, picture is rosy in the sense that, it was 11.20 percent 
in 1970-71 and rose to 13.53 in 1989-90. In Bombay, it was 38.31 
percent in 1960-61 and decline to 34.95 percent in 1988-89. Nagpur 
s h o w s 
the normal trend of decline from 31.35 percent in 1960-61 to 25.36 
percent in 1988-89. In Pune, we observe significant improvement, 
but it is not steady. In 1960-61 it was 12.45 percent then declined to 
5.99 percent in 1980-81, further it experiences an improvement in the 
position to 27.14 percent in 1989-90. If we plot the performance of 
service tax of Pune over the time period of 1960-61 and 1989-90, it 
will give a U-shape figure. Solapur shows the common trend of decline 
from 35.28 percent in 1960-61 to 20.14 percent in 1989-90. In 
Chandarnagar behaviour of service tax is quite irratic. In 1960-61 it 
was 45.78 percent, rose to 85.24 percent in 1965-66 and then declined 
to nil. Patna, Calicut shows almost the same picture of decline. 
Finally, in Delhi, contribution of service tax is quite insignificant. But, 
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eventhisinsignificantpercentageof 1.33 percent in 1960-61 declined to 
0.44 in 1988-89. In fine, we can say that contribution of service tax in 
total tax revenue is insignificant and even this has been experiencing 
constant stagnation or more commonly decline. 
Per Capita Revenue, Total Tax Revenue And Property Tax Revenue 
in Major Municipal Corporations 
Per capita total income, tax revenue and the yield from property 
tax are presented in Table 2.10.. It can be seen that per capita revenue of 
Calcutta corporation for the year 1989-90 was much Lower than that for 
other major municipal corporations, namely, Bombay, Delhi, Ahmadabad 
and Benglore. This trend supports the earlier observation that the per 
capita revenue expenditure was higher in the corporations where the level 
of per capita total revenue and tax revenue is also high. In Calcutta, per 
capita revenue, tax revenue and property tax revenue was Rs. 24.45, Rs. 
16.38 andRs. 15.26 respectively, it rose to Rs. 184.01, Rs. 62.03 and Rs. 
52.03 respectively in 1989.90. It gives us some idea about the perfor-
mance of total revenue, tax revenue and property tax. We can guage this 
much that comparative performance of the per capita revenue and tax 
revenue is better as compared to the per capita property tax. In Bombay, 
per capita revenue, tax revenue and property tax was Rs. 43.51, Rs. 38.14 
andRs. 31.28 respectively in 1960-61, it rose to Rs. 663.33, Rs. 561.34 
and Rs. 249.39 respectively in 1989-90. Bombay shows a much better 
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picture as compared to Calcutta. Bombay's per capita revenue is much 
more than Calcutta's. Further, Bombay has performed better as compared 
to Calcutta with respect to property tax. In Delhi, per capita revenue, tax 
revenue and property tax was Rs. 25.35, Rs. 14.04 and Rs. 553 respec-
tively. It rose to Rs. 343.07, Rs. 206.02 and Rs. 88.07 respectively in 
1989-90. In case of Delhi, we find that municipality has performed better 
than Calcutta on all fronts but its per capita revenue, tax revenue and 
property tax is less than Bombay's. In Madras municipality per capita 
revenue, tax revenue and property tax was Rs. 24.71, Rs. 16.19 and Rs. 
9.76 respectively in 1960-61, it rose to Rs. 144.66, Rs. 98.07 and Rs. 
44.07, respectively in 1989-90. Madras's per capita property tax is lower 
than the Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi's, the difference is more as com-
pared to Bombay and Delhi. And it is very close to Calcutta's per capita 
property tax. In Ahamedabad, per capita revenue, tax revenue and property 
tax was Rs. 37.32, Rs. 30.33 and Rs. 17.89 respectively in 1960-61. It 
rose to Rs. 382.03, Rs. 276.00 and Rs. 80.02 respectively in 1989-90. 
Ahamedabad's performance on all fronts is better than Calcutta, Delhi and 
Madras. But, it is less than Bombay, which has secured the highest per 
capita revenue, tax revenue and property tax. Finally, in Bangalore, per 
capitarevenue, tax revenue and property tax was Rs. 22.74, Rs. 13.14 and 
Rs. 4.16respectively in 1960-61. Itroseto Rs. 280.03,Rs. 51.01 andRs. 
38.01 respectively in 1989-90. Bangalore has performed poorly on tax 
120-A 
TABLE - 2.11 
Per Capita Property Tax (State Aggregate) 
(Rs.) 
State 
Maharashtra 
West Bengal 
Uttar Prades 
Rajasthan 
Karnataka 
Madhya Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Kerala 
Tamil Nadu 
1970-75 
1.47 
0.15 
0.19 
0.11 
0.58 
-
-
0.16 
0.50 
n.a. 
1975-80 
3.47 
0.26 
0.31 
0.13 
0.74 
-
-
0.15 
0.75 
n.a. 
1980-85 
4.89 
0.25 
0.37 
0.16 
0.82 
-
-
0.17 
0.78 
0.87 
1985-90 
6.00 
0.28 
0.43 
0.20 
0.86 
-
-
0.20 
0.85 
0.95 
Sources : 1. Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (various issues) 
2. Census ofIndia( 1961,1971,1981 and 1991) 
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revenue and property tax revenue fronts. Among all, Bengalore has 
performed poorly with respect to tax revenue and property tax. 
Thus, foregoing analysis shows that the per capita tax revenue for 
Bangalore during the year 1989-90 was Rs. 51.01, while Calcutta, Bombay, 
Delhi, Ahmadabad and Madras has achieved the per capita tax yield of Rs. 
62.03, Rs. 561.34, Rs. 206.02, Rs. 98.07 and Rs. 276.00. The same 
discrepancies hold good with regard to the property tax. The per capita 
property tax yield for the year 1989-90in Bangalore was Rs. 38.01, which 
was lower than the per capita property tax yield for the major corpora-
tions like Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Ahmadabad. 
Per Capita Property Tax (State A2gregate) 
We have analysed the behaviour of per capita property tax in 
some municipal corporations. Let us analyse the behaviour of property 
tax state-wise obviously state includes major as well as minor municipal-
ities, it will give us a much broader overview of the property tax behaviour. 
Table 2.11 shows that there is great variation in the per capita property 
tax of different states. On the one hand per capita property tax of 
Maharashtra was Rs. 1.47 andthatofRajasthanRs. 0.11 in 1970-71. Thus 
difference between the highest per capita property tax state and the 
lowest per capita property tax state is that of thirteen times round about. 
During 1985-90, the highest per capita property tax is that of Maharshtra 
again Rs. 6.00 and the lowest per capita property tax is that of Rajasthan 
121-A 
TABLE-2.12 
Per Capita Property Tax (State Ag£re2ate) 
(Rs.) 
State 
OCTROI STATES 
High Income 
Maharashtra 
West Bengal 
Average 
Low Income 
Uttar Prades 
Rajasthan 
Karnataka 
Madhya Pradesh 
Average 
1970-75 
1.47 
0.15 
0.81 
0.19 
0.11 
0.58 
-
0.29 
1975-80 
3.47 
0.26 
1.86 
0.31 
0.13 
0.74 
-
0.39 
1980-85 
4.89 
0.25 
2.57 
0.37 
0.16 
-
-
0.16 
1985-90 
6.00 
0.28 
0.28 
0.43 
0.20 
0.86 
-
0.35 
NON-OCTROI STATES 
Low Income 
Andhra Pradesh . . . . 
Bihar 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.20 
Kerala 0.50 0.75 0.78 0.85 
Tamil Nadu n.a. n.a. 0.87 0.95 
Average 0.33 0.45 0.82 0.90 
ENTRY TAX STATES 
Low Income 
Karnataka - - 0.80 0.90 
Madhya Pradesh . . . 
Average - - 0.80 0.85 
Sources : 1. Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (various issues) 
2. Census of India(1961,1971,1981 and 1991) 
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and Bihar Rs. 0.20. In 1990, we see that difference between the highest 
per capita property tax state and the lowest per capita property tax state 
is that of thirty times. Thus, we see that inequality between different 
states per capita property tax, especially the highest per capita property 
tax and the lowest per capita property tax state has risen to thirty times 
which is a more serious thing. 
Next, we study the behaviour of per capita property tax in octroi 
states and Non-octroi states in Table 2.12. Here, we find that per capita 
property tax is higher in non-octroi states than in octroi states. For 
example, the highest per capita property tax states belong to the 
octroi-states category while the lowest per capita property tax states 
belong to the Non-octroi states group. However, differences in the 
performance of municipal corporations in octroi and non-octroi 
states are not found statistically significant. This result may be 
interpreted to mean that the absence of octroi may have resulted in 
significantly lower revenue expenditure levels only in the municipalities 
of non-octroi states. Thus, no significant results are obtained to 
confirm that local bodies do undertake additional resource mobilisation 
to compensate for the loss of actroi. 
Percentage of Property Tax and Octroi in Own Revenue 
We know that octroi and property tax are two major sources of 
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TABLE-2.13 
Percentage of Property Tax and Octroi in Own Revenue 
State 
OCraOISTATES 
High Income 
Maharashtra 
West Bengal 
Average 
Low Income 
Utter Pradesh 
Kamataka 
Rajasthan 
Average 
1989-90 
25.01 
26.01 
23.02 
40.03 
36.04 
10.05 
10.01 
NON-OCTORAL STATES 
Low Income 
Bihar 
Tamil Nadu 
Kerala 
Average 
35.03 
99.3 
21.04 
59.00 
P T / o w n 
1970-71 
33.46 
38.25 
35.85 
n.a. 
35.42 
12.14 
23.78 
n.a. 
n.a. 
60.48 
60.40 
OC/own 
1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1989-90 
25.18 
36.04 
30.61 
15.92 
79.74 
7.38 
34.35 
38.75 
n.a. 
73.03 
55.89 
40.97 
25.34 
33.15 
15.91 
-
4.73 
10.32 
34.46 
99.11 
54.82 
62.80 
24.64 
25.07 
24.85 
n.a. 
-
11.40 
11.40 
n.a. 
99.20 
22.34 
60.77 
35.96 
0.09 
18.02 
n.a. 
61.33 
81.90 
71.61 
-
-
-
-
45.43 
17.13 
31.28 
52.14 
n.a. 
90.88 
71.51 
-
-
-
-
53.81 
35.17 
44.49 
59.191 
-
90.63 
74.91 
-
-
-
-
59.17 
20.40 
39.78 
62.14 
-
83.46 
72.80 
-
-
-
-
60.01 
30.0 
45.02 
65.01 
62.0 
89.0 
73.0 
-
-
-
-
ENTRYTAXSTATES 
Low Income 
kamataka 
Madhya Pradeshi 
Average 
80.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
82.69 
n.a. 
n.a. 
81.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
-
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
PT=PropertyTax 
OC=Octroi 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (Various Issues) 
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municipality revenue. It is better to compare the position of octroi and 
property tax in different states. This we do in Table 2.13, in this table we 
observe that percentage of property tax in own revenue has improved in 
1989-90 from 1970-71. Forexample, in 1970-71 percentage of property 
taxinownrevenue was 35.96, 0.09, 18.02,61.33, 81.90,71.61 percent 
in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Karnataka, Rajasthan respectively. Itrose 
to 60.01,30.0,45.02,62.0, 89.0 and 73 percent respectively in 1989-90. 
We can say that octroi is performing well. On the other hand percentage 
of property tax in own revenue has changed for worse from 1970-71 to 
1989-90. For example, in Maharashtra, percentage of property tax in own 
revenue was 33.46 in 1970-71, it declined to 25.01 percent in 1989-90. 
Similarly, in West Bengal, the percentage of property tax in own revenue 
was 38.25 in 1970-71, it declined to 26.01 in 1989-90. Same is the 
position of other states. 
Behaviour of Property Tax in Gujarat, Orissa, Delhi and Calcutta ; 
A Broader Overview 
In foregoing analysis we have seen the behaviour of per capita 
property tax in some states. In order to maintain uniformity in our 
analysis we could study only one demension of the property tax that is 
per capita property tax. Now, we will be making an analysis of property 
tax covering many dimensions of property tax. It is obvious that, 
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TABLE - 2.14 
Income From Property Tax and Tax Recovery 
in Municipalities of Gujarat 
SI. 
(1) 
1. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
Municipalities 
(2) 
South Gujarat 
A Class 
Navsari 
Bharuch 
B Class 
Valsad 
C Class 
Ankleshwar 
North Gujarat 
A Class 
Palanpur 
B Class 
Patan 
C Class 
Visnagar 
Saurashtra 
A Class 
Junagadh 
Porbandar 
B Class 
Dhoraji 
Morbi 
Gondal 
Jetpur 
Upleta 
Mahuva 
Surendranagar 
Dhrangadhra 
C Class 
Wankaner 
Palitana 
Savarkundala 
Mangrol 
Wadhwan 
Kutch 
B Class 
Bhuj 
Gandhidham 
C Class 
Anjar 
Mandvi 
1989-90 
Percentage of 
income from 
property tax 
to the total 
tax income 
(3) 
7.64 
9.34 
7.64 
1.17 
1.05 
2.73 
2.74 
51.66 
50.29 
57.80 
0.04 
5.27 
7.14 
28.60 
40.27 
36.00 
30.24 
0.03 
22.41 
33.81 
~ • 
30.00 
3.03 
84.67 
10.20 
1.75 
Percentage of 
property tax 
recovery 
(4) 
97.94 
65.88 
96.42 
77.51 
77.83 
59.41 
37.41 
22.27 
83.94 
• 
42.22 
60.22 
74.19 
46.97 
53.07 
25.62 
35.83 
71.00 
63.47 
48.39 
45.25 
59.50 
39,36 
96.00 
52.83 
90.69 
89.10 
Sources : Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (various issues) 
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we would not be able to maintain uniformity. But, it will give us an insight 
into the working of property tax in our country. 
Behavionr of Property Tax in Gujarat 
Property tax is a major source of municipal tax income in Gujarat. 
Income from property tax vary from one percent to 84 percent. Some of 
the municipalities levy property tax and general service taxes separately 
whereas some levy consolidated property tax including property tax, 
general water tax and general sanitary cess. Table 2.14 shows income 
from property tax in municipalities of Gujarat. There is no uniformity 
regarding property tax in Gujarat^^. Composition of property tax varies 
substantially from one municipal body to another, during last 10 years the 
income from property tax of different municipal bodies varied consider-
ably. This variation is due to real difference in rental level, efficiency of 
the tax collection machinery, public awareness, role of elected represen-
tatives, etc. Table 2.14. reveals the percentage of property tax to total tax 
income during 1989-91 in some of the the A,B and C class municipalities 
from different regions of Gujarat. It is observed that in the municipality 
of South Gujarat region, the percentage of property tax income to the 
total tax income is less than 10 percent. In North Gujarat region the 
contribution of municipal property tax / consolidated tax to the total tax 
income is low, municipalities like Patan (B class) and Visnagar (C class) 
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have very less (about 3%) income from property tax. 
In Sauashtra region the picture is mixed. In pre-independence era 
property tax was not levied in most of the princely states of Saurashtra 
region. Hence, even now the citizens are reluctant to pay property tax. 
Moreover, due to continuous drought, income from property tax is 
affected very badly. 
Percentage of the property tax income to the total tax income in 
"A" class municipalities like Junagarh is about 52 percent and in Porbander 
50 percent. In "B" class municipalities like Morbi, Gondal, Jetpur, in-
come from property tax is less than 10 percent. In three other municipal-
ities namely. Upleta, surendranagar and Dhrangadhra income from prop-
erty tax is between 20 to 30 percent. Property tax income in "C" class 
municipality of Wankaner constitutes less than one percent of the tax 
income in Wadhawan, income from property tax is about 30 percent. In 
Mandvi, income from property tax is about two percent. 
Thus, we reach to the conclusion that in Gujarat, like in other 
states, though the property tax is one of the major sources in the 
municipal revenue structure, the share of property tax in the total munic-
ipal revenue is on decline. 
Behaviour of Property Tax in Orissa 
Property tax along with octroi constitutes the mainstay of munic-
ipal revenues. Due to the fragile and often uncertain financial base of the 
12.5-A 
TABLE-2.15 
Property Tax (Holding Tax Including Service Taxes) 
Tax Revenue and Total Revenue, Ratio of Property 
Tax in Tax Revenue and Total Revenue, of the 
Local bodies in Orissa 
(Figure in Lakh) 
Year Property Tax Total Ratio of Ratio of Prop 
Tax Revenue Revenue Property Tax ertyTaxto 
toTaxRevenue TotalRevenue 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987.88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
151.82 
164.57 
180.25 
212.29 
252.62 
305.64 
396.5 
514.95 
668.48 
856.92 
936.51 
1038.83 
1463.54 
1745.27 
2118.6 
2570.7 
3109.7 
3762.03 
1503.47 
2337.08 
2227.90 
2795.7 
3518.13 
4237.2 
5296.25 
66.20 
82.75 
17.74 
2337.08 
17.34 
14.49 
14.44 
14.40 
15.40 
16.53 
17.75 
9.46 
17.57 7.9 
8.08 
7.58 
7.17 
7.19' 
7.47 
7.71 
8.07 
Source : Compiled from the figures of the Urban local bodies from the housing and 
urban development department. Government of Orissa. 
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TABLE - 2.16 
Year 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987.88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
C 
Holding 
86.25 
89.96 
96.99 
105.90 
117.74 
139.05 
149.00 
159.4 
170.15 
omoosition 
Lighting 
30.98 
35.04 
35.66 
49.04 
63.92 
78.19 
96.57 
120.71 
150.17 
of ProDC 
Latrine 
17.16 
19.93 
24.08 
31.61 
40.74 
51.86 
60.12 
72.13 
84.14 
srtv Tax 
Water 
14.23 
16.24 
19.35 
21.41 
24.82 
28.74 
32.10 
37.10 
42.13 
Drainage 
3.20 
3.50 
4.17 
4.33 
5.40 
6.80 
7.8 
8.1 
8.9 
Total 
151.82 
164.57 
180.25 
212.30 
252.6 
305.6 
345 
396.0 
455.0 
Source : Compiled from the figures of the Urban local bodies from the housing and 
urban development department. Government of Orissa. 
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municipal bodies, difficulties are witnessed in the maintenance of even 
the existing level of services out of the revenue they are able to generate 
from the tax resources. The abolition of octroi in many states and its 
substitution by the entry or turn over taxes, and the failure on the part of 
the municipal bodies to collect revenue from other tax resources mainly 
the property tax, has made it increasingly dependent on state government 
plan as well as non-plan funds. The present system of dichotomous fiscal 
arrangement for development and maintenance needs to be integrated 
through concrete measures to argument municipal fiscal capacity and 
performance, through a well - established system of transfer. ^ ^ Receiveing 
income generated from the internal sources is necessary to be mobilised 
through property tax so as to finance their increasing expenditure. 
Now, we study the different aspects of property tax of Orissa like 
- property tax, tax revenue and total revenue of the Urban local bodies, 
composition of property tax, growth of property taxes, tax revenue and 
total revenue ofthe Urban local bodies of Orissa from 1981-82 to 1989-
90 at current prices and constant prices and finally, changes in per capita 
yield from property taxes and tax revenue in the urban local bodies 
during, 1981-82 to 1989-90. 
First we take up property tax (Holding tax including service taxes), 
tax revenue and total revenue. Table 2.15, shows the property tax, tax 
revenue, total revenue. With the help of these information, we do some 
126-A 
T A B L E - 2 .17 
Growth in Property Taxes. Tax Revenue and Total Revenue of 
Urban Local Bodies of Orissa 1981-82 to 1989-90 at 
Current Prices and Constant Prices. 
Nature of Current Price Constant Price 
Revenue 
Property Tax 101.3 37.7 
Tax Revenue 147.2 69.3 
Total Revenue 164.3 80.9 
* Figures of constant price are deflated to 1981-82 price level on the 
basis of urban Non-manual consumer price index. 
Sources : Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract 
(various issues) 
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analytical work to assess the performance of property tax with respect to 
tax revenue and total revenue. Property tax as percentage of tax revenue 
was 17.74 percent in 1981-82 and was 17.75 in 1989-90. Thus, position 
of property tax with respect to tax revenue of the Orissa municipalities 
is more or less same. But, when we compare it with the National average, 
we find that Orissa municipalities position is not satisfactory, since 
national ratio of property tax to tax revenue is 28.5 percent. When we find 
out the ratio of property tax to total revenue we see that it was 9.46 
percent in 1981-82 and declined to 8.07 percent in 1989-90. This decline 
is due to a bit more fast rise in the growth of non-tax component of 
municipalities income. Thus, forgoing analysis revealed that the pattern of 
increase in property tax revenue has been, by and large, less than the growth in 
tax revnue and total revenue of the urban local bodies in the state. 
Next, we analyse the growth in property taxes, tax revenue and total 
revenue of the urban local bodies of Orissa from 1981-82 to 1989-90 at 
current prices and constant prices - as in Table 2.17. This table shows that 
property tax has grown at the rate of 101.3 percent during 1981-82 to 
1989-90, while tax revenue has grown at the rate of 147.2 percent during 
same period of time and total revenue at the rate of 164.3 percent. Thus, 
we find that growth rate of property tax is poor. In other words, property 
tax has not been able to keep pace with the tax revenue as well as non-tax 
components of the municipalities income. Studying property tax at 
127-A 
TABLE-2.18 
Changes in Per Capita Yield from property Taxes and 
Taxes Revenue in the Urban Local 
bodies, 1981-82 to 1989-90 
Nature of Revenue Per Capita Yield 
1981-82 1981-82 1989-90 
Current Constant 
TaxRevenue 
Property Tax 
27.5 
4.9 
49.3 
7.4 
35.3 
5.0 
* Figures at constant price are deflated at the 1981-82 levels on the basis of 
CPI-Urban Non-Manual. 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (Various Issues) 
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constant price shows that property tax grew at the rate of 37.7 percent 
during 1981-82 to 1989-90, while tax revenue grew at the rate of 69.3 
percent during the same period of time and total revenue grew at the rate 
of 80.9 percent. Thus, growth rates of three different variable during 
1981-82 to 1989-90 shows that property tax has not been performing 
well. In other words, growth rate of property tax is lower than the growth 
rate of tax revenue and total revenue. 
Per Capita Yield 
It is further important to see the implications of population in-
crease on the property tax yield and total tax revenue. The per capita yield 
at current as well as constant prices is given in Table 2.18. It is worth 
noting from an examination of the table that while the per capita yield 
form tax revenue at constant prices has shown an increase over the period 
1981-82 to 1989-90, the per capita yield from property taxes at constant 
prices has remained constant. For instance per capita yield from tax 
revenue was Rs. 27.5 in 1981-82, it rose to Rs. 49.3 in 1989-90, thus per 
capita revenue yield has almost doubled. But, on the other hand, per capita 
yield from property tax was Rs. 4.99 in 1981 -82, and it rose to merely Rs. 
7.2 in 1989-90. Even if we judge it by the criterian of constant prices, we 
find that performance of tax revenue is much impressive as compared to 
the property tax. 
The receipt from property tax in any particular year are composed 
128-A 
TABLE - 2.18 (a) 
Pattern of Urbanisation in Major Municipal 
Corporations in India 
(in Lalih) 
Corporation 1961 Rank 1971 Rank 1981 Rank 1991 Rank 
Ahmedabad 11.49 5 15.88 5 21.59 5 28.73 5 
Bangalore 11.41 6 15.48 6 26.29 6 26.51 6 
Bombay 39.98 1 59.71 1 82.43 1 99.10 1 
Calcutta 29.27 2 31.54 3 33.05 3 43.88 3 
Delhi 23.97 3 37.48 2 58.62 2 71.75 2 
Average 22.48 30.16 42.46 51.32 
Source : Census of India (1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991) 
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of collection from current year demand and collection on account of 
arrears. The improvements noticed in per capita yield at current price are 
largely due to a higher shift in collections for the current year. The 
position with regard to the collection of arrears seems to have deterio-
rated or remained constant. We can very safely conclude that the tax is 
not elastic to increasing service costs and is not related to demand for 
services, emancting from different land uses.^ "* 
Property Tax in Calcutta During Post 1980's 
The trend of urbanisation for the 6 major municipal corporations 
viz. Ahamedabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras indi-
cates that though the levels of urbanisation in these corporations have 
increased over the time, their relative position has remained almost 
static (Table 2.18 a). Thus, the position of Bombay, Bangalore, Ahamedabad 
and Madras remained the same during 1961 to 1919 whereas, Calcutta 
which occupied the 2nd positioin from 1961 to 1981 has declined to 3rd 
place by the year 1991. 
It may be contended that the rapid growth of uxbanistion in these 
municipal corporations would increase the demand for civic services 
which would raise the expenditure level of these corporations. The level 
of per capita revenue expenditure which is generally considered as an 
indicator of the level of Civil Services provided by the corporations has 
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TABLE-2.19 
Growth Rate of Per Capita Total Revenue Expenditure in 
Major Municipal Corporations 
(Per cent Per Annum) 
Municipal 
Corporation 
Ahmedabad 
Bangalore 
Bombay 
Calcutta 
Delhi 
1966-67 
to 
1979-80 
4.47 
4.98 
4.17 
2.96 
3.05 
Growth Rates 
1980-81 
to 
1989-90 
4.40 
6.25 
5.35 
4.35 
5.31 
1966-67 
to 
1989-90 
4.70 
4.77 
4.19 
3.81 
3.72 
Sources : 1. Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract 
(various issues) 
2. CensusofIndia(1961,1971,1981,& 1991) 
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gone up by 7 to 10 times for the major municipal corporations under 
reference as compared to the level which existed in 1960-61. Among the 
major corporations the performance of Calcutta Corporation in term of 
the provisions of urban public services was not only always poorer but 
level has been also lower than the National average (NCAER, 1980). A 
similar trend was also noticed in the case of municipalites of West 
Bengal as compared to states with similar level of urbanisation namely, 
Gujrat and Maharashtra (NIPFP, 1982). 
In adition to a lower per capita revenue expenditure for Calcutta 
corporation, its growth over the period was also the lowest in compar-
ison with other municipal Corporations. In absolute terms, the level of 
per capita revenue expenditure for Calcutta has increased from Rs 24.95 
in 1960-61 to Rs 171.55 1989-90, which is about 7 times. The municipal 
Corporation of Calcutta has not only a lower per capita expenditure but 
also a lower growth rate. It is seen that the per capita revenue expenditure 
given at the rate of 3.81 percent per annum during 1960-61 to 1989-90. 
In contrast to such a low rate of growth, the corporations of Ahamedabad, 
Bombay and Bangalore have registered, a higer rate of 4.19 percent per 
annum during the same period (Table 2.19). Similarly, the index of 
percapita revenue expenditure with 1960-61 as the base has also gone up 
to a little less than 7 times. However, in this regard when the position of 
Calcutta corporation is compared with other corporation for 1989-90 
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the index was 620, which was not only lower than other corporations but 
also lower than the National average of 900. The indices of Bombay and 
Delhi were 850 and 920 respectively. 
Despite being the oldest Corporation in West Bengal, the munic-
ipal corporation of Calcutta could not maintain a balance between reve-
nue and expenditure. The revenue should have also grown in accordance 
with the growth in the expenditure as the availability of resources with the 
local governments play a pivotal role in providing the minimum level of 
civic sercvices. 
Beside the other socio-economic and administrative consider-
ations, the major factor responsible for the lower growth of revenue has 
been low growth of economic activities in Calcutta. 
As has been observed the urban population of Calcutta has grown 
at a lower rate compared to other major corporation of the country. This 
low rate of growth could be responsible for supplying lower level of civic 
services by the local governments, who could not raise sufficient revenue 
due to the suggish rate of economic activites. 
The above discussion high liths the following features of Calcutta 
municipal corporation. 
1. The Urbanisation in Calcutta in general and in west Bengal in 
particular, has proceeded at a lower pace in comparison with other 
parts of the country. Such a trend shows that the economic activites 
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of the city may be growing at a slower rate, contributing to a low 
growth in the base of tax revenue of the local bodies. 
2. The per capita expenditure remains lower than other major 
corporations indicating an unsatisfactory level of services 
provided in the city. 
3. The yield from property tax, a major source of revenue for the 
municipal corporation, has registered a low rate of growth . This 
might have effected the expenditure on the services provided. 
In view of these observations, it becomes pertinent to 
examine the change in the growth rates of expenditure and revenue yield 
of property tax over time. In particular, it will be useful to assess, whether 
the revenue yield as well as the service standard has seen any improve-
ment in recent years. 
The First municipal Finance Commission which assessed the 
major problems of the local bodies in the state recommended measures 
to improve the property collection. The period after the submission of 
the commission's report should, therefore, have undergone some 
improvement. 
Growth Rate of Per Capita Revenue Expenditure in Major 
Municipal Corporations 
It may be contended that the rapid growth of urbanisation in 
municipal corporations would increase the demand for civic services 
CHRPTCa - 8 • 132 
which would raise the expenditure level of these corporations. Here, we 
consider the case of a few major municipal corporartions like 
Ahamedabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi. Growth rate of per 
capita revenue expenditure can be compared with the growth rate of per 
capita tax income and growth rate of per capita property tax. This way we 
can know that whether the growth rate of per capita property tax has been 
keeping pace with the growth rate of per capita revenue expenditure. 
Normally, it is expected that per capita property tax should grow in line 
with the expenditure growth , per capita. The level of per capita revenue 
expenditure which is generally considered as an indicator of the level of 
civic services provided by the corporations has gone up by seven to ten 
times for the major municipal corporations under reference as compared 
to the level which existed in 1960-61. 
Among the major corporation the performance of Calcutta Corpo-
ration in terms of the provisions of urban public services was not only 
always poorer, but the level was also lower than the National average 
(NCAER, 1980). A similar trend was also noticed in the case of the 
municipalities of West Bengal as compared to states with similar level 
of urbanisation namely Gujrat and Maharashtra (NIPFP, 1982). 
In adition to lower per capita revenue expenditure for Calcutta 
Corporation, its growth over the period was also the lowest in compari-
sons with other Municipal corporations. In Ahamedabad, per capita 
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revenue expenditure has grown at the rate of 4.7 percent during the period 
1966-67 to 1989-90. In Banglore, growth rate has been 4.77 percent. In 
Bombay, growth rate has been 4.19 percent. In Calcutta, growth rate has 
been 3.81 percent and in Delhi growth rate has been 3.72 percent. When 
we compare the growth rate of per capita revenue expenditure of these 
five major municipal corporation, we find that, among all the municipal 
corporations, the municipal corporation of Calcutta has not only a lower 
per capita expenditure but also alower growth rate. It is seen that the per 
capita revenue expenditure grew at the rate of 3.81 percent per annum 
during 1960-61 to 1989-90. In contrast to such a low rate of growth ,the 
corporation of Ahamedabad , Bombay and Bangalore have registered a 
higher rate of 4.19 percent per annum during the same period (Table. 
2.19). Similarly, the index of per capita revenue expenditure with 1960-
61 as the base, has also gone upto a little less than 7 times. However, in 
this regard when the position of Calcutta corporation is comapred with 
the other corporations for 1989-90, the index was 590, which was not 
only lower than other corporations, but also lower than the National average of 
859. The index for Bombay and Delhi were 824 and 888 respectively.^^ 
Growth Rate of Property Tax in Major Municipal Corporations 
We have analysed the growth rate of revenue expenditure in major 
municipal corporation, now we will see that how property tax . Then we 
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TABLE - 2.19 (a) 
Growth Rate of Property Tax in Maior Municipal Corporations 
Corporation 
Calcutta 
1960-61 
1980-81 
1960-61 
Bombay 
1960-61 
1980-81 
1960-61 
Delhi 
1960-61 
1980-81 
1960-61 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
to 
Bangalore 
1960-61 
1980-81 
1960-61 
to 
to 
to 
1979-80 
1989-90 
1989-90 
1979-80 
1989-90 
1989-90 
1979-80 
1989-90 
1989-90 
1979-80 
1989-90 
1989-90 
Property 
Tax 
5.31 
9.91 
6.73 
0.53 
3.22 
11.55 
13.76 
17.91 
13.70 
13.00 
10.41 
12.87 
Property 
Tax 
Prices 
-0.76 
2.07 
0.17 
0.48 
2.91 
4.08 
6.77 
7.87 
6.28 
5.76 
1.47 
5.08 
Per Capita 
Property Tax 
at constant 
4.66 
6.84 
5.83 
0.55 
3.33 
8.07 
8.93 
13.46 
9.02 
9.64 
7.80 
9.61 
Property Tax 
at constant 
-1.37 
-0.79 
-0.66 
0.50 
3.01 
0.84 
2.23 
3.80 
1.91 
2.62 
-0.93 
2.04 
Notes : P I = Property Tax PI* = Property Tax at Constant Prices 
PTp* = Per capita property tax 
PTp* = Per capita property tax at constant prices 
Sources : Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (various issues) 
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can have a comparative study of Growth of revenue expenditure and 
property tax. In one sense, there will be an equilibrium only when both are 
growing at the same rate. 
Table 2.19 (a) shows growth rate of property tax and per capita 
property tax in major municipal corporations. Growth rate of per capita 
property tax has been 5.83 percent, 8.07 percent, 9.02 percent, 9.02 
percent and 9.61 percent of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Ahamedabad and 
Bangalore respectively, during 1960-61 to 1989-90. On the other hand 
growth rate of per capita revenue expenditure has been 4.7, 4.77, 4.19, 
3.81, and 3.72 of Ahamedabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi 
respectively. We see that, so far as growth rate of per capita revenue 
expenditure and per capita property tax is concerned, there is almost no 
problem . But, when we study the performance of property tax and 
percapita property tax at current prices and at constant prices we find that 
property tax is performing unsatisfactorily. For example, growth rate of 
property tax at current prices has been 6.73, 11.55, 13.70, 13.70 and 
12.87 percent in Calcuttta, Bombay, Delhi, Ahamedabad and Bangalore 
respectively. But same has been 0.17, 4.08, 6.28, NA and 5.08 respec-
tively. Which can not be characterised as satisfactory. It means, there has 
not been considerable growth in the property tax in real terms. Perfor-
mance of per capita property tax in real terms is still more unsatisfactory 
for example, growth of per capita property tax at constant prices has been 
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negligible in all municipal corporations considered here. In Calcutta, per 
capita property tax at constant prices grew at the rate of 0.66 percent and 
0.84 percent, 1.91 percent, 1.91 percent, 2.04 percent in Bombay, Delhi, 
Ahamedabad and Bangalore respectively. 
In fine, the per capita growth of Calcutta's property tax at current 
prices (with 1960-61 as the base year), during 1960-61 to 1989-90, is 
0.66 percent per annum. Other major municipal corporation of the 
country under consideration registered a much higher rate of growth 
compared to that of Calcutta. The growth rates of per capita property tax 
achieved by the major municipal corporations, namely, Bombay, 
Delhi, Ahmedabad and Bangalore were 0.84,1.91,1.91, and 2.04 percent 
per annum respectively, and when we compare it with per capita 
revenue expenditure of same municipal corporations, we find that growth 
rate of per capita property tax is not matching with the growth rate of per 
capita expenditure. 
Growth Rates of Revenue. Expenditure and Property Tax of Some States 
In foregoing part, we have analysed the performance of revenue 
especially property tax and expenditure of some major municipal corpo-
rations, we saw that performance of property tax is not upto mark. Now 
let us see the performance of revenue and expenditure and property tax of 
some states. It is obvious that a state includes large as well as small 
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T A B L E - 2.20 
Growth Rates of Revenue. Expenditure and Property Tax 
(Corporation Series) 
(Per cent per annum) 
State 
Maharashtra 
Gujarat 
West Bengal 
Delhi 
Uttar Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Tamil Naud 
Kerala 
Karnataka 
Madhya Pradesh 
Total 
revenue 
13.476 
14.867 
5.292 
12.857 
6.825 
11.02 
n.c. 
-
11.452 
13.206 
8.708 
Total 
expenditure 
12.691 
15.148 
4.500 
12.753 
6.488 
18.617 
n.c. 
-
14.612 
9.783 
Per capita 
property tax 
5.880 
7.407 
4.332 
8.888 
7.594 
8.133 
5.940 
6.405 
12.349 
8.437 
8.000 
Sources : Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract 
(various issues) 
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municipalities, further, number of small municipalities will be much 
larger than the number of large municipalities. It is obvious that average 
of all municiapalities of a state will be modest as compared to the growth 
rates of major municipal corporations. But, the greatest advantage of 
analysis of state's performance is that it will give us idea about the 
national average. This way we can knowthat how the municipalities on an 
average have been performing, property tax and expenditure. Only then 
we can reach to some approximate conclusion at the national level and it 
will help in evolving a sound national policy regarding property tax. 
Table 2.20 shows the growth rates of revenue expenditure and 
property tax. In this table we have data of 11 states. There are three 
columns in this table. Column 1 shows the growth rates of total revenue 
percent per annum, column 2, shows the total expenditure growth rates 
percent per annum. And column 3 shows the per capita property tax 
growth rates percent per annum. When we make a comparative study of all 
the variables presented in the Table 2.20, we find that there is some kind 
of equilibrium between the growth rates of total revenue and growth rates 
of total expenditure of different states included in this table. But, when 
we make a comparative study of the behaviour of total revenue and per 
capita property tax we find that growth rates of per capita property tax 
percent per annum is much lower than the growth rates of total revenue 
percent per annum. Obviously per capita property tax also takes into 
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consideration the population factor. But, India's population has been 
growing at the rate of 2.2 percent per annum. If we make adjustment for 
it even then we find that performance of property tax is quiet unsatisfac-
tory. For example, in Maharashtra, growth rate of total revenue has been 
13.476 percent per annum, while growth rate of per capita property tax 
hasbeenmerely 5.88 percent per annum. Making adjustment for popula-
tion at the rate of 2.2 percent per annum, we find that, growth rate of per 
capita property tax is significantly less. This is the case with almost all 
the states hence, we reach to the conclusion that, performance of prop-
erty tax is poor. Property tax is unable to keep pace with other compo-
nents of revenue of the municipalities. Similarly, growth rate of property 
tax is not in line with the growth rate of total expenditure. In fine, we 
can say that, performance of property tax is quiet unsatisfactory 
from this anlge. 
Buoyancy and Elasticity of Property Tax 
The relationship between the tax yield and the factors affecting it 
over time are usually measured in terms of the buoyancy or elasticity 
coefficient. If the tax yield is affected by discretionary tax measures due 
to changes in rates over the period under consideration then the ratio of 
percentage change in tax to that in income is the buoyancy coefficient. 
While the elasticity coefficient is defined as the ratio of the percentage 
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change, automatic or responsive, in the dependent variable, eg, tax yield 
to percentage change in an independent variable, i.e income. 
An increasingly dormant Fiscal role of property tax apart, it is no 
longer an elastic source of revenue. A study conducted in early eightees 
revealed that whereas the elasitcity of property tax at constant price to 
population is weak in the case of Bomaby, Delhi and Madras, it is 
inelastic in Ahamedabad and negative in Calcutta. In Calcutta it was found 
inelastic even to the cost of construction (West Bengal 1982: 14-15) 
Despite a massive cosntruction upsurge in Delhi, property tax was found 
inelastic to capital investment at the city level and the number of holdings 
(Jha 1988: 184). A recent study of property tax in Delhi shows that 
between 1971 and 1989 the growth of property tax in per capita terms has 
fallen behind that of land prices, rents and general cost of construction. 
The buoyancy of property tax per capita with respect to average land and 
price was around 0.5; withrespeect to cost of construction, it was around 
0.8. It was abaout 0.7 with respect to rents (Delhi Administration 1990: 
22-23). The administrative deficiencies in valuation, assessment, and 
collection and the legal constraint associated with the very nature of the 
base as defined in the statutes have led to an erosion in the base. This has 
adversely affected buoyancy and elasitcity of property tax in India. 
Further, the tax is not elastic to increasing service costs and is not related 
to demand for services emanating from different land uses.^^ 
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An analysis of Delhi's property tax shows that property tax has not 
proved to be a buoyant and elastic source of revenue due to the operation 
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. There is a provision in this Act for 
determination of standard Rent for a property after the Fifth Year of its 
construction, which is determined on the basis of the price of land at the 
time of construction and cost of construction. The rateable value is to be 
determined at 81.4 percent of the cost thus arrived at. This provision was 
extended to even those properties for which the standard rent has not yet 
been determined by a Rent Controller. According to a judegement deliv-
ered by the Supreme Court, the base of the tax will be standard rent as 
determinable according to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control 
Act." This has led to depressing of the base of property tax in Delhi 
particularly with respect to the old properties an attempt was made to do 
away with this provision by amending the Delhi Rent Control Act. 
However the operation of the amended Act has been suspended in view of 
a spate of protests from the assessces. Presently, high powered commit-
tee of the Delhi Administration is examining the various aspects of the 
proposed property tax structure and system in Delhi. Till then tax has to 
be administered on the depressed base. 
It is perhaps due to this effect of Rent laws on property valuation 
that the yield from this tax is not found to be elastic to the indicators of 
urban development like manufacturing activities. Trade and Commerce, 
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capital investment by the DDA, per capita income and above all the 
argumentation in housing stock^^. Its elasticity, according to a recent 
study, to the housing stock was found to be 0.7090. Elasticities to 
manufacturing activities, trade and commerce, capital investment by the 
DDA and per capita income was found to be 0.5352, 0.4443, 0.1605 and 
0.6090 respectively. This is also coroborated by a lower average, as-
sessed value per holding and average property tax per holding in Delhi as 
compared to other municipal corporations in the metropolitan cities.^^ 
There has been a very increasing evidence over recent years that 
the property tax has not been a buoyant source of revenue. Between 1970-
71 and 1976-77 total property tax receipts in 51 sampled bodies were 
found to increase at about 15 percent per year^°. This growth in revenue 
has not been commensurate with the potential that-it has keeping in mind 
the increases in market values of property over the same period. This is 
also reflected in a study of sampled local bodies. Per capita property tax 
income decreased from Rs 23 in 1979-80 to Rs 19 in 1983-84.^' 
A paper was presented by Amresh Bagchi on Property Tax Reform 
in the case of Delhi, at workshop on Property Tax Reform in India 
Hyderabad, January 11-13,1989. Dr Bagchi pointed out that elasticity of 
property tax is low. He holds that the have of property taxation in Delhi 
as in the other municipal jurisdictions in India has been basically two-
fold: (1) gross disparities in the incidence of tax as between similar 
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TABLE - 2.21 
Estimates of Buovancv of Prooertv Tax with respect to 
Population and Urban Income 
Buoyancy 
Calcutta 
Log PT : 
Log PT : 
Log PT : 
LogPT* 
1 
LogP 
LogP 
LogUy 
: Log UY* 
Ahmedabad 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
LogP 
: LogP 
LogUY 
: Log UY* 
Bangalore 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Bombay 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Delhi 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
Log PT : 
Log PT* 
PT 
P 
PT* 
UY 
UY* 
Sources 
LogP 
: LogP 
LogUY 
: Log UY* 
LogP 
: LogP 
LogUY 
: Log UY* 
LogP 
: LogP 
LogUY 
1960-61 
to 
1989-90 
7.2640 
0.4215 
0.7462 
-0.0047 
2.8182 
0.5224 
0.6596 
0.2006 
4.1307 
1.7308 
0.9298 
0.5166 
3.3740 
1.3818 
0.8458 
0.4450 
3.0550 
1.4554 
0.6095 
: Log UY* 0.3590 
Property Tax 
Population 
Property 
1960-61 
to 
1979-80 
8.2025 
-1.3121 
0.6623 
-0.1498 
2.8025 
0.7020 
0.7126 
0.2320 
4.0525 
1.8571 
0.9461 
0.4744 
3.1002 
1.3704 
0.8363 
0.4323 
2.9715 
1.5156 
0.6780 
0.4039 
Tax at Constant Prices 
= Urban Income 
= Urban Income at constant prices 
: 1. Central Statistical Orgai 
1980-81 
to 
1989-90 
-3.0070 
3.3711 
0.7046 
0.9906 
2.6343 
-1.5475 
0.4674 
-0.7397 
4.4969 
-0.8099 
0.6274 
0.2633 
11.0814 
0.4418 
1.1975 
0.2986 
5.9938 
2.5617 
0.5885 
0.4112 
lisation. Statistical Abstract 
(various issues). 
Census of India (1961,1981 and 1991). 
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properties and (2) lack of elasticity in the revenue stemming from 
stagnatin in the base Factors primarily responsible for these infirmities 
are believed to be (1) linking of the tax base with the concept of "standard 
rent" as envisaged under the rent control laws and (11) The widespread 
practice of understanding the rents recieved and investments actually 
made in real estate. Administrative weaknesses have also contributed to 
the ills of the property tax as it is operating at present. 
Estimates of Buoyancy of Property Tax with Respect to Population 
and Urban Income 
Now we will have a study of buoyancy of property tax with 
respect to population and Urban income of some major municipal 
corporations. Table. 2.21. 
Calcutta: Calcutta municipal corporation appears to have a buoyant 
property tax when the tax is considered in terms of current prices. The 
results of estimated buoyancy coeffecients presented in table 2.21 show 
that, for the entire period, between 1960-61 to 1989-90, the buoyancy 
with respect to population in Calcutta is much greater than unity (7.26 
percent) with respect to the other variable, i,e. Urban income, the 
buoyancy of the property tax in Calcutta is, however, much lower (0.75). 
When considered in real terms, the buoyancy coefficients with 
respect to both population and urban income fail to show a buoyant 
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performance. Buoyancy of property tax with respect to population at 
current price is 7.26, while the same at constant price is 0.42. Similarly, 
property tax with respecet to Urban income has been 0.74 and the same 
at constant price has been -0.0047. Thus, when buoyancy measured in real 
terms we find that property tax has not been significantly responsive to 
either population or urban income. 
In our analysis, period, considered as 1960-61 tol989-90. In 
order to have idea about the change in buoyancy of property tax over time 
it is essential that we divide the time period into two atleast. In our 
present analysis we divide the time period into two i,e. 1960-61 to 1979-
80 and 1980-81 to 1989-90. This way we can know the change in 
buoyancy in 60's, 70's and 80's. It is found that the buoyancy coeffi-
cients of property tax with respect to urban income at both current and 
constant prices has improved in the 1980's compared to that for the 
1960s and 1970s. 
As the table indicates in the first period the coefficients at current 
and cosntant prices were 0.66 and 0.15. In the second sub-period the 
improved coefficients were 0.70 and 0.99. An improvement in the buoy-
ancy coefficient it is also noticed with respecet to population. The 
coefficients associated with these variables are 8.20 and 1.31 in the first 
period. In the second sub-period the percentage change in property tax 
with respect to percentage change in population was -3.01 at current 
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prices, whereas at constant prices it was 3.37. It may be useful to point 
out that the buoyancy coefficients in the second sub-periods was found 
satisfactorily significant from that of the first sub-period. 
Ahmedabad 
Ahmedabad municipal corporation has a buoyant property tax, 
when the tax is considered in terms of current prices, alike Culcutta 
municipal corporation. Buoyancy coefficient for the entire period, be-
tween 1960-61 to 1989-90, the buoyancy with respect to population in 
Ahmedabad is greater than unity (2.81), with respect to the other variable, 
i.e. urban income the buoyancy of the property tax in Ahamedabad is, 
however, much lower (0.66). 
When considered in real terms, the buoyancy coefficiet with 
respect to population fail to show a buoyant performance. Since log PT: 
Log P = 2.81, while Log PT *: Log P = 0.52. But, buoyancy coefficient 
with respect to urban income at constant prices shows significant fall. 
Since :Log PT: Log UY * =0.65 while log PT* : Log UY* = 20. In fine 
property tax, during the whole period, shows significantly high buoyancy 
coefficient, when measured with respect to population at current prices. 
But, buoyancy coefficient is low when measured at constant prices. 
Similarly, buoyancy coefficients with respect to urban income at con-
stant constant prices also fall or is less than unity (Log PT: Log UY = 
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0.65) > (Log PT *: Log UY* = 0.20). The difference in performance of 
the tax can be assessed from the buoyancy coefficients of two sub-
periods. It is found that the buoyancy coefficients of property tax with 
respect to population at both current and cosntant prices has deteriorated 
in the 1980s as comapared to that for the 1960s and 1970s. As the table 
indicates in the first period, the coefficients at current and constant 
prices were 2.80 and 0.70. In the second sub-period, the deteriorated 
coefficients were 2.63 and -1.54. Thus performance of Ahamedabad 
municipality is different from that of the Calcutta. In Calcutta, we 
noticed that buoyancy coefficient with respect to populatin both at 
current prices and at cosntant prices improved during 1980s. But, in 
Ahamedabad, we notice a deterioration in both log PT: log P and logPT *: 
LogP, during 1980s. 
So far as buoyancy coefficients with respect to urban income is 
concerned, we find that, there is change for the worse since log PT: log 
UP during 1960-61 to 1979-80 was 0.7 land log PT: log UY during 1980-
81 to 1989-90 is 0.46 similarly log PT* : Log UY during 1960-61 to 
1079-80 was 0.23 and it fell to -0.73 during 1989-90. Overall, we can say 
that Ahamedabad municipal corporations buoyancy coefficient of 
property tax is not satisfactory. 
Bangalore 
Bangalore municipal corporation's property tax buoyancy 
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coeffecients for the entire period, between 1960-61 to 1989-90, with 
respect to population is much greater than unity (4.13) with respect to 
other variable, i.e urban income, the buoyancy of the property tax in 
Bangalore is, however much lower (0.92). 
When considered in real terms, the buoyancy coefficients with 
respect to population is greater than unity (173). Here we notice that 
Bangalore's position is better than Calcutta and Ahamedabad as Calcutta 
and Ahamedabad's property prices have been coefficient with respect to 
population at constant prices have been less than unity i.e 0.42 and 0.52 
respecetively but buoyancy coefficient with respect to urban income at 
constant prices is less than unity and is less than Log PT; log UY. Since 
log PT *: log UY* = 0.51 is less than log PT : log UY = 0.92. 
Now, let us compare the property tax buoyancy in two periods in 
order to know the performance of the tax. Table shows that property tax 
buoyancy with respect to population at current prices has improved 
slightly during 1980s from 1960s and 1970s, since log PT: log P = 4.05 
(during 1960-61 to 1979-80) is less than log PT : log P = 4.49 (during 
1980s). But, when we compare property tax buoyancy with to respect 
population at constant prices and with respect to urban income at current 
prices and constant prices we find that, there has been deterioration all 
round during 1980s. Since log PT *: Log P = -0.80 (during 1980') 
similarly log PT : log UY = 0.94 (during 1960's, 1970's) is greater than 
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Log PT : log P = 1.85 (during 1960s and 1970s) is greater than log PT: 
log Uy = 0.62 (during 1980s). And finally, log PT *: log UY *= 0.47 
(during 1960s and 1970s) is greater than Log PT * : log UY* = 0.26 
during 1980s. Thus, we reach to the conclusion that, in Bangalore 
municipal corporation, property tax buoyancy has deteriorated during 
second period except property tax bouoyancy with respect to population 
at current prices which certainly has improved slightly. 
Bombay 
In Bombay municipal corporation, property tax buoyancy with 
respect to population (log PT; log P) at current prices during the whole 
period i.e 1960-61 to 1989-90 is statistically significant that is more 
than unity (3.37). Similarly log PT*: logP is also more than nity (1.88). 
On the contrary, during the same period of time, property tax bnoyancy 
with respect to population at current prices and constant prices have been 
statistically insignificant i.e less than unity (log PT : log UY = 0.84 and 
logPT*: log UY = 0.44). 
Now, let us comapre the buoyancy of first period i,e 1960-61 to 
1979-80 to the second period i.e 1980-81 to 1989-90. Only in one 
respect there is improvement in second period that is property tax at 
current prices with respect to population has improved during 1980s, 
from 4.05 to 4.49 otherwise in all three rerspects, there has been 
deterioration during 1980s. Table shows that log PT* : log P = 1.85 
CHAPTCII - S " 147 
during 1960s , 1970s, it deteriorated to -0.80. Similarly, log PT : log Uy 
= 0.94 during 1960s , 1970s ,it deriorated to 0.62 during 1980s. And 
finally, log PT*: log UY* = 0.43 in first period and declined to 0.29 
during 1980s. 
Thus, our foregoing analysis about Bomabay shows that property 
tax buoyancy with respect to population both at current prices and 
constant prices for entire period is statistically significant (3.37 and 
1.88 respectively) but, tax buoyancy with respect to other variable i.e 
urban income is statistically insignificant or less than unity (0.84,0.44) 
both at constant prices and current prices. So for as buoyancy position 
over time is concerned it has improved in one respect only and is 
statistically significant. It is tax buoyancy with respect to population at 
current prices. Log PT: Log P = 3.10 during 1960s, 1970s, it improved 
to 11.08 during 1980s. And in other remaining three respects, tax 
bouyancy (Log PT* Log P Log PT : Log UY & Log PT* : Log UY*) has 
declined and is statistically insignificant during 1980s. 
Delhi 
In Delhi, property tax buoyancy with respect to population at 
current and constant prices in whole period is statistically significant i.e 
more than unity. Log PT: Log P=3.05 and Log PT* : Log P=1.45. 
But , when we measure property tax buoyancy with respect to other 
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variable i.e urban income, we find that tax buoyancy both at current 
prices and constant prices is statistically insignificant or is less than 
unity. Log PT : Log UY = 0.60 and Log PT* : Log UY* = 0.35. 
For Delhi, 1980s has proved to be better from property tax buoy-
ancy point of view in two respects i.e property tax buoyancy with respect 
to population both at current prices and at cosntant prices. Table shows 
that Log PT: Log P=2.97 during 1960s, 1970s, it improved to 5.99 during 
1980s. Similarly Log PT*: Log P = 1.51 during 1960s, 1970s and 
improved to 2.56 during 1980s. On the contrary, property tax buoyancy 
with respect to population at current and constant prices declined during 
1980s. In first period Log PT: Log UY = 0.67, it declined to 0.58 in 
second period. Similarly, Log PT*: Log UY*= 0.40 during 1960s and 
1970s, it declined to 0.41 during 1980s. 
Till now, we have made analysis of property tax buoyancy of some 
maj or municipal corporation. Now in isolation let us make a comparative 
study of state of property tax of same municipal corporations. It is found 
that the corporation of Calcutta has the highest buoyancy coefficient of 
property tax with respect to population at current prices but with respect 
to urban income at constant prices, its coefficeint is lower than that of 
Bombay and Bangalore. 
When the property tax yield is considered in terms of constant 
prices and its movement is examined by relating it to the percentage 
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change in population the buoyancy coeffecient turned out to be the 
lowest in Calcutta during the period 1960-61 to 1989-90. As may be seen 
from the table, the relevant coeffecients are 0.42, 1.28, and 1.46 for 
Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi respectively. 
In contrast to the dismal performance shown during 196061 to 
1989-90, the buoyancy registered a marked improvement during the 
1980s. The coefficient of property tax with respect to population when 
the tax revenue is considered at constant price is the highest in the case 
of Calcutta. It is shown in the table that the above mentioned buoyancy 
coeffecient during the 1980s is 3.37 for Calcutta with other corporations 
such as Bombay and Delhi having 0.44 and 2.56 respectively. 
Buoyancy Estimates of Property Tax and Total Tax Revenue of 
Some States 
Our foregoing analysis about the property tax buoyancy is limited 
to a few major municipal coporations. But findings of that analysis 
does not say much about the national condition rergarding property tax 
buoyancy. Hence, our analysis would be inadequate unless buoyancy is 
analysed at state level. Because of this, now, we make an analysis of the 
state of property tax buoyancy and tax revenue buoyancy of some states; 
since it is not possible to do an analysis covering all the states owing to 
non-availability of data. 
150-A 
TABLE - 2.22 
Buoyancy Estimates of Property Tax and Total Tax 
Reyenue (Municipal Corporations) 
(1961 - 1990) 
State property Tax 
Tax Revenue 
Maharashtra 0.7544 1.0608 
Gujarat 0.8695 1.0608 
West Bengal 0.9171 1.1099 
Delhi 1.0764 1.0841 
Uttar Pradesh 0.7123 0.7232 
Andhra Pradesh 0.9756 0.9395 
Bihar -0.0144 -0.9277 
Tamil Nadu 
Karnataka 0.7496 1.0045 
Madhya Pradesh 0.9446 0.7706 
Sources : Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract (various issues) 
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Table 2.22 shows buoyancy estimates of property tax and Total Tax 
Revenue (municipal corporations) during 1960-61 to 1989-90. Let us 
consider the buoyancy of property tax and tax revenue of each state one 
by one. Then only we will be in a position to make a comparative study of 
different states, buoyancy, let us make one point clear here that, states 
considered in this analysis includes municipal corporations only, owing 
to lack of data. First, in Maharashtra, buoyancy of the property tax is 
statisticalUy insignificant or is less than unity (0.75). Further, it is less 
than bnoyancy coefficient of tax revenue which is statistically signifi-
cant (1.06). Thus, we find that tax revenue of the municipal corporations 
of Maharashtra is reasonably buoyant but property tax is not growing at 
the rate at which it could grow. And, property tax performance is not in 
line with the performance of the tax revenue. In fine, Maharashtra's 
municipal corporations property tax is not buoyant. 
Next, we take up the case of Gujarat. In Gujarat municipal corpo-
rations tax revenue's buoyancy coefficient is statistically significant, 
because it is more than unity (1.12). 
But, so for as buoyancy coefficient of property tax is concerned it 
is insignificant since it is less than unity (0.86). As compare to 
Maharashtra's municipal corporations tax buoyancy, Gujarat's tax 
buouyany is more. 
In West Bengal tax revenue buoyancy coefficient is statistically 
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significant, since it is more than unity (1.10) but, buoyancy coefficient 
of property tax is not signifcant. It is merely 0.91. It shows that even in 
West Bengal municipal corporations, property tax has not been perform-
ing well and is not in line with other taxes of the municpal corporations. 
Delhi municipal corporation, is different from other states munic-
ipal corporations. In Delhi, tax buoyancy of tax revenue has been statis-
tically significant at 1.08. 
Buoyancy coefficient of property tax has also been statistically 
significant, since it is more than unity (1.07). We find that in Delhi, 
property tax has been performing well and property tax performance is in 
line with the performance of overall tax revenue of the municipal 
corporations. Thus we find that Delhi's property tax performance is quiet 
distinct from other states performance. 
So far as Uttar Pradesh's municipal corporations property tax 
buoyancy coefficient is concerned, we find that it is not satisfactory. It 
is less than unity (0.71). Similarly, buoyancy coefficient of tax revenue 
has been 0.72, statistically insignificant. So, in Uttar Pradesh municipal 
corporations, property tax has not been a productive thing. It is not that 
only property tax has not been performing well, same is the case with 
other tax revenue as well. Here, property tax is in line with other tax 
revenue in the sense that buoyancy coefficients of both property tax and 
tax revenues are almost identical, property tax buoyancy coefficient is 
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0.71 and buoyancy coefficient of tax revenue is 0.72. 
In Andhra Pradesh municipal corporations, property tax buoyancy 
coefficient is statistically insignificant (0.97). 
Condition of tax revenue buoyancy coefficient is not satisfactory. 
It is 0.93. When we compare the position of property tax and tax revenue, 
we find that property tax has been performing comparatively better 
though statistically, performance of both are not satisfactory. 
Next we take up the case of Bihar, whose condition is worse. In 
Biharbuoyancy coefficient ofproperty tax has been negative at -0.0144, 
similarly buoyancy coefficient of tax revenue is in negative, -0.06. It 
shows that performance ofproperty tax as well as entire tax revenues is 
worst in Bihar municipal corporations. 
In Kerala, buoyancy coefficient ofproperty tax has been statisti-
cally insignificant or is less than unity (0.77). Performance of overall tax 
revenue is slightly better, but buoyancy coefficient is statistically insig-
nificant (0.92). When we compare the two, we find that property tax's 
performance is not inline with the performance of overall tax revenues. 
In Tamil Nadu, we do not have data on property tax. Buoyancy 
coefficient of overall tax revenues is absolutly insignificant at -0.61. 
Performance of overall tax revenues can give us some idea about the state 
ofproperty tax, atleast it can not be satisfactory. 
In Karnataka buoyancy coefficient of overall tax revenues is sta-
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tistically significant (1.00) but, performance of property tax is not 
satisfactory (0.74). When we make a comparative study between buoyan-
cy coefficient of property tax and overall tax revenues, we find that, 
performance of property tax is not in line with the performance of overall 
tax revenues. 
Finally, in Madhya Pradesh municipal corporations, buoyancy 
coefficient of property tax is not significant (0.94) and similarly, perfor-
mance of tax revenue is also poor of which buoyancy coefficient is 0.77. 
Thus, we find that performance of both property tax as well as overall tax 
revenue is statistically insignificant and when we compare the two, we 
find that performance of property tax is worse. 
In foregoing analysis, we have treated each state separately. Now 
we are in a position that we can make a comparative study of different 
state's buoyancy coefficient of property tax and overall tax revenue. We 
have analysed the performance of 11 states. Out of 11 states, buoyancy 
coefficient of property tax is significant only in one state that is Delhi 
(1.07) and thus obviously insignificant in remaining ten states. This way, 
we can very safely conclude that performance of property tax has been 
quiet unsatisfactory in almost all the states except Delhi. On the other 
hand performance of overall tax revenue of some states is concerned, 
picture is slightly better. Out of 11 states we find that buoyancy coeffi-
cient of overall tax revenue of six states is statistically significant. In 
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other words buoyancy coefficient of six states is more than unity. In fine, 
property tax of almost all states have not been performing in line with the 
overall tax revenues. 
Till now our analysis has been limited to India only. There is 
no doubt that our basic concern is our own country. But, property 
tax being universal tax, it would be much better if we also 
study property tax at the International level. It will enable us 
to make a comparative study of property tax. Therefore, let us 
go international. 
The influence of urbanization on the budget of local govern-
ment is dependent on the governemnt' s expenditure responsibility, 
revenue raising authority, and fiscal autonomy. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this part of study is to describe 
the fiscal practices of urban governments in developing countries, 
especially of India". 
We look at the expenditure responsibilities of local govern-
ments, particularly the division of responsibilities among central, 
state and city governments. The aim here is primarily to give a 
picture of the structure of urban government finances. 
There is little precedent for this kind of discription of 
city financing practices. Davey (1983) focussed on difference in 
the institutions that govern local finances but did not attempt 
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comparative, quantitative analysis. Smith (1974) used secondary 
data to compare city government finances in developing countries 
but did not use the broader definition of local government em-
ployed here. Walsh (1969) relied on case studies of selected cities 
but was not primarily concerned with financing patterns. This work 
also relies on case studies but differs from earlier works in that the 
case studies focus on financing , many were designed to produce 
comparable information, and all use a more comprehensive defini-
tion of local government. 
The expenditure responsiblity of local government varies 
widely across countries. As noted above, accurate data on the 
finances of individual local authorities are not collected by any 
central agency for purposes of international comparisons.^^ 
Hence, cross-country comparisons of the degree of fiscal 
decentralization have actually focussed on inter-country varia-
tions in the fiscal importance of the entire subnational level of 
government. On the basis of such evidence, it is possible to obtain 
some first impressions of the importance of subnational authori-
ties in developing countries and , to some extent, the importent of 
local government. 
Using fiscal data for 1973-76, a sample of twenty three 
industrial and thirty four developing countries for which data were 
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available, and the expenditure share of subnational governments as 
the measure of fiscal decentralization, Bahl and Nath (1986) found 
an average subnational share of 15 percent of all government 
expenditure in developing countries. Around this average is a 
subnational variation, with the subnational government sector ac-
counting for up to half of all government expenditures in some 
countries (for example, Brazil, Chile and India etc). To the extent 
that these figures are reliable, they indicate that state, provincial, 
and local governments are of substantial fiscal importance in 
developing countries, though much less so than in industrial 
nations^l It seems clear, however, that fiscal decentralization 
accompanies developement. The subnational average expenditure 
share for advanced countries in the study mentioned above was 32 
percent , and econometric results in Bahl and Nath (1986), 
Wasylenko (1987), Gates (1972) and Pommerehne (1977) show a 
significant positive statistical association between the degree of 
expenditure, decentralization and per capita GNP. 
There is no clear consensus from past research about whether 
the expenditure share of subnational government has been increas-
ing. Bahl andNath ' s (1986) comparison of twenty five developing 
countries for 1960-73 shows an approximately constant share, as 
does our own comparison of twenty seven developing nations for 
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1973 and 1980 using International Monetary Fund (IMF) data.^^ 
Such estimates do not necessarily help us to understand the 
fiscal importance of urban local government and how it has changed. 
In part this is because of the inclusion of state and federal govern-
ments, which in some federal countries dominate public financing 
activities in the subnational government sector. It is also true that 
local governments in large cities often have more fiscal responsi-
bility than do other local governments because urbanization has 
pressed them to offer a broader range of services. Many countries 
in fact have differentiated the fiscal powers and responsibilities of 
their local governments on the basis of population size. Simple 
comparison of subnational expenditure shares do not pick up 
intercountry variations in these dimensions of the importance of 
local government. 
The problem here is to find a measure which better describes 
the importance of local government in metropolitan areas. One 
possibility is to aggregate the expenditure made in the urban area 
by the central, state, and local governments and to ideiitify the 
contribution of local government to this total. Unfortunately, few 
higer-level governments track expenditures according to destina-
tion; hence, it is necessary to make some simplifying assumption 
in order to derive an estimate of total spending within urban areas. 
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We begin with the simplifying assumption that the national 
(or state) government spends as much on a per capita basis in the 
city as it does on average throughout the country (or state). To the 
extent that per capita higher-level government spending is more 
city-biased, our assumption will understate total government spend-
ing in urban areas and will overstate the relative contribution of 
local government. If biases in higher-level government budgets are 
towards rural areas and smaller cities, our assumption will over-
state the relative importance of higher level governments.^^ 
Using this basis for comparison, and data from a sample of 
23 cities in developing countries, estimates of the share of na-
tional, state and local government expenditures in urban areas are 
presented in Table 2.23. For example, all local governments in 
metropolitan Bombay spent the equivalent of $ 55 per capita in 
1982, which was 43 percent of estimated total (central, state, and 
local) government spending in the Bombay metropolitan area. 
(Throughout this chapter and in the table, unless noted, all dollars 
are current U.S. dollars). As may be seen from the local percentage 
share column in this table, the median local government expendi-
ture share is about 20 percent, but there is wide variation, and a 
share of one-third or more is not at all uncommon. Moreover, even 
this estimate is probably biased downward by the underlying as-
CHAPTCA - a 159 
sumption that per capita central (state) government expenditures 
are equal in the metropolitan area and the rest of the country 
(state). The right conclusion to draw from this small sample would 
seem to be that the local governments of many developing country 
cities play an important role in the provision of urban services and 
therefore have an important effect on the economic development 
of cities. These results should make the case that the fiscal prob-
lems of large cities in developing countries deserve more than the 
little attention they usually are given, and that the popular belief 
that urban local governments in developing counrties play a very 
minor budgetry role is mistaken. 
Table 2.23 (and most of the other tables in this chapter) has 
been constructed to include information from an earlier and a more 
recent period, usually the 1970s and the 1980s. Accordingly, the 
data might be used to describe very roughly the changing fiscal 
importance of urban governments. For example, local governments 
in metropolitan Bombay increased expenditures by 9.3 percent in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s while the state and central govern-
ments increased spending by 9.3 and 10.2 percent respectively. 
This would imply that the importance of the local government 
sector as a provider of public services in metropolitan Bombay has 
not changed markedly. The data for other cities show a mixed 
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pattern of increasing and declining importance. For example, the 
rate of growth of local government expenditures in Seoul was 
significantly higher than that of central expenditures in both peri-
ods observed, with the result that the local government share 
increased by about 2 percentage points. Just the opposite central-
izing tendencies can be observed for Tunis. It is difficult to draw 
out average performance from so small a sample and from data that 
are drawn from so many different combinations of years. The 
medians presented in Table 2.23 suggest that the urban government 
share of total expenditure has declined over the long-run. However, 
even if this conclusion could be substantiated with a larger and 
more complete sample of data, it would not suggest a poor fiscal 
performance by large city governments. Indeed, as we shall show 
below, some urban governments have done surprisingly well in 
keeping their expenditures in step with population and inflation. 
Foregoing analysis has made it clear that sub-national expen-
ditures of nations included in our model, constitute a significant 
proportion of total expenditures. Table 2.23 shows that in Indian 
cities of Ahamedabad and Bombay, per capita local expenditure is 
quiet substantial keeping India's GNP in view. To be more specific 
it was dollar 19.7 and dollar 29.6 in the period. 1965-71 and 1977-
81 respectively in Ahamedabad. In Bombay, per capita local expen-
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diture was dollar 22.0, and dolar 54.5 in the period 1963-70 and 
1975-82 respectively. In both cities, per capita local expenditure 
has been more than the median per capita local expenditure. Fur-
ther, percentage growth rate in per capita government expenditure 
in two Indian cities has been substantial. For example, in 
Ahamedabad, growth rate of per capita government expenditure has 
been 9.5 and 13.9 in the period 1965-71 and 1977-81 respectively 
and in Bombay, percentage growth rate in per capita government 
expenditure has been 6.1 and 9.3 in the period 1963-70 and 1975-
82 respectively. 
Now question is that property tax, which is an important 
source of sub-national government revenue is in line with the 
growth of the sub-national expenditure. In normal cirnumstances, 
it will be expected that growth, rate of property tax would be in 
same proportion to growth rate of sub-national expenditures. Here 
our job is to see that whether there is equilibrium between expen-
diture growth and revenue rate to be more specific is property tax 
growing at the pace at which sub-national expenditures has been 
growing. 
Expenditure analysis of developed and developing nations 
has demonstrated it that the trend and pattern of growth in consoli-
dated local government expenditure are perhaps surprising: real 
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per capita expenditure increased during the late 1960s and first 
half of the 1970s. The ability of some local governments to raise 
per capita expenditure during this period - despite rapid increase in 
population, limited resource basis, inflation, and constraints placed 
upon them by higher government authorities - was a remarkable 
achievement. 
But, so far as revenue of the sub-national government is 
concerned, we find that the situation changed somewhat in the 
1980s. Local revenues were not buoyant enought to cover expendi-
ture needs and there was a noticeable shift toward central financing 
of urban services and a slower growth in real per capita local 
government expenditure even so, there is enough evidence here to 
suggest that urban governments have a significant fiscal potential 
and that they may make an important contribution to national re-
source mobilization. 
Now question is whether property tax generate adequate 
revenue ? The property tax, it is alleged, does not generate enough 
revenue to satisfy public expenditure demands at any given point of 
time, nor does it grow as rapidly as do expenditure requirements. 
This complaint is most forceful in cities which do not have re-
course to other taxes or where intergovernmental transfers play an 
important role in local finances. To examine the adequacy of rev-
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enue, we make cross-city comparisons of the level of property tax 
effort and of the income-elasitcity of the property tax. Compari-
sons of property tax effort can serve as a first approximation to 
whether there is room to raise additional revenues through discre-
tionary actions. An analysis of the elasticity of the property tax in 
various cities may also identify internatiional norms, as well as 
suggest possibilities for improving the responsiveness of the tax 
to income and population growth in the local area. 
Tax Effort 
There are conceptual problems with measuring tax effort, 
that is the extent to which taxable capacity is actually used (Bahl 
1971; Bird 1976 a). Interpreting comparisons of effort for particu-
lar taxes is even more troublesome; for example, a low property tax 
effort may mean that only other taxes are used more intensively. 
For these reasons, we suggest no normative interpretation rather 
mechanical comparisons below-they show norms only in the sense 
of describing the variation in actual practice. 
The ratio of property tax revenue (T) to personal income(Y) 
is a traditional measure of tax effort. This ratio may be disaggre-
gated for any city as follows: 
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4.1 T/Y = [T/TL] [TL/AV] [AV/MV] [MV/Y] 
where TL = the property tax liability, AV= the total assessed value 
of the property, and MV= the total market (capital or rental) value 
of the property. The level of effort, then, may be viewed in terms of 
(a) collection efficiency (T/TL), (b) a tax rate effect (TL/AV), (c) 
assessment efficiency (AV/MV), and (d) a base effect (MV/Y). The 
last term, the ratio of the market value of property to income is 
beyond the short-run discretionary control of the local govern-
ment. In fact, in countries where assessment is highly centralized 
and where tax rate adjustments require central or state govern-
ments action, local governments may influence only the efficiency 
of collection. Where there is more local autonomy, the collection, 
tax rate, and assessment effects may all be subject to manipulation 
by the taxing local government. This might lead us to the conclu-
sion that, at least in some countries, variations in property tax 
effort may be attributed in considerable degree to conscious deci-
sions by local governments. 
A quantitative comparison of cities according to the four 
components of equation 4.1 is not as straight forward as it may 
seem. There are many reasons. Since cities using annual and capital 
value systems are not strictly comparable in terms of their ratio of 
property tax base to income, some rate of capitalization must be 
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TABLE - 2.23(a) 
Comparative Levels of Property Tax Effort 
Per capita Per capita Assessed Taxes as Property 
total prop- assessed value as percen- taxes as per-
erty taxes value percentage tage of centage of 
City, year (dollars) (dollars) of income value income 
Capital value systems 
Bogota, Colombia, 1990 3.49 653 1.260 0.50 0.63 
Cartagena, Colombia, 1990 2.76 518 2.040 0.50 1.00 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1990 0.35 3 0.020 0.18 
Ahmadabad, India, 1990 3.75 15 0.142 24.90 3.50 
Bombay, India, 1990 4.80 18 0.068 27.40 1.90 
Calcutta, India, 1990 5.73 14 0.080 40.90 3.30 
Source : World Bank 
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assumed. Comparable data are not always available to analyze varia-
tions in efficiency of collection and assessment. Moreover, actual 
collections are rarely disaggregated according to how much was 
collected in relation to any given year 's liability; hence, compari-
sons for a single year may be spurious. Studies of assessment ratio 
are rarely done in developing countries thereby making impossible 
comparisons of assessed and market value across cities, because 
of these data problems, we combined the first two terms in equa-
tion 4.1 into an effective tax rate (T/AV) and the last two into an 
effective base rate (AV/Y). If, in a particular city, the effective tax 
rate is low relative to other cities, the difference may be ascribed 
either to a low statutory rate or inefficient collection. If the 
effective tax base is relatively low, underassessment is likely the 
problem. The effective base and effective tax rates are comparable 
only among cities using the same base, but the composite 
measure of property tax effort (T/Y) is comparable across all 
cities in the sample. 
From the small sample available to this day, it is most 
difficult to infer a normal property tax effort, but the median of 
property tax collections relative to income of the cities studied 
was about 2.5 percent in the 1970s and slightly lower in the 1980s 
[Table 2.23 (a)]. If an effort ratio of 2.5 percent is about average. 
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TABLE - 2.23 (b) 
Property Tax Collection Ratios in Selected Cities 
City, year Collection ratio (Precent) 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1990 55 
Bogota, Colombia, 1990 84 
Cartagena, Colombia 1990 66 
Bombay, India, 1990 82 
Calcutta, India, 1990 53 
Delhi, India, 1990 68 
Madras, India, 1990 65 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1990 53 
Dakar, Senegal, 1990 50 
Kandy, Sri Lanka, 1990 75 
Source : Worl Bank 
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then Bogota, Cartagena, Jakarta, Kingston and Seoul would appear 
to have made abnormally low property tax efforts relative to their 
incomes. Because of the very small number of urban areas for 
which we have data, it is difficult to uncover any systematic 
relations which may exist between this pattern of effort and the 
characteristics of the cities. 
Something may be learned by analyzing the components of 
the below average performance of these five capital value cities. In 
Seoul, the problem has been a low effective rate and the base ratio 
have been low. This rough comparison squares with policy con-
cerns about the property tax in Kingston ans Seoul, that is, Seoul's 
very low rate and Kingston's long-standing need for overall reas-
sessment before its conversion to site value taxations in the late 
1970s. The variations in the tax-to-assessed-value ratio shown in 
Table 2.23 (a) appear to be due primarily to differences in rate level 
and structure. Variations in the collection ratio (the ratio of taxes 
collected to tax liabilities) are smaller [Table 2.23 (b)]. Among the 
rental value ci t ies , the pattern is less clear. Calcutta and 
Ahamedabad have made the highest tax efforts, Calcutta because of 
high effective rate and Ahamedabad because both the effctive rate 
and the effective base are high. For example, in Ahamedabad, 1972, 
per capita total property taxes (dolars) was 3.75, per capita as-
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sessed value (dollar) was 15, assessedvalue as percentage of income 
was 0.142, taxes as percentage of value was 24.90 and property 
taxes as percentage of income was 3.50. Similarly, in Bomaby, 
1971, per capita total property taxes (dollars) was 4.80, per capita 
assessed value (dollars) was 18, assessed value as percentage of 
income was 0.068, taxes as percentage of value was 27.40, and 
property taxes as percentage of income was 1.90. Finally, in 
Calcutta, 1971, per capita total property taxes (dollars) was 5.73, 
per capita assessed value (dollars) was 14, assessed values as 
percentage of income was 0.080, taxes as percentage of value was 
40.90, and property taxes as percentage of income was 3.30. Thus, 
table 4.4 showing comparative levels of property tax effort make it 
abundantly clear that median of different cities, comparative levels 
of property tax effort has been 2.00. When we make a comparative 
study we find that, Ahamedabad, Bombay and Calcuttas comparative 
levels of property tax effort has been quiet satisfactory or more 
than average. Except Bombay whose value is a little less than 
median. Further Indian cities, comparative level of property tax 
effort has been above almost 50 percent of cities included in this 
table. 
The wide variation in the base effect observed here could 
stem from a number of factors including variations in the compo-
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sitions of the tax base, heavy under assessment, and the level of 
exclusions. There are many examples of drastic under assessment 
in these cities, and in virtually every city there was evidence that 
property is assessed at a rate considerably below true market value. 
But the reasons for this under assessment vary widely. In some 
cases it is due to a consious under assessment of property value, 
whereas in others it is due to infrequent and dated assessments. 
So far, we have made analysis of some aspects of the expen-
diture and revenue structure of sub-national governments. Analysis 
done till now indicate that the trend and pattern of growth in 
consolidated local government expenditure (general purpose local 
governments and autonomous agencies) are perhaps surprising: 
real per capita expenditure increased during the late 1960s and 
first half of the 1970s. The ability of some local governments to 
raise per capita expenditure during this period despite rapid in-
creases in population, limited resource bases, inflation, and 
constrainsts placed upon them by higher government authorities 
was a remarkable achievement (Table 2.23). The situation changed 
somewhat in the 1980s. Local revenues were not buoyant enough to 
cover expenditure needs, and there was a noticeable shift toward 
central financing of urban services and a slower growth in real per 
capita local government expenditure. Even so, there is enough 
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evidence here to suggest that urban governments have a significant 
fiscal potential and that they may make an important contribution to 
national resource mobilization. On the other hand about 70 percent 
of revenues of metropolitan governments, on average, is raised 
from local sources, of which the property tax is by far the most 
important. It will come as a surprise to many that a relatively low 
average share of financing comes from central government grants 
and loans, though there is a wide variation in this dependence 
among the cities studied here. The property tax does not generate 
enough revenue to satisfy public expenditure demands at any given 
point in time, nor does it grow as rapidly as do expenditure require-
ments. This complaint is most forceful in cities which do not have 
recourse to other taxes or where intergovernmental transfer play 
an impotant role in local finances. 
Annual Growth Rate and Composition of Expenditure by Local 
Governments in Selected Cities 
In Table 2.24, we have elaborated on the variation in expendi-
ture growth rates among these cities and have made comparisons 
with population growth and inflation. As might be expected there is 
wide variation in the consolidatd expenditure performance of ur-
ban local governments. Some city governments have experienced 
expansion in real expenditure which are substantially above the 
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rate of increase in the city's population (for example, Gujranwala 
and Seoul). Other cities suffered a decline in real spending (Mex-
ico city & Tunis), whereas yet others show declining real per capita 
spending (Madras). 
One way to read the results presented in table 2.2 is that real 
per capita expenditure increased in many of the cities in this 
sample during the periods under consideration. The ability of some 
local governments to raise per capita expenditure, despite rapid 
increases in population, limited resource bases, inflation and con-
straints placed upon them by higher government authorities is a 
remarkable achievement. It suggests a very important conclusion 
urban governments can play a significant role in local resource 
mobil izat ion. Two cautions accompany even this generally 
favourable evaluation of the fiscal performance of cities. First, 
expenditure needs still many have gone unmet that is, although 
actual expenditures may have kept up with population, they may not 
have grown enough to hold levels of public service constant. Sec-
ond, the increase in real per capita expenditures in many cities 
many probably not sufficient even to dent the existing deficit in 
services.^^ 
One can also read these data as painting a less favourable 
picture of city finances. Growth in local government expenditure 
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was stronger in the 1970s than in the 1980s for about half the cities 
studied. This might be attributed to some combination of the after 
math of the oil crisis, a weak world economy, the debt crisis, high 
rates of inflation, and the low buoyancy of local government rev-
enues in some countries. Many cities show substantial decline in 
real per capita expenditure in the 1980s, an almost certain sign of 
fiscal problems and the deterioration of locally provided services. 
Table 2.24 has made it clear that in some countries, local 
government expenditure has risen, even after adjusting for infla-
tion and population growth, these cities are Bogota, Cartagena, 
Seoul, Lagos etc. On the other hand in certain countries, sub-
national expenditure has declined, which marks the fiscal crises of 
these cities. These cities are state of Gaubara, Sao Paulo, Madras, 
Jakarta, Narobi etc. 
Let us take into account the growth rate of total local expen-
diture of Indian cities. In Ahamedabad, during 1965-71 population 
growth rate was 3.3 percent, growth rate of total local expenditure 
was 9.4 percent, adjusting for inflation or growth rate of total local 
expenditure at constant prices was merely 3.7 percent. And if were 
discounted population growth rate from sub-national expenditure 
at constant prices, we find that, actual growth has been merely 0.4 
percent, which is insignificant. During the period 1977-81, there 
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is no any perceptible change in the fiscal position of the city 
Ahamedabad. In Bombay, during 1963-72, growth rate of local 
expenditure was 10.5 percent, and if we make adjustment for the 
population growth rate and inflation, we find that growth rate of 
sub-national government in real terms, per capita is insignificant 
like Ahamedabad on the contrary, during the period 1975-82, there 
is perceptible improvement in the expenditures of Bombay. In the 
second period, growth rate of total local expenditure has been 12.2 
percent population grew at the rate of 3.7 percent and expenditure 
after discounting for inflation grew at the rate of 6.4 percent. 
Finally, when we make adjustment for the population growth, we 
find that net growth in real expenditure has been comparatively 
substantial. Thus we infer that in Bombay, during the period 1975-
82, there is perceptible improvement. Finally, in Madras, during 
the period 1972-76, population given at the rate of 3.7 percent, 
rate of local expenditure growth was 4.3 and surprisingly, rate of 
local expenditure growth at constant price has been 8.8 percent. 
But, in Madras during the period 1977-79 growth rate of local 
expenditure was -3.4 percent at current prices and -4.1 percent at 
constant prices. Thus, we see that there is perceptible fall in the 
local expenditure of the Madras municipal corporations during the 
period 1977-79. While comparing the expenditure positions of the 
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Ahamedabad, Bombay and Madras we find that in Ahamedabad there 
is significant change in the expenditure position of the municipal-
ity in Bombay there is significant improvement in the expenditure 
position over time, to be more specific, position has improved 
during the second period (1975-82), and in Madras, expenditure 
position has significantly deteriorated over time. 
Table 2.23 and 2.24 gives us great insight into the expendi-
ture positions of large number of cities. Let us go more deep into 
it and analyse the responsibilities of these cities. Then we will be 
in a position to know that whether there is any match between the 
expenditure growth of these cities and expenditure obligations. 
How true is the claim that the services provided by local govern-
ments are essential to develop the urban economy and to protecting 
the living conditions of the urban populars, especially low income 
families ? On the basis of our analysis of urban governments in 
developing countries, their common functions would appear to be 
markets, abattoirs, fire protection, street cleaning and lighting, 
garbage collection, cemeteries, libraries and minor public disease 
prevention services. Beyond these common functions, responsi-
bilities vary widely, including - in many cases - the responsibility 
for major governmental functions. We have attempted to describe 
this variation in service responsibility for a sample of cities by 
174-A 
o 
C4 
Vi 
PQ 
< 
I 
II 
51 
PH 
es 
u 
o 
9» 
d o 
S -a 
« o -
til 
ili 
III 
li 
1 '^  
pa <-! 
ON 
s 
o 6 
BO - H 
IB 
S 
OucuZZcu (»<» fcZZ eL,a,ZaH D H Z 
PH OLI Z Z &< PH </3 t/3 PH Z PH PH PH Z PH PH Z 
PH PH Z Z PH PH M PH PH PH Z PH PH PH PH PH Z 
PH PH Z Z PH PH 00 PH PH PH 00 PH PH PH PH PH OO 
PH PH PH Z PH CO CO I/) PH PH PH PH PH PH PH PH Z 
P H P H Z Z P H 00 PHOO P H P H Z P H P H P H P H P H Z 
PH PH PH Z PH 00 CO PH PH PH PH PH CO PH PH P H Z 
PH PH Z Z PH PH PH CO PH PH PH PH PH PH PH P H Z 
PH PH PH PH CO CO Z M PH PH Z PH PH PH pH Z Z 
PH PH PH PH PH CO £» CW Pn PH 00 PH PH PH PH PH 00 
PH PH PH PH 00 OO Z 00 PH PH Z PH PH PH PH Z Z 
O 
cs 
a 
O H « 
'A ^ 
2 >- h i (U O 
K ^ (U 
> 0 0 
V3 rH 
o IS 
•2^.3 2 
« " 5 « 
8iJ-S g-S3 §•§)£ S 
H K O O 2 
•2 .« 
& ->> <0 
o o 
<0 
<o a 2 d '*^  
us 
g-s 
(U 
- - o " 6 
u 
2 u o •S u 
U rH L^ *H£ J ^ 
u u « J2 o 
O O S P H S O 
d 
a 2 
o a 
•J - ID 
iH d &.» 
u ^ 
UHH-I 
d 
o .t; M 9 
S 5'i "" o ^ 
" -^ d " t l 
^ o 
• • o 
O . . o 
Z t/3 Z « CA 
1 7 4 - i - A 
r^  
» 
< 
H 
(J 
tzi 
d 
••H 
W 
« u 
*> 
CC 
u 
£ 
> 
rs 
in 
O 
P 
09 
P< 
<J 
^^  
.A 
f>% 
r3 
F S 
•^N 
M 
a o 
as 
V 
PS 
•o 
o 
.4 
•*-> 
•? 
M 
•w 
U 
o 
£ « •" 2 S 2 
S V) t^ 
OQ - J ^ 
a 
;^  0, « 
a ;:. 
S " 2 
a 
u u « 
cu OH Z Iz; !» w) cu 
P H C U I Z I Z ; Z M O O O H 
O - C L H Z Z Z a , Z Z 
CU OH Z CU 
<1> 
W) 
d 
•a 
O O O H Z D - C L I C I H P H C L I Z 
P H C U Z o . a , a . & < c u Z 
Z c u c o O - C L I P H O H C U Z 
Q H P H Z Z QHCOOOO) P H Q H Z O i o o f x P H a ^ Z 
a, CL, Z Z W3 a, «i Z o -<^ ^ d. OH a, a. ^ Z 
c ^ c t i Z Z Z c o c w Z O H C L I Z fco. a< a< !/3 (/) 
o ^ O i Z Z CLH«5t>5c« O iCL iZ a < ( i H ( x a < a , Z 
M Z Z Z a. OH Z CL< OH CU OH DH Z 
'?5 >> 
a. 
3 
CO 
M 
a 
2 S 
^ 
OO 
>. 
o 
'C 
o lU 
s 
u a o 
43 
o. 
"u 
H 
a 
_o 
u 3 
•O 
<u 
CO f ^ ^ 
a 13 
a 
'B 
o 
d 
o 
(8 
d o 
t3 
n O 
u 
d a 
o 
CO ? * ? 
d J3 '^  
H ffi 00 
o 
o 
't 
w O 
u •-< 
3 O 
o 
d 
o 
2 O Pi OH 
* d 2 
« O H 
• Q CO o ^ 
d o (u g 
•^ o u 0 
"H s £ ^  
2 o HH J 
CHRPTCA - S 174 
categorizing local governments as having primary (P), secondary 
(S) or no (N) responsibility. (Table 2.25, 2.26).^» 
As may be seen from these compilations, many local govern-
ments have full or partial responsibility for the provision of physi-
cal infrastructure particularly in the construction and maintenance 
of streets, potable water supply, sewage, and drainage. In contrast, 
telephone and electricity services are typically the responsibility 
of higher level government agencies, with a few notable excep-
tions, such as in Colombia. It will be a surprise to many that 
primary education that is till 15 years age frequently controlled by 
local government in developing countries. Health and welfare ser-
vices, however, are rarely a local responsibility and are often not 
provided on a significant scale by any government agency. Local 
housing programmes are of importance in some cities, particularly 
in former British colonies where British focuses on local public 
housing has been retained (for example, Kenya and Zambia). Minor 
local public housing programmes are found in many cities, howev-
er, they tend to be small relative to national or state housing 
programmes and frequently cater only to municipal employees. 
Urban mass transportation is frequently the responsibility of a 
local authority, and sometimes it is managed by private firms which 
are supervised by local or national authorities. Police protection 
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is almost universally a responsibility of national authorities. 
Within developing countries, local governments in the larger 
cities usually have a greater range of responsibilities than do their 
counterparts in the smaller cities. One reason is that the largest 
cities in developing countries, and in particular the capital cities 
tend, to have a special administrative status cambining local and 
state (provincial) functions and therefore have a greater range of 
local government responsibilities. This practice is certainly not 
limited to developing countries, for example Washington, D.C., is 
a special district with some of the fiscal functions of both a city 
and a state. 
Cities in virtually all developing countries face an overlap of 
responsibilities of local, state, and national authorities. Often all 
levels of government are involved in the provision of a particular 
service within an urban area, though the intergovernmental ar-
rangement under which responsibility is shared varies widely. For 
example, various national, state, and local agencies in Cali, Colom-
bia, are involved in providing public housing, public health ser-
vices and education (Bird 1980); and in Jakarta the national 
governent and the city government share in the provision of water 
supply services, public health services, education, and transporta-
tion (Linn, Smith, and Wignijowijoto 1976). The different levels 
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of governments can also share the responsibility for delivering a 
service when one level of government controls what another level 
does. For example, the government of the Republic of Korea re-
placed the transfer of shared taxes to local government with a more 
and not allocation which includes prospect specific grants and 
which leads to much greater central control over local invesment 
policies (Smith and Kim 1979). Another means of increasing cen-
tral control is to create special metropolitan development agen-
cies or autonomous service companies in which the higher levels of 
governments take a more direct role than is the case with regular 
local government operations. Examples are the metropolitan de-
velopment authorities in Calcutta, Karanchi and Manila, overlap-
ping responsibility also occurs where national or state appointed 
civil servants carry out local government functions, for example, 
the manager of an autonomous agency or the local assessor. 
Are local governments in developing countries less involved 
in delivering public services than those in industrial countries ? 
These data do not give us an answer because there is so much 
variation in the scope of local government responsibility, it is 
difficult to make a statement about differences in the "average" 
practice. It is generally true, however, that urban mass transporta-
tion, health and welfare, and education are provided with greater 
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local government involvement in the industrial nations.^^ And pub-
lic utility services are more likely to be provided through the 
private sector in industrial countries. Otherwise, there are some 
close similarities between developing and industrial countries in 
the division of expenditure responsibilities. Large cities and cap-
ital cities have broader fiscal powers and responsibilities in most 
countries. Likewise, cities in developing countries are not alone in 
this pattern of overlapping responsibilities of local and higher 
levels of government. There is a similar pattern in the industrial 
nations, and calls for clear definitions of expenditure responsi-
bilities are heard in virtually every industrial country.'*" 
Let us look into the responsibility of Indian cities. It can give 
us idea about the expenditure growth rate required to meet these 
responsibilities. Ahamedabad, Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi are the 
cities with extensive responsibilities. Obviously, to meet exten-
sive respnsibilities, expenditure growth has to be extensive. And 
Madras is the city with moderate responsibility. It is fine that 
Madras city has moderate responsibilities because growth rate of 
real expenditure adjsuting for population growth has been negative 
Table 2.24. Ahamedabad and Bombay's growth rate of real expen-
diture has not been in line with the responsibilities of these cities. 
Thus, it is obvious that, these cities would not be able to fulfil their 
178-A 
pq 
u 
s 
• • * 
-a 
o 
.a « 
^ > 
S P < 
o a* 
*3 ^ ss * 
CS en 
SH 
«M (J 
o Z 
•-C " 
9) 
Ml 
R 
a 
V 
w 
hi 
u 
a 
- I 
o -5 
o 
H 
'u 
a 
«9 2 
® « 
o 
H 
0 0 o 
o 
rn 
O 0 0 oo 
r4 
OS 
OS 
vo iri 
so 
OS 
<N 
fN 
00 
SO 
f-H 
<o 
OS 
so 
m 
Csl 
•<t 
n-
^^  
•o 
l~ 
T—< 
00 
so 
fS 
so 
1 
r-
>o 
• * 
ro 
1—( 
/—s 
CO 
*^-' 
so 
CO 
o 
Os 
O 
<s 
OS 
i-H 
o 
•* 
t~ 
rt 
•t 
o 
• * 
o 
o 
^ 
00 
(N 
OO 
(N 
^ H 
CN 
•<t 
SO 
00 
o 
^ H 
r~ 
o 
'^  
0\ 
» — ' 
OS 
• * 
m 
»^  
m 
<N 
(^  
CO 
^ H 
o OS <N so 
^ - «». 
Tt rt r~ CO 
so 
cs 
O N CO Tt- l O 0 0 
CO —< - H 
so 
CN 
00 
CO o 
CO 
o 
CO 
>n 
CO 
CO 
•n 
O 
CO 
so 
• * 
00 
00 
T-H 
so 
>r\ 
CO 
CS 
<s 
<N 
(~ 
o 
rs 
^^  
(N 
• * 
tf^ 
00 
• * 
00 
s 
CO ' - I 0 0 
CO 
fs 
• * co' 
OS OS OS 00 <0 w^ CO 
00 ^ s o s o CO Tt CN 
• ^ s o Ti- • ^ CO t ~ t ~ 
CS CO 
s o '-' 
• * 
CO 
»—( 
f—< 
o 
r-^  ON 
O 
CO 
00 
OS 
<N 
O 
f-H 
00 
iri 
m 
• * 
00 
CN 
rsi 
OS 
O 
(N 
t-
in 
(N 
so 
CO 
s o CO s o ,—( Os 
Wi CO 
1 ^ 
o 
0 0 
CO 
so 
00 
o 
so 
CO CO so 
OS 
i n 
>n 
so 
00 00 
CO 
yn 
^H O N 
SO SO 
CO 
00 
ON 
»-H 
CO 
o T) 
"So 
c 
u 
ON 
> 
•—^  O 
PQ 
N 
O H 
MJ 
in 
00 
ON 
^ H 
o 
PQ 
N 
R 
OH 
« 
H-1 
rsl 
ON 
»-H 
es" 
d 
R 
O 
PQ 
a' 
o 
o 
d 
R [^  
SO 
00 
ON 
1—1 
R' 
d 
R 
*-• 
PQ 
d" 
o 
'3 
d 
R WH
so 
ON 
N 
R 
Wi 
PQ 
o 
U4 
d 
R 
i-> 
o 
oi 
rr 
00 
ON 
1-H 
r:: 
CO 
S 
4J 
1-^ 
.2 
oS 
1 
N 
2 
4 
R 
OH 
IZl 
ON 
R* 
.£> 
a 
o 1 ^ 
U 
R 
• « - ' 
O 
O 
PQ 
I 
O N 
a 
"o 
U 
CN 
OS 
a 
"o 
o 
R" 
d 
u 
60 
(^ 00 
OS OS 
O 
ON 
00 
OS 
—I CN 
r^ 00 
I i 
O -X 
I ^ 00 
OS OS 
-o •« 
£ ^ .2 .2 
T3 T3 
R R 
R R 
T3 "O 
R « 
a a R R J 3 . d 
o o < < 
T3 
d 
a 
o 
T3 
d 
R 
•a 
a 
o PQ PQ 
•T3 
d 
a. 
u 
O 
U 
3 
o 
"R 
U 
d 
I 
R 
c 
3 
o 
"R 
O 
so 
I 
!>• 
0\ 
R 
o 
- H • * 
1^ 
so 
ON 
1^ 
C^ 
SO 
CO 
o 
/^ 
o 
s ^ 
CO 
I — ' 
00 
CO 
ON 
<n 
CO 
^^  
o 
00 
I~ 
CO 
Tt 
ON 
CO 
CS 
i-H 
o 
,-^ 
^^ 
• * 
• ^ 
^^  
Tt 
N.^' 
SO 
d 
0 0 
O N s o 0 0 0 0 CO CN ON 
OS 
OS 
R 
'•3 
d 
R 
SO 
d 
SO 
OS 
SO 
so 
00 
2 S 
178-A 
- I 0) O 
o 
u 
l1 
13 
O 
09 
"5 a 
a 
« 
s fl 
> 
w 
9 
a 
> 
a» b 
•B 
« 93 
"5 
_^  
C8 
u 
e i-I 
a 
M 
i^ 0 
n 
la 
o 
M 
a 
u 
a a 
<C 
<M 
« (A 
^^  
».] 
^ 
v> 
2 s 
"S 
3 o 
H 
1 
M 
« 
u 
• > 
h 
4) 
s> 
s 
2 
n 
mm 
5 
o 
H 
t 
0 0 
0 0 
0^ 
OO 0 0 
0 \ 
I 
c4 
0\ t~ 
r-^  fs 
00 
1-^  
1 
o 
vb 
fN 
fS 
T—< 
r^  
•<t 
t~ 
vd 
m 
<N 
o< 
" 
rr 
o 
t~ 
00 
Tt 
'^  
• 00 ^ - <0 
0 0 
o ° 
ON i n (N 
O 
0 \ 
^ rn 
, <N 
<N • 
• <ri 
•^ r^ 
_ ^  VO ~ 
^- t~ 
«~ rt 
- H Wl ON 
U-) 0 0 NO NO d 
NO t - • ON - H 
• ON 
U-l V£S NO O 
NO C / rt r<-| 
VO f S 0 \ f S fN O —' (N f S 
O 
00 >n NO 
^ ON o 
00 
o o 
00 
00 
ON 
u 
a o 
CI 
V-l 
CS 
ON 
ro 
0\ .S 
. a 
a « 
o • • -
00 
ON 
c« 
a 
a 
o 
a o 
00 
00 o;; 
ON 
cd 
<U 
v< 
O 
o 
o 
CI. 
o 
u 
R 
Q 
a. 
a" o 
o 
c« 
Q 
00 
ON 
R 
O 
o 
a. 
<u 
Pi 
P 
•53 
d 
R 
r-H O N 
a CS 
0 0 
ON 
cS 
o 
ON 
0\ 
c8 
3 
60 
CS 
Vi 
CS 
u 
rs 
^ r<^  
d «i 
r*i 
• * 
m 
/--N 
^ 
d 
^H ON 
fo as 
lO NO 
• * 
Tf 
<N 
00 
ON 
*-H 
»-^  
<n 
• ^ 
00 
NO 
m 
00 
00 
>n 
CN 
0 
•t 
ON 
ON 
^H 
^H 
ON 
(N 
00 
ON 
'—^  
00 
00 
00 
• * 
ON 
NO 
1 
ON 
CO 
i-H 
0 
00 
NO 
r^  
n 
rn 
1—1 
r^  
<N 
Tl; 
en 
^^  
m 
uS 
m 
Tf 
ro 
CS 
00 
• * 
NO 
'—* 
ro 
• * 
^H 
<n 
00 CS 
NO -^ 00 "^ 
CO CU 
00 
CS 
ON 
CO 
NO 
<n 
1—t 
CO 
Tl-
CS 
00 
0 
• * 
CS 
00 
CO 
0 
0 
CO 
r~ 
00 
CO 
00 00 
CS 
0 
CS 
00 
N£> 
NO 
ON 
NO . 
- H O • ^ 
>0 '-1 00 
0 
00 
ON 
^ H 
CO 
00 
ON 
i-H 
CS 
'Si 
<n 
1 
0^ 
r 
a CS
a. 
u 
I 
O ! - ; C 
60 
o 
"3 
o 
D 
t/J 
3 
60 
CS 
a 
CS 
o 
60 
CS 
CS 
f 
cS 
u 
cS u 
CS 
178-A 
1 « 
ca 
- I 
o 
o 
91 
09 
a 5 
5 S 
o 
'S 
.A 
'3 
a 
C .2 
I/) 01 
A 
U 
o 
U 
O 
o 
ro 
• * 
o 
ro 
o 
OS 
^^ 
o d 
r<i 
f - H 
- t 
<N 
0 0 
W-1 
1 ^ ^ ^ 
t^ 
O 
1—< 
r~ 
t — ' 
<s 
o 
^ H 
d 
r<i 
- : ON 
ON (N 
yn I—I 
n ^ 
_; vo 
1 <S 
o 
o 
m 
• t 
00 
fN 
VO 
OS 
en 
^ - N 
>n 
—^' 
• ^ 
s o 
(N 
SO 
SO 
t s 
OS 
rt 
o 
en 
_ H 
m 
t~-
VN 
Os 
00 
OS 
rsl 
t ^ 
t ^ 
Os 
O 
OS 
d 
^ o 
vd d o 
so" 
OS Os 
o 
00 
CO - - -H (N 
m fS 
CO 
OS 
00 
- : ^ c^ 
r - m -H 
00 
so 
so 
<r, 
O 
SO 
so 
SO 
SO 
OS 
^ rt O so 
O ro d -^ 
-H r~ r~ «-~ 
• * 
o 
so 
00 
Os 
OS 
00 00 
o 
OS 
OS 
OS 
so 
OS 
s o 
V) 
o 
Os 
f S 
o 
r^  
Csl 
OS 
<s 
00 
l ~ O 
00 r-^  
>—I OS 
Os 00 
CN 00 
so 
00 
1 ^ 
00 
o 
s 
f 
Os 
r. 
a 
CO 
'•^ 
PL, 
00 
Os 
s 
l-> 
4) 
a 
o 
0 \ 
m 
o 
.g 
'a, 
'^ 3 
& 4 
ea" 
'3 
Rt 
w^ 
00 
Os 
IB 
<o 
ft 
''^ 
^4 
CL, 
"3 
CS 
Os 
<^  13 
43 
H 
^ 
o 
cd 
ca 
r^ 
i > 
OS 
es" 
'5 
'S 3 
H 
'3 
H 
W) 
00 
Os 
es" 
w 
'3 
3 
H 
'3 
H 
00 
so 
OS 
CO* 
u 
N 
U 
d 
<u 
> 
^ 
"o 
a 
ta 
> 
'"^  t~ 
OS 
U i 
'3 
N 
3 
ca 
p~ 
OS 
R 
N 
'V 
43 
g 
5 
OS 
V - i 
N 
JQ 
CO 
CS 
X> 
a 
3 
Xi 
a 
3 
Os 
o 
>i 
n 
2 
1 
•5" 
yr\ 
r~ Os 
es" 
,s a a 
N 
OS 
1—H 
ciT 
a 
CS N 
CS*" 
CS 
CO 
3 
n 
CS 
•5 
2 
Os 
Os 
60 
g •5 
_3 
u 
a 
T3 
d 
CS 
u 
ca 
OS 
r^ 
Os 
<u 
1 > 
X 
CS 
•o 
CS 
tn 
u 
•a 
_3 
d 
d 
o 
T3 
I« 
«i S 
4) >> 
" -S 
>H CS 
s l 
00 ft 
u 
*i~H 
CS 
CS 
> 
CS 
O 
Z 
(A 
CS 
60 
O 
a 
o 
ft 
a 
o o 
cs 
c« 
CS 
CO 
<0 
X 
CS 
• r f 
CO 
0 
T3 
3 
"o 
d 
. 1 - 1 
CO 
1> 
CO 
M 
d 
CS 
ft 
•S 
o 
d 
CO 
o 
.1 tl4 
4> 
X 
CS 
<*H 
o 
d 
u d 
o ft 
a 
o 
o 
d 
o 
u 
o 
X o 
d 
cS 
u 
CO 
id 
<u 
>^ 
CS 
60 
4) 
d 
u 
^ 
a CS 
o 
60 
d 
'% 
o 
o 
u 
d 
u 
CO 
3 
CS 
CO i j 
CO CS 
-^ o 
CIS O 
CS O 
d «> 
'•** a 
d.2 
••" 3 
Is 
<U 4 3 
d ^ 
S.2 
s S 
a <» 
" 60 00 « 
d CO 
•3 g 
fs 2 
2 a .S 0(S d d 5 
CS 3 
0 CS 
7* '*-' ^ 0 
0 
,„ d ^ 0
•JS'S 
CO s 
d -T; 0 " 
0 X 
ID 
1? 
- 1 - cS (U u 
PQ Z ca 
o 
et .a <^  
CHflPTCR - t 178 
responsibilities properly. 
Financing Urban Services 
How do local governments in cities of developing countries 
finance their expenditures ? How much autonomy do they have in 
structuring this financing and what are the basic factors determin-
ing their ability to meet this challange? This section addresses 
these questions on the basis of case studies of selected cities. 
Revenue Structures 
A first step in analyzing the financing patterns of urban 
governments is to distinguish between local and external sources 
of revenues. The three categories of local revenue considered here 
are (a) locally collected taxes (b) user charges and benefit charges; 
and (c) other locally raised revenues, such as licence fees, penal-
ties, stamp duties, and the like. The external sources of local 
financing are transfers (grants or shared taxes) from higherlevel 
governments and borrowings. The distinction between locally raised 
and external revenues is important because it describes the degree 
to which urban governments drawn on the resouces generated by the 
urban economy.*^ Further more, there is a presumption that local 
authorities have more discretion in managing their local sources of 
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finance than is the case for external revenues. 
The distribution of revenues according to these financing 
sources is shown in Table 2.18 (a). The share of locally raised 
revenues in financing total expenditure has ranged in recent years 
from 100 percent in Karanchi to an exceptionally low share of 26.9 
percent in Kishasa. More typically, however, between 60 percent 
and 90 percent of local expenditure is financed from local sources, 
with a median share of about 70 percent. The locally financed 
sharehowever declined significantly in the 1980s, as may be seen 
by comparing the medians reported in Table 2.18 (a).. These date 
also suggest a negative correlation between the ranking of cities 
according to the share of locally raised revenues and the ranking 
according to the share of local govnment spending in total public 
expenditure (Table. 2.23). This supports the hypothesis (Kee 1977) 
that the broader the expenditure responsibility of general - purpose 
local govenments, the less they can depend on their own revenue 
shares, that is, the more they must rely on external sources which 
tend to be controlled by higher level governments. 
Locally Raised Taxes 
Taxes provide more than half of locally raised revenues in the 
average city, and self-financing revenues contribute about a third. 
CHRPTCR • a 180 
These average hide a wide variety of local financing patterns and 
preferences. The large Colombian cities (Bogota, Cali, and 
Cartagina) are notable for their relatively limited reliance on local 
taxes. This is because the governments of these cities provide the 
most important public utilities (Water, sewerage, electricity, and 
telephones), but it also reflects the relatively heavy emphasis in 
Colombia on benefit related charges in financing urban infrastruc-
ture."^ By contrast, Bukaru, Jakarta, Karanchi, Madras, and Manila 
rely heavily on local taxes. This is in part because the governments 
of these cities provide education, public health services, and other 
general urban services which do not readily lend themselves to 
benefit financing. It also may reflect a lack of attention to the 
potential for benefit and user charge financing. In Bombay, and 
Francistown the thriving local electricity undertakings contribute 
substantially to revenues, whereas in Seoul there is an emphasis on 
benefit and user charge financing even though the scope for appli-
cation of such charging systems is limited. Finally, for those cities 
whose governments have little responsibility, such as Dhaka and 
Valencia, revenue sources other than taxes or user charges are most 
important. 
Let us concentrate on the position of Indian cities. Table 2.18 
(a) shows that in Ahmadabad, during the period 1970-71, locally 
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raised revenue was 86.3 percent, 3 8.6 percent of it was contributed 
by local taxes. And when we analyse the revenue from external 
sources, we see that, share of grants and shared taxes was 4.2 
percent and finally net borrowing was 9.5 percent. Further, during 
the period 1981, we observe some perceptible change. There is 
significant rise in the ratio of local taxes from 38.6 percent to 60.1 
percent. But, there is no any fall in the ratio of grants and shared 
taxes, rather it has increased from 4.2 percent to 8.6 percent, 
further net borrowing has also risen from 9.5 percent to 25.6 
percent. In Bombay, during the period 1970-71, local taxes con-
tributed 37.9 percent, grants and shared taxes was merely 1.0 
percent and net borrowing was 14.4 percent. We do not see any 
significant change in the percentage distribution of financing of 
local public expenditure of Bombay during the period 1981-82. 
Percentage Distributioii of Local Tax Revenues by Source 
Table 2.28 shows percentage distribution of local tax rev-
enues for twenty-two cities. Two Striking features emerge from an 
inspection of these data. First, local governments draw on a large 
variety of taxes. Second, the property tax is levied in virtually all 
cities and offen dominates the revenue structure - the median share 
in total local taxes is above 40 percent (though it has been 
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declining), pretty much regardless of region or location. 
Taxes on motor vehicles and on entertainment are levied in 
many cities, but with very few exceptions (motor vehicle taxes in 
Bangkok and Jakarta, for example) neither is of substantial impor-
tance for revenue. Industry and commerce taxes (usually a business 
license or a crude form of sales tax) are common in latin America 
and parts of Africa and can account for a significant amount of 
revenues. For example, this tax contributes approximately one-
third of the financing of local government expenditure in Bukaru, La 
Paz, and Manila. Some other forms of sales tax raise significant revenue 
in some cities. For instance, the general sales tax levied in Rio De Janiero 
and Managna has contributed more thanhalf the financing of total local 
expenditure in some recent years. Cities of India and Pakistan levy a 
special type of sales taxc colled "octroi" on all goods crossing city 
boundaries. This accounts for a significant share of local revenues and 
where used is a buoyant source of local revenue. In Karanchi, more than 
half of all local spending is financed from octroi proceeds. 
Local income taxes are not common but have been important 
in some important African cities, especially in Botswana, Nigera 
Sinegal Zaire, and Zambia.'*^ Property transfer taxes are a local tax 
instrument in a few cities, but only in a few instanes - notably the 
Korean cities did this source raise a substantial share.of local 
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taxes. In seoul it financed about 20 percent of total local govern-
ment expenditure. Finally, the category labelled "all other taxes" 
has contributed a size able share of local taxes in for example, 
Cartagena, Francistown, and Tehran. Usually, however the taxes 
falling under this heading comprise a motley collection of unisance 
taxes which often are costly to collect and to comply with and 
which provide little revenue. 
The data Tables 2-18 (a) and 2.28 shows several quite notice-
able changes in the pattern of urban government finance from the 
1970s to the 1980s : 
# There is a trend toward more or less overall reliance on 
locall raised revenues. 
# Locally raised revenues from charges are increasing in im-
portance, and those from taxes are declining. 
# Among local taxes, there appears to be a shift from property 
based to consumption based taxes. 
External Financing 
On average, about 30 percent of all local revenues in these 
cities are raised from external sources, mostly from grants and 
shared taxes [see Table 2.18 (a)]. The median share of external 
financing in this sample is up about 8 percentage points from the 
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previous decade. There is a wide variation around this average, but 
relatively few cities derive more than half their revenues from 
external sources and only two in the entire sample get more than 
half their revenues from grants and shared taxes.'*'* This low share 
flies in the face of popular notions of relatively little self-suffi-
ciency on the part of urban governments in developing countries 
(Marshall 1969). It also casts some doubt on the common belief 
that national government policy heavily subsidizes urban as com-
pared with rural dwellers through its fiscal policy. It would appear 
from these data that if such a subsidy taxes place, it is not through 
transfers to urban authorities. It is not even clear that large cities 
in developing countries are on average more dependent on grants 
than are large cities in industrial countries."^ 
Do these results suggest that the share of grant financing in 
large cities of developing countries is too low ? One answer is that 
it is, and that a way out of the serious problem of urban service 
deficits in developing countries is to expand the extent of grant and 
shared -0 tax financing Indeed, these data do show an increase in 
the share of local government expenditure financed from external 
grants. An other view, however, is that urban local governments in 
developing countries should receive less intergovernmental 
assitance than those in industrial countries. This is because public 
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service provision in cities in developing countries tends to have 
fewer spill overs to the rural winderlands, and cities in low -
income countries do not perform as many central place functions 
as do those in industrial countries."^ Moreover, since cities in 
developing countries tend to suffer less from jurisdictional frag-
mentation than is the case especially in the united states, there is 
less use for legalizing transfers from higher - level government to 
relieve intra metropolitant fiscal disparities. 
Loan financing generally is the smallest revenue source for 
cities in developing countries, contributing less than 10 percent of 
total financing. In this respect developing - country cities seem to 
differ markedly from their counterparts in industrial countries, 
where capital out lays are largely financed from borrowing (Kanfman 
and Fischer 1987; Prud'homme 1987). The practice is more pos-
sible in industrial countries because capital markets are more 
highly developed and because higher level governments are more 
flexible in their need to control the aggregate level of credit. 
A wide variation in the reliance on borrowing may be ob-
served in developing countries [Table 2.18 (a)]. Several cities 
experienced negative net borrowing during the earlier period under 
observation and several others did no borrowing at all. The more 
important borrowers were the Colombian and Indian cities. For the 
CHAPTCR - S — 186 
Colombian cities and for Bombay this may in part be explained by 
the importance of local public utility operations which (a) require 
loan financing for their lumpy investments and (b) are relatively 
good credit rises because they are often run by autonomous local 
authorities and are heavily financed by user charges. It is also 
important to not that in Colombia and India the higher levels of 
government are relatively flexible in permitting loan financing by 
state and local governments. 
Let us concentrate on Indian cities' percentage distribution 
of local tax revenues by source. We know that property tax has 
played important role in the financing of sub-national expendi-
tures. On an average property tax has contributed 40 percent of 
total local tax revenues. So far as position of Indian cities is 
concerned, property tax contributes 28.5 percent of total local tax 
revenues on an average. Table 2.28 shows that in Ahmadabad ion 
1971, property tax contributed 43 percent of total local tax rev-
enues. In 1981, we see a decline in the share of property tax to 29.7 
percent. In Bombay in 1970, share of property tax was 55.6 per-
cent, it is much more than national average of 28.5 percent . In 
1981, it declined to 51.9 percent. Thus, what we observe is that 
over a period of time, there is decline in the share of property tax 
in both the cities. In Calcutta, during the period 1974-75, the 
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contribution of property tax in the local tax revenue was 64.8 
percent then it fill to 58.5 percent in 1982. Next Indian mcity in the 
table is Madras, in this city, in the year 1975-76, contribution of 
the property tax was 68.9 percent, which changed to 72.0 percent in 
1979. So, in this table, we have four Indian cities, out of it three 
Indian cities have experienced a decline in the share of property 
tax. Madras is the city, which experienced an increase. Thus prop-
erty tax trend in case of Indian cities had been conforming the trend 
of other cities of developed and developing countries, as we have 
already observed in our foregoing analysis that the Indian share of 
property tax in total local taxes is above 40 percent though it has 
been declining; pretty much regardless of region or location. Fur-
ther, we do not observe aby correlation bettween local taxes as 
pecentage of total local expenditure and ratio of property tax to 
total tax revenues. Putting it differently, if local taxes as percent-
age of total local expenditures is higher, it does not mean that 
property tax's share as percentage of total tax revenues will also be 
higher. Lastly, Table 2.28 makes it abundantly clear that in almost 
all the developed and developing country's cities included in this 
table get a significant percentage of their tax revenues from prop-
erty taxes and on the extreme we have cities like Mombasa, Kenya, 
Nairobi-Kenya and Kingstone-Jamaica, where property tax contri-
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bution to total tax revenues is one hundred percent. 
Revenue Authority 
In evaluating the capacity of local governments in developing 
countries to respond to rapidly increasing urban service needs, the 
degree of local control over revenue sources is of primary impor-
tance. Can they adjust tax rates, impose new taxes, borrow to 
finance capital projects, adjust user-charge schedules, and so forth? 
An overview of local government revenue authority for selected 
cities is provided in Table 2.29. 
The most important of the local taxes, the property tax, is 
generally not fully controlled by local government. For the cities 
under consideration here, the setting of property tax rates is al-
most always constrained by higher level government, usually by 
setting a tax rate ceiling to apply to all local authorities. Where 
property value assessment is a local responsibility it may be frely 
handled by local authorities (India) or it may be centrally con-
trolled (Korea and Philippines) with national and local agencies 
cooperating to determine taxable property values. General sales 
and income taxes are less frequently at the disposal of urban 
governments and even then rate setting is usually done by national 
authorities. There are exceptions some specific sales taxes and 
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business taxes are often unhampered by central control, which 
helps, explain their importance in cities where they are levied 
(especially the octroi in India and Pakistan and the Industry and 
commerce taxes in latin America and parts of Africa). Motor 
vehicle taxes, although quite frequently at the disposal of urban 
government are usually resticted in use by higher level govern-
ment, with Jakarta being a notable exception. The importance of 
motor vehicle tax revenues in Jakarta points to the significant 
potential of this tax in the large cities of developing countries. 
Entertainment taxes are often not subject to restrictions by central 
government but they, in any case, have rarely shown great potential 
for contribution to local revenues. Other minor taxes and fees 
somewhat ironically, are the sources of local government revenue 
which are least subject to higher level government controls and 
restrictions. In some cities this has led imaginative officials to 
design such a wide variety of these minor sources that they add up 
to a noticable proportion of total city revenues. But they do not 
provide a basis for healthy and reliable local revenue collections, 
and local governments which rely heavily on them usually have 
serious problems with their revenue structures. 
With the exception of the Colombian and Korean cities, 
betterment levies and related revenue sources rarely account for an 
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important share of revenue."^ The problem in this case is not 
central government restrictions. In fact, virtually all the cities 
shown in Table 2.29 are entitled to use this form of expenditure 
financing. The problem is partly the reluctance of local authorities 
to apply these levies and partly their lack of knowledge about 
implementation. 
User charges, like taxes, are often controlled by central 
authorities. In Colombia, this has taken the form of nationwide 
guidelines from the National Utilities Tariff Board, which also 
reviewed and approved all applications for changes in user charges. 
The board has in the past discouraged cross-subsidization between 
service users, but in general it has been a force supporting the 
recovery of average long-run costs of public utility services, 
through user charges (Linn 1980s). In other countries and cities, 
the central control on local user chrges has had negative impacts on 
local revenue-raising efforts. Some Korean cities, for instance, 
have been unable to raise user fees to levels thought appropriate by 
local authorities because of intervention by higher level govern-
ment. The only sizeable self-financing service for which local 
government has generally been free to set it's user charges is the 
provision of public housing. To the extent that the national govern-
ment is involved in the planning and designing of local housing 
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projects, however, it may also exert influence over the cost-recov-
ery policies in this sector. In any case, in virtually all cities where 
large housing programmes are managed by local government, se-
vere financial problems have arisen (the Zambian cities are good 
case in point). 
It is not surprising that external revenue sources are even 
less amendable to local control than are locally raised revenues. 
Local governments rarely have a say in the determination of shared 
taxes and grants. 
Local borrowing is almost always controlled by higher level 
authorities in developing countries, but there are variations in the 
extent of this control. The Colombian Planning Ministry has re-
viewed and approved all applications for borrowing which exceed a 
low ceiling, below which local authorities may freely borrow from 
commercial banks mainly for purposes of cash-flow management 
(Bird 1980; Linn 1980 a). In Kenya and Philippines, local public 
agencies have had to receive prior authorization for all borrowing 
activities (Hubbel 1983). In many countries, local authorities many 
borrow only from higher level governments. These universal re-
strictions on borrowing by local governments are not surprising in 
countries where capital markets are poorly developed and where 
the national government has to be concerned about the nation wide 
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allocation of public and private savings. Industrial countries do not 
face such constraints on their capital resources and thus tend to 
control local borrowing to a lesser degree. It should be noted, 
however, that almost unlimited freedom of local authorities in the 
United State to borrow in private capital markets is exception, 
compared with the situations in other industrial countries. 
(Prud'homme 1987). The combination of poorly developed capital 
markets, saving constraints, and higher-level government restictions 
and controls over local government borrowing explain why this 
source of financing urban services is the least important of all 
sources of local government revenue and much less important in 
developing than in industrial nations.'*^ 
These constraints on borrowing are particularly troublesome 
where lumpy investment projects need to be financed by local 
authorities, especially in the area of public utilities, but also for 
slum improvement, public housing and sites-and-services projects, 
school building projects and the like. Where borrowing is made 
impossible for these purposes the investments have to be financed 
by higher-level grants, carried out directly by higher level govern-
ment agencies, or more frequently yet, they will not be made at all. 
A comparison of revenue authority with revenue perfor-
mance suggests that urban governments differ not only in the 
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degree of freedom they possess to raise revenues from various 
sources but also very much in the ways they use their authority. 
Ahamedabad, Bombay, and Jakarta have relative freedom to raise 
revenues but have not used it to the extent one might expect. 
Jakarta has relied most heavily on its motor vehicle tax, although it 
has not drawn on betterment levies on user charges to any signifi-
cant degree. Ahamedabad and Bombay have relied heavily on the 
octroi and Bombay has drawn on user charges. From electricity 
services to finance its mass transit system. Colombian cities, in 
contrast, are more resticted in their use of local taxes and conse-
quently have expanded their use of local taxation very slowly. 
These cities have used their fiscal autonomy to develop systems of 
benefit charges, which have led to significant recovery of the cost 
of providing, these services. The government of Seoul, despite the 
fact that its authority over virtually all revenue sources is limited 
has expanded expenditure rapidly with a balanced use of local 
taxes, betterment levies and user charges [Table 2.. 18 (a)]. The 
lesson in this comparison of revenue authority and its use is that 
even cities with comparable degree of freedom over comparable 
revenue sources have used them to very different degrees. Further-
more, central government control per se is no guarantee of a more 
or less successful use of particular revenue sources. 
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Thus, we see that sub national governments in developing 
countries account for an average of 15 percent of total government 
spending, and an average of about one-third of all urban area 
spending is financed through local government budgets. Perhaps 
most important, the expenditure responsibilities of local govern-
ments often include major development functions, notably public 
works, mass transit and primary education. Together, these find-
ings suggest that local governments have an important impact on 
the economic development of metropolitan cities. 
The trend and pattern of growth in consolidated local govern-
ment expenditure (general purpose local governments and autono-
mous agencies) are perhaps surprising : real per capita expenditure 
increased during the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s. The 
ability of some local governments to raise per capita expenditure 
during this period despite rapid increases in population, limited 
resource bases, inflation, and constraints placed upon them by 
higher government authorities - was a remarkable achievement. 
The situation changed somewhat in the 1980s. Local rev-
enues were not buoyant enough to cover expenditure needs and 
there was a noticeable shift toward central financing of urban 
services and as lower growth in real per capita local government 
expenditure. Even so, there is enough evidence here to suggest that 
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urban governments have a significant fiscal potential and that 
they may make an important contribution to national resource 
mobilization. 
About 70 percent of revenues of metropolitant governments, 
on average, is raised from local sources, of which the property tax 
is by far the most important. It will come as a surprise to many that 
a relatively low average share of financing comes from central 
government grants and loans, though there is a wide variation in 
this dependence among the cities studied here. 
An examination of changes in local government finances 
during the late 1960s, the 1970s, and part of the 1980s gives a 
resonably consistent picture. In cities where per capita expendi-
ture increased, locally raised resources were the largest contribu-
tors, whereas in cities where per capita expenditure declined, a 
slowdown in locally raised resources was evident. In the 1980s, 
when real growth in expenditure was slow slowed, growth in locally 
raised revenues was also slow resulty reliance on external financ-
ing increased. On the basis of small sample, changes in locally 
raised resources appear to have determined the ability of urban 
governments to increase the services they provide. A fall in locally 
raised revenues hurts urban government expenditure, and a rise 
helps it thrive. Central government transfers and borrowing are 
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TABLE - 2.30 
Revenue Importance of Property Taxes in Generating 
Revenue to Finance Urban Public Services 
City, year 
Percentage of 
total public 
expenditures 
made by local 
governments 
Property taxation 
Capital value, system 
La Paz, Bolivia, 1975 
La Paz, Bolivia, 1985 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1980 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1984 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1984 
Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1980 
Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1984 
Bogota, Colombia, 1972 
Cali, Colombia, 1975 
Cartagena, Colombia, 1972 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1970-73 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 1981-82 
Kingston Kenya, 1981 
Pusan, Rep. of Korea, 1971 
Pusan, Rep. of Korea, 1983 
Seoul, Rep. of Korea, 1965-71 
Seoul, Rep. of Korea, 1981-83 
Lima, Peru, 1981-82 
Manila, Philippines, 1970 
Manila, Philippines, 1985 
Lusaka, Zambia, 1971 
Percentage of Percentage 
total of Local 
expenditures expenditures 
financed from financed from 
property taxation property taxation 
-
-
17.4 
17.4 
13.4 
17.6 
16.7 
49.9 
48.8 
23.0 
36.9 
21.6 
46.3 
3.2 
21.7 
36.3 
38.4 
6.0 
30.5 
10.0 
26.8 
-
-
2.4 
2.4 
1.6 
3.1 
1.9 
4.0 
6.1 
3.3 
-
0.9 
17.2 
0.6 
2.8 
2.2 
3.2 
1.4 
10.4 
3.5 
7.9 
3.2 
11.7 
13.8 
13.8 
11.5 
17.6 
13.8 
8.0 
12.5 
14.3 
-
4.0 
34.1 
1.9 
13.3 
6.2 
8.2 
23.3 
34.0 
35.0 
29.3 
1 9 6 - a 
City, year 
Annual value systems 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1983 
Ahmadabad, India, 1965-71 
Ahmadabad, India, 1977-81 
Bombay, India, 1963-72 
Bombay, India, 1975-82 
Percentage of 
total public 
expenditures 
made by local 
governments 
Calcutta (Corp.), India, 1974-75" 
Calcutta (Corp.), India, 1982" 
Madras, India, 1972-76 
Madras, India, 1977-79 
Gujranwala, Pakistan, 1983-85 
Karachi, Pakistan, 1972-75 
Karachi, Pakistan, 1972-82 
Singabpre, Singapore, 1971 
Singapore, Singapore, 1983 
Bangkok, thailand, 1977 
Tunis, tunisa, 1986 
Median 
Before and including 1979 
After 1979 
- Not available. 
5.7 
41.5 
30.7 
41.7 
42.9 
-
-
-
10.1 
11.0 
-
20.2 
-
-
25.1 
10.1 
33.2 
17.5 
Percentage of 
total 
expenditures 
financed from 
property taxation 
1.5 
6.9 
5.5 
8.8 
8.3 
-
-
-
5.1 
3.3 
-
17.8'' 
-
11.5 
2.7 
2.4 
4.6 
2.5 
Percentage 
of Local 
expenditures 
financed from 
1 property taxation 
26.3 
16.6 
17.8 
21.1 
19.4 
41.7 
42.8 
50.1 
50.4 
30.0 
31.1 
25.4 
9.4 
11.5 
10.9 
23.8 
15.5 
19.4 
a. Includes only Calcutta municpal corporations. 
b. Excludes state government expenditures. 
Source : World Bank 
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less important either way at least for this small sample and for this 
time period/^ 
Local governments that want to achieve revenue autonomy 
face severe constraints in choosing their fiscal patterns. Even 
when they have had substantial freedom of action, however, their 
existing revenue authority has not always been fully utilized. The 
revenue instruments which seem most underutilized are property 
taxation, motor vehicle taxation, betterment levies, and user 
charges. Thus the degree to which a city's government is able to 
meet its rapidly rising expenditure requirements depends only on 
part of its revenue capacity, as determined mainly by the economic 
base of the city and by the restraints imposed by higher-level 
governments. It also depends on the revenue effort that is the 
extent to which the local government is using its revenue capacity. 
Revenue Importance of Property Taxes in Generatin2 Revenue to 
Finance Urban Public Services in India vis-a-vis other cities of 
Developed and Developing Nations 
The property tax takes on added importance if one considers only 
the financing of public services in urban areas, as shown in Table 2.30. 
The first column of this table refers to the fiscal importance of local 
governments as reported in Table 2.23. The second column shows the 
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contribution of the property tax to financing urban public expenditures. 
For the large urban areas considered here, the median share of property 
tax financing in total central, state and local expenditures in the urban 
area is 4.6 percent before and including 1979 and 2.8 percent after 1979. 
If we abstract from the general issue of the relative importance of local 
and central government expenditures and consider only the share of local 
expenditures supported by property taxation, quite a different picture 
may be painted. 
The third column of Table 2.30 shows that it is not uncommon for 
the property tax to finance more than one-third of all expenditures made 
by the local government. 
We do not have enough data to test rigourously the determinants of 
intercity variations in the level of property taxation. We can, however, 
offer some basic hypothesis that appear to be supported by these data. 
The property tax will be a less important source of finance under four sets 
of circumstances. The first is that local governments are unimportant 
relative to the central and state governments in providing services, that is, 
where the fiscal system is highly centralized (for example, in Kingston 
and Cartagena local governments accounted for less than 20 percent of 
urban area financing). The second is that expenditure responsibility has 
been decentralized but heavy use is made of grants and shared taxes 
(Nairobi). The third is that expenditure responsibility has been decen-
CHAPTCA - 2 ^^8 
tralized but the local government finances a major share of its expendi-
ture responsibilities with locally raised non-tax revenues (Bogota and 
Seoul) or with another local tax (Ahamedabad). The fourth is that the 
national government collects the property tax and returns a portion of 
receipts as transfers to local authorities (Jakarta). Since relatively few 
cities fall lender the later two explanations, one might generalize that 
where local government taxes play a maj or role in financing urban public 
services, the property tax will be an important source of revenue. 
One would like to use these data to infer whether the property tax 
has been increasing or declining as a source of local government finance. 
Such comparisons, however are difficult and depend on the sample of 
cities and the time period choosen. Still, the median share of the property 
tax in total local taxes fell from 54.7 percent in the pre-1979 period to 
42.4 percent in the post 1979 period (Table 2.28). Yet it is worth noting 
that the cities for which we have comparable data for the 1970s and 1980s 
were as likely to increase as decrease their property tax shares. 
A reasonable hypotheses, again supported by these data, is that the 
property tax had a rougher time of it in the 1980s. This was attributable 
to several factors : (a) the financing pressures on local governments, 
which forced the search for new revenue sources, (b) the inelastic 
response of property tax revenues to income growth and inflation, (c) the 
legal and administrative difficulties associated with increasing property 
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tax revenues through discretionary actions, and (d) the special difficul-
ties posed by high rates of inflation. The last two factors may be particu-
larly important since discretionary changes in sales tax rates and some 
user charges are less visible than changes in the property tax and are 
therefore politically more feasible. 
In the Table 2.30, we have four Indian cities: Ahamedabad, Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras. Behaviour of property tax in these cities is in line 
with the behaviour of property tax in other cities of the world showing 
that 1980s has been rougher time for the property tax. Let us take first 
total public expenditures made by local governments. Before 1979, on 
average, share of local governments in total public expenditures was 33.2 
percent and it declined to 17.5 percent after 1979. In other words in the 
1980s, local governments share in the total public expenditure has 
declined. Let us analyse the position of Indian cities. Ahamedabad during 
the period, 1965-71, contributed 41.5 percent of total public expendi-
tures, which declined to 30.7 percent, during 1977-81. Similarly, share 
of Bombay municipal corporation in total public expenditure was 41.7 
percent during the period 1963-72 and it rose to 42.9 percent during the 
period 1975-82 unfortunately data about Calcutta is not available. Fi-
nally, in Madras percentage of total public expenditures made by local 
governments was 10.1 percent in 1977-79. If we compare Indian cities 
position in respect of percentage of total public expenditures made by 
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local governments vis-a-vis other cities of the world included in this 
table, we see that, four major municipal corporations of India have 
contributed to total expenditure, more than the average. For example 
median before and including 1979 is 33.2 percent, while the same ratios 
for Indian cities at same time are 41.5 percent, 41.7 percent for Ahmadabad 
and Bombay respectively. It shows that, percentage of total public expen-
ditures made by local governments of Ahamedabad and Bombay has been 
above the Indian of 33.2 percent. Second column of the table 4-1 shows 
the percentage of total expenditures financed from property taxation. 
Median before and including 1979, percentage of total expenditures 
financed from property taxation is 4.6 percent. Ahamedabad, Bombay 
municipal corporations contributed 6.9 percent, 8.8 percent respec-
tively. It shows that, in two Indian cities, for which data is available, 
contribution of the property tax is more than the average. Further, in the 
second period that is after 1979, median has fallen to 2.8 percent (from 
4.6 percent). This fall makes it clear that role of property tax in the 1980s 
has diminished. It is enough to prove that 1980s has been rougher time for 
the property taxation. Ratio of the total expenditure financed from 
property taxation of Ahamedabad and Bombay during the second period 
shows a decline like the decline in the mean. It has declined from 6.9 
percent to 5.5 percent in case of Ahamadabad and from 8.8 percent to 8.3 
percent in case of Bombay. Thus trend of percentage of total expenditure 
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financed from property taxation of two Indian municipal corporations 
(for which data is available) is in line with the trend of other countries of 
the world. Since property tax is levied to finance the local expenditure, 
it becomes important to analyse its share in local expenditure. Column 
third of the Table 2.30 shows percentage of local expenditure financed 
from property taxation. Mean percentage of local expenditure financed 
from property taxation before and including 1979 was 15.5, which rose 
to 19.4 after 1979. Now, we analyse Indian cities' position. In Ahamedabad, 
during the period 1965-71, percentage of local expenditure financed 
from property taxation was 16.6, it is little more than mean figure of 
15.5. Further, during the period 1977-81, it improved to 17.8, this 
improvement in the position is in line with the trend prevalent among 
other cities of the world. But, this improvement is less than the improve-
ment in the average figure. Next Indian city is Bombay, in which percent-
age of local expenditures financed from property taxation, during the 
period 1963-72 was 21.1, definitely, in Bombay property taxation has 
performed better, since ratio is much more than the mean ratio of 15.5. 
Further, during the period 1975-82, ratio is 19.4 which is exactly equal 
to the mean ratio of 19.4. Thus, in Bombay, during the later period, there 
is fall instead of a rise unlike the mean position. But even after the slight 
fall ratio or position is not less than the mean ratio, rather it is exactly 
same. In Calcutta, during 1974-75, percentage of local expenditure 
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financed from property taxation was 41.7, here property tax has per-
formed much better, since mean figure is 15.5 for this period. Further 
during the period 1982, this ratio further rose to 42.8, whereas the mean 
figure for this period is 19.4. Thus, we see that Calcutta municipal 
corporation has performed much better. Finally, in Madras during the 
period 1972-76, the percentage of local expenditure financed from 
property taxation was 50.1, a remarkable performance, at least from one 
viewpoint since mean is only 15.5. We have many cities in the Table 2.30, 
when we make a comparative study of these cities, we find that Madras 
muncipal corporation's performance from this particular point of view is 
outstanding. Further, during the later period that is the period after 1979, 
in which mean ratio has been 19.4, Madras municipal corporation has 
performed very well. Thus, we reach to the conclusion that, property 
taxation has played important role in the financing of local expenditure 
in all Indian cities included in the Table 2.30. 
Revenue Growth 
Another important question is the adequacy of the growth of 
property tax revenue, this adequacy is usually measured in terms of the 
income elasticity of property tax revenues, with a normative judgement 
often made that at least a proportionate response is desirable. Such 
normative statements require qualification. If the property tax were the 
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sole source of local finances and if income were the sole determinant of 
public expenditure needs, then the unitary income elasticity argument for 
property tax revenues might be persuasive. But local governments have 
recourse to other revenues, and although it may be important that total 
revenues grow in response to expenditure needs, it is not necessary, or 
even desirable, that each tax so respond. Moreover, although income 
growth seems' a resonable basis on which to measure revenue respon-
siveness, there is nothing magic about an elasticity of 1.0 or 0.8 or 1.2, 
since it is not at all clear how expenditure needs increase with income. 
Indeed, one might ask whether it would be good policy, for example, to 
give up some revenue elasticity in the short run if an elastic property tax 
would increase the effective tax burden on the housing sector in the long 
run and dampen construction activity in the local housing market. 
It would be incorrect, however, to ignore the implications of an 
income inelastic property tax, especially where the property tax is the 
principal source of financing for a local government. Income growth is a 
significant (and elastic) determinant of the demand for public expendi-
ture in industrial countries, and other studies suggest that it may serve as 
a reasonable proxy for increased wage demands by public employees. To 
the extent that these paterns hold true in developing countries, a property 
tax which responds less than proportionately to income growth may 
substantially reduce the flexibility of a local government to increase 
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public service levels and may force frequent and politically unpopular 
adjustments to the rate and base. 
In fact, the urban property tax in developing countries appears to be 
income-inelastic. Available data suggest that the growth in property tax 
revenues has lagged behind the growth in income, and in some cases 
behind the growth in the general price level; that is, the real property tax 
yield has fallen. The rates of growth in real and actual levels of property 
tax revenue and assessed value are described for a sample of cities in the 
first three columns in Table 2.31.. There is a wide variation in these 
growth rates and a normal performance is difficult to identify. Only in 
about half the cities, however, was there an increase in the intensity of 
property taxation, that is, in the effective rate. 
Ideally, one would like to estimate the long-term income-elastic-
ity of the property tax for each city, but data problems are severe. In 
particular, data on changes in income are not generally available. More-
over, a major conceptual problem with estimation of the income elastic-
ity of the property tax is the difficulty in separating the increase in 
revenue due to automatic growth from that due to changes in the discre-
tionary rate or base. Nevertheless, some estimate of the responsiveness 
of property tax revenues to urban economic growth is an important 
element in tax policy planning in general, and in evaluating and adjusting 
the property tax structure in particular. 
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In each of the cities studied, some attempt has been made to 
estimate the responsiveness of the property tax revenues to growth in the 
local economy. Because of inadequate data on personal income, we must 
approximate an upper boundary on the income-elasticity of the property 
tax. We may derive a revenue-population elasticity, the percentage in-
crease in property tax revenues associated with a 1 percent increase in 
population, which is equivalent to the income-elasticity of revenue if 
there has been no change in per capita income. If per capita income has 
increased, then the population elasticity exceeds the income-elasticity. 
As may be seen in Table 2.31, nominal property tax revenues have 
generally grown two to three times faster than the population. This 
implies that there has been an increase in per capita property tax rev-
enues, but in real terms this increase has teneded to be small or negative. 
With respect to the cities studied here, the population-elasticity of the 
property tax exceeds unity in real terms only in Calcutta, Cartagena, 
Jakarta, and Seoul in the earlier period and in Cartagena, Seoul, and 
Singapore in the later period.^" Though adequate statistics on income 
growth rates are not available, it seems likely that incomes in these cities 
have grown at a faster rate than population and that therefore the property 
tax is inelastic. This conclusion of an income-inelastic revenue response 
is especially disturbing because we have included discretionary changes 
in computing revenue increase; that is, these data are an overstatement of 
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the automatic elasticity of the system. 
Thus, we find that so far as the population-elasticity of property 
tax is concerned, Indian cities have not performed satisfactorily for 
instance, in Ahmadabad, during the period 1961-78, population elasticity 
in actual terms was 1.44, but in in real terms merely 0.21, statistically in 
significant. In other words increase in property tax with respect to 
populationhas been inadequate. In Bombay, during 1963-72, population 
elasticity was 3.60 in actual, but when we see it in real terms, we find that 
it is only 0.61. In other words, it is inadequate. Further, Bombay munic-
ipal corporations' population elasticity during the later period i.e. 1969-
78 has been 1.9 in actual and in real terms only 0.02. Thus Bombay's 
property tax elasticity with respect to population has been inadequate. In 
Calcutta, during the period 1966-78, population elasticity in actual term 
was 7.98 and in real term merely 1.46. Thus, Calcutta is the only Indian 
city whose, property tax elasticity with respect to population in real term 
is statistically significant. Putting it differently, income growth has been 
adequate. Next Indian city in this table is Delhi in which during 1961-81, 
population elasticity in real term is statistically insignificant or income 
growth is inadequate. Finally, in Madras, during 1967-77 property tax 
elasticity with respect to population in real term is inadquate at 0.54. 
Thus, we see that, property tax elasticity with respect to population in 
real term of almost all Indian cities except Calcutta is inadquate. Same is 
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the condition of most of the cities included in the Table 2.31. 
For some cities, income estimates are available, and it is possible 
to estimate the income-elasticity of property tax revenues and its three 
components (again including discretionary changes). The base elasticity 
measures the responsiveness of assessed property value to income 
changes. The rate-elasticity measures the responsivess of tax collections 
to changes in the assessed property value. The collection rate elasticity 
indicates the responsiveness of tax collections to changes in tax liabitities. 
The first component therefore indicates the extent to which property tax 
revenues respond to changes in the economic base of the city (that is, 
income) because of change in the assessed value base. The second 
component shows the extent to which increase in assessed value are 
actually translated into property tax collections, reflecting three factors 
: the built-in elasticity of a given rate structure the effect of changes in 
the rate structure of changes in the rate structure which have occured 
during the period of measurement, and changes in collection efficiency. 
The third component isolates the impact of collection efficiency on 
changes in property tax collections. 
Analysis of these components, as reported in Table 2.32, indicates 
an income-inelastic property tax in most cities, even if discretionary 
changes are counted. The primary source of growth apears to be the rate 
elasticity, likely because of the influence of increases in the statutory 
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rate. These results square with Dillinger's (1988a : 6-8) analysis of the 
property tax performance in eleven developing countries in the 1980's " 
seven showed a real decline in property tax revenues. 
Thus, Table 2.32 makes it clear that income elasticity of all cities 
included in the table is less than unity, except one Indian city i.e, Delhi. 
Further, whatever increase in the revenue of these cities is taking place, 
it is due to Rate and collection rate. To elaborate Ahmadabad municipal 
corporation's (1961-78) income elasticity has been 0.81, statistically 
insignificant. Bombay municipal corporation's during 1969-78, income-
elasticity has been less than unity that is 0.83. In Calcutta, during the 
period 1966-78, income-elasticity has been 0.65, again less than unity or 
statistically insignificant. It is only in one particular case that, income-
elasticity has been significant, this is the case of Delhi during the period 
1961-81. In this unique case income elasticity has been 1.02, of course, 
a satisfactory performance, especially when we compare it with income 
elasticity coefficients of other cities included in the Table 2.32. 
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32. Throughout this work urban government is defined as the lowest 
level in the Government structure which comprises national, state 
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(province), and local authorities. Our definition of urban local 
government includes autonomous government agencies which 
have only a local franchise "Subnational government" is defined 
as the local and state (province) levels of government. In some 
unitary systems, no intermediate level of government exists, and 
hence the local government and subnational government sectors 
are the same. 
33. The United Nations does compile data on the finances of all 
subnational governments country by country for its aniiual year 
book of National Accounts Statistics. The International Monetary 
Fund Compiles fiscal data for provincial and local governments 
for most countries, but again no data for individual city govern-
ments are presented [IMF, Various years, a (1982); UN Statistical 
office 1980]. 
34. Although these figures provide a general impression of the 
relative importance of various levels of local government, they 
have to be treated with caution because of problems of data and 
definition most developing countries do not have universal re-
porting for all subnational authorities, and therefore the com-
pleteness of estimates of local and state spending many vary 
between countries. Also, the definition of the government sector 
varies between countries and analysts. Of particular importance is 
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whether or not autonomous government agencies and enterprises 
are defined as part of the public sector. 
3 5. We included only those developing countries for which data were 
available for both years. 
36. This approach considers the issue of the allocation of expenditure 
benefits. It is clearly as important a question, but benefit estima-
tion is well beyond the scope of this work. 
37. For instance, cali was able to service approximately 95 percent of 
its urban population with in-house water and sewer cormections in 
1976, compared with as little as 60 percent a few years earlier yet 
it had not been able to reduce significantly the proportion of 
neighbourhoods not served by paused streets. Unpaved streets in 
call become vartually impassable during the rainy season and thus 
seriously affect the provision of many other urban services such 
as garbage collection, transportation, and public utility mainte-
nance (Linn 1980a). 
38. These tables, like most of the tables in these chapters, are a 
Snapshot of the prevailing expenditure (or revenue) patterns at 
particular moments in time. Over time these patterns changes, 
although experience has shown that the structure of Urban finance 
changes slowly. 
39. In the United States, for example, common local government 
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functions would include education, police, fire, refuse collec-
tion, parks and recreation, road and stress maintenance, and public 
assistance. For a recent review of local government functions and 
finances in Industrial Countries, see Karran (1988). 
40. For a detil discussion of the pattern in the United States, see 
weight (1988); for the Federal Republic of Germany before 
reunification with the German Democratic Republic, see Ehrlicher 
and Hagemann (1976); and for other industrial countries, see 
Pred' homme (1987) and Karran (1988). A similar pattern of over 
lapping functional responsibilities has also been observed in the 
USSR (Paulov, 1975). 
41. External revenues do not necessarily constitute subsidies from 
higher-level government since loan financing may be supported by 
savings within the Urban sector. This is the case particularly with 
shared taxes, which are collected by the national government in 
the city and then wholly or partially remitted to local authorities. 
42. A particularly striking phenomenonon in Colombian cities has 
been the success of "Volorization" charges, a betterment levy 
assessed on the beneficiaries of urban street, highwavy, and 
sewarage facilities. 
43. Nairobi relied heavily on a local income tax before it was abol-
ished by the central government in 1974 : Korean local govern-
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ments were given the power 1973 to raise a combination of local 
head taxes and income taxes (smith and Kim 1979). 
44. These findings confirm the results of some earlier studies (Wash 
1969; Smith 1974; table 9). 
45. For a discussion of the role of grants from the central government 
in industrial countries, see Bird (1986) for a review of Federalism 
Lotz (1981) forthe Scandinavian countries, Preud'homme (1987) 
and Karan (19988) for the countries that belong to the organisation 
for Economic cooperation and Development, Yonehara (1986) 
for Japan, and Ehrlicher and Hagemann (1976) for the Federal 
Republic of Germany before reunification with the Gurman Demo-
cratic Republic. A discussion of the declining importance of 
federal grants in the United States is wright (1988, Chaps, 4-7). 
46. One basis for this hypothesis is that because the automobile is not 
as common in the rural areas of developing countries as it is in 
those of industrial countries, people in developing country 
rural areas have much less mobility (short of outright migration 
to the city). 
47. Betterment levies are broadly defined to include cost recoupment 
schemes which are designed to capture part of the increase in land 
value generated by investments in infrastructure. These levies 
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include, in particular, valorization in Colombia and land adjust-
ments in Korea (Chapter - 6). 
48. One particular problem with extensive central control over local 
borrowing is the often massive paperwork and delays which are 
encountered when having to apply for permission to borrow even 
relatively small amounts. This in itself has helped to discourage 
borrowing by local governments (see bird 1980) for the 
example of cali, Colombia and Hubbil 1983 for example in the 
Philippines). 
49. Casuality may, however, also run in the opposite direction: Urban 
governments that successfully expand urban services, and thus 
spending, many be better able to raise more resources as citizen's 
willingness to pay increases with increased service availability. 
Even in this case, it is important that local authorities have the 
appropriate revenue instruments under their control to raise 
additional revenues as revices are expanded. 
50. Linn has estimated the income - elasticity of the property 
tax in Cartagena to be 0.81 (Linn 1975), and 0.77 for Bogota 
(Linn 1980b). 
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R A T E S T R U C T U R E 
The available literature on property taxation in India, the 
reports of the various official inquiry committees and investigations 
of other research, bear ample evidence to the good deal of discussion 
on the assessment problem, for it is generally considered to be the 
kingpin of reform effort in the area. The other aspects of the tax, in 
comparison, do not seem to have received due appreciation. A case in 
point is the rate structure. In this chapter, an attempt is, therefore, 
made to compare the municipal property tax rate structures in vogue 
in different states and discuss the issues they pose vis-a-vis the 
reforms for improvement. 
Existing System 
The term property taxes' is often used to refer several munici-
pal imposts with a common base of either annual rental or capital 
value, of land and buildings. The range includes, general property tax 
(house tax)., water tax; sewerage tax; conservancy tax; latrine/scav-
enging tax; lighting tax; and fire tax. In actual practice, however, the 
composition and scope of these various imposts are observed to vary 
from one state's municipal statute to another and at times between that 
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of corporations and the municipalities within a state. An idea about the 
variations in the composition (and also in the nomenclature) of the 
property taxes in different states can be had from the data given in 
column 3 of the Appendix I. Property taxes are compulsory under 
statutes applicable to the municipalities in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and West Bengal and also under the 
statutes of most of the corporations. In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, though 
the taxes are not made statutorily compulsory, they constitute the 
mainstay of the municipal revenues. In Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, property 
taxes are discretionary levies of the municipalities. Under the Assam 
municipalities Act, 1956, the general purpose holding tax is discre-
tionary, but as a consequence of an amendment introduced in section 
68A of the Act, in 1966, the 'service taxes' become compulsory 
wherever the services concerned are provided by the municipality. The 
imposition of a service tax under almost all the statutes is, subject to 
the general qualifying condition of making available the service con-
cerned at certain standard in the area of location of the property, 
compulsory. A second distinguishing feature noticed in respect of the 
'service taxes ' is that, they are leviable from all properties, whichev-
er availed those services, irrespective of whether they are subjected 
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to the general purpose property tax or exempted from it (as is the case 
with the central and state government properties and that of public 
institutions). Thirdly, there is no general bar on levy of a service tax, 
while still charging the service either on measurement of actual 
consumption or on some other basis. In actual practice, however, this 
kind of tax and price charge system is prevalent only in the corpora-
tions. In most municipalities, it is generally reported that taxes and 
price charges are treated as substitutes to each other. Certain statutes 
including the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964; the Hyderabad 
Municipal Corporation Act, 1955; Karnataka Municipal Corporation 
Act, 1976; Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 specially bar the 
above kind of simultaneous tax and price charge arrangement. Most 
other statutes do not appear to have any such bar. 
Now coming to the subject proper of the property tax rate 
structures, a general feature noticed in almost all the statutes govern-
ing the municipalities is the stipulation making it obligatory for a 
municipality to refer the fixation and alteration of the rates to the 
state Government for final approval and to comply with the directions 
that the latter might issue in that matter. Some of the notable excep-
tions to this general rule include the municipal statutes of Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Naud, where the mu-
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nicipal bodies, provided they are not indebted, have powers to 
alter the rates of the tax at their discretion within the limits 
prescribed under the statute or by the rules framed there under. 
As regards the corporations, they seem to enjoy relatively greater 
autonomy in the matter. 
Rate Structure Limits 
This above common feature notwithstanding, significant varia-
tions are observed over the rate structure provisions in different 
states. Some statutes stipulate the maximum and minimum of the rates 
of the tax as percentage of the rates of the tax as percentage of the 
annual rental or capital value, in some either one side limit or no limit 
is indicated (vide column, 4 to 7 of Appendix I). Thus under the Bihar 
and Orrisa Municipalities Act, 1992, the maximum ceiling on the rates 
of tax are fixed at 12.5 percent in the case of general holding tax, for 
water tax at 12.5 percent; lighting at 3 percent; latrine (or drainage) 
tax at 7.5 percent. The Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1968 limits 
the rate of general tax on buildings and land to 12.5 percent. The 
Karnataka Municipal Act, 1964, while fixing the maximum ceilings on 
the rates of component taxes has also fixed the minimum limit on the 
rate of the aggregate of all those taxes. There maximum limits for the 
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tax on buildings and land is 10 percent, for special sanitary tax is 3 
percent and for general sanitary tax it is 4 percent the maximum limit 
on aggregate of all property taxes is 12.5 percent in the case of town 
municipalities and 17.5 percent in the case of city municipalities.^ 
The position appears to be the quite opposite under the Kerala Munic-
ipal Act, 1960. Here the minimum limits on rates of component taxes 
are fixed as : general purposes tax, 5 percent; lighting tax, 2 percent; 
and sanitary tax, 3 percent. No limits are prescribed in respect of 
water tax, but it is stipulated that the aggregate rate of all the property 
taxes can vary over the range of only 10 to 15 percent of the annual 
value. In the case of Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, where only a 
general tax on buildings and lands is allowed, the maximum and min-
imum in respect of it are fixed respectively at 15 and 7.5 percent. 
Similar is the provision under Punjab municipal Act, 1911. The M.P. 
Municipal Act, 1961, fixed the maximum and minimum rates of gen-
eral purpose tax respectively at 12.5 and 5 percent of the annual value. 
Under the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, the maximum ceilings on the 
various components the property taxes are; tax on holdings, 10 
percent; latrine tax, 10 percent; drainage tax, 10 percent; and lighting 
tax, 5 percent. The Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, stipulated that the 
holding rate, water rate, lighting rate, conservancy rate should not 
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exceed,?.5 percent, 10 percent^, 3 percent and 10 percent respective-
ly of the annual value of the holding. As regards the corporations, it is 
observed that the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Act, 1955 stipu-
lated the maximum limits on the aggregate of all property taxes at 20 
and 15 percent respectively. These limits under the Kerala Municipal 
Corporation Act, 1961 are 25 and 15 percent respectively. Under the 
Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1956, the maximum and 
minimum rates of general property, tax which is envisaged to be 
levied as a consolidated rate, are 33.5 and 15.5 percent respectively. 
Under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, the maxi-
mum and minimum ceiling on the aggregate tax rates are 25 and 15.5 
percent respectively and under the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika 
Adhiniyam, 1959 the limits are respectively 25 and 15 percent. The 
permitted range of rates under the Guahati Municipal Corporation Act, 
1969, is 15 to 25 percent. Under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation 
Act, 1976 it is 20 to 25 percent. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 
1957, provided for a range of 10 to 25 percent. Under the Bombay 
provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, the minimum limit on 
the rate of general purpose tax is fixed at 12 percent. Under the 
Bombay City Municipal Corporation Act. 1888 not only the maximum 
and minimum limits on the rate of general tax are fixed at 21 and 8 
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percent respectively, but those limits are also fixed in respect of fire 
tax at 3/4 and 1/8 percent. In addition, there is a maximum ceiling on 
the rates of halalkhor (scavenging) tax at 5 percent. The Patna Munic-
ipal Corporation Act, 1951, stipulates only the maximum ceilings on 
the component taxes. They are for general holding tax 12.5 percent. 
Water tax 12.5 percent; scavenging tax (drainage tax) 10 percent, and 
lighting tax 3 percent. Under the Punjab Municipal Corporations Act, 
1976 a maximum ceiling on the rate of only the general tax is 
stipulated at 15 percent. Speaking of the consolidated levy of the 
property taxes, a statutory directive to that effect exists under the 
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, as already stated and also under the 
Maharashtra Municipal Act, 1965. In some other legislations it is an 
optional provision and these include the enactments applicable to the 
municipalities of Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Ut-
ter Pradesh. But it is generally reported that this option is riot being 
extensively adopted. 
Progression and Exemptions 
Property tax in a good number of municipal enactments is 
envisaged to be levied at a fixed proportional rate of the annul values. 
A few, however, have provision for the levy of the tax according to 
progressive rates, the rates of the tax increasing along with the annual 
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value of the property concerned. Thus, under the Calcutta Municipal 
Act, 1951, the rate structures applicable to different annual reteable 
values of the properties are as follows: 
T A B L E - 3 . 1 
Range of the Annual Tax rate (percentage 
Retable value of the ARV) 
Less than Rs 1,000 15.5 
Rs 1000-3,000 18.5 
Rs 3,000-12,000 22.5 
Rs 12000-15,000 27.5 
Rs 15,000 and above 33.5 
The other enactments which have similar enabling provisions 
for the levy of progressive tax according to graduated rates include 
those applicable to the corporations of Hyderabad, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. 
An aspect that is usually regarded as close to the progressive tax 
rates, is the exemption of properties with low annual values from the 
levy. The position in this regard seems to vary significantly in differ-
ent statutes. In some, there is no clear directive and in others where it 
exists, the exemption limits (which is generally applicable only in 
respect of the general purpose tax and to the owner-occupied 
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properties) vary in the range of just Rs 6 to Rs 120, the highest 
(vide column 2 of Appendix I). 
Special Rates 
The provision for the application of special rates of tax in 
respect of certain types of properties also vary from state to state. It 
is general knowledge that at the valuation stage, a number of conces-
sions as per specific statutory guidelines or by convention are applied 
to the reported (market) rental or capital values. But once the assess-
ments are finalised, almost all the statutes require the properties with 
equal annual values to be treated equally for purpose of application of 
tax rates. But a few conspicuous exceptions to this general rule are to 
be noticed. For example, both the Guahati Municipal Corporation and 
Assam Municipalities Acts direct the discounting of annual values by 
25 percent in the case of owner-occupied properties for the determi-
nation of the rate and tax applicable. Some statutes, including those of 
Guahati Municipal Corporation and the Bombay Provincial Municipal 
Corporations, permit charging of general purpose property tax in 
respect of buildings used for certain classes of trades, etc. at a higher 
rate not exceeding half percent of the one otherwise applicable. In the 
case of Calcutta corporation, a 50 percent additional cess on property 
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tax is levied in respect of premises used for commercial or non-
residential purposes. Application of conservancy tax at special rates 
or on actual cost basis is permissible in respect of large buildings 
premises, such as clubs, hotels, etc. Under the statutes of the corpo-
rations of Hyderabad, Patna, Guahati, and Delhi and the municipal 
legislation of Maharashtra. Yet another interesting provision is the 
one enabling the variations in water rates according to the distance of 
the property from public stand post and also whether a communication 
pipe for private supply is provided on the premisses. Enabling provi-
sions of the above type exist under the enactments applicable to the 
municipalities in Assam, Orissa and that of Patna Corporation. Under 
the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the location of the properties is one 
of the criteria for application of special rates. Thus the properties in 
the bustees (slums) are charged at the special concessional rate of 
15.57 percent for properties with annual values of Rs 1,000 or less 
and at 18.5 percent for properties with annual values more than Rs 
1000. A new innovation in the proposed Calcutta Municipal Corpora-
tion Bill, 1980, is the provision of rebate of 25 percent to the newly 
constructed houses used exclusively for residential purpose for a 
duration not exceeding 3 years [Section 167 (5)]. This is intended to 
encourage new house construction. This is in addition to the provi-
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sion in section 169(1) of the Bill, that premises, used for self occu-
pation would enjoy a rebate in the assessment which on a sliding scale, 
varying from 30 percent for a property of a valuation of Rs. 600 or 
below to 1 percent for one with a valuation of Rs 18,000 and above. 
The foregoing account clearly brings out that the major issues 
for critical consideration in any effort for reform of property tax rate 
structures would centre around : 
1. Adoption of a consolidated rate in place of several imposts on 
the same tax base 
2. Statutory specification of the maximum and minimum of the 
rates. 
3. Incorporation of progressivity in the rates and the exemption 
from levy of the properties with low annual value. 
4. Application of discriminatory rate structures to properties 
according to their use, location, etc. 
The discussion on these various issues have necessarily to be 
with reference to the paramenters provided by the generally 
accepted cannon of property taxation. Here they may be adopted as: 
(a) maximisation of the revenue yields, (b) unambiguity and conve-
nience in administration, (c) incidence according to the paying 
capacity, and (d) supplementation of efforts made at various levels for 
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orderly urban development. 
Several Taxes Vs. A consolidated Tax 
The justification for several municipal imposts on property 
with different service levels could be given as follows. A good number 
of municipal services are in the nature of merit goods. In most cases 
it is not possible to charge the price from the identifiable beneficia-
ries strictly on the basis of either actual consumption or some other 
norm. Even in cases where charge by measurement is feasible, pricing 
on costs basis is not an easy task because of the cross subsidization 
that is usually warranted. In both the cases taxes would-be the most 
convenient and economical form, of revenue, realisation. For, the 
service taxes are chargeable along with the general purpose property 
tax. This arrangement incidentally helps the promotion of equity 
according to the benefit principle of taxation. Suitable tax conces-
sions could be given to the properties situated in the areas where 
adequate standard of the municipal service concerned could not be 
made available. It would obviously not be proper to charge the entire 
body of rate payers for services which benefit only a particular area.^ 
As the service taxes (particularly water tax and scavenging tax) are 
realisable from all the properties which availed the service, irrespec-
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tive of whether they are exempted from the general property tax or 
not, these taxes are a facility to mobilise extra revenues. Lastly, the 
statutory appointinent of tax revenues under different, service heads' 
would help to promote better accounting and pricing disciplines in 
respect of these services. The above arguments, at first sight, may 
appear very logical. But the basic tenet of the entire approach is 
unsound in theory and also can not be rated very highly as a strategy as 
far as the promotion of the revenues and equity objectives of taxation 
are concerned. The principle of quid-pro-quo latent in the above 
approach is inconsistent with the universally accepted philosophy of 
tax'*. The principle, for argument's sake, could as well be logically 
extended to interpret that individual properties which do not require 
a particular municipal service for claiming exemption from the tax. In 
fact, the provisions under the Assam, Kerala, Orissa, Madras and 
Bengal municipal Acts for granting concessions in respect of the 
latrine and the scavenging tax to the properties with flush type latrines 
or some other private arrangements for removal of night-soil etc., 
appear to endorse the extended logic of service tax in practice. As far 
as equity, according to the benefit principle is concerned, it is largely 
being taken care of at the assessment stage itself, for the properties 
in the areas with inadequate municipal services generally fetch lower 
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rents and this is in turn reflected in the tax assessed also. Thus there 
does not appear to be any need to have an additional avenue for 
granting concessions in the form of lower tax rates. Further, the 
various services after which these different property taxes are la-
belled, constitute the obligatory functions of the municipalities. So 
whatever concessions that are to be provided would, at best, be tran-
sitory. Just for providing concession in the event of inadequate ser-
vice one need not have separate service taxes. The field studies have, 
no doubt, indicated a high degree of correlation between the income 
of the residents and the quantum of to their demand for municipal 
utility, services.^ But a service-tax-based annual values might not be 
able to achieve the required regulatory objectives in the same fashion 
as say a discriminating pricing system could do. The service taxes can 
be used only as supplement to the efforts in the price-charge system 
where that is feasible. Even then, the arguments favoring separate 
service taxes have still to be weighed against the two distinctive 
advantages of a single consolidated rate of property tax. These are 
administrative simplicity and greater scope for the introduction of 
graduation in rates. As far as the tax payers are concerned, it makes 
little difference to them whether the amount of the tax they have to 
pay is in the form of a single rate or is against several imposts. But as 
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far as the administration is concerned a single rate could be expected 
to bring in considerable savings of manpower and costs in the prepa-
ration servicing, and posting of bills etc. About the advantages in 
accounting and pricing mentioned in respect of the several service 
taxes, the same could also be derived under the single property tax 
system, through appropriate guidelines incorporated in the statutes. 
Statutory Maxima And Minima of Rates 
It is observed that in the cases where the statutes stipulated the 
maxima and minima of the property tax rates, (either in respect of 
individual or on the aggregate of the taxes), they are generally high. 
Also in states, like, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, where property 
tax is the main stay of municipal revenues, the rates of the tax are 
observed to be fairly high, though there is no statutory directives 
about the minimum. But in other cases the rates of the property taxes 
appear to be relatively low (vide appendix II a and b). Therefore, it is 
suggested that in all the cases the statutes should lay down the maxima 
and minima of tax rates.^ An important rider to this suggestion is that 
once the limits are statutorily fixed, the municipalities should enjoy 
autonomy in the determination of actual rate levels. Unfortunately, 
the municipalities in a good number of states are at present required 
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to consult and obtain permission of the state Government at every 
stage of rate determination. It is generally agreed that such controls 
are not conducive for the growth of financial discipline among the 
municipalities. ' An added advantage of the suggestion made is that 
they facilitate a better state supervision over the municipalities in the 
matter of actual revenue collections and in judging the revenue 
needs of different municipal bodies and dispensing the revenue, 
supporting grants. 
Progressive Rates 
Progressive rate structure in property taxation is suggested to 
promote the equity in the tax incidence and also to make the yields 
more elastic. The potentialities in these two respects are, however, 
doubted by some. The Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54), for 
instance, was against the introduction of progression in the property 
tax of municipal bodies in general as it did not rate very highly the 
utility of the proposal in practice.^ The commission, however, did not 
oppose giving the suggestion a try in the muncipal corporations and 
also in bigger municipalities. ' The arguments advanced against the 
progression in property tax are broadly as under. Property tax is an 
impost only on one category of property owners, i.e., those of urban 
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lands and buildings and so discriminatory against those owners, in 
comparison, owning other types of property, such as shares, jwellery 
etc. A progressive property tax is likely to further this discrimination, 
for, among the latter there could be found not only the bigger inves-
tors and property dealers but also those whose main form of posses-
sion, or source of income is the urban immovable property.'" In case 
of owner-occupied properties, as no rental income in money terms are 
derived, the basis of tax is purely hypothetical. Further, unlike in the 
case of income tax, there is no provision in property taxation for 
giving remission in respect of loans incurred, or hypothetication of 
other property made in the creation of the urban land or building. ' ' 
Another point to be noted is that in the determination of property tax 
burden, the annual values of the properties are separately considered, 
but not the total of the annual values that are accuring to a particular 
citizen from all the urban lands and buildings he owns. More than all 
these, a rental income of a property owner is generally observed to be 
uncorrelated to his income from all sources and, thus, his paying 
capacity. Under the circumstances, it is not feasible to operate a 
system of property levies that takes into account the variations in the 
ability to pay with any reasonable degree of success. 
As regards the scope for mobilisation of additional revenues 
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the argument is that the pursuit of equity and progression would imply 
a relatively high exemption limit and also pegging down of the rates in 
respect of annual valuations at lower levels. But "both the exemption 
and lower rates will, for the smaller municipalities, imply loss of 
revenue which will be impracticable to make up by higher rate on the 
relatively few bigger properties".*^ In case of properties whose annu-
al values fall in the marginal range of various slabs the wide gaps in the 
tax burden might induce the owners to resort to unethical practices to 
get lower assessments and thus the application of a lower grade of 
rates, on this account also, the revenues could decline. Unlike the 
fixed proportional rate which is easily understood by the clients and 
simple to administer, progressive rates might lead to administrative 
complications and thus to higher costs of collection. 
An examination of the above various arguments may now be 
taken up; but, at the outset, two points need to be recognised as part 
of the reference setting. The first is that property tax is not a tax on 
rental incomes as such, but a tax on the property itself, in the fashion 
similar to the central estate duty. This, coupled with the fact that 
property tax is levied by a body of the government at the lowest level, 
should make it clear that the task of ensuring equity in tax incidence 
as between the owners of various types of properties and also within 
CHAPTfA - 3 235 
the owners of urban land and buildings with different total annual 
rental incomes can not be construed to be falling under the ambit of 
property taxation. In any case, the proposition is too wide an expecta-
tion for a local government body to accompolish. These equity issues 
are, in fact, the prerogative of the national-level government and 
could rightly be expected to be managed under various provisions of 
the central wealth tax and income tax legislations. The role that could 
be envisaged to the property taxation in the above is purely that of a 
supplemental direct tax. The second point to be noted is that which 
ever base is adopted in respect of property tax, whether it is the annual 
rental value, capital value or some other, it would be too much to 
expect it to reflect all the facets of the intrinsic value of the property 
for incorporation in the tax process. In the case of rental values, as has 
been pointed out, imperfections in the rental market are caused by 
various extraneous factors, such as, rent control provisions, etc. so, 
the market values are generally no reflection of the true occupancy 
values. A plausible deduction from this could be that the inequitiveness 
in property tax incidence manifest largely from the inability of the tax 
base to incorporate the various facets of property values. 
With the above postulations of property taxation in the general 
reference setting, an evaluation of the merits of progressive rates is 
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attempted with the help of data from the field. Here it is noted that, 
since the alternative mostly suggested is the proportional rate, an 
assessment in relative terms would suffice. First to be considered is 
the equity aspect. For this purpose, the data about rents and incomes 
of the occupiers from two different settings. In the first situation, it 
is observed that as the income level increases, the percentage of the 
income spent towards rent and taxes decreases. If this kind of income-
rent distinction pattern could be assumed to be held true in respect of 
urban property owners in general, then a proportional rate of taxation 
is evidently regressive. Thus, progressive rates could help to make the 
tax incidence more equitable. On the other hand, if the rent and 
income distribution of the property owners are uncorrelated in the 
pattern, then it is difficult to make positive assertions about the 
advantages of progressive rates over that of proportional rates and 
vice versa. Thus, the data reported gives ample indication, if not of 
anything elase, about the possible wide divergences in the field 
situations and the potential hazards of relying on progressive property 
tax rate as a tool to promote equity objectives. 
As for the criticism that under the progressive rates system, 
steep variations in the burdents are likely to occur in respect of 
properties at the marginal ranges of different rate slabs, the difficulty 
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in that regard, as it has been recently suggested, could be considerably 
minimised through adoption of a straight line method of fixing the 
progressive ra tes . ' ' 
Next we may proceed to the examination of the likely impacts of 
the rate structure options on the revenue mobilization objectives. The 
apprehenension that the pursuit of progressive rates might entail 
revenue losses on account of the implications towards the high ex-
emption limit and the pegging down of the rates in respect of lower 
annual values is not sustainable in the face of the facts as reported 
from the field. It is a general observation that a large percentage of 
urban dewellers do not own land and buildings.'' 'So a property, howev-
er small be its rental income, cannot justifiably claim the exemp-
tion. '^  It may be further reiterated, that the equity that is sought to be 
ensured is of intra-class type, i.e., among the properties themselves 
(with all the known hurdles in its operationalisation). Therefore, in 
the derivation of the progressive property tax rates one need not 
entirely be guided by the equity in the conventional sense. The pointed 
submission is that in moulding the rate structure, other criteria, like, 
yield, etc., might also be taken as relevant without, of course, signif-
icantly affecting the equity considerations. The feasibility of this 
proposition in practice may be illustrated with the help of data taken 
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from class I municipality in Haryana where property tax is presently 
levied at a fixed proportional rate. The distribution of tax-payers 
according to their tax liability and their share of contribution to the 
total current demand are presented. I tmay be noted that 91.43 percent 
of the tax payers contributed just 3 8.89 percent of the tax demand; 
8.22 percent to the 25.59 percent of the tax demand and juist 27 
constituting 0.3 5 percent of the total tax payers accounted for as high 
as 35.66 percent of the tax demand.^* From this data it could be seen 
that by slightly increasing the tax rates at the higher levels of the 
annual values, the tax yields could be substantially increased. Alterna-
tively, if it is desired to raise the exemption limit marginally to give 
tax relief to a substantial number of property holders, it can be done 
without affecting the revenues significantly.'^ 
It is also observed in repsect of the municipality under consid-
eration that 84 percent of the tax defaulters fall in the tax range of Rs. 
12.50, but their share of tax arrears in the total is not more than 53.5 
percent. However, 16 percent of defaulters who belong to the high tax 
ranges accounted for as much as 46 percent of the arrears. Therefore, 
increasing the exemption limit in this case may as well lead to the 
administrative efficiency in the collection process. For the savings in 
manpower that could be effected in the preparation of bills, serving 
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them, etc., to a large number of taxpayers whose contibution towards 
total net tax collections is not very high, could as well be used to 
improve the collections from defaulters in the high tax brackets. 
Discriminatory Rate Structure 
The provisions in some of the statutes, as already mentioned, 
for special rates of property tax to deal with certain specified catego-
ries of properties (according to use etc.,) is a clear enough recogni-
tion of the need to mould the tax rate structure to capture as many 
typications of properties as possible and the inadequacy of the 
present single base and rate structure combination to meet the felt 
objectives. Properties cause various social burdens according to the 
use they are put and the municipal government being the most proxi-
mate to the people are often called upon to shoulder a fair share of 
those social burdens in the form of additional civic amenities. There-
fore, the revenues that are to be raised by a municipality could 
justifiably be expected to be shaped after these expenditures require-
ments or, alternatively, by utilising the fiscal instruments available to 
minimize the recurence of various social burdens requiring environ-
mental protection, conservation of energy, construction of new hous-
es, etc. It implies the need for adoption of a larger canvas of social 
CHAPTCA - S : - 240 
costs and benefits in urban development in respect of municipal 
revenue mobilisation. Toward this new dispensation, there are broadly 
two approaches as far as reforms in tax rate structure are concerned. 
The first is to have a single base and a number of property taxes after 
various municipal service, as at present, but increasingly to make 
these service tax rates an integral, part of the respective tax-price 
charging systems, geared to the service objectives. Under this ar-
rangement the emphasis would be more on the 'pr ice ' than on the tax 
component because of its amenability for discriminatory charging. 
The tax rates could not be so varied, for, they have to be uniform for 
all properties with similar (tax) base. The operationalisation of this 
suggestion is, however, beset with many a practical difficulty. An 
alternative course of reform could be to have a number of property tax 
systems for different categorisations of properties according to use, 
location, etc, and under each system to have different base-rate struc-
tures evolved on varying configurations of criteria to meet the overall 
objectives of urban development. The orientation of the municipal 
property taxation in this direction might appear to be a radical depar-
ture from the existing framework, but the thinking of reform on these 
lines perhaps can not be postponed for long. 
Thus, when we go through the various statutes regarding prop-
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TABLE - 3.5 
Rate Structure : The Corporations of Madras and Trivandrum 
(Per cent of rental value) 
Corporation 
1. Madras 
RV slabs 
(Rs.) 
37 - 500 
501 - 1000 
1001 - 5000 
5001 + 
General 
tax 
5.00 
10.5 
12.0 
14.5 
L ighint 
tax 
3.5 
3.5 
13.5 
3.5 
Edi ucation 
tax 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
D raina 
tax 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
ge Water 
. tax" 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
2. Trivandrum Plate rate 7.0 3.0 - 5.0 3.0 
Note : a = abolished in Madras in 1978 - 79 
Source : Municipal Corporation of Madras and Trivandrum. 
CHflPTCA - S 241 
erty taxation and make an analysis of it we find that there exists four 
types of rate structure : 
1. Flat Rate System 
2. Slab System 
3. Graduated slab system 
4. Straight line system 
Graduated slab system is distinguished from the simple slab 
system because the tax payable in the preceding slab increases by a 
specified amount which keeps on increasing progressively in the 
subsequent slabs. The system is in vogue in the income tax depart-
ment. MCD is presently following this system straight line method is 
provided for in the new Calcutta coporation Act, 1980. Here only the 
minimum tax rate (11 percent) and the maximum rate (40 percent) has 
been specified. In between these two limits, the tax demand is worked 
out according to a formula which requires to divide the RV by 600 and 
to add 10 to the quotient'^. Corporations of Bombay and Trivandrum 
follow the flat rate system. The corporation of Ahmadabad, and 
Madras follow the simple slab system. The rate structure of these 
corporations is tabulated in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. The corporations of 
Delhi and Calcutta practice discriminating tax rates between residen-
tial and non-residential properties. In Delhi the marginal rates of 
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general tax for these two types of properties vary from 10 and 15 
percent respectively on the lowest slab to 20 to 25 percent respec-
tively in the slab of Rs. 1 0 - 2 0 thousand. The corporation of Calcutta 
imposes surcharge on non-residential properties to the extent of 50 
percent of the consolidated rate. It gives tax concessions up to 25 percent 
of the consolidated rate to the newly constructed properties for a period of 
three years. 
Relatively high tax rate in Bombay and Ahmadabad (including 
service taxes) has been brought about by the compulsions of a de-
pressed tax base. Ever increasing local public expenditure commit-
ments and the depressed tax base are compelling factors for the 
enhancement of tax rate. However, the coporations of Madras and 
Trivandrum seem oblivious to such a situation. In the latter, the rate 
structure has not been revised since 1967. In the former, it is still 
pegged at 1972 levels. 
Thus, we find that prevalence of flat rate (as in Bombay and 
Trivandrum). Slab system (as in Ahmadabad and Madras), graduated 
slab system (as in Delhi), straight line method (as in Calcutta), dis-
criminatory rates between land uses and tagging of a number of ser-
vice taxes and cesses are the basic features of rate structure in India. 
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Flat Rate Versus Progression 
Equity considerations and the ability to pay principle of taxa-
tion are said to suggest a progressive rate structure based on slab 
(step) system and graduated slab system. Yet another spin-off of a 
progressive rate structure is said to be a higher degree of revenue 
mobilisation under this system. However, even a step system may be 
regressive if the assessess in the higher slabs keep on paying 
incrementaly less with increase in subsequent slabs. In Madras step 
system, for example, after the slab of Rs. 501, for every increase of 
Rs. 100 in the subsequent slabs the marginal increment keeps on 
declining till the slab of Rs. 1000. It again declines thereafter. So is 
the case with the Ahmadabad slab system. The Calcutta corporation 
under the old Calcutta Corporation Act, 1951, was loosing a revenue 
of about Rs. 16.80 million out of a demand of Rs. 125 million due to 
this (Kapoor and Ghosh 1991 : 12). 
Equity considerations apparently do not hold good. Theoretical 
pursuit of ability to pay will entail (1) high exemption limit; (ii) 
graduation of rates above the exemption limit and (iii) appreciable 
reduction of rate in the lower slabs (India 1955 : 389). The first and 
the third dictates of ability to pay will militate against revenue 
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mobilisation, which, it will be difficult to make up by the second 
dictate. Yet another argument against application of ability to pay for 
divising a progressive property tax rate structure is that property 
value is an imperfect indicator of a tax. Payer 's net wealth or income 
(Dillinger 1991 : 7). It will require to take into account the total 
ability to pay on the basis of income from all sources which is the 
domain of the central income tax and with which the local bodies are 
hardly concerned (India 1953 : 388). Moreover, it involves substan-
tive distributional issues which pertain to a branch of public finance 
with which the municipal authorities are not supposed to be concerned 
with. Progressive rate strucutre also has a built-in incentive for the 
assessess to continue to stay in the lower slab. This affects tax 
compliance, promotes corruption and reduces revenues. A very high 
rate of tax in the higher slabs will have adverse allocation effects and 
will adversely affect the housing stock. A flat rate system is free from 
these and it is also convenient to administer. However, a differenti-
ated rate between land uses will still be advisable for revenue consid-
erations. The existing high rate (in Ahmadabad and Bombay and even in 
Delhi and Calcutta) has so far proved workable because it is levied on 
a depleted base. If applied on a base determined through valuation 
based on prevaling rents, it would result in adverse socio-economic 
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and political implications. 
The Orissa Municipal Act provides for the holding tax imposed 
at a rate not exceeding 10 percent on the annual value of the holding. 
This rate of taxation appears to be very low as compared to the rate 
prevalent in many other states. For example : 
T A B L E - 3 .6 
Name of the state Rate of general property tax, 
as percent of the ARV 
Andhra Pradesh 
Gujarat 
Maharashtra 
Delhi 
10 - 24 
12 - 30 
19 - 25 
10 - 30 
in Andhra Pradesh, the rate of general property tax is 10 to 24 percent 
of the rateable value, in Gujarat it is 12 to 30 percent, in Maharashtra 
19 to 25 percent (consolidated), in Delhi 10 to 30 percent and so on. 
The rules under the Act also provide for impostion of the maximum 
rates concerning water, light, latrine and drainage taxes. *^  
From the above table it is observed that majority of the local 
bodies in, the state have imposed taxes (general). Property tax and 
service taxes) at a very low rate, i.e., five to or Forteen percent of ARV. 
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TABLE-3 .7 
Rates of Taxes -General Proper ty Tax (Holding) 
Including Services Taxes 
SI. No Rates of Taxes (% of ARV) Number of Local 
bodies Levied 
5 
14 
32 
40 
03 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
20 to 28 
15 to 19 
10 to 14 
5 to 09 
Below 5 
It is found that although Cuttack municipality has imposed only 
Four taxes, the total rate is hlighest, i.e, 28 percent (10 percent 
holding, 4 percent lighting, 4 percent water and 10 percent latrine). 
Berhamper muncipality, although has imposed all the five taxes, it 
comes next to Cuttack as per the rate, of taxes, i.e., 25 percent of the 
ARV. It is interesting to note that a few class I urban local bodies have 
levied the above taxes at the rate of 10 to 15 percent of ARV. 
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Municipal Proper ty Tax in Gujara t 
Rate structure as applied in the municipalities in Gujarat 
that varies substantially from one municipal body to another. The 
rates of the property tax/consolidated tax range from six percent 
of annual rental value in Navasari municipality to 10 percent in 
Nadiad Municipality. 
Unlike the Government of Maharashtra, the Government of 
Gujarat has not prescribed the minimum and maximum rates of prop-
erty tax. Hence, about 5 percent of the municipalities in Gujarat have 
levied property tax at differential rates for properties used for resi-
dential purpose (self-occupied or rental) or for commercial or indus-
trial purpose. 
Till now we have had a cursory look at majority of the 
mucnipality's rate structure. It would be better, if we make an exten-
sive study of certain states municipalities property tax rate structure. 
Here we choose Delhi rather entire national capital region. As we 
known that NCR comprises of Delhi metropolitan Area (DMA) and 
the priority towns (PTs). 
Tax Rates 
The rates at which taxes can be levied by the municipal bodies 
248-A 
TABLE - 3.8 
Rate Structure of Property Taxes in Selected NCR Towns, 1990 
(as % of ARV) 
Town Property Taxes 
General/li losue/ 
consolidated 
tax 
10.00 
10.00 
12.50 
12.50 
8.00 
Rates 
applied 
since 
N.A. 
1988 
1980 
N.A. 
1977 
Water Sewer/conser-
tax vancy tax 
Total 
DMA Towns 
Faridabad 
Ghaziabad 
Gurgaon 
Bahadurgarh 
Loni 
10.00 
10.00 
12.50 
20.00 
12.50 
12.50 
18.00 
Priority Towns 
Meerut 
Rohtak 
Alwar 
Panipat 
Bulandshahar 
Hapur 
Khurja 
Rewari 
Palwal 
10 (upto an ARV 1977 
of Rs. 3000) 
12.5 (For an ARV 
of Rs. 3000 +) 
10.00 1935 
6.25 1976 
( A R V R s . 601-1200) 
7.50 
(ARVRs . 1201 + ) 
12.50 N.A. 
6.25 1957 
5.00 1970 
7.00 1966 
12.50 1977 
12.50 1982 
4.00 
6.25 
10.00 
7.00 
2.00 
14.50-
16.50 
12.50 
6.25-
12.50 
14.00 
17.00 
14.00 
12.50 
12.50 
N.A. = Not Available 
ARV = Annual Rateable Value 
Note : Municipal acts in Uttar Pradesh (except for UP Nagar mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 
which provides for a limit of 15 to 25 per cent of ARV) and Rajasthan do not provide 
for any limit of property tax rates. However, the Haryana Municipal Act 1973 provides 
for a rate of 12.5% of ARV for the municipalit ies having the status of Class A and 
Class B and 10% of ARV for Class C municipalit ies. 
Source : NIUA Survey 1990. 
TABLE -3.9 
Property Tax Base in Selected NCR Towns as 
Existing in 1990 
2 4 8 - i - A 
Towns 
DMA Towns 
Faridabad 
Ghaziabad 
Gurgaon 
Bahadurgarh 
Loni 
Priority Towns 
Meerut 
Rohtak 
Alwar 
Panipat 
Bulandshahr 
Hapur 
Khurja 
Rewari 
Palwal 
Res idential/ 
Commercial use 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
RV 
Industrial 
use 
CV 
cv 
CV 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
cv 
RV : Rental Value (Annual) 
CV : Capital Value 
Source : NIUA Survey 1990 
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are decided by the respective state governments who are empowered 
by the municipal enactments to finally decide, modify and approve the 
tax rates and also the method of collection. Accordingly, the state 
governments either prescribe a fixed rate at which a tax has to be 
levied or provide for a range of tax rates with specified minimum and 
maximum rates within which the municipal authorities can manovure 
the tax rates. 
A great deal of variation is found in the tax rates not only in the 
three states of the NCR but also amongst the various DMA towns and 
PTs selected for this study (Table 3.8) though the base of this tax 
happens to be the same (Table 3.9) 
A close look at Table 3.8 reveals some interesting facts : The 
consolidated rate (consisting of property tax and other service taxes) 
varies from a minimum of 6.25 percent of the ARV in Alwar in 
Rajasthan to a maxiraium of 20 percent in Ghazibad in U.P. It thus, 
indicates interstate variations within the NCR. 
Alwar has the lowest level of taxation. It also happens to be one 
of the two towns (the other being Meerut, U.P.) with a discriminatory 
tax rate where properties with an ARV of Rs. 600 to Rs. 1200 are taxed 
at 6.25 percent of the ARV; for properties with an ARV exceeding this 
limit, the rate increases marginally to 7.5 percent. In Meerut the 
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graduation in the tax rates includes a 10 percent rate for properties 
having ARV up to Rs. 3000, for properties with an ARV exceeding this 
limit, the rate increases marginally to 12.5 percent. 
In Haryana all the municipal bodies levy the tax at a uniform rate 
of 12.5 percent of the ARV except for the municipal bodies at Faridabad 
and Rohtak. These towns apply a lower rate of 10 percent of ARV. The 
reason for such a lower rate is attributed to the fact that in Rohtak the 
rates have not been revised since 1935 whereas in Faridabad the 
existing rates are the same as in the years prior to 1971 when the 
complex administration was established by merging the municipali-
ties of Faridabad old and new townships and Ballabhgarh. All these 
municipal bodies used to enjoy the statutes of class C for which the 
prescribed rate was 10 percent of ARV. However, the existing statutes 
of both these towns being class B make them eligible to apply the 
higher rate, namely, 12.5 percent of ARV. 
In UP there exist variations in the general house tax rates as 
well. These vary from a minimum of the five percent in Hapur to 10 -
12.5 percent in Meerut. The variations in water tax are between 6.25 
percent of the ARV in Bulandshahar and 10 percent in Ghaziabad, Loni 
and Hapur. So is the case with respect to the sewer/scavenging tax 
which varies from two percent to four percent. There are two resons 
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for such variations in the property tax rates in Uttar Pradesh. Firstly 
the UP municipality Act does not provide for a fixed limit of property 
taxes. Secondly the revisions have not been made in an uniform 
manner. Except for Ghaziabad all other towns belonging to UP have 
not revised their rates for sevaral years, 
Meerut being the municipal corporation should be governed by 
UP Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959. As against this, the rates for 
property taxes in Meerut can be raised anywhere between 15 to 25 
percent of ARV. 
Service taxes are not imposed in the selected towns in Haryana 
andRajasthan. 
Thus, analysis of tax rates of municipalities under NCR reveal 
that property tax rates are low in all the selected towns except in 
Ghaziabad and they vary substantially from one town to the other. 
There are three reasons for such variations and low rates. Firstly, the 
municipal acts in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan do not provide for any 
fixed rate whereas the municipal act in Haryana provides for a fairly 
low rate as 12.5 percent of ARV for class A and B municipalities and 
10 percent of ARV for class C municipalities. Secondly, inmost cases 
except for Ghaziabad the rates have not been revised since long. 
Thirdly, the representative states have not followed any uniform pat-
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tern for revising the property tax rates. Different land uses, namely, 
residential, commercial, industrial and so on do not have differential 
rates. The rate structure consists of a flat rate in all towns (except in 
Meerut and Alwar) which has made this tax regressive and unproduc-
tive. Even in Meerut and Alwar the extent of graduation in the rate 
structure is marginal. 
Intra-State equalisation of Rate Structure 
As discussed earlier, the rate-structure of property taxes shows 
a great deal interstate and intrastate variation. Rationalising the inter-
state variation is a separate issue. However, the intrastate variation 
can be removed within the framework of respective Municipal Acts. 
Such variations exist because of the lack of initiative from the respec-
tive municipal bodies to revise their rates in accordance with the 
changes in administrative statutes as may be seen in the case of 
Faridabad, Rohtak and all the municipal bodies belonging to Uttar 
Pradesh except for Ghaziabad. In view of this, we are suggesting an 
equalisation of intrastate rate structure of property taxes in accor-
dance with the highest rate applied by the municipal bodies in the 
respective state. The projected increase in the revenue yields of 
individual taxes is presented in the Table 3.10. However, the total 
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revenue, yields from all such taxes for the respective reference years 
are presented in Table 3.11. 
The equalisation of rate structure will substantially increase the 
municipal income in as many as seven cases. However, it will not make 
any susbtantial impact on the maintenance gap. As may be seen from 
Table 3.11, the revenue increase from equalisation of the rate struc-
ture as a proportion of the maintenance gap in effective towns varies 
between 1.54 percent at Hapur to 5.17 percent at Meerut in 1995 and 
1.45 percent at Hapur to 4.47 percent at Meerut in 2001. 
Thus, property tax rates are found to be low in the selected 
towns of the NCR and these are based on a flat rate system. The net 
result is that the rate is not conducive to resource mobilisation. It 
needs to be emphasised that if services are to be maintained at levels 
comparable to Delhi, the rate structure needs to be evolved on the 
Delhi pattern, that is varying from 14 percent to a maximum of 53 
percent of the ARV. Hence tax rates in the NCR towns need to be made 
progressive with different rates for residential and non-residential 
properties by introduing the graduated slab system. However, since 
low tax rates have been prescribed for many years, a sudden steep 
enhancement may prove to be counter productive. Secondly, in the 
absence of an efficient information base, it is somewhat difficult to 
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enforce the graduated rate structure without making the necessary 
improvements in the existing information system. Therefore, 
to begin with the existing rates need to be enhanced suitably. 
Nevertheless, the need for introducing the differentiated tax rate 
with graduated slabs can not be minimised. 
Special Rates for Large Industrial Units 
Although different taxes and rates are at present levied in the 
selected towns in the form of property taxes and user charges on 
industrial units, there is still scope to review these rates for large 
industrial units. The prevailing rates seem to be relevant only for 
small and medium sized industrial units. In the case of large industrial 
units these rates are low and not able to exploit their paying capacity. 
The Visakhapatnam municipal corporation has adopted two innovative 
measures in this regard.^° 
As regards property taxes. National Institute of Urban Affairs, 
New Delhi, recommends that the rateable value could be calculated as 
two percent of gross earnings for major industrial units. However, in 
the case of sale of water we would recommend that the prevailing rates 
should be increased to the extent possible. This type of revision in 
our context assumes utmost importance at a time when there ^re plans 
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to substantially expand the industrial base of the selected towns as 
part of the NCR plan. 
Thus we see that, in certain cases, there appears to be variation 
in the rate structure of UP towns varies substantially from one town 
to other. Similarly from among the Haryana towns, Faridabad and 
Rohtak apply a rate lower (10 percent of rateable value) than all other 
towns (12.5 percent of rateable value). The main reason for such 
variation has been the inability of the municipal bodies to pass a 
resolution and request the state government to issue a notification for 
modifying their rate structure in accordance with their eligibility. 
In view of this, an intra-state equalisation of rate structure of 
property taxes is suggested so that the selected municipal bodies can 
impose the property tax rate as per their eligibility. 
International Comparison 
Till now our analysis had been limited to Indian states and cities. 
Now, we are in a position that we can do some comparative study. To 
be more specific, now we would be analysing comparative rate stuctures 
of Indian cities and some of the cities, countries of the world. In this 
section of international comparison, first we will take up rate struc-
tures in some, Asian countries and subsequently, some cities, nations 
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TABLE - 3.12 
Types of Property Subject to Tax and the Rates Imposes 
in Selected Asian Counteries 
Country Type of 
Property 
Rates Imposed 
Republic of China Land 
Building 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Land impro 
vements 
Net wealth 
Land impro 
vements 
Land 
Loas 
Malaysia* 
Land 
Building 
Land 
Rural land-the tax rate varies with grades, of 
land and location. 
Urban land - a land value tax of 1.5% based on 
official value if land is used directly by facto-
ries. A progressive rate ranging from 1.5% to 
7% if land is used for other purposes. 
Land value increment tax - applicable to the 
unearned increment of value of land or the 
increased value of land, at the time of transfer 
of ownership. 
Buildings for businesspurposes- 3% of market 
value. Buildings for residential purpose-1.38% 
of rental or market value. 
Factory building - 1.5% of assessed value. 
Most of the rates fall between 2.5 % and 33 % of the 
annual rental value. Some local bodies impose 
levies ranging from 5% to 7.5% of the capital 
value. 
Property tax is 5% of the net property 
From 1.4% to 2.% of market value 
Land - 2% of the gross annual rental value 
Building - 3 won per assessment unit. 
Assessnment unit is determined by local tax 
laws according to floor space, classified by 
grades and further subdivided by house struc-
ture and use. 
land - from 0.10 to 0.50 kip per square meter. 
Building - from 0.40 to 6.00 kip persquare 
meter. 
The rates vary according to type of land use. In 
Selangor for instance, the rate on residential 
land in towns is M$20 per 1,000 square feet 
compared to M$10 per 1,000 square feet in 
rural areas. 
Contd...2 
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Country Type of 
Property 
Rates Imposed 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Southern Vietnam 
Building 
Land 
Building and 
Maclunes 
and other 
improvements 
not specifi-
cally exemp 
ted by law 
Land impro-
vements 
Land 
Land 
Building 
Commercialland-M$120per 1,00 square feet. 
Padi land - M$250 per 1,000 square feet. 
The rates very from State to State. In 
Kualalumpur, the rate is 18% of the annual 
rental value. 
For municipalities - from 2/8 to 4/8 of 1% 
to be fixed by the municipal council: 
For provinces - from 1/8 to 4/8 of 1% to 
be fixed by the provincial board; and 
For cities - fiom 1/8 of 1% to 2% as fixed 
in their respective characters, either 
flat or graduated. 
Additional 1/8 of 1% on properties within 
Metropolitan Manila for the Greather Manila 
Flood Control Project. Additional 1% on prop-
erties assessed not less than P 3.000 for special 
education fimd (National). 
Less developoed area: 
Buildings 18% 
Vacant land 12% 
More developed area : 
Building 27% 
Vacant land 18% 
Developed area : 
BuUding 36% 
Land 36% 
Concessional rates are given to owner occu-
pied properties and approved development 
projects. 
From 0.1 to 0.5% depending on value land. 
Tax rate varies according to class of 
property. 
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of the world. This way we can have better understanding about property 
tax rate structures, prevailing in some cities, nations of the world. 
Thus, first we make an analysis of rate structures of Asian countries. 
Rates and Levies Imposed : Asian Countries 
Singapore Levies rates ranging from 12 to 36 precent of the 
annual rental value. Close to Singorpore's is India's 2.5 percent to 
33.3 percent. The republic of S. Korea has a relatively low rate of 2 
percent based on annual rental value. Buildings are assessed at three 
per assessment unit which is determined according to floor space, 
classified by grade, lots and further subdivided by building structure 
and use. Table - 3.12. 
The phillipines has three groups of rate that may be applied on 
the assessed value of real property based on fair market value. Under 
the assessment law, provinces may impose a levy ranging from 1/8 to 
4/8 of one percent, to be set there respective provincial boards or 
municipal councils. Cities under their respective charters may im-
pose a levy ranging from a fixed rate of 1/8 of one percent to not 
exceeding two percent.^^ 
In Japan, the annual tax rate is 1.4 percent of the market value. 
A higher rate may be levied by the relatively poor municipalities, but 
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the rate can not exceed 2.1 percent. In India, some local bodies 
impose taxes the rates of which range from 5 percent to 7.5 percent of 
capital value. Thailand'slowrates vary from 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent 
of the capital value. In Indonesia the property tax is 5 percent of 
the net property. Since 1949, Laos has been collecting 0.10 to 1.50 
Kip per square meter of land 0.40 to 6.00 Kip per square meter 
of buildings. 
There are two types of taxes which may be related to property 
tax in West Malaysia. These are the land rent or quit rent and assess-
ment on property. The annual tax on land differs among states. In the 
state of Silangor, for instance, the rate on residential land in towns in 
Malysian (m) dollar 20 per 1,000 square feet compared to Malysian 
dollar 10 per 1000 square feet on similar land in the rural areas. The 
rate on commercial land is m $ 120 per 1,000 square feet while m $ 
2.50 is levied on padi lands. The rates on buildings also vary from 
state to state. In Kuala Lampur for instance, the rate is 18 percent of 
the annual rental value. 
In south Viatham, the type of crop produced is another determi-
nant used in taxing agricultural lands. This practice is also found in 
West Malaysia. The tax on land in South Viatnam is computed per 
square meter while that of buildings is based upon the rental value. 
CHAPTCII - S ——• 257 
both depending on the class of property. Each province is free to fix 
the rate based according to the limits provided by law. Since 1968 the 
rate ranges from 6 percent to 13 percent of the annual rental value. 
In the Republic of China, varying tax rates for rural land are 
applied depending on grade and location. The rural land tax is payable 
in kind, such as rice or wheat. The standard or measure of assessment 
in a rice growing area is 27 kilograms of paddy rice per tax unit and 
in the wheat growing area, 25 kilograms of wheat per tax unit. These 
standards may be reduced by the Executive Yuan on the basis of the tax 
burden of each area. 
In the case of urban land, the land value tax is 1.5 percent based 
on officially declared value when used directly by factories. When 
used for other purposes, a progressive rate ranging from 1.5 percent 
to 7 percent is imposed on land. The land value increment tax applies 
to the unearned increment of value of land or the increased value of 
land, at the time of transfer of ownership. 
Also, in the Republic of China, a distinction is made foi: purpos-
es of taxation between buildings for business and residential purpos-
es. Those for business purposes levied at rate of 3 percent of assessed 
value, for buildings devoted to residential purposes, the rate is 
1.38 percent; while in the case of factory buildings owned and 
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directly used by the owner for manufacturing, the rate is 1.5 percent 
of the assessed value. 
In the Asian countries, the proceeds from the property tax 
generally accrue to the central or general fund of either the local units 
or the central governments, as the case may be. In the united states and 
in many countries in Europe usually the entire proceeds from this tax 
are used to finance education. In some Asian countries, additional 
taxes are also imposed on real property the proceeds of which are 
earmarked for education. For instance, to supplement the regular 
budget for education, the congress of the Philippines enacted Repub-
lic Act No. 5447 in 1968, creating a special Education Fund and 
authorizing the imposition of an additional 1 percent tax on real 
property. Likewise, in the Republic of China, there is an Educational 
Surtax of 30 percent imposed on the tax liability which pertains to 
houses, the proceeds of which are channeled to the financing of the 
extension of free education from six to nine years. 
Rate Structures 
There are important differences among cities in the level, struc-
ture, and flexibility of annual value property tax rates. A flat rate 
structure is not as common as one that is progressive with respect to 
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T A B L E - 3 . 1 3 
Statutory Rate Structures ; Selected Annual Value Systems 
City, Year Rate' Comments 
Ahmadabad, India, 1980 0.120-0.300 Progressive rate with respect to annual 
value. Exemption limit of 300 rupees. 
Madras, India, 1983; 
rateable value (rupees) 
In additiona, all properties pay a 3.5 
percent lighting tax on rateable value. 
Less than 500 0.160 Plant and machinery are not taxed. A 
500 - 1,000 0.220 10 percent depreciation offsets is 
1,000 - 5,000 0.240 allowed, and owner-occupied relief of 
More than 5,000 0.265 
Bangkok, Thailand, 1980; 
up to 25 percent may be provided. 
The rate is reduced to 0.042 for 
House and rent tax 0.125 structures that contain machines for 
manufacturing activities. Vacant land 
and unoccupied housing are exempt 
from tax. 
a. Rate for Madrass includes general tax, water tax and drainage tax, 
and education tax. 
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property value. Otherwise, statutory rates may vary according to the 
location of the property within the urban area, whether or not the land 
is developed and whether or not it is owner-occupied. To give the 
flavour of the variations in rate structure, some examples are present-
ed in Table 3.13^^. The problem in reading these schedules is that they 
may not approxiamate real tax rates because of wide variations in the 
assessment ratio. 
From an examination of the statutory rate schedules in use in 
various cities, it might be concluded that two objectives underly their 
markup. The first is to allocate property tax burdens according to 
ability to pay. This objective is reflected in the progressive features 
of statutory rate schedules, as in the cities of India. The second is to 
allocate property tax burdens according to benefits received as evi-
denced by the lower rates on sub urban properties (for example, 
Bombay and Singapore) and on undeveloped properties (for examples 
Calcutta), where public service levels are thought to be lower, and by 
the divisions of the total property tax rate into separate rates for 
water, refuse collection, fire fighting, general services, and the l ike ." 
From this observation, it would seem that there is more than a little 
concern about how to make the distribution of the property tax burden 
more equitable, or at least more fair. 
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In fact, such attempts to improve the fairness of the property tax 
may fail because they do not take into account all elements of the 
property tax system. For example, the equity effects of a graduated 
rate structure may be offset by preferential assessment of higher valued 
properties. A good illustration of this is in Ahmedabad (Bahl 1975), 
where owner-occupied properties were assessed at as little as one-
fifth the level of rented properties. Since owner-occupants were 
likely to have higher incomes than renters, the intent of the graduated 
rate structure was defeated by the assessment practice. There was a 
similar result in Bombay, but in Dakar owner-occupants are taxed at 
30 percent and rental units at 15 percent. 
Variations across cities in the effective tax rate-the ratio of 
taxes paid to market rent or market value-are probably as much influ-
enced by variations in assessment practices as by variations in either 
the definition of the legal base or the statutory rate structure. No 
matter what the base and rate structure is stated to be, evaluation of 
the equity, elasticity, and performance of annual value systems must 
begin with a careful examination of the methods used to determine 
annual value. 
Owner-occupied residential properties are assessed on a com-
pletely different basis than are rented properties. Among the impor-
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tant considerations in determining assessed value are location, the 
specific amenities of the property, construction material, ventilation, 
and carpet areas. In Ahmadabad, there weere graduated assessment 
rates (assessed value per square meter) which depended on these 
considerations but, again, the judgement of the assessor played a 
major role. Though there was no mannual to which assessors strictly 
adhered, the range of assessment rates which evolved over time were 
used as a guide. One study estimated that the result of this procedure 
in Ahmadabad was a substantial preferential assessment of owner-occupied 
properties, on the order of about one-fifth of that for rented properties 
(Bahl 1975). A similar procedure was followed in Bombay, but the 
preferntial treatment was estimated to have resulted in a reduction of 
80 - 85 percent of rateable value (Bongeon - Maassen 1976). 
Three important features of capital value rate structures 
[Table 2.23(a)] distinguish them from annual value systems: the use of 
flat rates is more common, there is more frequent use of differential 
taxation of land and improvements, and the capital value rate struc-
tures tend to be more complicated. Some examples are given in 
Table 3.14 to illustrate the variations but, as noted above, these are 
statutory rates and can not be used to make inferences about 
effective property tax rates because there are wide variations in the 
C H U P T C B - 3 ' 2 6 2 
assessment ratio. 
These examples do, however suggest a different emphasis for 
those designing capital value rate structures (versus those designing 
annual value rate structures). There is an apparently greater concern 
with the allocative (Land use) effects of the tax under capital value 
systems than under rental value systems, or at least a concern that 
there be more flexibility to deal with allocative effects. This is 
reflected in the differential taxation of improvements versus land, 
improved land versus idle land, and land in different locations in the 
urban area. Where tax rates on land and improvements are different, 
most cities tax land more heavily than improvements; for example, 
differentially lower rates have been applied to improvements in 
Bangkok, Francistown, Istanbul, Jakarta, and Tehran. Higher effective 
tax rates have been applied to improvements in seoul, Taipei, and Tunis 
because of higher statutory tax rates, and in Manila because of a 
higher assessment ratio.^'* 
Differentially, higher tax rates on idle or unimproved land are 
also common and in some cases the rate levied, if properly enforced, 
woud be a significant stimulus to develop the land. Bolivia levies a 
surcharge on idle land - above the basic rate of 0.4 percent of market 
value - of 2 percent on the land that has access to public utilities and 
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1 percent that does not. In Honduras, the basic rate is 0.5 percent, but 
vacant land is subject to a 1 percent rate. 
Conversely, the general absence of progressive rate structures 
implies less propensity to use property tax to reshape the distribution 
of income.^^ Rate structures in some cases appear to have been 
designed to achieve other objectives. The structure in Taipei tends to 
encourage the breakup of large landholdings because it applies grad-
uated rates to the aggregate value of all holdings of a single owner 
within the city (Harris 1979; Riew 1987). The Peruvian system also 
applied a graduated rate structure to all holdings of a single taxpayer 
within a province (Greytak 1983). 
Distributive Effects of Rate Structures and Administration 
Most studies of the incidence of the property tax assume the 
application of equal rates to all properties, that is, a tax strictly 
proportional to property value. Yet in fact the property tax typically is 
not applied at uniform legal rates, and a great deal of additional 
variation is introduced by assessment and administrative practices. 
Indeed, probably more than for any other major tax, the incidence of 
the property tax depends on its implementation. Unless one takes 
account of this implementation, it is impossible to determine the 
distribution of tax burdens. 
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In this work, we have a chapter on assessment, a chapter on 
administration and obviously present chapter is devoted to the rate 
structures. Important point to be noted is that all these taken together 
determines the incidence of the tax burden. In this section we are 
interested in studying the net effect of administrative practices on 
property tax incidence, which will depend on rate structure, assess-
ment, differential treatment by property value, differential treatment 
by location or use, differential treatment of land improvements, 
preferential treatment of owner-occupants and frequency of assess-
ments. There is no doubt that there are many determinents of the 
incidence. But rate structures is the major determinent of the tax 
incidence. Through this kind of analysis, we can have better under-
standing about the impact of rate structures. Now, let us make an 
analysis of various determinants of tax incidence. 
The features of property tax structure and administration which 
are relevant to the question of incidence are summarized in Table 3.15 
for selected cities of developing economies. Typically, these prac-
tices can be distinguished by how they effect the appraisal of property 
values, the structure of tax rates, and collection procedures. 
Rate structure and appraisal practices in particular may vary 
with the value, location, or use of the property and differ for land as 
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compared with improvements for owner-occupants and tenants. 
Differntial Treatment bv Proopertv Value 
Property tax structure and administration may discriminate 
among properties of different values by applying graduated tax rates, 
by allowing assesssment ratios to vary across value classes, or by 
granting exemption to properties in particular value classes. Two 
practices are common in developing countries. Rate structures are 
more often graduated than not, and exemptions for owner-occupancy 
industrial activity, and low valued properties are frequently granted. 
The evidence on assessment bias is less clear. Bahl (1975) 
found a preferential assessment on owner-occupied properties in 
Ahmadabad, and we found one city (Manila) in which the statutory 
assessment ratio increases with property value. Yet another system-
atic study of assessment ratios by value class in Cali (Linn 1977b; this 
is the only such study of a developing-country city that we know of) 
found no statistically significant bias in assessment ratios. 
The distributive effects of differential rates or assessment 
ratios by property value class and of exempting low-value properties 
are quite straight forward since ownership of property and housing 
consumption tends to vary directly with income a progressive ( or 
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regressive) rate structure, assessment ratio, or exemption policy will 
also result in a more progressive (regressive) the incidence than 
would be the case for a proportional property tax, irrespective of 
whether the tax falls on owners (short-run) or consumers ( long-run). 
Diffrential Treatment by Location Or Use : 
Cities in developing contries have found numerous ways to 
discriminate among properties according to use or locations. One 
frequent practice is to apply higher tax rates to vacant lots within the 
urban periphery ( for example, in Abid Jan , Bogota, Francistown, La 
Paz, Salvador, Sao, Panto Taipei and Tunis) The distributive effect of 
this policy is likely to be progressive since the burden of the tax 
differential is inecessarily borne by property owners rather than by 
consumers (even in the long-run), and since the ownership of vacant 
land is likely to be concentrated in the higher income groups. 
Many Indian cities (for example, Ahmadabad and Calcutta) do 
not tax vacant land. This may be traced to the Colonial origins of 
Indian property tax : Under British rule, vacant lots were not taxed 
because they were presumed to yield no actual or imputed rental 
income. This exemption is likely to have regressive effects on in-
come distribution. A special situation appears to have existed in Rio 
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de Janeiro, where lower rates have been charged for vacant than for 
improved lots but where a higher assessment ratio has been applied to 
vacant lots. Although these practices partially offset the regressive 
effects of the undertaxation of vacant land, their net effect is to leave 
vacant land still relatively undertaxed, at about a quarter of the effec-
tive legal rate for improved properties (Richman 1977).^^ 
In many countries, rural properties are assessed and taxed on a 
diffferent basis than urban properties. And even where the same tax is 
applied to both types of properties, different rates are frequently 
charged. For instance, in the cities of Colombia, Portugal, and Turkey 
rates within the urban perimeter have been higher than outside. The 
incidence of this practice is uncertain, but on balance it may heighten 
the regressiveness of the system. In the long-run, much of the tax 
differentiation may be shifted forward to consumers or labor, but 
since the consumers of rural production activities are likely to reside 
mainly in urban areas and some of the goods and services produced in 
urban areas are consumed in rural areas, the incidence may be regres-
sive. In the short run, where the tax differential is borne by property 
owners, the incidence depends on the relative pattern of property 
ownership of urban and rural land. Since rural land in some countries 
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is owned by wealthy city dwellers, the lower rural rates may again have 
a regressive impact. 
Differential tax rates and assessment ratios are frequently 
applied to specified locations within cities. For insance, certain 
suburban areas of Bombay and Nairobi are taxed below the standard 
rates. In the metropolitan areas of Jakarta, Sao Paulo, Singapore, and 
Taipei lower assessment ratios have been applied at the periphery. The 
explanation frequently given by city officials for these lower effec-
tive rates of taxation is that peripheral properties receive fewer urban 
services and therefore should not be required to pay the same amount 
of taxes. Even where this critirion is given officially as the explicit 
rational, however, it is not always correct, since the favoured areas 
may actually receive the same services as the majority of urban areas 
taxed at standard rates (for example in Bombay and Nairobi). Assess-
ment ratios may also differ by area within a city not because of 
statutory provisions but because of systematic differentials in assess-
ment procedures. In Abidjan and Cartagena, properties in higher in-
come areas on balance appear to have been assessed at ratios below 
the standard, whereas in Bogota and Cali squatters' areas and illegal 
subdivisions have been favoured by lower assessment ratios. Finally, 
differntial tax rates and assessment ratios tend to apply in different 
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sections of metropolitant area where jurisdictional fragmentation 
prevails, as in Calcutta and Manila. The distributive effect of all these 
differntial rates and assessment ratios depends on whether they 
favour high or low-income areas of the city. 
Differential Treatment of Land and Improvements 
In many cities differential tax rates or assessment ratios are 
applied to land as compared with improvements. Under site value 
taxation, improvements are not taxed, for example, in Kingston and 
Nairobi. More common is the application of a differentially higher tax 
rate on land, though in some cases improvements are taxed at a higher 
rate. Two main objectives explain differential taxation of land and 
improvements. Lower taxes on improvements are usually supported 
on the grounds that improvements reflect ability to pay, and thus 
higher improvement rates are beneficial on equity grounds. 
In summary, it can not be assumed automatically that lower (or 
higher) taxation of improvements will have a progressive effect. If 
improvements are treated preferentially, as is the case in most cities 
where differential rates apply, then it should be done nation wide, 
since this will ensure a progressive effect, at least in the long run.^' 
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Preferent ia l Treatment for Owner - Occnpants 
One of the most common biases is administering and structuring 
the property tax is preferential treatment of owner-occupied proper-
ties. Lower than average tax rates were applied to owner-occupied 
properties in Abidjan, Istanbul, Karachi, Madras, and three Brazilian 
cities. In Portugal higher cut off levels are applied for tax exemptions 
of low-value property in the case of owner-occupants. 
In Abidjan, Ahmadabad, Bangkok, Calcutta and Tunis, preferen-
tially low assessment rate ratio have been applied to owner-occupied 
property. In Abidjan, furthermore, owner-occupants were given larger 
temporary exemptions from property taxation than was the case for all 
other types of properties. 
Where rental is predominant, the regressive impact will be more 
important. In countries, where rental is relatively important (for 
example, India, Sri Lanka ) the exemption of owner-occupants would 
be more regressive in the long run than in countries (Colombia and 
Mexico) where property rental is a less preponderant type of 
land tenure. 
Collecting the Proper ty Tax 
Collecting the property tax may introduce further biases into its 
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incidence. In developing countries high-income taxpayers are more 
successful in evading taxation than are low-income taxpayers.^* This 
directly reduces the progressivity of the existing property tax system 
or worsens its regressivity. It is, however, difficult to quantify the 
extent to which different income groups benefit from in-efficiencies 
of collection. In Cali, Linn (1979b) measured the relation between 
arrears and the income level of taxpayers. The evidence indicated the 
reverse of the usual presumption, in that lower-income taxpayers 
tended to countribute more heavily to arrears. Evidently the pattern of 
tax collections by income groups may differ from city to city and 
country to country (and may well differ for different taxes within the 
same locality). The incidence effects will vary accordingly).^^ 
From the broad overview of urban property tax administration in 
all the cities and countries shown in Table 3.15 one can assess to some 
extent the distributive effects of these practices.^** In seventeen out of 
thirty-two cases the overall effect of these institutional aspects is 
progressive when compared with that of proportional property tax; in 
six cases it appears to be regressive. In the remainder of the cases it 
was either impossible to assign a clear direction to the impact of the 
administrative practice, or procedures with mutually offsetting dis-
tributive effects are being applied (Ahmadabad, Calcutta, Istandbul, 
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Karachi and Madras) These last examples reflect not only the effect of 
objectives other than equity, but also the adhoc way in which distrib-
utive objectives are persued by those who administer the property tax 
in these cities. 
In some countries administrative practices and their net dis-
tributive effects differed among cities, (for example, Brazil, Colom-
bia, and India). 
In the last, let us make detailed analysis of certain Indian cities' 
rate structures and its impact on the progressiveness or regressive-
ness on the tax incidence. We should not forget that like rate struc-
tures, there are other determinants also like, assessment pracitices 
etc. But, here safely, we can assume that, rate structures of the 
property tax is the major determinant of the tax incidence. In the 
Table 3.15, we have five Indian cities, Ahmadabad, Bombay, Calcutta, 
Delhi and Madras. Of the same five cities, we have done detail 
analysis of rate structures in previous section. Now, here we will 
study the impact of rate structures on the tax incidence. 
In Bombay, so far as rate structure is concerned, rates increase 
with assessed rental value. Properties with very low rental value are 
exempt. De facto exemptions of squatters on municipal land. Further, there 
is provision of differential treatment by location or use. Here, we see that 
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suburban properties are taxed at lower rates. Temporary examptions (ten 
years) for newly constructed small tenements. And frequency of 
assessments is every four years. Net effect of all this is that property 
tax structure is progressive. In the case of Bombay, we find that rates 
increase with assessed rental value and this progressive rate is suc-
cessful in making the property tax structure progressive. In Calcutta, 
rates increase with assessed rental value. Properties with low rental 
value are exempt. Further, vacant land is exempt from taxes. Differen-
tial tax rates in fragmented metropolitant jurisdictions. Preferential 
assessment to owner-occupier at 80 percent of full imputed rental 
value and frequency of assessments is six years. Now question is what 
is net effect of all this on the structure of property tax ? In this case, 
it is either impossible to assign a clear direction to the impact of the 
administrative practice, or procedures with mutually offsetting dis-
tributive effects are being applied. Putting it differntly, in case of 
Calcutta, it can-not be ascertained that what is the impact of the rate 
structures on the incidence of the property tax. In Delhi, rates in-
crease with assessed rental value. Further, there is provision of dif-
ferential treatment by location or use for example, higher rates for 
industrial and commercial properties than for residential properties. 
As far as preferential treatment of owner-occupants is concerned, 
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preferential assessment of owner-occupied properties was recently 
abolished by court order. Besides, frequency of assessment is three 
years. Net impact of all this is that, property tax incidence is progressive. 
In case of Delhi, we notice a positive correlation between rate structures and 
tax incidence. Increased rates with assessed rental value is accompanied by 
progressive tax incidence. In Madras, rates increase with assessed 
rental value, low-value property is exempted. There is provision of 
preferential treatment of owner-occupants, for example, there is 
provision of informal reduction of 10-15 percent of tax liability for 
owner-occupants. Besides, frequently of assessments is five years. 
But, here we can not ascertain the impact of rate structures on the 
property tax incidence. Finally, in Ahmadabad, rates increase with 
assessed rental value. Under the provision of differential treatment by 
location or use, we notice that in some cities in Gujarat state, vacant 
land is not taxed. Besides, there is also provision of preferntial 
assessment for owner - occupier (rental properties assessed 3.5 to 
5.0 times higher), similar preferential treatment in other cities of 
Gujarat state and in Assam state. And frequency of assessments is four 
years. But, here again like Calcutta and Madras, net effect of rate 
structures on property tax incidence is not clear. 
Thus, above analysis has made it clear that, performance of 
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Indian cities on the front of rate structures and incidence is not 
satisfactory. Table 3.15 includes thirty two cities, out of it, seventeen 
cities have progressive tax structure that is a little more than fifty percent 
cities are having progressive tax structure, six cities, are having re-
gressive tax structure and in case of nine cities, it can not be known that 
whether it is progressive or regressive. When we focus on the performance 
of Indian cities, we find that it is not satisfactory, since out of five 
cities, only two that is Bombay and Delhi are having progressive tax 
structures. And in rest three cities, kind of tax structures is uncertain. 
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B A S E OF T H E P R O P E R T Y T A X 
Nature of the Base 
According to conventional wisdom, there are three basic forms of 
property taxation. The property tax may be levied on the annual or rental 
value of the property, the capital value of the land and improvements, or 
the site value of the land. The annual value form may be seen as an 
attempt to tax the yearly income from properties, whereas the capital and 
site value forms are partial wealth taxes. However, a reason why this 
trichotomy over simplifies is that many system use both capital and 
annual value basis. 
Annual Value Systems 
Annual value property tax systems, more or less resembling the 
British rates, are still used in most of the former British Colonies. But 
inherent assessment problems have prompted many countries to modify 
their approach to property taxation. Indeed, perhaps the most significant 
feature of the annual value systems surveyed here is that all resort to 
some use of capital value assessment. 
In an annual value system the base is defined as the expected or 
notional rental value of a property. An English court has described well 
the problems of measuring this notional value : 
The rent prescribed by the statute is a hypothetical rent, as hypo-
CHAPTCA - 4 2 8 2 
thetical as the tenant. It is the rent which an imaginary tenant might be 
resonably expected to pay to an imaginary Landlored for the tenancy of 
this dwelling in this locality, on the hypothisis that both are resonable 
people, the landlord not being extortionate, the tenant not being under 
pressure, the dewelling being vacant and available to let, not subject to 
any control, the landlord agreeing to do the repairs, and pay the insur-
ance, the tenant agreeing to pay the rates, the period not too short nor yet 
too long, simply from year to year. I do not suppose that throughout the 
length and breadth of Paddington you could find a rent corresponding to 
this imaginary rent. ^  
Difinitioii and Coverage of the Base 
The common feature of annual value systems is property assess-
ment according to some estimate of rental value or net rent. In theory, a 
discounted stream of net rent payments is equivalent to the capital value 
of a property, hence the capital and annual value bases are equivalent. In 
practice, there is no such equivalence because annual value systems are 
not based on market rents any more than capital value systems are based 
on market prices. 
There is usually a wide divergence between assessed annual value 
and net market rent. Though assessment-sales ratio studies are rarely 
done, some available evidence suggests the extent of under assessment. 
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A survey by the World Bank in Calcutta has estimated the assessment 
ratio at about 50 percent for central commercial properties and 7.5 
percent for outlying industrial estates. Nath and Shroeder (1984) report 
assessment ratios in the 25 to 35 percent range in Delhi and Madras. The 
ratio for residential property was estimated at 40 percent in Tunis 
(Prud'homme 1975) and 50 percent in Dakar. Quite apart from the politi-
cal and administrative problems that lead to infrequent reassessment, there 
are three reasons for such divergences : (a) Legally allowable reductions 
in annual value; (b) rent controls; and (c) assessment deffficulties, par-
ticularly for non residential properties. 
With respect to the first, the annual value tax base is often adjust-
ed to a basis which is net of maintenance costs. These reductions , 
however, require no evidence of maintenance expenditures and so are 
tantamount to a general reduction in the assessment ratio. For example, 
there was an allowance of 10 percent of annual value in many Indian 
cities. The allowance in Dakar was 40 percent for residences and 50 
percent for businesses. 
The presence of rent control confounds the notion of what consti-
tutes a market rent. In theory, the rent control constraints could severely 
limit both the level and growth of assessed value. The actual level of rent 
is the controlled amount plus the premium which the renter must pay to 
secure the lease, the latter component-also called -key money "or a 
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"charge for furnishings" - is indeed a part of market rent but is generally 
illegal, unreported and therefore, excluded from the base of most tax 
systems where controlled rents are used as the property tax base, as-
sessed value grows only with new construction because controlled rents 
are rarely increased.^ 
In practice, however, the problem of assessment under rent control 
has been dealt with in different ways. For example, Bombay, Cairo, Delhi 
and Singapore all have had Long-standing rent control ordinances and all 
assessed property was subject to rent control according to the controlled 
rent. Ahmadabad ignored the rent control ordinance and assessed at 
what it deemed market rent - a procedure which has been challenged in 
the courts. 
Two other important points can be made about rent control and the 
property tax. The First is that rent controls are usually imposed by the 
state and central governments, which do not feel the pain of the loss of 
property taxes. The second is the considerable opportunity cost of rent 
control assessments, in terms of property tax revenues foregone. Mohan 
(1974) estimated that Bombay's property tax revenues could have been 
50 percent higher in the absence of rent controls. Nath (1983) made a 
similar estimate of property tax loss in Calcutta. Any gains from rent 
control, which protects low-income families from rent increases are there-
fore achieved by sacrificing revenue, and therefore the public services. 
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avalilable to these same low-income families may ultimately be reduced. 
The third reason for a divergence between net market rents and 
annual value arises because of the difficulties in defining the tax base for 
nonresidential properties and for vacant land. In theory, and according to 
law it is the annual expected rent', or the amount for which the property 
could be let; if capitalized, the base is equivalent to the present value of 
the expected future flow of earnings from the property. In practice how-
ever, the assessment procedure for such properties usually assumes that 
annual rent is equivalent to a fixed proportion of estimated capital value. 
But practices in assessing capital value and assumptions about rates of 
capitalizatiion vary widely. The same inconsistency oppears to exist in 
the treatment of vacant land. 
The tax base under rental value systems is further reduced by 
exemptions of certain classes of property and by a range of prefrential 
assessments. Most annual value systems fully exempt properties of the 
government, properties of religious and charitable institutions and for-
eign embassies. Another important class of exemption is owner-occupied 
properties, as in Abidjan, Bangkok, and Karachi where owner-occupied 
properties are not fully exempt, prefrential assessments are not uncom-
mon; this is the practice in Ahmedabad and Tunis. The underassessment, 
relative to comparable rented properties, has been roughly estimated for 
selected Indian cities : 60 to 80 percent under assessment in Ahmadabad 
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(Bahl 1975), 15 to 20 percent in Bombay (Bougeon - Massen 1976), 10 
to 15 percent in Madras and 25 percent in Delhi (Mohan 1974, 1977). 
The existing property tax system in India has been subjected to 
increasing criticism in recent years and it is now advocated that the 
property tax must look for an alternative base. Dissatisfaction with the 
existing system is based on the grounds that the determination of tax 
base-Annual Rental value (ARV) as also periodical change in it suffers 
from built-in deficiencies, like, substantial scope for creeping in of sub-
jective elements and discretion which create further built-in scope for 
corrupt practices. The system is not elastic to service requirements, the 
increasing service costs, and is not properly related to demand for ser-
vices emanating from different land uses. Moreover, the ARV as the base 
of this tax has lost its relveance because of old tenancies and rent con-
trol legislations which have put a severe limitation on the growth and 
level of assessed value. A recent judicial pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court' requiring the civic authorities to assess the tax on the basis of fair 
rent as determinable under the relevant rent control Act irrespective of 
whether a fair rent has been determined by a rent control court or not, 
has put additional constraints on the existing system as an important 
source of revenue. 
Other arguments against the existing system relate to broader is-
sues of rising land values which it is unable to keep pace with and its 
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inability to serve any urban development objective. Thus it is neither 
serving as a tool of revenue mobilisation for meeting the increasing ser-
vice requirements, nor as an instrument for promoting the land use ob-
jectives. The net result is that the existing system has become an 
ineffecient and inequitious source of revenue. 
As the inadequacies of the existing system emanate mainly from 
its tax base, the maladies could possibly be removed in one stroke by 
changing over from ARV to capital value (CV) system. But here also one 
comes across almost the same problem. Firstly, it is agrued that, quanti-
fication of a host of external and uncontrollable factors influencing the 
CV would meet insurmountable problems and may ultimately end up on 
account of a number of subjective elements. Secondly, the comparative 
sale information may be mislaeding in view of under-statement of sale 
value. Thirdly, the diversified assessment methods currently in vogue in 
the countries having the CV system hardly make it convincing if the valu-
ation mode is reallly based on CV per se''. Attempts have been made even 
under the capital value system to evolve ways and means of objective 
valuation which could be free from subjective considerations and could 
take into account the host of variables affecting the values of land and 
buildings. Cartagena (Columbia), for example, assesses land, on the ba-
sis of 'base unit value' obtained after a most elaborate exercise spread 
into six stages and based on pysical factors including land-usej accessi-
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bility, soil conditions, slope of the ground, etc.^ The value of building is 
assessed on the basis of points attributed to building characteristics, like, 
materials, finish, state of conservation, age, and floor area. 
Likewise, dissatisfaction with the ARV system has culminated in 
some positive suggestions to free property tax from the deficiencies and 
resurrect it by making it morre objective, elastic and equitious source of 
revenue for the civic authorities. This work is an attempt to examine the 
suggested alternative modes of reform for comprehending their revenue, 
distributional and allocation objective and operational problems, if any. 
Almost all the taxation enquiry committees^ have gone into the 
question of the basis of property tax. Yet the basis of property tax con-
tinue to be a matter of controversey. 
A careful consideration of the nature of complaints from tax pay-
ers and the response of the municipal authorities shows that the problem 
has to be dealt with in two distinct parts. 
First, the degree of discretion and possible arbitrariness in the 
present system has to be reduced, if not eliminated altogether whether it 
is possible to devise a new and practical basis for assessment of property 
tax in a manner that can be demonstrably objective has to be examined. 
This is dealt with in the latter part of this chapter. 
Second, whether the taxation can be made more progressive by 
giving relief to the lower middle classes who depend on rents as the main 
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source of income and to owner-occupied residential buildings 
without affecting the overall revenues of the municipalities in any sig-
nificant maimer. 
Thus there is now a better and wider appreciation of flaws in the 
existing system of property taxation in India. This application has now 
channelised into positive urge to search for a new objective, elastic and 
simple alternative to the existing system. These still being in a forma-
tive stage are seemingly susceptible to pitfalls as is evident from the 
foregoing analysis. One can only hope that the current debate on the 
resurrection of property tax system will continue to gather momentum 
and would ultimately result in finding out of an alternative which could 
satisfy the cannons of elasticity, simplicity, equity and economic effi-
ciency. The present thinking must not be allowed to recede back to a 
state of inaction and slumber as has been the fate of sevaral useful de-
bates on municipal taxation in the past. 
The question of alternative valuation bases has been dominating 
the discussions on property taxation in India every since the Local Fi-
nance Inquiry Committee report in 1951. Remakrishna's proposals are a 
refined version of the Andhra Pradesh attempt to introduce a so-called 
CV method; this is not surprising that the author coming from the same 
state probably had a hand in the attempted change-over to the new system 
this proposed schedule refers to the property tax rule of the Hyderabad 
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municipal corporation). In spite of these antecedents, Remakrishna's pa-
per contains the most original set of proposals for the reform of proper-
ty tax base. Next, Gangadhar Jha considers it along with other similar 
suggestions for advocating an area-based valuation system in India and 
abroad. Ammukutty advocates the adoption of a site value-based system 
of valuation on the basis of her empirical investigations into the levels of 
valuation in a part of Delhi on the existing ARV method. Mohan surveys 
the whole problem of alternative bases and advocated valuation 
standardisation as a guideline for assessment training, monitoring and 
checking valuations, rather than to be pursued as an objective which is 
patent in all recent proposals on the area method of valuation. And some-
one has advocated for "the standardisation of letting values for deter-
mining ARV is a procedureal refinement for assessment valuation on the 
existing rental base and not a tax on area measurement alone. 
Now it is time that we have a look at nature of base. Then, look 
into the factors responsible for the erosion in the base, what steps have 
been taken for the retrieval of base ? Obviously, these attempt have been 
sporadic in the form of rent standardisation. Further, we will explore the 
practicability of adopting a new base. And finally, what can be done to 
reform the annual rental value. 
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Nature of Base 
Though rental value of land and building constitutes the base of 
property tax, the enabling legislations in all the states have only vaguely 
defined the base. As discussed subsequently in greater detail, lack of 
clarity in the definition of property tax base has led to considerable 
erosion in the base with all its accompanying consequences for elasticity 
and buoyancy of property tax. Almost all the enactment, for constituting 
the municipal authorities in various, Indian states define the base as the 
"gross annual rent of land and building at which they may reasonably be 
expected to let from year to year". Deductions varying from 10 to 15 
percent of the gross annual rental value are provided for in various enact-
ments towards repairs and maintenance so that the properties could be in 
a state to command that rent. Legal provisions relating to the base in the 
states of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, as also in the three other major 
municipal corporations are Tabulated in Table 4.1. 
Only in Gujarat, the Municipal Acts and Rules provide for the "rent 
actually realised" as the basis for levying of property tax. But it also lays 
down that if the rent realised is a collusive rent, the tax is to be assessed 
on the basis of "reasonable rent". Some of the Acts provide for determi-
nation of annual rental value (ARV) by taking some proportion of the 
capital value of land and buildings. The enactments in the states of Tamil 
Nadu and Kerala provide that for government and railway properties or 
CHflPTCfl - 4 — 2 9 2 
any other type of property which are not rented and therefore the rent 
can not be estimated, rental value is to be computed at 6 percent of the 
price of land and the estimated cost of construction at the time of as-
sessment. The law provides for depreciation on construction cost vary-
ing from 10 to 15 percent. 
The Calcutta Coroporation Act provides for 5 percent of the capi-
tal value of properties used as hospitals, educational institutions, places 
of worship etc. as the gross rental value. However, this is 7.5 percent for 
other types of properties for which rental value can not be estimated. The 
Act has an innovative provision in so far as it has included also "service 
charges" within the purview of rentals. This has been done to prevent the 
existing widespread practice to split the rent into per se which is a 
much lower amount and service charges, for reducing and even avoiding 
the tax burden. 
A peculiarity of Calcutta Corporation Act is the built-in provision 
in it for discrimination in determination of rental value for rented and 
self occupied properties. Table 4.1 depicts that rental value for self-
occupied properties is reduced by 30 percent for such properties which 
have a gross annual rent of upto Rs. 600. Reduction with respect to prop-
erties having gross annual rent of Rs. 601 to Rs. 1800 is given at a 
percentage which is derived by dividing the gross annual rent by 600 and 
subtracting the quotient from 3V. However, such reductions are allowed 
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in gross annual rent only for such self-occupied residential properties 
which have a covered area of up to 150 Sq. mt. and the owner of such 
property does not own more than one plot of land or building. 
Property tax apparently, consists of rentals which a property could 
be "reasonably expected" to fetch in the market. Application of such an 
abstract concept in a real, live situation has been one of the major prob-
lems afflicting the property tax in India. 
Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation 
A number of interesting practices have been evolved over the years 
by various municipal authorities to give operational form to the base 
provided for in various enactements for detemination of the annual rental 
value. Ahmedabad municipal corporation (AMC) in Gujarat, arrives at 
rental value for the rented residential properties on the basis of actual 
rent realised by the landlord. If, however, the realised rent turns out to be 
a collusive rent, rental value is determined on the basis of obtaining 
market rent for the similar properties. Rental value for the self-occupied 
residential properties is determined on the basis of an elaborated As-
sessment Table 4.2. 
Selected Examples of Standardised Assessment in Practice 
In most states annual rental value is defined as the gross annual 
294-A 
TABLE - 4.3 
Assessment Table for Determination of Rental Value 
of Commercial Properties in Ahmedabad 
Type of Property 
1. Open plot for commercial purposes 
2. Open shed 
3. Enclosed shed, pucca wall 
4. Enclosed shed with GI sheets or 
cement sheet wall 
5. With RCC construction and RCC shed 
6. All commercial properties/flats 
on main road except EUisbridge 
Rate (Rs./sq.m.) 
2 
5 
10 
7.5 
15 
20 
Source : Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. 
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rent at which the property may reasonably be expected to be, let from 
year to year. Problems arise because this is a hypothetical value by defi-
nition and therefore the assessor has a great amount of discretion in the 
valution procedure. Many inequities are observed as a result and some 
local authorities have attempted to find procedures to minimise this dis-
cretion by adopting standardised assessment procedures. Examples of such 
procedures in Ahmadabad municipal corporation in Gujarat, Kerala, 
Bombay and Bangalore are given below. 
It contains different rates of rentals on the square meter basis 
which have to be used for arriving at the annual gross rental value. The 
rate varies according to the type of property assessed. For this purpose, 
properties are classified into three broad categories viz., (i) village sites, 
(ii) tenements, apartments, row houses and (iii) independent bungalows. 
The Table provides for discriminating rental values for the three distinct 
types of self-occupied residential properties which keep on increasing 
along with the type and the built up area of properties Table 4.2. Non-
residential properties are also assessed on the basis of an assessment 
Table which contains predetermined rates on the square metre basis for 
six different types of non-residential properties into which these have 
been categorised. The rate varies from Rs. 2 per sq. mt. for the First 
category of properties to Rs. 20 per Sq. mt. for the sixth type. Table 4.3. 
These seemingly innovative methods notwithstanding, the pre-determined 
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TABLE - 4.4 
Lettm2 Rates Adopted for Determination of Rental Value in Trivandrum 
Area of the 
building (sq.m) 
Zone Locality Type 
(Rs./sq.ni) 
Rate 
More than (>) 100 
Less than (<) 100 
Less than 
>100 
<100 
ff 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
> 100 
<100 
II 
II 
>100 
<100 
II 
II 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3.00 
2.75 
1.00 
2.60 
2.40 
2.00 
1.00 
2.50 
2.30 
1.70 
0.90 
2.75 
2.50 
2.00 
1.00 
2.50 
2.30 
1.90 
1.00 
2.40 
2.20 
1.60 
0.60 
1.20 
1.75 
1.35 
1.00 
1.50 
1.30 
1.25 
1.00 
1.20 
1.10 
1.00 
0.50 
Source : Municipal Corporation of Trivandrum. 
CHAPTCB - 4 295 
rates are only one-tenth of the market rentals and are only marginally 
revised periodically (Mehta and Mehta 1991 : 24). Rental value for 
educational institutions, factories, institutional properties and so on is 
assessed on the basis of depreciated capital value of properties. Annual 
rent is taken as 6 percent of land value and depreciated cost of 
construction. 
Thus, in Kerala rental value is determined by the Trivandrum mu-
nicipal corporation as well on the basis of an Assessment Table. The city 
has been divided into three zones viz. (i) inner city (ii) outer city and 
(iii) peripheries. The properties located in these three different zones 
are cross-classified in terms of location and type of construction. Each 
property is assessed on the basis of a graded rent per Sq.mt. Which var-
ies according to the above mentioned features of properties and also its 
area. The rate varies from Rs. 0.50 to Rs. 3 per Sq. mt. Table 4.4. Rental 
value for non-residential properties is assessed at 5 to 10 times the val-
ues depicted in the Assessment Table 4.4. The municipal councils in the 
state also assess the properties on the basis of similar Assessment Table 
which has relatively lower predetermined rental values. However, in its 
operational form, there is a lot of deviation from the Assessment Table 
which results in reduction in rental value. Moreover, rates depicted in 
the Table are hardly revised periodically. 
CHAPTCR - 4 :— 296 
Bangalore 
Yazdani (1978) has given information on standarization practicies 
in Bangalore and Bombay. The Bangalore city corporation has developed 
a schedule of letting values Sq. mt. of plinth area of properties classified 
according to nature of roof, nature of floor and year of construction 
based on construction indices. No account is taken of location. It is not 
clear from Yazdani how exactly the letting values are derived. 
This standardization procedure would probably lead, to as many 
cases of 'unreasonable' assessments as the traditional method since it 
does not take into account variations in value according to location. If 
the letting values are derived from observed rentals the method would be 
similar to the Kerala method (except for location) but if they are arbi-
trarily imposed, they would not be following the spirit of the hypotheti-
cal rent idea. 
Bombay 
Bombay corporation has given considerable attention to the prob-
lem of property valuation and is attempting to make annual revisions of 
rates of taxation. One problem it has faced increasingly in recent years is 
that a large number of new properties are either owner occupied or be-
long to cooperative societies. Annual rental values are then difficult to 
observe. Detailed guidelines are given to adopt the 'contractor's test meth-
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od' for assessment. A schedule has been drawn up for different types of 
construction, for different types of buildings, for different years and 
locations. Account is also taken of the cost of land. The method adopted 
is essentially to ascertain the capital value and then approximate the "fair" 
and reasonable renturn on capital invested. It is claimed that with the 
guidelines given, assessment is mechanical and fair. 
Table 4.5, the municipal corporation of Greater Bombay arrives at 
the gross annual rent by applying a table which contains pre-determined 
rental values for every 10 sq. mtrs. of covered area according to location 
and year of construction. It varies from a minimum of Rs. 137.-145 and 
ward B for properties constructed in 1988-89 to a maximum of Rs. 224-
232 in ward A(a) and D(b). Rental value of hotels is determined by apply-
ing the occupancy method but unlike Madras municipal corporation, va-
cancy remission is given only to the extent of 20 percent. 
It is difficult to evaluate this method without further information. 
To the extent that the valuation procedure reflects the real capital value 
of buildings it is, in principle, appoximately the 'hypothetical rent' idea 
since few real rents can be observed. The schedule is an administrative 
device where experts do the valuation and then give relatively simple 
instructions to the field assessors-hence avoiding individual errors as well as 
excessive discretion. Once again, such rules wouldbe difficult to put into a 
legal code and yet retain a certain amount of Flexibility. 
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The municipal corporation of Delhi, due to compulsions arising 
out of a judicial prononcement of the Supreme Court of India (AIR : 
1980), assesses rental value of properties of all types on cost basis as 
provided for in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Accordingly, rental 
value is computed at 8.25 percent of the cost of construction and the 
market value of land at the start of construction of residential properties 
which have already come out of the rent control holiday of initial 5 
years. This in case of non-residential properties is 8.625 per cent. A 
recent ammendement in the Act has enhanced these ratios to 10 percent 
for all types of properties. During the Rent Control holiday, the newly 
constructed properties are assessed on the basis of rental data evolved by 
the municipal corporation of Delhi on the basis of prevailing market 
rent. The data are collected by conducting a 5 percent sample survey of 
properties in each homgeneous localitiy. The rent realised and the carpet 
area of the sample properties are collected to work out the rent per sq.ft. 
which is used for determination of rental value for property tax purposes. 
Before the Supreme Court judgement MCD was assessing rental value on 
the basis of prevailing market rent for the rented properties and by apply-
ing the comparison method for the self-occupied properties. Hotels and 
other properties which are not let and for which there does not eixst any 
rental evidence, were assessed on the basis of contractor's test method. 
As a substantial proportion of buildings were constructed long long ago, 
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the cost method has frozen the rental value of such properties at the 
historical value. 
The corporation of Calcutta determines rental value of rented resi-
dential properties on the basis of actual rent. If, however, the realised 
rent is on the lower side, it goes by the comparable rent method. Rental 
value of self-occupied properties is assessed on the basis of the last rent 
fetched by the old properties, allowing 10 per cent increase over it and 
on the basis of predetermined rental values on sq. ft. basis for the newly 
constructed properties. Non-residential rented properties are likewise 
assessed on the basis of actual rent realised. Prevailing rent in the local-
ity is taken as the guideline for assessing the rental value of self-occu-
pied non-residential properties. But like residential self-occupied prop-
erties, rental value is scaled down to some extent though it is not pro-
vided for in the law. Hotels are assessed differently, however. They are 
divided into business area (rooms with beds) and service area. Rental 
value for business area is determined on the basis of comparable rent in 
the locality. Rental value for service area is assessed at one-fifth of the 
rental value of business area. 
Property tax in India, obviously, is suffering from a depressed base, 
not-so-rational a tax structure. Behavioral factors like corrupt practices 
and an attitude to avoid the tax further contribute to the declining role 
property tax. However, the greatest harm to it has been caused by a de-
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pressed base. There has been considerable erosion in the base over 
the years. 
Erosion in the Base 
Erosion in the base has been brought about primarily by (1) the 
specific nature and spectrum of valuation and assessment practices and 
(ii) by the very nature of the base as provided for in all the municipal 
statutes in India. 
Legal Interpretation of the Base 
The most severe below has come from a spate of legal interpreta-
tions of the tax base. The annual gross rental value at which a property is 
"reasonably expected to let from year to year", though not specifically 
defined in the enabling legislations, it meant, in the case of rented prop-
erties, the potential earning capacity as reflected in the prevailing market 
rent and the comparable prevailing rent for similar self-occupied proper-
ties, the concept of hypothetical tenant was brought-in for the first time 
in determination of Gross annual rent in 1887 in Madras through a judi-
cial pronouncement. Since there does not exist any rental evidence for 
self-occupied properties, the court held that its rent has to be measured 
by an amount the property would be worth to the "hypothetical tenant" 
(ILR 1887 : 38). Taking clue from Britain, an imaginary situation was 
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thus introduced for the assessment of rental value. "Rent prescribed by 
the statute is a hypothetical rent, as hypothetical as the tenant, It is the 
rent which an imaginary tenant might be reasonably expected to pay to an 
imaginary landlord for the tenancy of dwelling in that locality on the 
hypothesis that both are reasonable people, the landlord not extortionate, 
the tenant not being under pressure ...." (Holland 1970 : 65). 
The concept of hypothetical tenant and hypothetical rent was fur-
ther accepted by Calcutta High Court while interpreting the reasonable 
annual rental value of land and building as provided for in the erstwhile 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1923 (AIR 1927 : 659).. This re-
ceived the seal of the privy council (the British House of Lords) which 
reaffirmed that reasonable rent is a rent which a hypothetical tenant would 
be willing to pay (AIR 1947 : 50). 
Having developed the new concept of "reasonable rent" the Su-
preme Court finally held that standard rent fixed under rent control law 
constitutes the upper limit of rentals. Accordingly, "in determining the 
gross annual rent, statutory limitation of rent circumscribes the scope of 
the bargain in the market and therefore in no circumstances the hypo-
thetical rent may exceed the limit." "Reasonable rent" as laid down in 
the Muncipal Statutes was thus interpreted to be constrained by the limit 
imosed by the concept of fair or standard rent as provided for in the Rent 
Control laws. 
CHRPTCR - 4 3 0 2 
Thus, hypothetical rent became standard rent even in situations 
where no such rent had yet been fixed by a controller nor it had been 
statutorily determined. The extension of the new interpretation was final 
and complete in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor case decided in 1979 even 
though the Delhi High court had earlier rejected the extension of 
Padma Devi's case to this situation where agreed rent was legally 
recoverable and standard rent was not yet fixed (municipal corporation 
cases 1973 : 355).« 
Since this is a landmark judgement^ delivered by the highest court 
of the land, its application is universal throughout India. Municipal as-
sessment for property taxation thus has to be limited to the amount of 
standard rent determinable according to the Rent Control laws. It should 
be obvious that such a system of taxation has inequities built into the 
system itself as the rateable values of old and new properties will be 
considerably different from each other if the standard rent is determined 
on cost basis as is provided for in several Acts. The same will equally 
apply in situations where standard rent with respect to properties has 
been determined on the basis of pegged rent in certain base years but 
with reference to prevailing rent in the case of others. Such a system of 
property taxation is therefore riddled with disparities, discrimination and 
inequities. The Supreme Court tried to take care of this as well in its own 
way in a case decided in 1984. The court in Dr. Balbir Singh and others 
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Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi not only extended the principle enun-
ciated in the Dewan Daulat Rai case but also ordered to further reduce 
standard rent with respect to such properties which are not likely to yield 
the precribed standard rent due to reasons such as large size, locational 
disadvantage, stage of repair and any other similar reasons. The court 
held that the principles evolved in the Diwan Daulat Rai case was "the 
last word on the subject..." and yet held that though standard rent consti-
tutes the upper limit for assessment of rental value, if the standard rent 
computed according to the provisions laid down in the Rent Control law 
appeared too high and was not likely to be fetched by properties, rental 
value must be determined on the basis of such lower rent ! The court 
specifically mentioned the disparities created by strict application of 
standard rent in the case of newly constructed self-occupied properties 
and directed that in such cases rental value should be assessed at a rent 
which the owner of similar premises constructed earlier and situated in 
the same and adjouning locality could expect and which will necessarily 
be within the upper limit of standard rent of such properties. 
Retrieval of Base : Sporadic Attempts and Suggestions 
A frozen and depressed base has been a compelling factor for (1) en-
hancement of tax rate and (2) rent standardisation. Relatively higher rates in 
Ahmedabad and Bombay, as aheady discussed, are the cases in point. Such prac-
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tices are in vogue in other states as well (Datta 1983:50-51). 
Rate Standardisation 
Standardisation of rents by evolving a predetermined schedule of 
rental values is yet another innovation for taking care of erosion in base 
especially due to deficiencies in valuation and assessment practices and 
prevalence of corrupt practices. The practice of evolving of rental data 
by the MCD in Delhi, as discussed earlier, is a very crude way of rent 
standardisation other municipal authorities have brought about further 
improvement in it (Mohan 1983 : 118-37). The Bangalore Municipal Cor-
poration developed a schedule of letting values per Sq. mt. of plinth area 
by differentiting them on the basis of the nature of roof, floor and year 
of construction (Yazdani : 1978). Location, an important variable in in-
fluencing property values does not find place in this schedule. The sys-
tem based on such a schedule of rental values will therefore be equally 
unreasonable and inequitous. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation, as mentioned earlier, has also 
developed a schedule of rental values for the determination of rental 
value. This is based on contractor's test method. It has taken into account 
a few key variables like type of construction, year of construction and 
location of properties. An additional element of type of zone was also 
introduced by dividing the city into "Posh" and "non-posh" localities. 
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However, since this was done on the basis of an executive order rather 
than by amending the statute, it was struck down by the court. But the 
schedule is even now in use (Table 4.5). Kerala, as mentioned earlier, has 
also developed a schedule of rents for valuation purposes which is based 
on the types of zone, localities, and construction as also the extent of 
covered area (Table 4.4). 
Basic purposes of rent standardisation is to minimise, if not alto-
gether eliminate creeping in of corrupt practices in valuation and assess-
ment of rental value as also to take care of collusive rent. These practic-
es of rent standardisation are pursued rather clandestinely and hence by 
flaunting the existing legal provisions in this regard. Madras Municipal 
corporation when in 1977 was to issue an executive order for determina-
tion of rental value on the basis of plinth area; the Madras High Court did 
not permit to do so on the plea that it was against the relevant enabling 
legal provisions of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act (MLJ 
1978 ; 93). The High Court, in deciding this case, relied on a couple of 
case laws of the Supreme Court which branded such attempt as going 
against the law (AIR 1961 : 1358; AIR 1963 : 1742). 
Adopting a New Base 
Property tax in India is thus suffering from a number of infirmi-
ties. A host of legal, administrative and behaviour at factors have in ca-
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pacitated its base and hence its revenue performance. Determination of 
the base as also periodical changes in it suffers from built-in deficien-
cies like substantial scope for creeping in of subjective elements and 
discretion which in turn creates additional built-in scope for corrupt 
practices. The tax is not elastic to service requirements, increasing ser-
vice costs and is not properly related to the demand for services emanat-
ing from different land uses. 
Annual rental value the base-is said to have lost its relevance due 
to prevalence of old tenancies and the rent control laws which have put 
severe limitations on the growth and the level of assessed value. Other 
arguments against it relate to broader issues of rising land values which 
is not reflected in the assessed rental value and its inability to serve any 
urban development objective (Kapoor 1977 : 53-74; Operation Research 
Group 1979; Ramkrishna 1983 : 83-93). In view of these insurmountable 
problems, the dissatisfaction with Annual Rental value system of proper-
ty tax has culminated in suggestions to abandon this system itself and 
switch over to other system of property tax. 
Thus, we see that the assessment of property tax by municipal bod-
ies has given rise to widespread compliants from the public. In this chap-
ter an attempt is being made to analyse the basis of the present system, 
and causes for complaints and to suggest a new approach which may meet 
most of the legitimate objections against the existing practices. 
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The determination of Annual rental value for actually rented build-
ings has several snags. It is even more complicated in the case owner 
occupied buildings. The combined result of the system of assessing prop-
erty tax, with its built-in element of discretion, and its enthusiastic ap-
plication in circumstances of compelling financial need has been the 
widespread dissatisfaction among tax payers. 
A careful consideration of the nature of complaints from taxpayers 
and the response of the municipal authorities show that the problem has 
to be dealt with in two distinct parts. 
First, the degree of discretion and possible arbitrariness in the 
present system has to be reduced, if not eliminated altogether. Whether 
it is possible to devise a new and practical basis for assessment of prop-
erty tax in a manner that can be objective has to be examined. 
Second, whether the taxation can be made more progressive by 
giving relief to the lower middle classes who depend on rents as the main 
source of income and to owner occupied residential buildings 
without affecting the overall revenues of the municipalities in any sig-
nificant manner. 
The basic idea is to move away from the concept of property tax 
levied with reference to annual rental value, to the levy of property tax 
with reference to objective criteria related to the building. 
Besides the capital value system and site value systems which are 
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already in vogue in other countries, an indigeneous system known as the 
Area Detial system has been very strongly suggested for taxation of land 
and buildings to mobilise increasing financial resources to meet the 
rising demand for urban services. 
Capital Value Systems 
There appears to be much more diversity in practice among cities 
using capital value systems than among cities using annual value systems. 
There also are some important common features in assessment practices 
among capital value systems. The more important of these are (a) a dif-
ferential tax treatment of land and improvements, (b) an objective as-
sessment practice for residential properties, and (c) a uniform assess-
ment procedure for various types of land. Another common tendency is 
for capital value systems to involve central and state governments much 
more heavily in the administration of the tax. 
Capital value is generally considered to be what a willing seller 
could be expected to receive for his property from a willing buyer if it 
were offered for sale free of encumbrances and on reasonable terms. The 
concept here again is the price of the property under a regime of a 
freely competitive market. 
Now, the capital value of a property is the present value of the 
discounted stream of its expected income, i.e. 
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t = l^ 
Rt 
Vo = S 
( 1 + rt )' 
t = o 
where Vo is the capital value of a property at time. Rt is the rental at time 
t and r is the appropriate discount rate. In equilibrium, 
Rj = Rj = . . . R a n d 
r = r = . r 
Thus theoretically, in an equilibrium or stable situation there is no 
conceptual difference between the two bases of assessment. However, in 
reality, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the future and es-
pecially so in situations of relatively rapid urbanisation. Moreover, in 
conditions of high and variable rates of inflation, there can be consider-
able differences between the present value of the discounted stream of 
annual rentals based on current rentals and the current capital value. To 
the extent that rising future rentals are foreseen, capital value increases 
can be expected to lead annual rental increases. One advantage of the 
capital value basis of property tax assessment is that, given frequent re-
assessment, property taxes would be more buoyant with rising capital 
values. To the extent that property taxes get capitalised the rising value 
of land and property would be. Slowed down if indeed the bases was 
capital value and there was frequent reassessment. Other advantages of 
capital value taxation that are often stressed are : 
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(i) Vacant land would be easier to tax and would, therefore, lead to 
more efficient land-use. 
(ii) If would be possible to from an elaborate valuation code, 
(iii) Since some of the central taxes are based on capital valuation it 
would also lead to better collection of those taxes, 
(iv) It would be more difficult to evade taxation. 
Ramkrishna (1980) had recently made a strong case for a new ap-
proach to the basis of the property tax. His ideas essentially respond to 
the widespread complaints from the public concerning the inequities and 
inefficiencies in the administration of the current system. He feels that 
the system of valuation as it exists now is "at best discretionary to a 
large extent and at worst arbitrary to an unacceptable degree". As a con-
sequence, the first priority for reform should be that" the degree of dis-
cretion and possible arbitrariness in the present system has to be reduced 
if not eliminated altogether". The new basis suggested by him is then a 
system which is thought to be much more rational and mechanical where 
the discretionary powers of the valuation officers are reduced consider-
ably. Under the system proposed, the basic tax would be related to the 
plinth area. There would be a surcharge on excess appurtenant land which 
is greater than three times the built-up area. Extra surcharges would be 
levied according to location, type of construction, nature of its use and 
age of building. Each of these variable would have five or six categories. 
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The advantages of moving to such a system are seem to be : 
(a) Owners can pay on a self-assessment basis once the paramenters 
of the scheme are worked out. 
(b) The scope of discretion now exercised by valuation officers would 
be greatly reduced. 
(c) Computerisation of the tax system would be easier. 
(d) Effort in reassessments every five years would be saved. 
(e) Variation of taxes can be made by alteration of basic rates. 
(f) Progressivity in taxation can be achieved by organising the extras 
such that the poor are benefited. 
A dispassionate view of the proposed transplantation of capital value 
system into the Indian soil suggests further compounding of confusions 
and complications. Capital value system for its successful functioning 
requires a well developed real estate market where the latest sale infor-
mation for diverse type of properties abounds. As this does not exist in 
India even in a rudimentary form, the comparative sale information may 
be misleading due to understantement of sale value. Secondly, quantifica-
tion of a host of external and uncontrollable factors influencing the capi-
tal value would meet insurmountable problems and may ultimately end up 
on account of a number of subjective elements. Thirdly, the diversified 
assessment practices and methods currently in vogue in the countries 
with capital value system hardly make it convincing if the valuation made 
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is really based on capital value per se (Bahl 1979 : 4). 
Site Value Taxation 
The other basis of taxation suggested is site valuation (Ammukutty, 
1980). Under this system it is the site value of land alone which is taxed 
not the built-up property. The argument behind this tax is that land value 
increases are attributable to public investment or other external events 
and not due to the efforts of the individual owner; the increments in 
value should then be captured for public benefit. Ammukutty suggests a 
number of differences between the property tax as it is levied now and 
the proposed system of site value tax. It is not true to say that property 
tax is levied "mainly or wholly on man-made capital". Whether based on 
annual value or capital value, the value of land is part of the property 
value and usually an indeterminate part. A well administered property tax 
would not favour old over new property as long as land values were rising 
and proper reassessments were done frequently. Land values are usually 
changed as a result of building up an area hitherto unbuilt up. It is also 
claimed that site value tax favours land utilisation to the maximum limit 
since the tax bill increses with the increase in economic rent of the land. 
Again, a well administered property tax would have the same effect. It 
should be obvious that since property value subsuemes land value, any 
virtues of site value taxation should also be manifested in property value 
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taxation. The only difference is that site value taxation does not tax the 
building, which the property tax does. Theoretically, at least, a change 
from property tax to site value tax should give a boost to housing con-
struction activity. Although Ammukutty presents a good simulation exer-
cise based on a part of Delhi to show how site value taxation can replace 
property taxation, practically a system based on site value suffers from a 
number of problems. 
The significant differences between property tax as it is levied 
now and site value taxation as it is proposed are : 
# Property tax is levied mainly or wholly on man-made capital. 
# Site value taxation is levied on land. 
# The weight (rate of taxation) adversely affects the quantity and 
quality of man-made capital. 
# The quantity of land which is created by nature does not rise or 
fall under the weight of site value taxation.'" 
# Property tax favours old over new because property tax rockets 
upward when the new (rentals on new buildings or houses are like-
ly to be higher) succeeds the old. 
# Site value tax is neutral because renewal does not change land value. 
# Property tax encourages holding land for speculative purposes. 
# Site value tax forces land utilisation to the maximum limit as the 
tax bill increases with the increase in economic rent of the land." 
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The key conceptual problems with site value taxation is the "there 
is not meaningful way, in theory as well as in practice, of separating the 
value of the site from the value of improvements if the site is not a 
vacant one" (Netzer, 1966, p. 128). Among other things, such as location, 
it is improvements themselves that have an impact on site values. Im-
provements on land alter the character of the location itself and hence 
change site values. This is not to say that there is no such thing as land 
value when it is built upon; only to say that it is theoretically as well as 
practically difficult to determine. Site value taxation has been tried in a 
number of countries, specially Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Canada, Netzer (1966) reports from a study by A.M. Woodruf and L.L. 
Ecker-Racz that" they observed little visible evidence of difference be-
tween communities which use site value taxation and those which use 
more conventional forms of property taxation". 
Ammukutty's empirical exercise on the feasibility of applying site 
value taxation to the South Extension area of New Delhi illustrates an-
other difficulty with the application of site value taxation. This relates to 
the adequacy of revenues that can be collected from site value tax. Ac-
cording to a study by James Heiburn, cited by Netzer, it has been esti-
mated that the present yield of the real estate tax in the United States 
may exceed the whole rent of land, which is the theoretical maximum 
revenue potential. In fact, if there is 100 percent taxation the value of 
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land would decline to zero. Hence the taxation rate would have to be 
considerably less than 100 percent. Ammukutty attempts to show that it 
is quite possible to collect equivalent revenue from site value tax. How-
ever, the assessable annual value of land alone as estimated by her is 
greater than the estimated total rateable property value. ^ ^ The estimated 
property tax collected is between 15 and 20 percent of the annual 
property value. 
This implies that if the property and land values were taken in 
comparable terms, site value tax would have to be atleast 50 per cent of 
annual site value (assuming that land value is between 30 and 40 percent 
of total property value on average), in order to give tax revenue equiva-
lent to property tax revenues. 
Having made all these strictnes, it should be pointed out that it has 
long been recognised that site value taxation is a theoritically very at-
tractive insturment of taxation. Since land can not be moved, taxing loca-
tion rents has no effect on landlord's descretions. It is also neutral with 
regard to the intensity of land-use. Incentives to develop high values 
sites remain unaffected - relative values of different sites are not al-
tered. Furthermore, the capitalisation of the land tax would reduce land 
prices and, therefore, dampen land value increases. Imposition of site 
value taxation would then encourage an increased rate of investment in 
new buildings, less speculation and more intensive use of land. 
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The justice of this policy is strongly defended because ownership 
of land is sought as a refuge from inflation. The division of capital to 
investment in land tends to accentuate the rise in land prices. There are 
several countries which have site value taxation to combat land specula-
tion and to bring about development of land. Korea, it is stated, levies a 
50 percent tax on unearned increments on land to reduce speculative 
activities. To bring about development of land Beones Ares levies a tax 
of 5 percent to 10 percent on vacant land in contrast to 0.6 percfent on 
built up Land. Some other countries which have switched on to site value 
taxation are Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Greece, Iraq, Den-
mark, Trinidad, etc. Further, as Mason Gaffiinay puts it "capital has loose 
feet; land on the other land has only square feet; you can tax the 
very all out of land and not one square foot will get up and walk out 
of the town". 1^  
Some of the American Cities which have switched over to land 
value tax are south Field (Michigan) and Pittsburg. Building industry is 
stated to be flourishing in these cities and "Land values have increased, 
but at a moderate rate only". 
Experiments site value taxation in several cities have shown that 
the tax is economically sound and practically feasible. The change-over 
from property tax to site value taxation can be gradual, spreading over 5 
to 10 years during which period the tax on improvements is reduced 
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gradually and on land is increased so that hardsh%8 are reduced. 
If land values are assessed correctly and reassessed <»t fegular intervals 
and land taxation is properly structured and administrered, it v '^^ '^ d provide a 
fairly stable and predictable'" source of revenue to the local body whic.'w^ould 
in addition have a tendency to increase with economic development. 
Thus about site value taxation, we reach to the conclusion that si. 
value taxation for its success requires objective valuation of site on the 
basis of capital value which is again fraught with pitfalls in Indian situa-
tion, secondly, since it exempts improvement on land, it could be effec-
tively enforced only in planned cities and towns or in the planned locali-
ties within an old city. If enforced in old and unplanned cities, the tax 
would prove penal in nature resulting in driving away of the low income 
families from the urban core where land values are the highest. 
Area Detail System 
Area detail system has been advocated with much force and a de-
bate is still on for its universal adoption. Basically, this system involves 
dividing a city into homogeneous zones and taxing land and buildings on 
the basis of a few key variables which are said to be instrumental in rise 
in property values. These include type of location, type of construction, 
age of building and land use. Each of them is converted into four or five 
gradations. Basic tax is to be related to the plinth area of buildings. An 
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additional basic tax is to supplement it depending on the extent of appur-
tenant land and finally, a progressive surcharge is to be imposed on the 
basic and additional tax which is to be higher on the higher grades of the 
four attributes of properties. Despite a lack of consenses on the accept-
ability of such a system (Mohan 1983; Jha 1983; Banerjee 1983; West 
Bengal 1982; Delhi Administration 1990; Baqchi 1991) it was incorpo-
rated into an Amendment Bill in Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly for 
amending the existing municipal laws in the state (Tamil Nadu : 1988). 
The Bill, however, lapsed and could not be enacted into a law. 
Area Based Scheme Vs ARV Approach 
As mentioned earlier^ main problems of property tax system in 
India are linking of provisions of rent control with assessment of proper-
ty tax base, understatement of rents received, and subjectivity of the 
assessing authorities. The expert committee for Delhi as well as the Ma-
dras study have suggested 'delinking' of property tax base with the stan-
dard rent concept of the rent control Act. In Madras, the existing Annual 
rental value method is suggested to be replaced by area based taxation 
scheme. It has recommended use of zonal rates per unit of area based on 
parameters such as location, use, type, etc. The Delhi committee has 
suggested to amend the law to drop the word 'reasonable' in relation to 
the Annual rental value assessment and constitute a panel of assessors to 
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lay down norms of prevalent market rent for homogeneous locality or 
broad classess of properties. 
Area based taxation method is simple and objective. However, this 
approach has certain limitations which need to be examined. A more con-
crete model of area based taxation has been given in the Tamil Nadu 
Municipal Corporation Bill 1988. The bill did not get a chance to be 
debated in the state Assembly and was dropped. Experts opposing this 
system have argued that taxation based on unit area even considering 
other parameters would be arbitrary and unsustainable in law. ^ ^ According 
to critics this approach is not justified on equity considerations in the 
context of Article 14 of the constitution. It will be also difficult to 
revise the per unit area rates regularly. 
Experts advocating area based taxation approach argue that true 
value of a given property is not easy to determine even in countries 
where capital value is more active and open.'^ There is nothing like abso-
lute value of a property. 
Arbitrariness in estimating unit area tax can be reduced by using 
statistical techniques. The methodology devised by the central valuation 
Board in West Bengal for this purpose can not possibly be regarded as 
arbitrary. ^ ^ Area based tax system is similar to income tax on a presuptive 
or potential basis. Reasonable rent concept which is the basis of property 
tax in India is itself a presumptive measure. Therefore, this approach can 
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not be questioned on equity or legal grounds. 
Basic argument of area based system advocates is that Annual rent-
al value tax assessment is equitable and elastic if there is no rent control. 
However, major reforms in rent control act are not expected to take 
place in near feature. In the case of Delhi, where rent control Act chang-
es were made fist three years ago, bulk of the properties (over 98% in 
MCD) continues to be within the upper limit of the Act. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to replace the annual rental value assessment method 
and area based scheme provides one such approach. 
Suggestions made by Madras study have not been implemented. 
State government apparently felt that it may not be sustainable in court 
of law. High Powered committee for property tax in Delhi while 
recognising the need for serving nexus of property tax base with standard 
rent concept has not agreed to apply the rule of actual rent or market rent 
uniformly in all cases. It is difficult to delink property taxation from rent 
control laws. The moot question is, how one hand of the government say 
that there will be control on rent and another say that the tax base will be 
market rent. 
Thus, area detail system in its operational form is basically based 
on presumptive taxation and hence suffers from arbitrariness in deciding 
the annual value and in assigning weights to the different gradations of 
the attributes of an urban property. It was due to "insurmountable diffi-
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culties in deciding the weights to the less tangible factors" that a points 
system was rejected by the layfield committee in England (U.K. 1976 : 
169-70). It appears to be inequitous as well in that it is unrelated to the 
productivity of property to its owner or to differential capacities to bear 
the tax. Due to arbitrary nature of taxation of annual value, it may not be 
sustainable in law. Beside, by taxing even a small substandard shelter in a 
high value zone at a uniform zonal rate, it may adversely affect the con-
stitutional right of the citizen to hold property. The proposed system will 
also be inelastic as the rates of basic tax, additional basic tax and sur-
charges are to be provided for in the statute itself which will not provide 
any scope for manoeuring them. Moreover operational difficulties under 
the system would be enormous as experienced under a cognate system 
tried in Jakarta (Linn 1976 : Ch vi; Bahl 1979 . 9-47). 
Thus, foregoing analysis shows that, due to its very nature of base 
the annual rental value, is subject to increasing criticism in recent years 
which has now culminated in strong arguments for the abandonment of its 
base in many states of India. 
Reform proposals have to be based on the one hand, on the exist-
ing situation from which a start has to be made and, on the other, on the 
realities of situation which put constraints on future action. 
Proposals have been made to replace the base of annual rental 
value by alternatives like capital value, or site value, or composite bases 
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determined by the summation of number of selected variables, (e.g., 
location type of building, use of property, age of structure, etc.) each 
with a predetermined weight. It is necessary to mention that sevaral coun-
tries including Canada, USA some Latin Amercian Countries and a few 
other, have the capital value base. In U.K. from which our system was 
borrowed, the Lay field committee of 1976 recommended a change over 
from annual rental value to capital value, but this recommendation has 
not been accepted by the British Govertnment. 
Although capital value base has advantages like easy determination 
than annual rental value; flexibility in adjusting rates; inducing better 
land use by bringing unimproved land under taxation; attaining the desired 
allocative effects in regard to the use of land; and becoming more re-
sponsive to the economic changes and have an objective valuation of 
property; in Indian situation because of the imperfect property market, 
the system can not work. Unlike Europe and Ameria where capital value 
system is in vogue, we do not have a well developed real estate market in 
our country, where properties could be sold frequently. Even when the 
properties are sold, the amount mentioned in the sale deed is understat-
ed. The valuation exercise in the absence of a well developed real state 
market will prove to be highly subjective.^^ Local Finance Enquirry com-
mittee 1951 and Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54 were all against 
the capital value system. 
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Will it then be worthwhile to switchover to site value system ? The 
site value system of property taxation besides serving as an instrument of 
revenue mobilisation, also serves the urban development objectives. Un-
der this system the tax is imposed only on the value of the site, leaving 
out all structures. It is, argeed that if buildings are dirated then building 
activity will be encouraged and unutilised areas fully utilised. 
However, the basic problem of valuation, still remains intact. If 
there is no open and free land market, the determination of site value 
presents the difficulty as that of capital value. Leaving the buildings out 
mean serious discrimination against the owners of residential 
accomodation or small structures.'^ 
This then leaves the scope for reforming the property tax limited 
to a system of imposing the tax on the basis of certain area details. 
Suggestions have been made for the replacement of all direct valuation 
whether of rental, or of capital worth, or of site by some objective crite-
ria, like the area of land, the plinth area, the floor area and so on. A more 
developed variant of this composite base or the points system under which 
the tax is payable is determined by the summation of a number of select-
ed weighed variables. In fact, the single criterion schemes also include 
weightage for a few other variables and therefore, all this can be dis-
cussed together. 
One suggestion has been to levy a land tax and also a building tax, 
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both on the basis of area measurement. The rates would vary according to 
zone and there would be additional charges for non-residential use and 
also to meet development cost where applicable. 
A second suggestion is that in addition to land and plinth areas, 
other factor like location, type of contraction, nature of use and age 
should be compounded into a standardised formula. 
The system adopted in Orissa had come somewhat nearer to this 
system. However if the property tax is continued with the system of area 
characteristics and valuation of assessment is formalised on the basis of 
the for most important factors giving rise to property values, it may not 
withstand scrutiny by the courts of law after the enactment of new rent 
control law,^" if it does not delink the property valuation from the provi-
sion of rent control law. The fair rent or the hyposthetical rent to be 
fetched by a property has been interpreted by the supreme court as the 
standard rent determined according to the Rent Control Act. 
The alternative suggested reveal that there hardly exists any scope 
for changing base of the property tax. The remedy lies in improving the 
annual rental value system within the existing system itself, by either 
computing the rateable value on the basis of area of land and built-up 
value there on or with the application of appropriate factors taking into 
account the location and standard of construction.^' 
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Reforming The Annual Rental Value System: The Nature of Base 
Insurmountable problems associated with operationalisation of cap-
ital value system and site value system in Indian conditions as also the 
inherent infirmities of Area detail system suggest that there is no alter-
native to the Annual rental value system. It needs to be liberated from the 
crippling effects on its base. Much of the problem in this system has 
arisen due to the very nature of its base —" rent at which land or building 
is reasonably expected to let" which is not explicitly defined with the 
result that the courts have interpreted it to be within the upper limit of 
standard rent as determinable according to the provisions of the relevant 
rent control laws. Hence, first, the vaguely defined base needs to be 
defined explicity in unambiguous terms and second, the valuation and 
assessment of rental value needs to be insulated from the dampening 
effects of rent control laws. 
Dlfining the Base 
The concept of reasonable rent as provided for in the enabling 
enactments needs to be replaced by the "rent actually received", or "the 
prevailling rent" so that there would not exist any ambiguity about it. But 
then, it will have to be accompanied by an amendment in the rent control 
laws for delinking the determination of standard rent from the newly 
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defined base. Attempts have already been made in a couple of states to 
explicity define the rental value by replacing the concept of reasonable 
rent. In the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, "Annual value" has been de-
fined as the Gross annual rent at which a property is "expected to be let 
or it is actually let, which ever is greater". Similarly, the Himachal 
Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 was amended after the Su-
preme Court Dcision in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor case in 1979 on simi-
lar line and so far there has not been any problem with this. However, the 
Haryana Act still recognises standard rent for such properties for which 
it has already been determined. In Andhra Pradesh the problem of reason-
able rent' has been dealt with by specifying it "with reference to its 
location, type of construction, plinth area, age of buildings, nature of 
use" by amending the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities. Act, 1979 was 
amended after the Supreme Court Decision in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor 
case in 1979 on similar line and so far there has not been any problem 
with this. However, the Haryana Act still recognises standard rent for 
such properties for which it has already been determined. In Andhra 
Pradesh, the problem of reasonable rent' has been dealt with by specify-
ing it" with reference to its location type of construction, plinth area, 
age of buildings, nature of use" by amending the Andhra Pradesh 
Muncipalities. Act, 1969 and the Hyderabad muncipal corporation Act 
1955. In all these states an attempt has simulatneously been made to 
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insulate municipal assessment from the shadow of rent laws by puting a 
non-obstante clause in municipal amendment Acts. Recently, in the union 
territory of Delhi, a High Powered Committee has also recommended to 
substitute the expression "reasonable rent" by actual rent or prevalent 
market rent. Which ever is higher. By way of caution, it suggested to 
insert a non-obstante clause for preventing the influence of rent control 
laws. These seemingly laudable attempts notwithstanding, provisions of 
the rent control laws are still most likely to have the field day particu-
larly because the rent control law is a social Act which has precedence 
over the muncipal laws. Morever, despite providing for expressions like 
"actual rent, prevailing rent which like "actual rent prevailing rent which-
ever is higher" it will still be constrained by fair rent which according to 
the various case laws constitute the upper limit of rent. Hence any mean-
ingful reform in annual rental value system has to be accompanied by 
appropriable steps to amend the rent control laws. 
Rent Control Laws in India ; A Review 
Control of rents in India is a state subject and hence the laws 
relating to rent control are enacted by the state governments. The rent 
control laws (RCLs) in India owe their genesis to the first world war 
when the control measures on rentals were initiated for the first time as 
temporary measures. RCLs were enacted in 1918 in Bombay and in 1920 
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in Calcutta (Balachandar on 1983 : 55-82). However, the Rent Acts have 
not only stayed all these decades but have been amended and consolidat-
ed and even replaced by new enactments. In fact, the process of enact-
ment of new laws gathered momentum after the second war. Substantial 
properties of the existing RCLs in Indian states were enacted during 
sixties (as many as 8) and seventies (7 Acts)." Only three laws were 
enacted each during fourties and fifties. 
Much of the erosion in property tax base in India has been brought 
about by the restraining provision of the RCLs relating to fixation of fair 
rent (FR) or standard rent (SR). Although all the RCLs provide for fixa-
tion of SR, as these laws are enacted by the state legislatures, the provi-
sions differ from state to state. Nevertheless, three broad features could 
be discerned in RCLs in so far as they impinge on municipal finances. 
These pertain to (i) fixation of fair rent (FR) or standard rent (SR); (ii) 
permissible increase in standard rent; and (iii) Exemptions granted to 
certain categories of properties from the purview of Rent Acts. Specific 
features of RCLs are presented in Appendix. 
(1) Fixation of Fair Rent 
Provisions for fixation of standard rent could be grouped under 
four categories viz. (i) pegging of rentals at certain predetermined base 
years with nominal increase; (ii) application of certain ratios on the 
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price of land and the cost of construction taken together; (iii) a blending 
of pegged rentals and a proportion of property values; and (iv) the rea-
sonable rent. 
(i) Pegging of Rent 
The rent control laws operating in the states of Andhra.Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Haryana Tripura, Bihar, Punjab, Kerala and Rajasthan 
provide for determination of standard rent with reference to rentals pre-
vailing in some specified base years. Such base years by and large, be-
long to the late thirties (Punjab and Maharashtra and Gujarat in certain 
cases) and fourties (Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar) except 
the states of Haryana and Rajasthan, where the prescribed base years are 
December 31, 1967 and January, 1962 respectively. In Kerala, standard 
rent is fixed with reference to rental value assessed by the municpal 
authorities at the time of letting and it is not to exceed the assessed 
rental value by 15 percent. Once fixed, the rent continues to be pegged at 
this level. If the property is not yet assessed, standard rent is fixed in 
relation to the prevailing rent in the locality for similar properties during 
12 months preceding the letting. In Tripura also standard rent is to be 
fixed in relation to the rental value assessed two years before the date of 
application for fixation of standard rent. In some of the states, the rent 
cotrol laws provide for fixation of standard rent on the basis of rent at 
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which the property was first let after the prescribed base years, as in the 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. In Rajasthan, it is to be fixed with due regard to 
prevailing rent or standard rent for similar properties in the same locali-
ty, various amenities, cost of construction, maintenance and repairs. 
(ii) Some Proportion of Property Value 
Rent Control Laws operating in the state of Assam, Pondicherry, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Meghalaya provide for fixation of standard 
rent on the basis of some proportion of property value as reflected in 
the cost of construction and the Market price of construction and the 
Market price of land. The ratio to be applied on cost varies from a maxi-
mum of 12 percent for non-residential properties in Tamil Nadu and 10 
percent for residential properties in U.P. to a minimum of 6 percent in 
Pondicherry. In Tamil Nadu the ratio is applied on the total cost obtain-
ing on the date of application for fixation of standard rent whereas in 
U.P, the cost relates to the date immediately before the date of com-
mencement of the rent control laws in the state or on the date of letting 
which ever occurs later. In Pondicherry, it is weighted with reference to 
the type of locality where the property is Located, features of architec-
tural interest and accessibility to the amenities like market, hospitals, 
dispensaries and educational institutions. But such allowances are not to 
exceed 25 percent of the cost of construction. 
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(iii) Pegging of Rent and Some Ratio of Cost 
The rent laws operating in Delhi, Goa, West Bengal, Karnataka and 
Madhya Pradesh provide for fixation of standard rent with reference to 
either the prevailing rent in some predetermined base years or to the rent 
as determined by the Predecessor Act and also on the basis of cost. The 
latter provision applies to properties constucted after the prescribed 
base years. In Delhi, for example, the base year partains to 1944. The 
base years prescribed in the statutes of M.P., Karnataka and Goa are 
1948, 1947 and 1965 respectively. 
For the properties constructed after the base years, a recent amend-
ment in rent control laws in Delhi provides to determine standard rent 
on the basis of 10 percent of the reasonable cost of construction and the 
market price of land at the commecement of construction both for resi-
dential and non-residential uses. In Goa, it is to be fixed on the basis of 
7.5 percent of the property value prevailing on January 1, 1965 or on the 
date of completion of construction whichever is later. The prescribed 
ratios are 6.75 percent in the states of West Bengal and M.P and 6 
percent in Karnataka. In the states of Karnataka and West Bengal, the 
benchmark for market price of land and cost of construction happens to 
be the date of starting the construction. However, in West Bengal, the 
cost thus obtained has to include one-half of the local taxes and rates 
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paid on the property. In Madhya Pradesh, the provision for applying the 
ratio is altogether different. As mentioned earlier, standard rent in Madhya 
Pradesh is to be fixed at 15 percent of the monthly rateable value as 
assessed by the municipal authorities. If the property is not yet assessed, 
standard rent is calculated with refence to the first agreed rent. If, how-
ever, a property is not let out, standard rent has to be fixed with refer-
ence to the rent realised immediately after the completion of construc-
tion or on the basis of cost which ever is less. 
Reasonable Rent 
Orissa is the only state where none of the above methods are 
applied for fixation of standard rent. It is to be fixed on the basis of rent 
considered reasonable having regard to situation, locality, level of ser-
vices and amenities provided and also the rental value fixed by the local 
bodies. In West Bengal, as well, there is a residual provision. Accord-
ingly, if provisions relating to fixation of standard rent with reference to 
rentals fixed by predecessor Acts or the one obtaining in the base year or 
fixed on the basis of cost method do not apply in a particular situation, 
the standard rent could be fixed with regard to situation, locality and 
condition of premises and the amenities provided. 
Permissible Increase 
The damage caused to the property tax base could be undone to 
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some extent if the rent control laws provided for periodical increases in 
the standard rent. But the enhancements permitted in the various rent 
control laws are at most only marginal and nominal. These are limited to 
situations where alteration, addition or improvement have been addition 
or improvement have been brought about in the buildings. Some of the 
Acts also provide for increase in standard rent subject to enhancement in 
municipal taxes and rates. Only in three states, the permitted increase in 
standard rent is linked to some other factors. In the states of Assam and 
Meghalaya, if within a period of five years of continuous possession by 
the same tenant, the property value increases by more than 25 percent, 
the landlord is entitled to increase the monthly standard rent upto l/20th 
and 1.12th respectively of 7.5 per cent of such increase subject to a 
maximum of 50 percent of the preceding standard rent. The rent act in 
Haryana provides that while fixing the standard rent, an increase or de-
crease on basic rent could be effected on the basis of rise or fall in the 
general price index. But such adjustment is not supposed to exceed 25 
percent of price change. In Delhi, standard rent and also the agreed rent 
are permitted to be enhanced by 10 percent every three years. In Madhya 
Pradesh, the Act provides for an increase of 35 percent in the rentals of 
residential and educational premises if the accomodation is kept in good 
and tenantable repairs. 
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Exemption 
The most unconventional and unorthodox law providing for exemp-
tion to certain categories of properties is operating in the state of Tamil 
Nadu, it has delinked all the properties with a monthly rent of Rs. 400 
and more from the purview of the rent Act. Such a liberal provision at 
current prices suggests that there does not exist any rent control law in 
this state. Recently, through an amendment in the Rent control law, a cut-
off point on the basis of monthly rent paid has also been identified in 
Delhi for delinking certain categories of buildings from the purview of 
the rent control law. But it is placed at a monthly rent of Rs. 3500 and 
above which is on a very high side. Hardly 2 percent of the total build-
ings in Delhi belong to a higher monthly rental group than this. . 
Some of the Acts also provide for a rent control holiday for speci-
fied period for the newly constructed properties. The rent control laws in 
Uttar Pradesh and Delhi provide for holiday of 10 years whereas in Tamil 
Nadu, the holiday period is limited to Five years. In Uttar Pradesh, the 
properties constructed substantially out of loans drawn from financial 
institutions and state governments and repaid in more than 10 years, en-
joy a rent control holiday of 15 years. Buildings leased out alongwith 
plants, machinery, fixures and furnitures in the states of Uttar Pradesh 
and Tamil Nadu and used as an industry or factory are altogether exempt-
ed from the provisions of rent control laws. In Uttar Pradesh, it also 
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includes such buildings which are used as shops, places of public enter-
tainment (excluding cinema halls) and buildings built and held by coop-
erative and registered societies, companies and firms. 
The overview of the provisions in the various rent control laws in India 
brings into sharp focus the following features which have gone a long way in 
distorting the rental market and weakening of property tax base. 
First, all the rent control laws which provide for pegging of rentals 
at some historical base years or according to the assessed rental value 
have frozen the rentals at nominal amounts. 
Second, all the acts which provides for determination of standard 
rent with reference to certain proportion of property value prevailing at 
the time of commencement of construction have, besides freezing the 
rentals especially for old constructions, brought about substantial dis-
parities in the rental market and the property tax system. Whereas the 
buildings constructed long ago have to pay nominal tax due to lower cost, 
those constructed recently have to bear 'a much higher dose of tax due to 
high property values. This has led to an inequitous tax system built-in to 
the law itself 
Third, even the provision for relating standard rent to the circum-
stances of properties like location, levels of services and so on as pro-
vided for in the rent control laws operating in Orissa, appears to be un-
conventional only in the short-run. Once standard rent is fixed with ref-
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erence to these attributes, it would continue to be so throughout the life 
of the property in its current state. 
Only the Tamil Nadu Act seems to be liberal and fulfilling the 
objective of providing protection to the low income group eviction and 
enhancement of rentals. In other states; the advantage is enjoyed by the 
higher income groups. 
The range and extent of provisions in the rent control laws and the 
fact that it is a social Act meant to provide protection to the low income 
group from exorbitant enhancement of rentals and from eviction by the 
landlord suggest to deal with it separately. Inserting of a non-obstante 
clause will not fully insulate the determination of rental value from the 
depressing effects of rent control laws. The practice of providing a non-
obstante clause has perhaps received impetus from a case decided by the 
Supreme Court in a case arising in Madhy Pradesh involving the Indore 
Municipal Corporation. 
In Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the non-
obstante clause provided that "notwithstanding anything contained in any 
other law for the time being in force", the annual value will be deemed 
to be the annual rent at which the property is reasonbaly expected to let. 
The court held that where standard rent has not yet been determined, 
fixing of reasonable rent without regard to the provisions of the rent 
control laws of the state was permissible (AIR 1977 : 308). The Calcutta 
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corporation Act has similar non-obstante clause and was also permitted 
by the Calcutta High Court to overlook the provisions of the West Ben-
gal premises Tenancy Act 1956 (AIR 1982 : 1479). An appeal against the 
decision is, however, presently pending with the supreme court. 
These success stories notwithstandarding, in the Dewan Daulat Rai 
Kapoor Case (AIR 1980 : 541), the supreme court had doubted if the 
interpretation of the non-obstante clause in the case involving the Indore 
Municipal Corporation was current. Recently, the Calcutta High Court 
has questioned the relevance and efficacy of the non-obstante clause in 
the new CC ACT, 1980 (CWN 1990-91 : 1). Hence the elaborate and 
innovative provisions brought about in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and 
Andhra Pradesh Acts are likely to operate so long as the assesses have 
not approached the court. Sustainable reform for refurbishing of the re-
form for refurbishing of the base requires to amend the Rent Act itself 
This could be done in three ways. 
Delinking of Municipal Assessment 
Buoyancy of property tax could be restored by restoring the com-
petitiveness of the rental market which has been distorted by, among 
other things, the rent control laws. The scope of rent control laws should 
be restricted to the determination of standard rent for giving protection 
to the low income households. Its influence on valuation and assessment 
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of rental value needs to be insulated by inserting a provision in the rent 
control laws that standard rent shall have nothing to do with municipal 
assessment so that it could be done on the bases of the prevailing market 
rent. The question of inequity of such a system could be dealt with by 
legally permitting the owners of such properties to pass on the additional 
incidence to the occupier. Such a practice already exists in Calcutta un-
der the Calcutta corporation Act, 1980. 
Restricting the Scope of Rent Control Laws 
The Rent Acts were enacted to protect the needy. But its benefit 
is presently being enjoyed by the higher and middle income groups. With 
a view to restricting its benefit to the real clientele group, a cut off point 
needs to be identified. The operation of rent control laws could be re-
stricted up to this point. This could be identified either on the basis of 
rent (as in Tamil Nadu) or on the basis of floor area. This in a city like 
Calcutta or Bombay where housing problem is very acute, could be 500 
square feet. Houses having a floor area of more than this could be taken 
away from the purview of the Rent Act so that the prevailing market rent 
could be made the basis of assessment of rental for such properties. 
The Delhi Rent control Act, as mentioned earlier, has been recent-
ly amended by identifying a cut off point on the basis of rentals. But this 
is on too higher a side to be meaningful for municipal finance. Hardly 2 
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percent of the total assessed properties are beyond the cut off point of 
Rs. 3500 rent per month. However, it has extended the rent control 
holiday from five years to 10 years for the properties constructed after 
1st December, 1988. Such properties will now be assessed on the basis of 
prevailing market rent up to 10 years. From the elventh year onward, 
assessment will have to revert back to the cost method. The amended Act 
has also increased the ratio to be applied on cost from 8.25 percent and 
8.625 percent for residential and non-residential properties respectively 
to 10 percent. It also permits on increase in the rent of properties which 
are still within the purview of the rent control law by 10 percent every 
three years. Similar increase is permissible even with respect to proper-
ties which are outside the scope of rent control law. However, these are 
only in the nature of marginal improvement. What is required is to pro-
vide for a total delinking of rental determination from the scope of rent 
control law. Even with these amendments, the basic problem of dispari-
ties in the assessment of similar properties within the same locality and 
the depressing effect of fair rent on the base will still remain. 
Indexing of Rent 
Even though assessment of rental value is delinked from the con-
cept of fair rent, there may be deviations from the prevailing market rent 
due to corrupt practices, concealment of rent, rent splitting and so on. 
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Besides, restoring the market rent in the case of very old tenancies will 
bring about complications to a very great extent. The recent amendment 
in the Delhi Rent Control Law led to increase in tax liability in more 
than 50 percent of a sample of properties studied by an expert sub-com-
mittee. The increase was to the extent of more than 200 percent. In 
certain cases the increase was 32 times (Delhi Administration 1990 : 
68). In view of these, it is suggested to allow for enhancement in the 
rentals with respect to old tenacies in stages and to link the prevailing 
rent with the Consumer Price Index Number (CPIN). The Economic Ad-
ministration Reforms Commission (The Commission) suggested to allow 
for revision of rent once in five years with 50 percent neutralisation of 
inflation on the basis of consumer price index number for urban non-
mannual workers. For old tenancies, the rent is suggested to be increased 
such that there is 50 percent neutralisation of inflation from the date of 
initial determination of rent up to the present. Actual increase is to be 
staggered over a period of five years (India 1982). 
Yet another commission of the government of India has given sim-
ilar suggestion for dealing with the Rent Act and old tenancies (India 
1987 : 58-65). Accordingly, the rent of non-residential properties ten-
anted between 1st January, 1974 and 1987 need to be increased such that 
it neutralises the incidence of inflation by 100 percent. The increase is 
to be spread in a five-year period. Therefore the rent is to be linked to 
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consumer price index number. For the residential properties of more 
than 50 sq. mts. built-up area, the increase is suggested to neutralise only 
50 percent of the incidence of inflation. For residential properties of 
less than 80 sq. mts, the policy is suggested to be confined to 
neutralisation of only the future incidence of inflation (India 1987 : 63-
64). The scope of this second commission seems to be narrower than the 
framework of the Indian Commission as the former is concerned only 
with such properties which were tenanted after 1974. It has, however, 
suggested to keep all the properties with a plinth area of 80 sq.mt. and 
more outside the purview of the rent control laws irrespective of land 
use. For the newly constructed properties of less than 80 sq. mt., the 
first agreed rent is suggested to be treated as the base rent and linked to 
consumer price index number for urban non-mannual workers. 
Refurbishing of the base requires (a) to delink the determination 
of rental value from the rent control laws, (b) to prevent collusive rent 
and concealment of rent, and (c) to link the rentals with the consumer 
price index number by identifying a base year. However, it is not a pana-
cea to all the ills afflicting the property tax system in India. Tamil Nadu 
has a liberal rent control law and yet the base is frozen at the levels 
obtaining in the seventies. Reforms in the rent control laws therfore 
need to be accompanied by innovative and objective valuation and assess-
ment practices. 
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V A L U A T I O N AND ASSESSMENT P R A C T I C E S 
Valuation of Property 
There are two requirements that lie at the heart of an efficient 
porperty tax system: (a) Accurate valuation of property, whether one is on 
the ARV or the CV System and (2) the existence of a legal framework that 
allows the corporation to levy and recover the appropriate rent. 
Valuation practices in property taxation are major concern. Detail 
examination of the legal problems of valuation has been done. A detail 
analysis of the existing adminsitrative procedure of valuation and assess-
ment and a discussion on the organisational aspects of a central valuation 
agency. This chapter underlines the difficulties in determining the struc-
ture and functioning of a central valuation agency. This perhaps is 
indicative of the reasons for not attempting to create a central valuation 
agency by the states inspite of the supposed benefits flowing from such an 
agency. In this chapter we find that the basic problems of property tax 
assessments in USA and India are surprisingly similar, such as assessment 
lags, assessor discretion and the role of the state governments. 
A number of interesting practices have been evolved over the years 
by various municipal anthorities to give operational form to the base 
provided for in various enactments for determination of the annual rental 
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value. Ahmadabad municipal corporation (AMC) in Gujarat, arrives at RV 
for the rented residential properties on the basis of actual rent realised by 
the landlord. If however, the realised rent turns out to be a collusive rent, 
RV is determined on the basis of obtaining market rent for the similar 
properties, RV for the self-occupied residential properties is determined 
on the basis of an elaborate assessment table. It contains different rates of 
rentals on the sq. mt. basis which have to be used for arriving at the annual 
gross rental value (GRV). The rate varies according to the type of property 
assessed. For this purpose, properties are classified into three broad 
categories viz. (i) village sites, (ii) tenements, apartments, row houses, 
and (iii) independent bunglows. The table provides for discriminating 
rental values for the three distinct types of self-occupied residential 
properties which keep on increasing along with the type and the built up 
area of properties. Table - 4.2. Non-residential properties are also assessed 
on the basis of an Assessment table which contains pre-determined rates 
on the sq. mt. basis for six different types on non-residential properties 
into which these have been categorised. The rate varies from Rs. 2 per sq. 
mt. for the First category of properties to Rs. 20 per sq. mt. fore the sixth 
type, Table 4.3. These seemingly innovative methods notwithstanding, the 
pre-determined rates are only one-tenth of the market rentals and are only 
marginally revised periodically (Mehta and Mehta 1991 : 24). RV for 
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educational institutions, factories, institutional properties and so on is 
assessed on the basis of depreciated capital value of properties. Annual 
rent is taken as 6 percent of land value and depreciated cost of construction 
In Tamil Nadu, the Madrass Municipal Corporation (MMC) goes by 
the "prevailing rentals" in the various localities for determination or RV. 
This is applied universally for tenanted and self-occupied properties 
irrespective of land uses. There does not exist any guideline for capturing 
the prevailing market rent. Hotels constitute a separate category in 
themselves and are assessed on the basis of occupancy method. But it is 
curious that even the starred hotels are allowed a vacancy remmission of 
85 percent. Thus, in the case of hotesl categorised as class "A", is 75 
percent and for ordinary hotels it is 27.5 percent. The base of property 
tax, is still forzen at 1978-79 levels as the RV has not been updated 
ever since. The concept of "prevailing rent" in such a situation thus 
does not make any sense. 
In Kerala, RV is determined by the Trivandrum Municipal Corpo-
ration (TMC) as well on the basis of Assessment Table. The city has been 
divided into three zones, viz. (i) inner city (ii) outer city and (iii) 
peripheries. The properties located in these three different zones are cross 
classified in terms of location and type of construction. Each property is 
assessed on the basis of a graded rent per sq. mt. which varies according 
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to the above mentioned features of properties and also its area. The rate 
varies from Rs. 0.50 to Rs. 3 per sq. mt., Table 4.4. R. V. for non-residential 
properties is assessed at 5 to 10 times the values depicted in the Assess-
ment Table, Table 4.4. The municipal councils in the state also assess the 
properties on the basis of similar assessment table which has relatively 
lower predetermined rental values. However, in its operational, from, 
there is a lot of deviation from the Assessment Table which results in 
reduction in RV. Moreover, rates depicted in the table are hardly revised 
periodically. 
The municipal corporation of Greater Bombay (BMC) also arrives 
at the gross annual rent by applying a table which contains. Pre-deter-
mined rental values for every 10 sq. mtrs. of covered area according to 
location and year of construction. It varies from a minimum of Rs. 137-
145 in ward B for properties constructed in 1988-89 to a maximum of Rs. 
224-232 in ward A (a) and D (b). RV of hotels is determined by applying 
the accupancy method but unlike MMC, vacancy remission is given only 
to the extent of 20 percent. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi.(MCD), 
due to compulsions arising out of ajudicial pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court of India (AIR: 1980), assesses RV of properties of all types on cost 
basis as provided for in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Accordingly, RV 
is computed at 8.25 percent of the cost of construction and the marked 
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value of land at the start of construction of residential properties which 
have already come out of the rent control holiday of initial 5 years. This 
in the case of non-residential properties is 8.625 percent. A recent 
amendment in the Act has enhanced these ratios to 10 percent for all types 
of properties. During the rent control holiday, the newly constructed 
properties are assessed on the basis of Rental Data evolved by the MCD 
on the basis of prevailing market rent. The data are collected by conduct-
ing a 5 percent sample survey of properties in each homogeneous locality. 
The rent realised and the carpet area of the sample properties are collected 
to work out the rent per sq. ft. which is used for determination of RV for 
property tax purposes. Before the Supreme Court Judgement, MCD was 
assessing RV on the basis of prevailing market rent for the rented proper-
ties and by applying the comparison method for the self-occupied proper-
ties. Hotels and other properties which are not let and for which there does 
not exist any rental evidence, were assessed on the basis of contractor's 
test method. As a substantial proportion of building were constructed 
long-long ago, method has frozen the RV of such properties at the 
historical value. 
The Corporation of Calcutta (CC) determines RV of rented residen-
tial properties on the basis of actual rent. If, however, the realised rent is 
on the lower side, it goes by the comparable rent method. RV of self-
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occupied properties is assessed on the basis of the last rent fetched by the 
old properties, allowing 10 percent increase over it and on the basis of 
predetermined rental values on sq. ft. basis for the newly constructed 
properties. Non-residential rented properties are likewise assessed on the 
basis of actual rent realised. Prevailing rent in the locality is taken as the 
guideline for assessing the RV of self-occupiednon-residential properties. 
But like residential self-occupied properties, RV is scaled down to some 
extent though it is not provided for in the law. Hotels are assessed 
differently, however. They are divided into business area (rooms with 
beds) and service area. RV for business area is determined on the basis of 
comprable rent in the locality. RV for service area is assessed at one-fifth 
of the RV of business area. 
Exemptions 
By and large, land and buildings used exclusively for worship and 
charitable purposes are exempted from the levy of property tax. The Act 
in Kerala and Madras provide for exemption even to educational institu-
tions. In the latter two states, exemption is extended even to the hostel 
attached to an educational institution. In Madrass, exemption is also 
extended to charitable hostpitals and dispensaries, burial and burying 
grounds. However, the exempted properties are required to pay service 
taxes and cess. 
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Exemptions are also granted on the basis of rental value. In 
Ahmadabad and within the jurisdiction of CC, all the properties with an 
RV of less than Rs. 600 per annum, are exempted from the perview of 
property tax. In Kerala, the cut-off point is Rs. 60 per annum and in 
Madras, it is Rs. 36 per annum. MCD exempts the properties with an RV 
of upto Rs. 1000 per annum. 
Valuation of Vacant Land 
Taxation of vacant land is not provided for in the Law in Gujarat and 
Kerala. Hence, the municipal authorities do not tax such land. In Madras, 
RV for vacant land is assessed at a nominal rate. It is at the rate of Rs. 104 
per ground^ MCD, CC and BMC in Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay respec-
tively, determine the RV by taking some fraction of the capital value (CV). 
This, in case of Delhi, is 5 percent. In Calcutta, it is assessed by CC at 7 
percent of capital value. BMC however determines RV at 12 percent of the 
capital value. Obviously, in Ahmadabad, Kerala and Madras, the property 
tax system provides an incentive for not building upon the vacant land for 
speculative purposes. Bombay presents a much more deterrent taxation of 
vacant urban land. 
Taxation of Government Property 
The properties belonging to the Central Government and State 
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Governments are taxed fifferently. Taxation of Union properties is gov-
erned by the provisions laid down in section 154 of the repealed Govern-
ment of India Act. 1935 which exempted the Central Government proper-
ties from the payment of all taxes imposed by a state or any authority 
within a state. The same provision was adopted in the constitution of India 
under Article 285. However, following the Act of 1935 which provided for 
continuance of taxes already imposed before the commecement of this Act 
in April, 1937, the constitution of India allows for the continuation of such 
taxes even after 1950 when the constitution was adopted. But the rate of 
taxes obtaining before April, 1937 is not liable to be enhanced. 
In 1953, however, the Government of India (GOI) reviewed it and 
agreed to pay enhanced taxes on the properties which are subject to 
taxation since 1937. The enhanced tax was to be paid with retrospective 
effect from April 1948. But following a decision of the Supreme Court of 
India (SC) after an interpretation of Article 277 of the constitution in 
1964, the enhanced rate was discontinued in 1966 (AIR : 1964). Thus the 
union properties subject to taxation before 1937, are still taxed at the old 
rate, however, periodical valuation of such properties is, permitted. 
Liberal Assessment of Self-occupied Properties 
It should be obvious from the spectrum of diverse type of valuation 
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practices that even in the case of land and buildings used exclusively for 
residential prupose, there exists varying practices for self-occupied prop-
erties and rented properties. By and large, self-occupied properties are 
assessed much more liberally on the plea that they do not earn any rent. As 
mentioned earlier, in Ahmadabad, such properties are assessed according 
to a Table which is only one-tenth of the market value. In Calcutta, there 
is statutory provision to give them allowance in the determination of RV 
on the basis of a formula. Discussions with the officials in Trivandrum and 
Madras also revealed that though there does not exist any such provision 
in the statute, RV for the owner-occupied properties are assessed liberally. 
In Amritsar, in Punjab, the self-occupied properties are assessed only at 50 
percent of the prevailing market rent for similar properties. Since self-
occupied properties constitute a sizeable proportion of the total holdings 
assessed in a city or town, the adverse impact of Liberal assessment is 
substantial. Besides, it becomes instrumental in promoting disparities and 
inequities in the tax system. Self-occupied properties in Delhi accounts 
for about 65 percent of the total number of holdings (Delhi Administration 
1990 : 30). In Calcutta, such properties are to the extent of about 35 
percent (West Bengal 1982 : 37). In small and medium towns, self-
occupied properties constitute about 60 to 90 percent of the total housing stock. 
Liberal valuation of self-occupied properties has an interesting 
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history. As early as in the early fifties, soon after the inception of the 
Indian Republic, in the erstwhile state of Madras, the state Government 
issued a caveat to MMC and other municipal authorities in the state that 
the RV with respect to self-occupied properties should not be increased 
over the valuation in force in 1939 beyond the ceiling prescribed in the 
Rent Act. Soon such orders were enforced in Andhra Pradesh as well. In 
Delhi, a dilution in valuation of self-occupied properties has been per-
petuated as a sequel to the guidelines issued by a committee constituted in 
the early sixties, immediately, after the setting up of the MCD, to lay down 
principles for determination of rental value. Among other things, the 
committee sugested to freeze the RV for self-occupied properties at the 
1960-61 levels unless there was circumstantial change and ample justifi-
cation for an increase (Delhi Administration 1990 : 29). Accordingly, RV, 
once determined at the time of first assessment, is generally not enhanced 
unless there are alterations or additions to properties. This is but only one 
amongst a host of factors which have weakened the base. 
Discretionary Valuation 
Yet another factor contributing to the erosion in the base is related 
to the nature of the base itself. As the reasonable expectation is not defined 
explicitly and as there does not exist any objective method of ascertaining 
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it, determination of RV becomes highly a subjective exercise which has 
built-in scope for corrupt practices. These in turn, further erode the base 
(Orissa 1975 : 60). 
Thus, we see that the defective assessment of the property for tax 
purpose is one of the main bottlenecks that has impaired its elasticity and 
productivity. It may seem pertinent to discuss how the present assessment 
is undertaken in the light of the historical retrospect. The Act of 1850 
authorised voluntary associations in towns to raise the required funds for 
the purpose of meeting the municipal service charges. No hard and fast 
rule was laid down and the commissioners were given considerable 
latitude in the matter.^ The greater difficulty in the levy of the property tax 
arose from the absence of statutory rating and assessment committees. 
There was a provision in the Act for revising the assessment of the rental 
value once in every five years, but in the absence of properly constituted 
assessing authorities the practice had been to accept the rent receipts 
granted by the landlord to the tenants as the basis of taxation.' Instances 
were not wanting where, under clandestine arrangement with tenants, land 
lords granted receipts for accounts lower than the actual rents received, 
thereby defrauding the municipality of its legitimate revenue.'* 
Moreover, the assessment of properties which were in the immedi-
ate possession and enjoyment of the owners themselves, created difficul-
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ties^. In the district municipalities of the Madras Presidency a majority of 
the inhabitants lived in their own houses, and, consequently, there was an 
absence of reliable data on which their rental value could be assessed.^ The 
taxes were levied on a rough estimate by the low-paid municipal assessors, 
and that provided opportunities for corruption.' 
Thus the historical background of the property tax reveals that due 
to lack of property constituted assessing authorities, false statements 
furnished by the tenants prompted by landlords; difficulty with regard to 
taxing of owner-occupied properties and betrayal of trust by the low paid 
municipal assessors resulted in large-scale reduction in the yield of the 
tax. Almost all these difficulties continue to persist and now let us briefly 
analyse that how the present assessment is defective. 
It is no better than the past because the officials deputed by the state 
government are those who have experience in revenue collection and not 
in assessment. Instance are not lacking whereby sanitary inspectors are 
asked to take up assessment programme. Under these circumstances, 
assessment can not be objective, accurate and scientific and at the same 
time assessment is a job which requires technical expertise. Besides, the 
assessor's failure to assess the property, either because of his ineffeciency 
and corruption or both; the tendency of under assessment on the part of the 
Land Lord is at its full swing. 
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Assessment is ineffecient while under assessment and over asessment 
are rampant in most of the municipal areas-these have largely been 
responsible for inequality and unfairness. Similar observation is made by 
Professor Tripathy who says in the context of the Bihar municipalities that 
very often in case of persons with substantial holding of property and large 
local influence, the annual value is underassessed whereas holdings 
owned by people with small income and very small in size and in bad 
conditions are overassssed.^ 
By now it is clear that property tax assessment is the general 
problem being faced by almost all countries imposing property tax. Mr. 
Larry schroeder has done very good work on assessment aspect and a 
comparative study of India and America "Property Tax Assessment Prob-
lems in The United States And India : Some contrasts and comparisons". 
He has attempted to indicate the many similarities and few differences in 
the assessment of the property tax in India and the United States. While the 
tax base in the two countries differ, with a free market and proper 
assessment there would be little difference in the assessments under the 
two systems. In addtion, it is striking that many of the problems faced by 
assessors and administrators of the tax in the two countries are quite 
similar. Thus, assessment lags, assessor discretion and the role of higher 
levels of government face both countries. Probably, the most crucial 
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difference in the problems faced in the two countries is not directly tied 
to the property tax but instead to the housing policies in the two countries. 
While the housing market in the United States is highly compititve, rent 
controls in India distort the market and in doing so create problems with 
respect to both the equity and revenue potential of the tax in India. 
Determination of the tax base in each country relies upon the efforts 
of assessors who have the task of evaluating the tax base for each parcel 
on the tax roll. There are many similarities in the approaches taken by 
assessors in the two countries in determining these bases. The primary 
approaches are : (1) direct observation of sales or rent, (2) comparable 
property method; and (3) less direct methods that rely on the cost of the 
property and/or the return from the property and that must be applied when 
there is no turnover or letting of the property. We consider each in turn. 
Direct Observation 
The simplest approach to the valuation of the tax base is to observe 
it directly. The selling price of a property sold in the United States could 
then become the basis of the tax like wise, in India such an approach could 
rely on observation of the rent received by the owner of a rental ('Left') 
property.^ Given the prominence of such rented property in India espe-
cially, residential property, it is this direct approach which is most heavily 
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relied upon there. Since turnover of property in the Unites States is not 
especially great, the direct approach to assessment is less important there. 
The key to the direct assessment method (indeed, to any method) is 
accurate information. In the United States there is reliance upon real 
property transfer records, which are reasonably accurate. In India it is 
necessary to obtain information on the rental transaction. Apparently, this 
is cause of one problem in the system since owner and tenant may conspire 
to mislead the asessor by understanding such rents. The assessor can, 
however, utilize his discretion and knowledge of the market to overrule the 
tenant and landlord. 
Comparison of Properties 
Since many properties are not sold during any one year in the United 
States and since some properties are not let in India, the comparative 
method of assessment is used in both countries. This means that in the 
United States, the assessor must use his judgement concerning those 
attributes of properties that are important in determining market values 
and then match properties on the basis of such attributes. The prices of 
properties that did turn over (were sold) can then be used as proxies for 
those not sold. Among the commonly used attributes in such a process are 
building material, floor space, lot size and location.'" 
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Similar property attributes are used in India when the comparable 
property method is used. For owner-occupied housing and certain com-
mercial property it is not possible to observe directly the rental value. 
Thus, as in the United States, the assessors consider these attributes then 
compare the rental value of properties actually let with those owner 
occupied to determine an annual value for the latter. 
Once again accurate information is at the heart of this method (as 
well as good judgement on the part of the assessor). If property character-
istics are incorrect or if the directly - observed value data are wrong, 
inaccuracies in assessment are likely to occur. 
Cost or Net Return Methods 
In both the United States and India it is sometimes impossible to use 
either of the first two methods of assessment. That is, some properties are 
never sold or let nor do they have attributes in common with those that do 
turn over or are rented. Examples of such properties include utilities and 
many factories. In these cases, less direct methods must be applied. These 
methods utilise certain attributes of the market in determining values. 
The functioning of a market can be described in terms of the rate of 
return on a property. Thus, the rate of return, r, is simply the ratio of net 
return, R, to the market value of property, V. That is : 
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r = R/V (1) 
This identity can be and is used as the basis of assessment in both 
the United States and India. If r^ is such as the normal rate of return 
investors could obtain in alternative opportunities and if a property is 
yielding approximately Rj annual net returns, then the most an investor 
will bid on the property (with no purely speculative expections) would be 
V, = R , / r , (2) 
Thus, in the Unites States if the income statement of a property 
suggests that it yields an annual return of dollar one million and 'the' rate 
of return in the market is assumed to be 10 percent then that property 
would have a market value of dollar 10 million which can be used as the 
basis of assessment. 
A second approach used in both the United States and India relies 
on the cost of replacing the property. Thus, in the United States estimates 
of the value of the land plus the cost of replacing the building and 
equipment in their current condition (that is current replacement costs less 
depreciation) yeilds an estimate of the current worth of the property. 
Indian municipalities use this method together with another variant on 
equation (1) for non-let and unique properties an estimate of the value of 
the property, V ,^ can be obtained using the cost approach as in the United 
States. The tax base, R^ is then 
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R. = h \ (3) 
where r^ is the policy determined reasonable rate of return. 
These indirect methods require greater amounts of information 
thatn the first two discribed, yet accuracy is still of utmost importance. For 
the capitalised value method as applied in the United States, accurate 
accounting data must be available to determine Rl . Furthermore, consid-
erable technical information concerning engineering and construction 
costs is necessary to ascertain replacement costs. Finally, if current values 
are to be estimated accurate depreciation data must also be available. 
One short-cut to these data requirements that apparently is used in 
some Indian cities is to use original cost rather than replacement cost less 
depreciation in estimating T^^\ While this greatly eases the estimation 
process, its accuracy depends on the relative rates of depreciation and 
inflation of construction costs if construction prices have increased at a 
rate greater (less) than the rate of depreciation in the property, the 
resultant assessed valuation would be lower (higher) than that obtained 
under the conceptually preferable replacement cost less depreciation 
method. 
Normative Criteria For Judging Property Tax Assessment 
Several different criteria should be considered when judging the 
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assessment of property - efficiency, equity, revenue, administrative costs 
and certainty. 
All taxes, save a poll or head tax involve non-neutral effects. Thus, 
the tax on tangible property is likely to increase the attractiveness of 
holding wealth in the form of intangible property. Likewise where only 
land and building are taxed, there may be an effect on the relative amounts 
of these assets used vis-a-vis machinery and equipment. 
While certain incentives may or may not be socially desirable, it is 
more apparent that outright inequalities in the assessment of similar 
properties are undersirable. Possibly nothing does more to undermine the 
role of the property tax in a municipal tax structure than obvious inequities 
in the assessment process. To find that one's neighbour, living in a similar 
structure, is paying considerably less in the form of property taxes not only 
causes dissatisfaction with the tax and those who administer it but may 
also erode overall confidence in municipal government. 
There are at least two different ways to view equity in taxes 
according to benefits derived and ability to pay. 
While revenue yields to the jurisdictionis an important aspect of an 
overall evaluation of a tax, there also must be cognizance that most 
revenue sources require costs to administer. Furthermore, these costs 
accrue to both the taxing jurisdiction itself and to the taxpayer; and both 
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should be recognised. Administrative efficiency must be pursued and may 
be achieved through mechanisation of the process. ^ ^ 
It also must be recognised that compliance costs to the taxpayer are 
a part of the overall costs of administering a tax. If administrative 
arrangements make compliance difficult, not only is it likely that yields 
will suffer through tax avoidance but in addition inequities may be 
introduced, into the system. 
Finally, there must be a degree of certainty associated with admin-
istration of the tax. The tax should not be applied in a highly capricious 
manner such that the taxpayer does not know from period to period why 
or how he has been taxed nor should different taxpayers be treated 
dissimilarly at the whims of those administering the tax. While it may be 
that local regulations concerning the tax differ depending upon the state 
or locality, the taxpayer should be able to ascertain exactly how his tax 
liability was determined. 
Now we make a review of these issues in the light of the efficiency, 
equity, revenue yield, cost and certainty criteria and find that many 
similarities exists between these two systems. We consider in turn, 
assessment inequities, assessment of land, inefficiencies in the housing 
market assessment lags, collection problems, and the role of the state in 
the municipal tax assessment process. 
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Assessment Inequities 
The discretion of assessor plays a crucial role in all property tax 
assessment as it is currently carried out in both the United States and India. 
This discretion, if applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary way, can lead 
to the most blatant inequities, undersirable incentives and lack of growth 
in the base. 
It has been suggested in the United States that self-assessment be 
used to avoid such discretion with the owner's self-declaration of market 
value being, in essence, an offer to selPl Interestingly, India is currently 
allowing such an approach with respect to the centre's wealth tax '^*. The 
provision has however, not actually been put into practice since the 
legislation allows only the government to accept such offers and no funds 
have been allocated for this purpose. If the provision would, in fact, 
become operable, coordination between localities and the centre 
could vastly improve assessment practices by diminishing the discretion 
of the assessor. 
In both India and the United States there is apparently a great 
deal of discretion used by assessors which results in both inequities 
and possibly inefficiencies in the tax. This discretion takes the form 
both of discretion with respect to assessments across and within types 
of properties. 
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Experience in the United States suggests that there are considerable 
differences in assessment practices accross property types^^. 
Apparently, similar inter-property type discrimination on the part 
of assessors occurs, as well in India. While certain states specify a 
particular form of favourable treatment to owner occupiers vis-a-vis rental 
property (eg. in Uttar Pradesh) in other areas such practice is accom-
plished without the role of law'^. 
Unfortunately similar data are not available on any wide scale in 
India. Nevertheless, there is suspicion, that considerable differences 
exist, there too. In part this may be due to underreporting of rental values 
by owner and tenants with the rate of such underreporting differing across 
renter-owner combinations. It may also be due to outright fraud on the part 
of assessors. ^ ^ This problem can, unfortunately, be exacerbate by the use 
of progressive rate as is done in many Indian municipalities. That is, if an 
assessor finds a rental value that exceeds a lower rate cut-off points, it may 
be very tempting to negotiate an annual value that lies somewhere below 
the rate bound. This then would create additional intra-class inequities in 
assessment. 
Land Assessment 
One extremelly important issue withr respect to urban property 
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taxation concerns the assessment of land. Property taxation by altering 
relative prices incentives and incentives and disincentives within the 
market. Thus, property taxation can be used to create incentives which are 
socially desirable. This can be especially important with respect to the 
assessment of land. Once again this is an issue that has been faced in both 
the United State and India. 
In India, with its expanding population and urbanisation, the vacant 
land problem may be even greater. Totally unused land yields no annual 
rental value and, apparently, in at least some Indian municipalities, is not 
taxed. Yet it is quite obvious that the holder of such land must be realising 
at least some net positive expected return on his land. If not, it would 
immediately be developed. Thus, on basis of economic efficiency such 
land should be taxed, possibly by applying a normal rate or return to the 
market price of such property (equation (3) above). 
The Housing Market 
A major concern in most societies is the provision of adequate 
housing, India is no exception. In India a principal housing policy has been 
in the form of rent controls. For those who obtain housing, this policy does 
not allow for lower-cost housing yet, the inefficiencies created have 
undesirable effects both on overall housing availability and on the equity 
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and revenue growth effects in the property tax. As with any effective price 
control mechanism in a profit-oriented economy shortages many result. ^ ^ 
The current approach to property taxation in India is to use actual 
rents as the basis of annual value. Furthermore, in many Indian munici-
palities, the controlled rent is to be used as the basis of the tax for rent-
controlled properties. ^ ^ This has two effects - on the equity of the tax and 
on its revenue growth. With respect to either ability to pay or benefit 
principles of taxation, inequities may occur under controlled rents. With 
no rent controls the forcesof the market are likely to result in persons with 
similar incomes (ability to pay) living in similarly valued residences. 
Likewise, the benefits of at least certain property financed services, eg., 
fire protection can be said to be positively related with the value (rental or 
capital) of the property. With rent controls, however, there is no reason to 
expect such correspondences since apparently rent controls are tied to 
incomes. If the property tax is linked to controlled rents, the resultant tax 
can be in conflict with the ability to pay principle. Furthermore, the 
benefit norm of taxation may also be violated when rent controls are in 
effect. Controlled rents are not necessarily closely related to the flow of 
housing services derived from the structure while benefits from at least 
certain municipal services are likely to be so related; thus, the benefit 
principle may break down. 
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Finally, rent controls with property tax levies tied to the controlled 
rents have obvious revenue implications. If rents are not allowed to rise 
with general increases in overall costs of producing public expenditures, 
then revenues from such taxes will tend either to hold back necessary 
spending increases or alternative revenue sources have to be found.^ '^  
Assessment Lags 
Lack of growth in the assessed tax base can also be tied to the 
rapidity at which increases in the legal tax base are captured on the tax 
rolls. The Indian situation with respect to assessment lags is not much 
better. Certain states even require that reassessment occur only every five 
years. In the interim, the assessment list can be altered only if property is 
added or deleted. No adjustments in assessed values are possible even if 
such changes actually occur and are known by the assessor. Once again 
this introduces inequities into the tax base and retards the growth in tax 
yield (if rates remain unchanged). 
In India, mucnipalities are the creation of the states. They thus 
derive all their taxing powers from the state. Admittedly the system in 
India provides considerably greater power to the state in the overall 
budgetary process, however, localities seem to be quite jealous of their 
power over the setting of assessed values. There is, nevertheless, an 
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important question as to what role the state should play in the assessment 
process. 
The problem associated with the assessment process in India have 
led some to argue that the state should take over the entire process. This 
would have the possible advantage of increasing the professionalism of 
the assessment process and possibly decreasing fraudulent practices. It 
would, however, further weaken the already weak municipal government 
structure of localities. If the overall competency of municipal govern-
ments in India is to be improved, it would seem that centralisation of the 
assessment process would not aid in this process. 
There are nevertheless, possible roles to be played by states in 
India. In the first place, a state could actively attempt to strengthen the 
assessment process. This could take the form of professional training for 
the assessors and active assistance to municipalities in improving their 
administrat ive practices. Secondly, since there currently is 
intergovernmental aid provided to municipalities, this aid could somehow 
be altered to provide incentives to municipalities to improve their assess-
ment and collection practices. By tying some inter governmental revenues 
to the efforts made by assessors and collectors, the overall level of such 
effort may be improved.^^ 
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TABLE - 5.1 
Periodicity of Valuation 
Periodicity of General Revision 
of Assessment 
States 
1. No prescribed period within 
\siuch general revision should 
take place 
2. To be revised once in every : 
(a) Three years 
(b) Four years 
Maharashtra and Kamataka 
(c) Five years 
Himachal Pradesh and Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Assam, West bengal, Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh, Haryana, Orissa, 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala 
Source : Municipal Statutes and the Municipal Authorities. 
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Importance of Revision 
In our municipalities, it can not be said confidently how far there is 
a rise in the number of taxable items (buildings) due mainly to lack of 
complete and comprehensive revisions. In municipal jurisdictions where 
the revision has been carried on, the facts of those revisions were not 
allowed to be enforced because of the injunctions of the courts. These have 
helped a large number of properties escape tax liability. For example 
vijaywada with its nine percent rise^^ in assessments takes pride of place 
among the municipalities in Andhra Pradesh. In Guntur municipality it is 
reported that some hereditaments miss the tax liability for the reason that 
the municipality lost its records in the accident during 1966-67. No efforts 
seem to be made by this municipality to restore the lost data, by preparing 
new lits for revision purpose. 
Periodical Revision of Rental Value 
All the municipal enactments provide for periodical upadating of 
the base through fresh valuation except in Delhi. In the state of Gujarat, 
it is done every four years and so is the practice in Bombay. In Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala, it is taken recourse to every five years. C. C. does it once in six 
years (Table 5.1). A cycle of periodical revision is followed by dividing 
the cities into zones so that by the time the revision of valuation is 
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completed in the last zone, the first zone becomes due for fresh valuation. 
Barring M.M.C., all other municipal authorities have so far been follow-
ing the prescribed cycle of revision. M.M.C. in Madras still relies on the 
valuation done last in 1978-79. Property tax in Madras is therefore still 
pegged at the base obtaining in the late seventies. Consequent upon the 
Supreme Court Judgement which requires to determine rental value on the 
basis of SR, the MCD has discontinued periodical updating of rental value 
in Delhi. In the state of Uttar Pradesh, the Act provides for updating of 
rental value once in five years but the revised rental value is not to exceed 
the rental value in force by more than 25 percent. Periodical updating of 
rental value does not make sense elsewhere as will unless the rental 
value is still below SR which now constitutes the upper limit of 
"reasonable rent". 
In fact, general revision of valuation of properties is a precondition 
for property tax to be an elastic source of municipal revenue. If it is not 
done, the local bodies will be deprived of higher revenues. Though all 
municipal enactments provide for general revision, variation in its period-
icity will be observed from the Table 5.1. In Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, 
the valuation may be done every year or the municipal council may adopt 
the valuation and assessment for any year with such alteration where 
necessary, as the valuation and assessment for the following year. While 
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TABLE - 5.2 
Validation Process of Valuation / Asisessment 
Activity / Authority Assigned to State 
I. Public Notice to be Given by : 
(a) Municipal council Assam, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh 
(b) Chairman of the Council West Bengal 
(c) Executive officer Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, 
Kerala and Uttar Pradesh 
(d) Valuation officer/assessor Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa 
and Karnataka 
II. Objections to be Made to : 
(a) Municipal council 
(b) Executive committee of 
the council 
(c) Chairman of the council 
(d) Executive Officer 
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Orissa and 
Uttar Pradesh. 
(e) Valuation officer/assessor 
III. Objections to be Heard by : 
(a) Municipal council (Generally 
delegated) 
Rajasthan 
(b) Special committee 
Gujarat 
(c) Valuation officer/assessor 
and Orissa 
(d) Executive officer 
(e) Revising authority 
Assam, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh 
and Punjab 
Gujarat 
West Bengal 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Karnataka 
Assam, haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 
Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal and 
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala 
Karnataka 
Source : Municipal Statutes and the Municipal Authorities. 
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the assessment list is required to be completely revised in Rajasthan not 
less than once in every three years, in Maharashtra, Karnataka and 
Madhya Pradesh, it is to be done at least once in four years. Once the 
assessment list is revised in Maharashtra, it is to remain in force for four 
years. In Gujarat too, the assessment is required to be revised every 
four years. In other states, quinquennial assessment of annual value is 
provided for. 
Validation of Valuation / Assessment List 
After the general revision of the valuation / assessment list, all the 
municipal enactments require an elaborate procedure for its validification, 
which involves issuing of public notice for inspection of the list, inviting 
objections against any entry there in, hearing of objections, and authenti-
cation of the list. Significant variations in regard to allocation of respon-
sibility in these matters amongst different states will be noticed from 
Table 5.1. The public notice for inviting objections against assessment in 
Assam, haryana and Himachal Pradesh is to be given by the municipal 
council, implying that unless the council acts in this matter or delegates its 
power to one of its committees or to any one prescribed under law, further 
action can not be taken. In West Bengal, the responsibility is entrusted to 
the chairman of the council. Execution officers in Bihar, Madya Pradesh, 
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Punjab, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, 
while valuation officer / assessor in Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa 
and Karnataka are to issue public notice, it will also be observed that in all 
the states, the authority required to issue the public notice is also the one 
to receive objections, with the exception of Punjab, Gujarat and Orissa. 
Even though the responsibility of preparation of assessment list in 
Maharashtra is that of the Exceutive officer (known as chief officer), the 
list is verified by the valuation officer to be appointed by the State 
Government. After verification he forwards it to the chief officer who who 
hears the objections and after disposing them off, he authenticates the list 
and sends it to the chief officer for implementation. The authorised 
valuation officers are to be appointed by the state Government from 
amongst the officers of its Town Planning and Valuation Department. Till 
such time a valuation officer is appointed his powers and functions are 
entrusted to the standing committee of the council. 
Modification / Alteration in Assessment List 
Between one general revision and another, it becomes necessary to 
amend the assessment list by carrying out modifications and alterations 
necessitated by revision of rate of taxation, change of ownership or 
constructions of new buildings or when the buildings are altered or added 
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to or reconstructed in whole or in part where such constructions, alter-
ations and additons have been contemplated after the preparation of the 
assessment list. The valuation of a property may to be altered when it is 
demolished or distroyed or when the property is erroneously omitted or 
valued or assessed through fraud, misrepresentation, accident or mistake 
or while correcting any clerical or arithmetical error. All the municipal 
enactments stipulate such contingencies requiring amendments to the 
assessment list from time to time. In order to minimise the loss of 
municipal revenue by keeping the records correct and up to date, the 
muncipalities are enabled to claim their share of the increase in rental 
value caused by additions / alterations to or reconstruction of buildings. 
In Bihar, the amendment to the list can be caused at any time by revaluation 
and reassessing, on the bases of general improvement in locality, of the 
properties located there in. In Madhya Pradesh, the owner of a.property 
which is let out is required to give a notice to the council whenever there 
is an increase in rent and the assessment list can be modified to reflect the 
increase in rental value. In Andhra Pradesh, however, the assessment can 
be altered as a consequence of a revision petition claiming the decrease in 
annual value. 
The authority to cause the amendment in the valuation / assessment 
list in Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya 
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Pradesh, West Bengal and Assam vests in the municipal council which 
may delegate it. But in case of Punjab, it is the special committee of the 
council with the executive officer as its member and in Gujarat, the 
executive committee of the council which is entrusted with this task. In 
Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and 
Maharashtra, it will be observed from Table 4.3 that the executive officer, 
be whatever designation he is known in these states, is empowered to 
amend the list. In Maharashtra, the chief officer is required to exercise his 
authority in this matter in consultation with the valuation officer or the 
standing committee of the council when there is no valuation officer. 
The municipal councils in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh are 
also empowered to direct the executive officer to amend the assessment 
book whenever it appears to them that any person or property has been 
inadquately assessed, inadvertently or improperly omitted or on account 
of other reasons mentioned above. However, when a special officer is 
appointed by any council by the state, the power of the council is required 
to be exercised by such officer. 
When any modification / alteration in the assessment list involves 
increase in the valuation and assessment due to any of the reasons stated 
earlier, except when the tax rate is increased, or when the amendment is 
necessitated for correction of arithmetical or clerical error, it is required 
TABLE - 5.3 
Appeal Against Revising Authority 
211-a 
Revising Authority Appellate Authority States 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Council or its 
Committee whose 
decision is final 
Council or its 
committee or 
special committee 
Municipal commissioner 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
or assistant commissioner 
a pointed by the government 
for the government for 
this purpose, if there 
is no municipal 
commissioner 
Executive officer 
Valuation officer (a) 
(b) 
District magistrate/ 
collected/deputy 
commissioner 
Civil judge 
Judicial magistrate 
Magistrrate designated 
for this purpose 
council/special officer 
appointed by state 
government for this 
purpose. 
Appellate commi-
ssion (appointed by 
the state government) 
in consultation with 
chairman of the 
council 
District magistrate 
Assam, Bihar and West 
Bengal 
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Uttar pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Punjab 
Madhya Pradesh 
Gujarat and Maharashtra 
Karnata 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala 
Andhra Pradesh 
Orissa 
Source : Mtmicipal Statutes and the Mimicipal Authorities. 
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that a special notice to the affected party should be given to invite 
objections, if any, against the amendment. The machinery for hearing the 
objections and the procedure for their disposal are almost similar to these 
prescribed for hearing objections arising out of general revision discussed 
earlier. In Karnataka, however, it is prescribed that when any alteration is 
made by the Chief Officer, objections will be heard and decided by the 
assessor and when such alteration is made by the municipal commissioner, 
he will also be the revising authority. 
Appeal Against Revising Authority 
There are considerable variations in regard to the provisions for 
appeal against the order of the revising authority, that is the authority 
which hears the objections against general revision of assessment list 
before authenticating it or against any alterations or modifications in it 
subsequently. With the exception of Assam, Bihar and West Bengal where 
the decision of the revising authority is final, it would be observed from 
Table 5.3 that muncipal enactments of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab and Orrisa provide for appeal to lie before 
District Magistrate / Collector / Deputy Commissioner or to such other 
officer as may be empowered by the state government. In the case of 
Gujarat and Maharashtra, the judicial magistrate or the magistrate desig-
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nated by sessions judge; in Karnataka a magistrate designated by the 
District Magistrate and in Madhya Pradesh, the civil judge constitute the 
appeailate authority. In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the council or in case a 
special officer is appointed by the state government in a municipal council 
such officer, hears the appeal against the order of the revising authority. 
In Andhra Pradesh, an appellate commissioner is required tobe appointed 
by the state government to dispose of the appeals in consultation with the 
chairman of the council. 
In Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
Orrisa, Andhra Pradesh, karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala one of the 
important conditions before the appellate authority can entertain an 
appeal is that the amount claimed should be deposited by the applicant. In 
Assam no application for review is to be entertained unless the applicant 
has paid all dues to the municipal council other than the sum which has 
been enhanced through revaluation or reassessment. In Haryana and 
Himachal Pradesh, however, the requirement is that all other municipal 
taxes due up-to-date should be paid before preferring an appeal; while in 
West Bengal, the payment of the tax based on previous assessment is a 
prerequisite condition for review of the valuation and assessment. 
Foregoing analysis shows that the lack of periodical review of the 
valuation and assessment have led to considerable erosion of the property 
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tax base. Firstly, a substantial proportion of additions and alterations 
brought about in the properties are not properly reported. Secondly, the 
distortion of the rental market because of underhand practices of pugree 
(key money) and advances does not allow an assessment of the real rental 
values of properties. The base of this tax thus gets depressed further. 
Thirdly, the valuation and assessment of the property tax is not revised as 
stipulated in the relevant acts and bye-laws. Table 5.3 gives an account of 
delays in revision of valuation and assessment. Study of the Table 5.3 
prove that the valuation and assessments are not revised as frequently as 
prescribed in the various municipal laws and bye-laws; this depresses the 
base of this tax. 
Timely Revision of Property Tax Demand 
The crux of the problem in resource mobilisation from this tax lies 
in capturing, as far as possible, the market value of the land and building 
so that increases in property values are constantly mopped up. This calls 
for periodical valuation and assessment as provided for in the relevant 
laws and bye-laws. It is important to note that in a majority of municipal 
bodies the revision of the property tax demand has been made on time. 
However, as many as five municipal bodies have not been able to make 
such a timely revision. In some cases such as in Meerut and Hapur 
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TABLE - 5^ 
Mobilisation of Prooertv Taxes Through Ouinauennial 
Town 
DMA Towns 
Faridabad 
Ghaziabad 
(including Loni) 
Gurgaon 
Noida 
Bhadurgarh 
Kundli 
Priority Towns 
Meerut 
Rohtak 
Alwar 
Panipat 
Bulandshahr 
Hapur 
Khurja 
Rewari 
Palwal 
Bhiwadi 
Dharuhera 
Revision of Existing Demand in 1986 - 1987 
Property 
Tax yields 
in 1986 
(Rs.) 
15600 
17773 
2495 
-
612 
-
8177 
3338 
876 
4145 
1482 
1342 
560 
874 
881 
-
-
Projected 
yields in 
1941@25% 
increase 
19500 
22216 
3119 
-
765 
-
10221 
4173 
1095 
5181 
1853 
1678 
700 
1093 
1010 
-728 
-
Projected 
yields in 
1996@25% 
increase 
24375 
27770 
3898 
12870 
956 
2244 
12777 
5216 
1369 
6477 
2316 
2097 
875 
1366 
1377 
910 
476 
Projected 
yields in 
2001@25% 
increase 
30469 
34713 
4873 
16087 
1195 
2805 
15970 
6520 
1711 
8096 
2895 
2621 
1094 
1707 
1721 
-
597 
Net increase 
1995 
8775 
9997 
1403 
-
344 
-
4600 
1878 
493 
2332 
834 
755 
315 
492 
496 
182 
-
^ in yield by 
2001 
14869 
16940 
2378 
3217 
583 
561 
7793 
3182 
835 
3951 
1413 
1239 
534 
833 
840 
119 
* Net increase in 1996 has been assumed for the year 1995 as well. 
Source: NIUA Survey 1990 
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TABLE - 5.5 
Mobilisation of Property Taxes Through Quinquennial Revision 
of Property Tax Demand on Increased Population 
Town Per capita Population Population Increased Projected Revision of Netincrease 
yields in 1986 in 1995: 
from property ('000) Induced 
taxes (Rs.) ('000) 
population: demand in demand In in the yields 
86 to 95 1995* 2001 @ 25% in 2001 
('000) ('000 Rs.) increase ('000 Rs.) 
('000 Rs.) 
DMA Town 
Faridabad 
Ghaziabad 
(including Loni) 
Gurgaon 
Bhahadurgarh 
Priority Towns 
Meerut 
Roiitak 
Alwar 
Panipat 
Bulandshalir 
Hapur 
Kiiurja 
Rewari 
Palwal 
29 
44 
22 
14 
16 
17 
5 
24 
11 
11 
7 
16 
16 
543 
407 
111 
45 
507 
193 
176 
173 
136 
124 
-
56 
54 
759 
868 
412 
119 
1118 
346 
341 
340 
319 
282 
184 
82 
169 
216 
461 
301 
74 
611 
153 
165 
167 
183 
158 
184 
26 
115 
6264 
20284 
6622 
1036 
9776 
2601 
825 
4008 
2013 
1738 
1288 
416 
1840 
7830 
25355 
8277 
1295 
12220 
3251 
1031 
6010 
2516 
2172 
1610 
520 
2300 
1566 
5071 
1655 
259 
2444 
650 
606 
1002 
563 
434 
323 
104 
**@ per capital yields in 1986. 
Source : NIUA Survey 1990 
TABLE - 5.6 
Estimated Revenue Income from Timely Revision 
of Property Taxes in Selected Towns 
3 8 0 - i i - A 
Town 
Faridabad 
Ghaziabad 
and Loni 
Gurgaon 
Noice 
Bhadurgarh 
Kundli 
Meenit 
Rohtak 
Alwar 
Panipat 
Bulandshahr 
Hapur 
Khurja 
Rewari 
Palwal 
Bhiwadi 
Dharuhera 
All 
Maintenance 
Gap (000') 
1995 2001 
304200 
233400 
102900 
40400 
93900 
12700 
281000 
88200 
57100 
89000 
85800 
76700 
51500 
40600 
35500 
12100 
8100 
1614100 
3994 
314300 
157900 
56600 
156700 
36600 
42550 
121100 
81900 
146900 
180200 
129900 
88200 
66200 
70800 
30600 
20400 
2483200 
1995 
8775 
9997 
1403 
-
344 
-
4600 
1878 
493 
2332 
834 
755 
315 
492 
496 
-
-
32714 
Mobilisation tlirough timely 
revision 
2001 
Existing 
demand 
14869 
16740 
2378 
-
583 
-
7793 
3182 
835 
3951 
1413 
1239 
534 
833 
840 
-
-
55390 
Increased Total 
population 
1566 
5071 
1655 
3217 
259 
561 
2444 
650 
206 
1002 
503 
434 
322 
104 
460 
182 
199 
18755 
16435 
22011 
4033 
3217 
242 
561 
10237 
3832 
1041 
4953 
1916 
1673 
856 
937 
1300 
182 
199 
74145 
Revenut 
increase 
through 
revision 
> 
as 
a % of gap 
1995 - 2001 
2.88 
4.73 
1.36 
- 6.08 
0.37 
- 1.56 
1.64 
2.13 
0.76 
2.62 
0.96 
0.98 
0.61 
1.21 
1.40 
- 0.60 
- 0.59 
2.04 
3.66 
7.98 
2.70 
0.54 
2.45 
3.14 
1.07 
3.45 
1.07 
1.30 
0.98 
1.43 
1.93 
3.07 
Source NIUA Survey 1990 
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revisions have not been made for the last 10 to 20 years. 
In view of the fact that it is politically as well as administratively 
difficult to revise the property tax demand in retrospect; we suggest that 
hereafter the selected municipal bodies should exercise their powers of 
quinquennial assessment of property tax demand well in time. This has 
substantial potential for the mobilisation of municipal resources. We have 
worked out the projected yield in such quinquennial revisions will be 
made hereafter by selected municipal bodies : Table 5.4 and 5.5. 
While projecting the yields from timely revisions we have assumed 
that the municipal bodies will be able to fully utilise their powers to revise 
the property tax demand as per the respective municipal acts. Accordingly, 
an increase of 25 percent has been worked out in respective property 
tax yields. 
As may be seen from Table 5.6 the timely revisions will substan-
tially increase the levels of municipal income. However, as proportion of 
the maintenance gap, they work out to be only 2.09 percent in 1995 and 
2.99 percent in 2001. 
Thus, so far revision or revalution is concerned our foregoing 
analysis has proven that with a view to exploit fully the revenue raising 
potential of property taxes, an attempt should be made to capture the rising 
market values of urban properties by a regular and timely review of 
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property tax assessment. In other words, efforts should be made to have a 
timely revision of assessment of urban properties. 
Organisation of Property Tax Valuation and Assessment 
Till now, we have learnt that revenue productivity of property tax is 
heavily dependent upon the machinery for its administration. Now, we 
will explore and examine the organisational and administrative aspects of 
valuation and assessment of property tax in India. 
Organisational Setting 
The administration of property tax closely follows the executive 
structure of municipal organisation. The municipal corporation Acts 
clearly separate the deliberative and executive functions and the head of 
executive system, the commissioner, is recognised under law as a distinct 
municipal authority enjoying statutory powers. He belongs invariably to 
higher civil service and serves the corporation on deputation. Historically, 
in the case of the municipal councils (also known as boards or committees 
in different states), there has been fusing of the deliberative and the 
executive functions in the council which, at its inception, was a nominated 
body under the control of the district collector, but gradually became and 
elected body. However, the municipal councils in the southern states have 
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remained close to the 'corporation' model. In the municipal corporations 
and the southern municipalities, following the 'corporation' model, the 
administration of property tax is entirely the responsibility of the ap-
pointed executive. 
The detrimental effects on municipal administration caused by the 
fusion of deliberative and executive functions in the council have fre-
quently been pointed out. The Taxation Enquiry Commission in 1955 
endorsed the following observations of the conference of local self-
government Ministers. 
For improving the standards of administration in local bodies there 
is a very good case for separating as far as possible, their purely executive 
functions from the deliberative or policy making functions. The latter 
category of functions should appropriately be the sphere of the elected 
wing of the local bodies. Once policies and decisions have been adopted, 
however, their implementation and execution should be left to the chief 
executive officer who must be made primarily and directly responsible for 
this part of the work.^^ 
The commission further emphasised that executive powers and 
administrative responsibility should vest by statutory provisions in the 
chief executive officer "who shouldbe selected and appointed by Govern-
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ment or by an independent statutory board" '^* In recent years many state 
governments, following the councilliar model, have introduced changes to 
separate deliberative and executive functions of the municipal council and 
entrust the latter to the executive wing headed by an executive officer 
appointed by the State Government. However, in the administration of 
property tax certain linkages between the two wings have been retained to 
a varying degree under the legislations govering municipalities in differ-
ent states, with the exception of collection of tax which is uniformly 
entrusted to the executive wing. The legislation covered provide that the 
municipalities, with the exception of those in Haryana and Maharashtra, 
may impose property tax, while in these two states it is mandatory to do 
so. Nevertheless, the State Government are empowered to require the 
municipalities to impose the tax and it is this provision which has taken 
away the discretion of municipalities in the imposition of property tax. 
Still the councils have the discretion to decide the rate at which the tax 
shall be levied within the limits, if any, prescribed by Act. Once the tax has 
been imposed and rate decided, the municipal legislations prescribe the 
procedure for valuation and assessment of proerties. The essential compo-
nents of this procedure are : 
1. Preparation of valuation and / or assessment lists; 
2. Periodic revision of valuation / assessment list'; 
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3. Validation of valuation / assessment list' 
4. Grant of exemptions and remissions' 
5. Modifications / alterations in the assessment lists; and 
6. Appeals. 
Salient Features 
An analysis of machinery for valuation and assessment of property 
tax in different states reveal the following salient features : 
1. With the exception of two states, i.e. Himachal Pradesh and Punjab 
in all other states the period within which general revision of assessment 
should take place is prescribed. 
2. The general revision of assessment is the responsibility of the local 
bodies, exception in Orissa, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, where an 
assessor / valuation officer is to be appointed by the State Government for 
this purpose. 
3. Within municipal administration, the responsibility of the perparation 
of valuation/assessment list is entrusted to the executive officer except in 
the case of West Bengal, Assam and Orissa where assessors are required 
to be appointed by the council, the executive officers are either appointed 
by the state government from amongst its civil servants or from state 
municipal-cadre or they enjoy considerable protection of their service 
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conditions from the state government. While the degree of general super-
vision and control of the council over an executive officer varies according 
to whether he enjoys powers delegated to him by the council or entrusted 
to him by the statute, most of the municipal enactments, however, do 
provide for securing their transfer on passing a resolution by the council 
with a prescribed majority of votes. 
4. The assessing and the revising authority vests in the executive 
officer in Tamil Nadu and Kerala and in the valuation officer/assessment 
in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. In Karnataka, the revising authority is the 
executive officer, while it is the valuation officer in Maharashtra. How-
ever, the standing committee of the council has assumed this role in 
Maharashtra because the valuation officers were withdrawn by the state 
government due tothe opposition of the urban local bodies. In the remain-
ing ten states, the deliberative wing of the municipal government consti-
tutes the main component of the revising authority. 
5. The appeal against the order of the revising authority lies to the 
council or special officers in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, to an appellate 
commission in Andhra Pradesh, while in all other states it lies before the 
District Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate or a Civil Judge. 
6. The assessing authority (except where an assessor or a valuation 
officer is appointed), the revising authority and the appellate authority 
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thus vests in persons who do not possess the technical expertise in the 
valuation and assessment of property. 
Inadequancies of the Assessment Machinery 
The machinery for assessment of property tax has been one of the 
focal points of almost every commission or committee set up by the central 
or state governments to examine the local finances or tax administration. 
Inefficient, inequitable, and defective assessment and the consequent loss 
of revenue is the main theme of their findings and invariably this is 
attributed to the failure of local bodies in tax administration. 
Even though the periodicity of general revision of assessment is 
prescribed in Municipal Acts, "too many local authorities are loosing 
substantial revenue each year due to assessment list remaining more or 
less static over many years."^^ In states where general revision is required 
be undertaken on the resolution of local body or on the direction of state 
government, such resolution or direction often does not emerge for years. 
The process of revision of assessment often requires additional staff and 
funds to be provided in the annual budget of the municipalities. Due to 
paucity of resources and well-equipped staff, the requirement of the law 
is often over looked many of the local bodies, particularly in small and 
medium sized towns, do not have a regular assessment department. If the 
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general revision is at all, undertaken, the entire operation is carried out by 
non-technical staff assembled from different departments to create an 
adhoc organisation and whatever experience is gained by such staff is lost 
with the dismantling of the organisation after the revision exercise is over. 
Even when an assessment department is set up on a regular basis it is often 
assessumed that any municipal employee at the level of an inspector can 
carry out this task and it is not uncommon to discover intense struggle 
amongst the municipal staff to get posted to this department, whether 
regular or adhoc. This gives rise to a crude and unscientific system of 
assessment with its characteristic features of corruption, in-efficiency, 
and inequity. It is generally felt that the under-assessment varies from 25 
percent to 85 percent of the annual value. There is another widespread 
feeling that the underassessment is largely in respect of properties with 
high rental value owned by the people belonging to the higher income 
groups and whose potential contribution to tax revenue is substantial, 
while on the other side, the small holdings owned by low income groups 
whose net share of contribution is marginal, tend to be over assessed.^^ 
This essential and desirable characteristic which constitutes one of 
the fundamental justifications of having the local government, however, 
makes the elected representative more susceptible to local pressures and 
its administration at all levels more open and prone to political or 
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individual influences in its day-to-day functioning. The observation of the 
Taxation Enquiry Commission in 1955 that in some states the work to 
assessment was being done by the councillors,^' under the circumstances, 
assumes importance. As early as 1926, the Taxation Enquiry Committee 
had recommended that the work of assessment and collection should not 
be done by persons dependent on the votes of the electorate.^* Though the 
task of assessment is now entrusted to an appointed officer, there is still 
the formal involvement of the councillors in the process of validation of 
the assessment or at the appeal stage in all states, except inOrissa, Andhra 
Pradesh, and Karnataka. Observing that "quite often, any benefits derived 
from careful assessment are lost at appeal stage the Taxation Enquiry 
Commission recommended that no revisional or appellate function should 
be vested in municipal councillors.^^ In many states, it has been observed 
that the task of assessment and valuation is now the statutory responsibil-
ity of the executive officer or of an officer appointed by either the council 
or by the state government. Though this is intended to insulate the task 
from political or other local influences, it does not ensure scientific and 
sound approach to scientific and sound approach to this vital function. The 
Local Finance Inquiry Committee in 1951 pointed out that: 
Valuation of property is such a highly technical business that it can 
not be entrusted to any person who has not received training, however 
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competent he may otherwise be. There is a great difference between 
ordinary administrative work and the valuation of immovable properties, 
particularly properties other than residential houses. In the determination 
of their annual value so many principles and standards of valuation have 
to be applied that the work can not be entrusted even to the members of 
civil services from whom usually Executive Officers of municipalities are 
recruited. ^ ° 
Regarding the arrangement of lending by the state government of 
the services of its officers to undertake periodical revision of assessment, 
the Taxation Enquiry Commission noted that : 
Quite often the officers whose services are so lent are deputed from 
the revenue or other departments of government and the deputed personnel 
have no particular training in or experience of assessment work. Hence 
assessment remains unsatisfactory notwithstanding that it is done by 
officers deputed by government. ^ ^ 
In states where valuation officers/assessors are drawn from the 
town planning and valuation department of the state government, they, by 
and large, possess technical experience in the background of valuation for 
purposes of land acquisition. In Assam and Orissa, the valuation 
organisation within Municipal Directorate is manned largely by the 
officers with revenue administrative experience. To the extent these 
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measures help in developing and retaining a pool of officers of these 
agencies with requistite expertise, they represent, no doubt, a consider-
able improvement over the other arrangements discussed earlier. In all 
these states however, either the revising authority or the appellate author-
ity still vests in non-technical persons. 
Central Valuation Organisation 
Valuation and assessment is said to be both an art and a science. 
Various scientific valuation methods have to be applied skilfully in 
different situations. The municipal authorites in India especially the ones 
in small and medium sized towns, do not have resources to afford the 
services of a professional cadre of valuers. Even the municipal corpora-
tions in metropolitan cities do not have professional group of valuers. 
Valuation is therefore done by pooling the clerical staff from other 
departments whenever periodical valuation and assessment is in the 
offing. Not versed with the art of valuation, the involvement of untrained 
staff adversely affects the quality of valuation and hence the base. 
Secondly, even if valuation is done objectively and scienfically, political 
pulls and presssure are applied by the council to reduce the assessed value. 
In view of the inadquancies of the assessment machinary, the Local 
Finance Inquiry Committee (1951), the Taxation Enquiry Commission 
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(1955), the Committee on Augmentation of Financial Resources of urban 
Local Bodies (1963), and the Rural Urban Relationship Committee (1966) 
appointed by the central government have all recommended the setting up 
of an independent Central Valuation Agency, whil recommending it for all 
local bodies within a state, the Local Finance Inquiry Committee observed 
that : Even in England, where local bodies are tenactious of their rights, 
the task of valuation has been taken away from them under the Local 
Government Act of 1948 and vested in the Board of Inland Revenue.^^ It 
is entrusted to the Rating and Valuation Department of the Board. The role 
of the proposed Valuation Department vis-a-vis the local bodies was 
elaborated by the committee when it recommended that : 
Its duty will be to see valuation list is corrected and up-to-date for 
each local body. The valuation list as prepared by this department should 
be forwarded to the local body covered and should be published. Any 
person including the local body itself, will have the right to object to any 
valuation included in the list. But it will not be open to the local body to 
alter any entry as made by the Valuation Department, it will have to make 
a representation against such entry and if the Valuation Department is not 
satisfied with the objection and the local body or the person making the 
objection feels aggrieved by such action, it will have right to appeal to a 
local valuation court. The decision of the valuation court will be final on 
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points of facts." 
While endorsing the above recommendation, the Taxation Enquiry 
Commission, however, felt that municipal corporation should be excluded 
because "they are in a position to employ staff which is adequately 
trained".^" 
The committee on Augmentation of Financial Resources of Urban 
Local Bodies does not seem to have maintained any distinction between 
the municipal corporations and muncipal councils in determining the 
jurisdiction of the valuation agency when it observed that "efficiency of 
assessment is incompatible with local control of the assessor". The other 
advantages it stressed were : 
Centralised assessment offers an uncomplicated and effective means 
of obtaining uniformly high standard of assessment through the state, by 
the use of professional staff following standard methods and procedures 
under central direction. Once such a Valuation Department is set up, 
reassment of urban properties can be taken up systematically at regular 
intervals and the cases of unequal and under-assessment which are very 
common now, can be removed to a great extent. ^ ^ 
The argument of the committee that even local bodies whose limited 
resources do not permit employement of highly paid qualified valuers, 
will be able to get the services of the Valuation Department of the state 
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government, however, must be read with the provision in municipal 
enactments of most of the states requiring the municipal councils to bear 
the expenses of officers including valuation officers/assessors appointed 
by the state government and their establishement. 
The Rural - Urban Relationship Committee, while reviewing the 
subsequent progress towards the setting up of the Central Valuation 
Agency noted the appointment of valuation officers/assessors in some 
states, observed that "such sporadic attempts do not help to build up 
experience and expertise in this specialised field^*. It recommended that: 
(a) There should be a chief valuation officer in the Directorate of Local 
Bodies, who should lay down principles for determination of annual value 
and supervise and control of the valuation officers. 
(b) There should be full time valuation officers for cities with a 
population of five lakhs or more. For groups of smaller cities and towns, 
valuation officers should be appointed according to the volume of work; 
(c) The assessment lists should be prepared by the valuation officer 
with the assistance of the executive officer/deputy municipal commis-
sioner and published for objections. After deciding the objection, the 
valuation officer may finalise the list; 
(d) Appeals against assessment made by the valuation officer shall lie 
to the chief valuation officer; 
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(e) An appeal against decision of the chief valuation officer shall lie to 
the District Judge^^ 
While the setting up of the C VA as a department at the state level has 
been recommended by all; the RURC was specific in suggesting that this 
agency should be located in the Directorate of Local Bodies. The argu-
ments in favour of CYA can be summed up as follows : 
(1) It will insulate the process of assessment from local pressue. it is 
assumed that once that assessment machinary at local level is free from 
control of the local body, the local pressures will be reduced considerably; 
(2) By having a state-wide cadre of officals responsible for valuation 
task, it will be possible to attract better qualified persons and to train and 
develop them systematically as professionally skilled manpower for this 
purpose. 
(3) The agency would develop uniform norms and standards for deter-
mination of rental and capital value (whatever be the bases of assessment) 
of various types of properties, prepare an assessment code and revise them 
from time to time. 
(4) Collection, analysis and determination of data regarding the 
behaviour of rental and capital values in urban areas will be an important 
function of the CVA. it has been ignored up till now. It will provide not 
only a sound basis for valuation decisions (reducing the level of subjec-
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tivity) and training of valuers, but also it can help in securing a better 
cooperation between taxpayers and tax administration. 
(5) Since the urban property is the basis of wide range of taxes such as 
income tax (income from property), wealth tax, gift tax, estate duty, 
capital gains tax etc., the availability of the authenticated data with CVA 
will facilitate coordination amongst various agencies carrying out almost 
similar exercise independently of each other and thus help in reducing the 
inconsistencies in valuation for different purposes. 
However, it has not made much headway. Presently, it exists as a 
formal organisation only in West Bengal, it exists as an informal 
organisation in the states of Orissa and Assam. An attempt has been made 
in Andhra Pradesh to have central valuation done through the Directorate 
of Local Authorities and in Maharashtra, Valuation forms part of the State 
Level Town Planning and Valuation Department (TPV). 
In West Bengal, the Central Valuation Board was created in 1979 
under the West Bengal Central Valuation Board Act, 1978 as a sequel to 
a suggestion given by the World Bank under the Calcutta urban Develop-
ment Project n. The Board, according to stipulations of the Act, can enter 
any municipal area for valuation only when it is invited to do so. It took 
quite some time for the Board to act and it was only in 1985 that it evolved 
a methodology for objective valuation. It has taken into account four 
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factors, which in the opinion of Board are instrumental in rise in property 
value and hence in the rentals. These variables include the cost of 
structure, location, occupational use, and age. These have again been 
blown into a number of gradations. The values to the gradation are 
assigned on the basis of basic data collected from the survey of properties 
and the "reasonable rental value" is worked out on the basis of results 
derived out of a complicated regression equation. Assessed value is then 
matched wdth the requirement of resources to provide reasonable level of 
services in the particular municipal area concerned. The total municipal 
valuation is thus determined so as to arrive at a total tax demand which will 
be sufficient to meet the expenditure requirement of the municipal author-
ity (Guha Thakurta 1989 : 43-44). 
In Orissa, a valuation organisation (VO) was set up under the Orissa 
Municipal Act in 1970. It is under the administrative control of the 
Director of Municipal Administration. It also developed an Assessment 
Table by diving the areas into three grades depending on their proximity 
to intrastructure and amenities. These are corss classified according to 
quality of construction. A value is assigned to a particular property on a 
per sq. mt. basis depending on the quality of construction and locality^^. 
However, valuation is done by the municipal employees who do not 
possess any knowledge in this regard. The schedule of RV developed by 
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it is not revised and hence it has by now lost its relevance. Even in its initial 
days, VO could not do valuation properly (Orissa 1975 : 61) Central 
Valuation in Orissa has apparently failed (NCAER 1980 : 48-49). 
In Assam as well, valuation organisation was set up on the basis of 
an executive order and hence it could not be a formal organisation. It has 
not yet got off the ground. In Andhra Pradesh, as in Orissa, Valuation was 
made part of the state level directorate of Municipal Administration. In the 
seventees it evolved its own scheme of valuation on CV basis which 
proved a disaster due to a spate of protest and agitation. Since then, it has 
been dormant. In Maharashtra, the TPVD tried to enter into municipal 
valuation but could not succeed with the result that its role is limited to 
valuation of land for town planning purposes. The overview of limited 
attempt towards central valuation does not present an encouraging picture. 
Even though CVB has not yet proved effective, there does not seem to be 
any thing wrong with the concept. It will take some more time before it 
takes roots. As mentioned earlier, CVO has several good things about it 
and it needs to be tried rather much more seriously for introducing the 
desired reforms in valuation. 
The High Powered Committee in Delhi has also suggested to set up 
central valuation organisation to facilitate objective valuation. In the 
interim period, it suggested to adopt the practice of filing of return by the 
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assessees giving details of the property as also the rent fetched by it and 
payment of tax suo moto alongvsdth the return, failing which the tax payer 
will be charged suitable interest rate for the period during which the tax 
was not paid. This could form the basis for a panel of assessors to be 
constituted to lay down norms of prevailing market rent for each broadly 
homogeneous locality or area for broad classes of properties (Delhi 
Administration 1990 : 13). 
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PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION 
The property tax is difficult to administer is an often lamented fact 
in industrial as well as developing countries. The problems are particu-
larly severe in developing countries because of a shortage of skilled staff 
and because records of land ownership and property transfers are often 
notoriously bad. Yet urban property values are growing rapidly, and local 
governments have little option but to make the most of the property tax. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that some notable improvements 
have been made in administering the local property tax in some cities 
of developing countries. 
The administrative constraints in improving the fairness and reve-
nue productivity of the property tax lie in all four facets of property tax 
administration : identification of property site and ownership, record 
keeping, assessment, and collection. Reforms that attempt to improve 
any one aspect without considering the other three are not likely to be 
successful. Indeed, when the poor revenue performance of the property 
tax is attributed to administrative shortcomings, the refernce may be to 
any or all of these four areas. 
In this chapter we will examine that is it useful to separate out 
questions of valuation, assessment, control and collection of property 
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taxes, or should all (most) of these functions be carried out by the same 
level of government ? and what measures are to be undertaken to improve 
relations between property tax payers and the tax administrations? 
As is discussed below, however, it is difficult to know where to 
start. Most attempts at reforms begin with either property identification 
or valuation, but Dillinger (1988a) argues that the best place to begin is 
with collections. 
Discovery and Determinatioii of Property Ownership 
The problems of identifying ownership and assembling a complete 
enumeration of properties are perhaps the greatest constraints to effi-
cient administration of the property tax. The basis of good property tax 
practice is a full fiscal cadastre. This would involve describing and 
defining boundaries for every property (cadastral maps), establishing 
ownership or taxpayer liability,' and valuing the land. An estimated 20-40 
percent of all urban households in developing countries are living on land 
to which neither they nor their landlords have legal title. In many cities 
the figure is much higher (Mayo, Malpezzi, and Grross 1986 : 192). 
The difficulty of the task is compounded even further because of 
the poor quality of available information on ownership and sales values. 
Property title records are in poor shape in developing countries, and a 
search and interview process to establish ownership for every plot is a 
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very expensive undertaking. Some governments have tried to get around 
the problem of determining ownership by requiring self-declarations 
(for example, Gautemala, the Philippines). Such programmes do not give 
the clear - cut results that one would hope for, because of a number of 
complications : disputes among heirs over ownership, how to treat 
declarations on occupied properties in illegal and squatter settlements, 
uncertainties about ownership in region of land reform, different 
declared values for family-owned properties, and so forth. One result 
of required self-declarations in the Philippines, for example, was a 
large number of duplicate ownership claims (Wayslenko; Bahl, and 
Holland, 1980). 
The presentation of cadastral maps is expensive, especially if full 
aerial surveys are necessary, but these maps are essential to successful 
valuation and collection. Indeed, the first step toward improved property 
tax administration is to prepare or update the tax maps. Starting with 
partial and dated cadastral maps - or better yet, with existing aerial 
photographs. This procedure establishes (by field survey) a complete 
inventory of all real property and assigns to each parcel a unique property 
identification number. This system provides a simple means to keep track 
of all parcels and to link assessment, billing, and property transfer 
records. Even this process - which includes no valuation - is expensive; 
1980 estimates for the Philippines placed the cost of tax mapping at 
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between $ 1.30 and $ 2.60 per parcel, excluding the cost of any aerial 
photographs (WasylenkOjBahl, and Holland 1980). Estimates as of 1984 
were that the cost per parcel was $ 2.75, including the assigned overhead 
cost of the project (Dillinger 1988a : 21). As a result of this relatively 
high cost and the management and training problems, tax mapping was 
carried out only by about 20 percent of all Philippines local 
governments. 
The Philippine tax mapping exercise, because it addressed only 
one phase of the problem of property tax administration, did not neces-
sarily improve the revenue productivity of the property tax. Wasy lenko, 
Bahl and Holland (1980) studied a sample of 19 taxed - mapped munic-
ipalities in the Philippines and drew the following conclusions : (a) the 
total number of parcels increased by more than 10 percent in 11 of the 19 
mapped communities, decreased in 4 (because of the removal of dupli-
cates) and remained essentially unchanged in 1; (b) collection efficiency 
increased in 11 of the 19 but decreased in 8; and (c) assessed value 
increased in 11 of the 14 for which suitable data were available for 
analysis. A comparision of 18 mapped with 18 nonmapped but otherwise 
roughly comparable municipalities showed that the average collection 
efficiency was 62 percent among the mapped and 57 percent among the 
unmapped. Yet in 10 of the comparisions, collection efficiency was 
higher in the nonmapped jurisdiction. Tax mapping may be an important 
CHAPTCR - 6 407 
first step to improved project administration, but it is only one step in a 
process. In a later review of the Philippine propect, Dillinger (1988a : 
46) reports that revenues in the municipalities involved remained 
stagnant because the prospect "did not address problems in collection 
administration and enforcement. In many jurisdictions, reductions in 
collection efficiency more than offset increases in assessments". 
Records Keeping and Records Management 
The inadequacy of property tax records is a large problem for 
administring property tax systems in developing countries. The problem 
may go back to an incomplete tax roll or inadequate ownership informa-
tion, but it many also be due to dated information, duplicate records, poor 
or out-of-date information on improvements, or simply a poor method of 
maintaining and filing the information. Underlying this problem is a lack 
of attention by the government responsible and lack of coordination 
among the local, state and central government offices involved. 
As a rule, there is an absence of coordination between the office 
of the assessor, the registrar of deeds, those handling building permits, 
the public utilities providing services, and the office handling property 
transfer stamps. It follows that information on changes of ownership, 
sale prices, and new construction is not recorded promptly by the 
assessor. Resolution of this problem of coordination lies mostly with the 
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central government, because the office of deeds registration is usually 
part of a central ministry. Local governments sometimes station an 
officer in the land registry office to improve the flow of information, but 
there still remain the problems of the quality of information on deeds and 
the underdeclaration of sales values. The resolution of all these problems 
will generally require action by the central government. The problem may 
reflect the low priority which central governments have assigned to 
strengthening the local property tax. If that is so, even centralized 
assessment will not improve matters. 
The local government is better able to enforce building permits 
and regulations and make sure that new improvements are reported to the 
assessors office. Improvements require policing to determine that build-
ing permits are being obtained and that files describing improvements are 
being updated. Most local governments simply do not have the staff to 
carry out such a task, and as a result, improvements are typically assessed 
well below their market values. 
Brazil has made an attempt to use cross - referencing of informa-
tion to improve property tax assessment. A system has been development 
that requires any approval of subdivision, building or occupancy, permit 
or registration of title to be reported directly to the office of the 
assessor. Brazil's experience with cross - referencing, however, has been 
somewhat disappointing (Dillinger 1989). In part this is because many of 
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the changes above occur outside the systems of formal permits and 
registrations - either legally or in violation of the law. Another problem 
is that the various government agencies are either uncooperative or 
inefficient in their record keeping. 
The organization and handling of the records present other prob-
lems procedures for updating are often poor; the design of the records is 
sometimes inadequate. Quite often all reports are handled manually; 
and generally not enough clerks are assigned to the job, and they 
may be unskilled, and have little incentive to carry out a more 
efficient operation. 
Local governments may deal with the records problem in three 
phases, depending on the level of sophistication of their present system. 
First, the existing tax records can be sorted manually by neighbourhood, 
duplicates can be eliminated, and some coordination with valuation, 
billing, and collecting can be established. This option is likely to be most 
attractive to smaller local governments and to some larger places not yet 
ready to overhaul their records system. A second stage of reform in-
volves redesigning the format and the content of the information con-
tained on the cards and assigning each parcel an identification number. At 
this stage, the fiscal cadastre could be updated and a linkage could be 
established with the titles office to obtain updated information on sales 
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prices. A third level of reform is to computerize the system. This last 
level is essential, particularly for large cities, but requires specialized 
technical expertise, careful planning and implementation, and sufficient 
financial resources. Where these ingredients are absent computerization 
of property records can cause endless confusion in cadastral administra-
tion and property tax collection (Linn 1981). The advent of microcom-
puters, however, has greately reduced the problems of computerization 
and has brought the possibility of efficient and inexpensive computerized 
record keeping even to small local governments. 
Resource Information System 
Efficient tax administration and financial management call for a 
well-oiled information system in the municipal authorities. For example 
the existing information system in the selected National Capital Region 
towns suffers from lack of data on the demand and collection of property 
taxes on a year to year basis, the distribution of assessed properties 
according to annual rental value for residential use as also non-residen-
tial use, the type and location of properties, number of properties below 
the exemption limit of this tax by land use and annual rental value, number 
of metered and unmetered water connections, number of meters not 
working, the number of public stand posts, the quantum of water supplied 
for different uses, the proportion of total municipal expenditure on 
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establishement, operations and maintenance and development 
works and so on. 
Deficiencies and gaps in the information system prevent the prop-
er administration of taxes and fees and also hamper financial planning 
even in rudimentary form. 
The municipal bodies do not even have the basic data for efficient 
tax administration and for introducing financial planning. Their budget-
ing practices are outdated and are not related to financial accountability. 
Improving the Information System 
The property tax structure and water supply network are the two 
main areas of the municipal information system where traditional meth-
ods need to be modified. Being the most important sources of municipal 
income improvements in these areas will subsequently help identifica-
tion of priorities in order to make efforts to increase revenue yields. This 
is, however, possible without making any specific amendment in the 
respective municipal acts. 
As regards the property taxes there is a need to develop an infor-
mation base as a management information aid for enhancing the efficien-
cy in valuation, assessment and collection of property tax. Property 
attributes such as number of assessed properties, their assessed value, 
location, type of construction, land use, age, tax demand and arrears need 
to be made an integral part of the information system. 
Collection 
The last step in administering the property tax, i.e. collection, may 
present the most difficult problems because costs are high and collection 
efficiency often low. Collection rates (the ratio of collections to col-
lectibles) of less than 75 percent are not at all uncommon^. Data 
problems notwithstanding, these low rates of collection are probably 
good indication of the situation. The source of the problem may lie with 
an inadequate collection procedure, with the structure of the tax itself, 
with an inadequate set of penalties necessary to inforce the tax, or with 
the inducements necessary to stimulate collection. 
In many cities, problem with collection procedures often grow out 
of a shortage of skilled staff in the treasurer's office. A number of other 
problems have been cited: poor coordination between the assessor's and 
treasurer's offices, no follow-up mailings or field visits to major delin-
quents records which do not easily permit an identification of delin-
quents, and of course inadequate records of property ownership. 
High collection costs and low collection efficiency might also be 
due to the property tax structure. If the tax is thought to be unfair because 
of horizontal inequity, taxpayers resistance increases. For example, the 
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high dispersion of assessment ratios was seen as partial explanation of 
Jakarta's ability to collect no more than 30 to 40 percent of residential 
property tax liabilities in the early 1970s (Lerche 1974). In addition, 
where Low-valued parcels are not exempt' from the tax base, collection 
costs may be quite high. In the case of Jakarta, for example, there was a 
very high concentration of the property tax base : 69 percent of taxpayers 
accounted for 11 percent of the base, and 7 percent of the taxpayers 
accounted for 63 percent of the base (Linn, Smith, and Wighjowijoto 
1976). Such concentrations and equity objectives have led some cities to 
exempt low-valued properties from the base. For example, in 1972 Seoul 
exempted properties with an annual rent less than $ 650, and in the early 
1970s Lusaka exempted all squater settlements. 
Two final collection problems are a lack of enforcement, and the 
absence of adequate incentives for prompt and full payment. There are 
some successes to report in solving these problems, but also many 
failures. Governments in developing countries have not vigorously exer-
cised their powers to impose heavy penalties on property tax delinquents. 
In some cases the penalties are adequate but not enforced, in other cases 
they are quite inadequate. Cash penalties are frequently too low to be 
effective. For example, the penalty rate in the Philippines (2 percent per 
month to a maximum of 24 percent) was less than the return on private 
investments (Bahl, Holland, and Linn 1983), and there has been a poorly 
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enforced lump sum penalty charge of 5 percent in Jakarta (Linn, Smith 
and Wignijowijoto 1976). Central governments are hesitant to move to 
the stiffer penalties (for example, sale of property at auction) for 
political reasons and also because lengthy court action many be involved. 
The lack of a special court for the local authority cases has been cited as 
a serious impediments in Lagos and Nairobi, since the regular courts are 
unable to dispose speedily of appeals or tax enforcement actions such as 
expropriation. In court actions, there inevitably arises the problem of 
determining ownership and the long delay which the local government 
may face in getting its money. Because of these delays, some Indian 
cities have in the past negotiated the amounts due (Bahl 1975; Bongion 
- Maassen 1976). If contested taxes have to be paid before a court ruling 
(with the payment refundable), the local government is placed in a much 
more comfortable position (Mohan 1974). In Anambra state, Nigeria, 
property tax cases have been dismissed for want of a judge to try the 
case (Dillinger 1988:35). 
Other enforcement mechanisms that do not require court action 
might be effective. In Tehran, where in past years the collection record 
was good, the electric company cut power to owner-occupied or non-
residential properties that fill two months in arrears. City council have 
attached rents in Nigeria (Orewa 1966). Finally, moral suasion is some-
times used: the names of delinquents are posted in public places or 
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announced in the news media (Bahl and Shroeder 1983d). One difficulty 
which inhibits enforcement is that property taxes generally are not levied 
on the property but on the owner; that is, the tax is in personam, not in 
rem. This means that the owner must be located and brought to court in 
order to institute proceedings for nonpayment of taxes. This greatly 
complicates the collection of the tax, particularaly where ownership 
titles are contested or unclear. 
Collection Efficiency 
Thus, we see that, a very important factor affecting revenue perfor-
mance of property tax in India is poor collection efficiency of the 
property tax administration. Whatever tax is assessed on a deficient and 
depressed base by applying the rate structure which itself is not 
rationalised and reviewed frequently, is not collected effectively. 
A large bulk of the revenue is forgone because of the municipali-
ties negligence and also due to intolerable corruption, bribery and 
misappropriation. As far as collection is concerned, there is discernible 
or growing unwillingness to pay the property tax in the municipalities of 
Indian states and a complaint levelled is that the tax does not confer 
corresponding benefit. It is unfortunate that with a weak tradition of local 
government in many of our towns (as also noted by Lady Hicks), it is 
often very common, paying attention on the productive taxes.^ Some 
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Indian States found it desirable, in order to galvanize local bodies into 
activitiy or strengthen their hands vis-a-vis the taxpayers, to enforce 
minimium rates of taxes." 
The municipalities have to see that the arrears do not accumulate, 
and there are no delinquent cases. Recourse must be had to the civil 
courts or a threat of imprisonment must be made available. Clearly the 
latter is not desirable, although as a way of securing payment it is 
practicable, since the social security system of the extended family is 
still strong enough to ensure that payment will be forthcoming.^ 
The difficulty with the legal action is that the procedure tends to be 
very slow so that the tax arrears may go out of hand. And in order to 
overcome this, the possibility of special court for property tax rate cases 
should be examined.^ 
The information available indicates that the average percentage of 
tax collection to total (current and arrears) demand in the Indian munic-
ipalities was 37.6 and it is 74.9 percent ^ during 1960-61. While the 
current collection is not very much encouraging in some municipalities, 
the arrear collection of the property tax is lamentably poor. In some 
cases the accumulated arrears in tax realisation are a little more than the 
current years' demand. Streamlining of the collection procedures and 
introduction of automatic data processing machinery would go along way 
towards presentation of bill on time. In some cities, a system of a rebate 
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TABLE - 6.1 
ProDcrtv 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-92 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Source : Mu 
Tax Demand 
Arrears 
132-72 
(49.92) 
160-90 
(52.62) 
176.68 
(53.26) 
201.57 
(49.63) 
260.61 
(52.61) 
344.95 
(59.65) 
407.35 
(58.55) 
505-71 
(53.93) 
707-20 
(59.50) 
918.22 
(61.22) 
1147.91 
(65.61) 
nicipal Corpora 
and Col lec t ion : Ahmedabi 
1980-81 to 1990-91 
Demand 
Current 
133.13 
(50.08) 
144.88 
(47.38) 
154.84 
46.74) 
204.59 
(50.37) 
234.71 
(47.39) 
233.32 
(40.35) 
288.38 
(41.45) 
431.98 
(46.07) 
481-45 
(40.50) 
531.70 
(38.78) 
601.72 
(34.39) 
tion of Ahmedabad 
Total 
265.85 
(100.00) 
305.78 
(100.00) 
331.52 
(100.00) 
406.16 
(100.00) 
495.32 
(100.00) 
578.27 
(100.00) 
695.73 
(100.00) 
937.69 
(100.00) 
1188.65 
(100.00) 
1499.92 
(100.00) 
1749.63 
(100.00) 
ad Munic inal 
Collection 
104.95 
129.10 
129.95 
145.55 
150.37 
170.92 
190.02 
230.49 
270.43 
302.01 
311.23 
Corporat ion 
(Rs. in million) 
% collected 
39.48 
42.22 
24.45 
35.84 
30.36 
29.56 
27.31 
24.58 
22.75 
20.83 
17.79 
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T A B L E - 6.2 
P r o o e r t v T a x 
Year 
Madras 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Trivandrum 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Delhi 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
Arrears 
76.00 
(25.68) 
78.00 
(33.12) 
75.00 
(22.39) 
80.00 
(28.67) 
90.00 
(22.42) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
296.00 
(41.40) 
318.70 
(38.13) 
346.09 
(29.37) 
275.89 
(23.50) 
367.29 
(26.99) 
D e m a n d a n d C o l l e c t i o n : M u n i c i n a l C o r o c 
of M a d r a s , T r i v a n d r u m a n d Delh i 
Demand 
Current 
220.00 
(74.32) 
235.50 
(66.88) 
260.00 
(77.61) 
279.00 
(71.33) 
311.50 
(77.58) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
418.96 
(58.60) 
517.07 
(61.87) 
832.35 
(70.63) 
898.14 
(76.50) 
993.50 
(73.01) 
Total 
296.00 
(100.00) 
313.50 
(100.00) 
335.00 
(100.00) 
359.00 
(100.00) 
401.50 
(100.00) 
24.89 
33.05 
36.57 
40.40 
62.50 
714.96 
(100.00) 
835.77 
(100.00) 
1178.44 
(100.00) 
1174.03 
(100.00) 
1360.79 
(100.00) 
Collection 
214.58 
225.04 
224.82 
264.09 
280.05 
14.60 
16.19 
20.39 
15.34 
19.95 
396.26 
489.68 
902.55 
806.74 
874.05 
• r a t i o n s 
(Rs. in million) 
% collected 
72.49 
71.78 
67.11 
73.56 
69.75 
58.66 
48.99 
57.12 
37.97 
31.92 
55.42 
58.59 
76.59 
68.72 
64.23 
Source : Collected from the Municipal Corporations. 
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TABLE - 6.3 
Prop( 
Year 
Bombav 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Calcutta 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
Note : N.A. 
a 
ertv Tax Demand and Collec 
Greater Bombav 
Arrears 
33.75 
(5.60) 
44.14 
(6.44) 
32.59 
(4.25) 
41.49 
(4.79) 
70.05 
(7.28) 
78.21 
(7.42) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
= Not available 
= Data relate or 
Demand 
Current 
569.02 
(94.40) 
641.16 
(93.56) 
734.03 
(95.75) 
825.45 
(95.21) 
892.67 
(2.72) 
976.15 
(92.58) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
ily to Calcutta pr 
t ion : MuniciDal CorD( 
and Calcutta 
Total 
602.77 
(100.00) 
685.30 
(100.00) 
766.62 
(100.00) 
866.94 
(100.00) 
962.72 
(100.00) 
1054.36 
(100.00) 
278.90 
329.40 
335.19 
495.19 
643.96 
650.17 
775.83 
oper; data for J 
Collection 
507.60 
551.86 
581.75 
644.03 
704.36 
759.31 
191.42 
231.72 
294.45 
326.93 
456.21 
419.29 
423.19 
adavpur. To 
»rations 
(Rs. in million) 
% collected 
84.21 
80.53 
75.89 
74.29 
73.16 
72.02 
68.63 
70.35 
87.53 
66.02 
70.84 
64.49 
54.55 
llyganj and South 
Source 
suburban which form part of Calcutta Corporation could not be available 
Collected from the Municipal Corporations. 
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Prooertv Tax 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-92 
1 TABLE - 6.4 
Demand and CoII( 
Greatei 
Arrears 
88.66 
(17.47) 
86.84 
(15.74) 
97.77 
(16.81) 
97.18 
(15.09) 
117.38 
(16.66) 
118.51 
(15.61) 
' Bombi 
ection : Municipal 
av and Calcutta 
Collection out 
Current 
418.94 
(82.53) 
465.02 
(84.26) 
483.98 
(83.19) 
546.85 
(4.98) 
586.98 
(83.34) 
640.80 
984.39) 
Cc 
of 
trnorations 
(Rs. in million) 
Total 
507.60 
(100.00) 
551.02 
(100.00) 
581.75 
(100.00) 
644.03 
(100.00) 
704.36 
(100.00) 
759.31 
(100.00) 
Source : Collected from the Municipal Corporations. 
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for prompt payment of tax dues and a penalty for delays in payment is in 
vogue; the system is reported to have yielded satisfactory results. 
Collection Efficiency in Selected Municipal Corporations of India 
Collection efficiency of above selected municipal corporation is 
tabulated in Tables 6.1 to 6.4. Theratioof collection to total tax demand 
in the case of Ahmedabad has declined from 39.48 percent in 1980-81 to 
17.79 percent in 1990-91. During the same period, its accumulated 
arrear demand has increased from 49.92 percent to 65.61 percent of the 
total tax demand, Table 6.4. Madras is the only municiapl corporation in 
our sample of six, which is able to collect around 70 percent of the total 
tax demand. But the arrears to be collected have mounted to about one-
fourth of the total demand. To be more specific, tax collection was 
72.49% of total tax demand in 1980-81 and stayed around at the same 
level in 1990-91 i.e. 69.75 percent on the other hand arrears was 25.68 
percent in 1980-81 and it declined slightly to 22.42 percent in 1990-91. 
Trivandrum municipal corporation is able to collect less than one-third 
of the total property tax demand. Table 6.2. To be more specific, tax 
collection was 58.66 percent in 1986-87 and it declined to 31.92 percent 
in 1990-91. Thus, we see that Trivandrum municipal corporation has 
performed very badly on collection front. Unfortunately, arrears figure 
of the same is not available. In Delhi, tax collection has improved from 
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55.42 percent in 1980-81 to 65 percent in 1990-91. Here we see that 
Delhi's performance is outstanding, when we compare it with the collec-
tion performance of other five municipal corporations being analysed 
here. Surprisingly, arrears position reflects an improvement. Since, 
arrear was 41.40 percent in 1980-81 and it declined to 27% in 1990-91. 
Bombay municipal corporation is in a position to collect around 72 to 75 
percent of the total tax demand. Its accumulated arrears constitute hardly 
7 percent of the total tax demand. However, even Bombay municipal 
corporation is able to collect only about 16 percent of the arrear demand. 
And finally, in Calcutta, tax collection was 68.63 percent of total demand 
in 1984-85, which declined to 54.55 percent in 1990-91. 
Thus, we come to the conclusion that, majority of these munici-
palities suffer from administrative inefficiency, especially with regard 
to tax collection. In our above done analysis, five out of six municipal 
corporations have shown collection inefficiency. Only exception is 
Delhi. Besides, arrears in these municiapl corporations is on rise, which 
prove that, municipal corporation is administratively incapable of recov-
ering its dues from the people. 
The hypothesis of collection inefficiency is supported by the 
findings of an outstanding work done by O.P. BOHRA "Municipal Prop-
erty Tax Reforms in West Bengal", a study sponsored by The Second 
Municipal Finance Commission, West Bengal and the National Institute 
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TABLE - 6.5 
Recovery Ratios of Property Taxes 
is Selected Towns in 1989-90 
Responding 
Ghaziabad 
Gurgaon 
Loni 
Hapur 
Khurja 
Palwal 
Property Tax 
demand* 
('000 Rs.) 
34257 
6353 
786 
3217 
1459 
1484 
Property Tax 
collections 
('000 Rs.) 
17597 
2495 
176 
1342 
560 
881 
Collection as 
% of demand 
51 
39 
22 
42-
38 
59 
This demand includes the current demand as well as arrears. 
This information has not been reported by the municipal bodies 
of the other selected towns. 
Source : NIUA Survey 1991-92. 
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of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. Demand and collection of 
property in Siliguri Municipality have been estimated, in addition to 
calculation of demand and collection of property tax in Ajsansol 
municipality There is no doubt that Siliguri and Asansol estimates are 
important in the sense that, these findings throw light on the collection 
performance of smaller municipalities which have not been covered 
in the present work. Findings of Siliguri and Asansol prove that collec-
tion efficiency of small municipalities like Siliguri and Asansol 
is equally poor. Thus, there is nothing to distinguish between big 
municipal corporations and small municipalities so far as tax collection 
efficiency is concerned. 
In our foregoing analysis we have assessed the collection efficien-
cy of some major municipal corporations of India. We also took note of 
Asansol and Siliguri municipalities which are smaller in size. Since, we 
have been analysing the case of National Capital Region it would be 
prudent, if we analyse the recovery ratios of property taxes in selected 
towns. It will make our work with respect to tax collection, more 
exhaustive. In Table 6.5 we have data of collection as percent of demand 
in case of six municipalities of NCR: Ghaziabad, Gurgaon, Loni, Hapur, 
Khurja, andPalwal. In Ghaziabad, collection is 51 percent, in Gurgaon it 
is 39 percent, in Loni, it is record low 22 percent, in Hapur it is 
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42 percent and collection position in Khurja and Palwal is equally bad. 
Thus, a look at table indicates that everything is not well with the 
collection machinery of the municipal bodies. Not a single local body has 
been able to collect more than 60 percent of the demand in 1990-91. The 
situation is thus deplorable in all the towns. But it is very serious 
especially in Loni, Gurgaon and Khurja, where the municipal authorities 
have not been able to collect even half of the total demand. 
Now there is no doubt that collection efficiency is very poor in 
almost all municipalities. Hence it becomes a very pertinent question to 
examine the causes of poor collection. 
At the out set property tax which is one of the important sources 
of municipal revenues, has not been administered efficiently because of 
several reasons some of which are within the capabilities of the munic-
ipal bodies while others are external to them. Taking first the internal 
factors, we have seen that: 
* The valuation and assessments are not revised as frequently as 
prescribed in the various municipal laws and bye-laws; this 
depresses the base of this tax. 
* Property tax rates are not rational. Different land uses, namely, 
residential, 
* Commercial, Industrial and other entities soon do not have 
differential rates. 
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Among the external factors, the most important factor is the 
existence of Rent Control laws which have the provision for determina-
tion of standard rents. A recent Supreme Court decision has extended the 
logic of standard rent even for such properties for which the standard rent 
has not yet been determined by any Rent control court. This has 
further stifled any attempt to mobilise the resources from this prime 
municipal tax. 
Beside these, there exist a host of administrative deficiencies in 
the management of financial resources. These deficiencies are : 
(i) There is virtually no management information system for an ef-
fective and efficient tax administration. For example, information 
on the various property attributes which are very important for 
property tax administration does not exist even in rudimentary 
form. This makes it difficult to identify the problem areas, 
(ii) The current accounting and budgeting practices do not include the 
factual and actual resource position. 
(iii) There is complete lack of inter and intragency coordination among 
the various agencies involved in financial management. These 
managerial problems have adversely influenced the municipal 
income and expenditure and have also contributed to time and cost 
overruns in various areas of municipal functions. 
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(iv) The collection machinery has been lethargic and inefficient with 
the result that the tax arrears have been mounting year after year. 
We now proceed to have a look at the findings of National Institute 
of Urban Affairs, New Delhi, November 1990, work "Municipal Corpo-
ration of Delhi, A study of its Finances", which supports our hypothesis. 
According to NIUA, in case of MCD, there has been deficiencies in 
property tax administration 
Delay and Backlog in Finalisation of Valnation 
There are about 6 lakh properties within the jurisdiction of the 
MCD and this number is increasing every year due to the process of 
suburbanisation and urban growth. The assessment, department, however, 
is not able to cope with this magnitude, thus valuation and assessment is 
not finalised for a very large number of properties. According to a recent 
study of procedures relating to fixation of rateable value of property in 
MCD, the backlog of properties is increasing year after year. Its number 
increased from 80,744 at the end of 1981-82 to 2,10,928 by October, 
1985. The number of properties yet to be valued and assessed increased 
by more than 150 percent in a span of about 3 years.'" On the basis of 
indepth study of the time taken in finalisation of rateble for a sample of 
100 properties in New Delhi and South Zones, it was found that it took, 
on an average, 20 months to finalise' a case. 
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Tax Collection 
On tax collection, NIUA says that non-availability of data on the 
extent of current demand arrears and collection of current demand as 
well as arrears do not permit an objective analysis is of tax collection. 
The MCD could furnish data only on the estimated demand as per 
the Budget Estimates and extent of collection out of it.MCD was able 
to collect about 158 percent of the projected demand in 1985-86 and 
114 percent in 1986-87. This gives an impression that the projected 
demand itself is kept at a low level. An efficient collection would 
not have resulted into mounting of arrears. There has been a progressive 
increase in the arrears. Thus, much is desired to one up the collection 
of property tax. 
Steps Needed to Improve Property Tax Administration 
It is the established fact that property tax administration is poor 
and to a great extent it is responsible for the poor elasticity and buoyancy 
of the tax revenue of property taxation. It is certain that, tax administra-
tion is to be toned up. But, pertinent arliment question is that how ? 
According to Roy W. Bahl and Johannes F. Linn - property tax 
structure and administration go hand in hand and can not easily be 
separated while undertaking a reform. As stated earlier there are four 
critical aspects for administration of the property tax - property identi-
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fication, record keeping, assessment, and collection. 
Unless all are considered, administrative reform will not neces-
sarily produce a "better" property tax. Both of these conclusions point to 
the need to view the property tax as a system rather than as a set of 
independent activities. 
An important point is that it is important to monitor and if possible 
quantify the importance of the property tax in order to plan for effective 
reform. The major weaknesses in the administrative practices of property 
taxation can be identified by quantitative measurement of such compo-
nents as assessment, exemptions, and collection. This approach was 
developed and applied in Bogota (Linn 1980b). For 1972, it was found 
that a ratio of effective to statutory property tax rate of 0.50 was 
accounted for by a collection ratio of 0.68, an exemption ratio of 0.87, 
and an assessment ratio of 0.85. In other words, the 50 percent shortfall 
of the actual average property tax rate from the legal rate was accounted 
for by the combination of a 32 percent shortfall in collection below tax 
liabilities, exemption of 13 percent of all assessed property value, and an 
under assessment of 15 percent. The low income-elasticity of property 
tax revenues of 0.77 between 1961 and 1972 was, however, accounted for 
mainly by the relatively low income-elasticity of market value (0.67). 
Administrative practices (in particular collection efficiency), exemp-
tions, and assessment practices actually improved slightly over time as 
CHAPTCR - 6 425 
indicated by greater than unitary elasticities of tax collections to tax 
liabilities, taxable assessed value to total assessed value, and total 
assessed value to market value of property (Linn 1980b). In Bogota, 
therefore, administrative practices of property taxation, and especially 
collection efficiency, left considerable room for improvement. But 
permanent improvements in the revenue buoyancy should, according to 
this analysis, not be expected from improved tax administration.'^ 
In above few paragraphs, we have outlined some steps taken 
worldwide to tone up property tax administration. Now let us be 
specific and see that what measures can be taken to improve tax 
administration in India. 
Toning up of Tax Administration 
The machinery for administration of various taxes in general and 
property tax in particular needs to be toned up. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the administration of property tax is suffuring from certain 
deficiencies. For elimination of these deficiencies following points are 
suggested : 
Enhancing the Coverage 
Presently, the valuation and assessment department is not impos-
ing property tax in the - unauthorised and relocation colonies. It should 
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not be necessarily assumed that all the properties in these colonies are 
below the exemption limit of property tax. By not going for valuation and 
assessment in these colonies, for example the MCD is losing a handsome 
amount of tax revenue. MCD covers about 2 million people and hence 
approximately about 4 lakh households who are provided with municipal 
services but do not pay anything for this. To begin with, the property tax 
and the service charges could be separated from each other and the 
residents of unauthorised colonies and relocation colonies could at least 
pay the service charges. 
Removing the Back Log of Valnation 
Majority of the municipalities, are not able to finalise valuation 
with respect to all properties with the result that there is a sizable number 
of properties yet to be assessed. The accumulating tax burden of the 
assesses concerned will not make them to promptly comply with 
the payment of the tax. An efficient valuation and assessment machinery 
is therefore required to promptly detect the newly constructed 
properties as also the addition and alteration in the old properties 
and impose the tax at an appropriate time so that the tax does not 
become a burden to be avoided. 
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Delinking of Rent Control Law and Property Valuation 
If a rented property is fetching a handsome amount as rentals, there 
is every justification to impose a tax on it at the market rate. The main 
contention in property taxation the world over has been to devise ways 
and means to capture the "market rent" so that property tax becomes an 
efficient fiscal instrument for resource mobiliation. If the tax base is not 
buoyant one is left with manouering the rate only. This is what ought to be 
done to improve the fisical capabilities of the municipalities. 
Tax Collection 
The information on the extent of total current tax demand and 
demand for the arrears and actual collection is not available. This does 
not enable to take an objective view of tax administration. The arrears are 
still mounting. It will help the municipalities to have an inventory of 
properties classified according to the assessed value and tax demand and 
concentrate its collection machinery on the high value properties ac-
cording to the ABC analysis. These reforms notwithstanding, the argu-
mentation of resources will ultimately depend on the extent to which the 
tax is collected. Bringing about improvement in collection requires 
introduction of innovations in collection methods and procedures. These 
should provide in incentives to the taxpayers for prompt payment and 
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penalties for the nonpayment of tax on time. This also requires the 
formulationm of certain measures for the satisfaction of the 
taxpayers. The following suggestions are therefore given to improve 
property tax collection : 
a) With a view to motivate taxpayers to make prompt payments attrac-
tive rebates should be offered. It is a kind of positive inducements. In 
many countries (Colambia and Philippnes for examples), cash dis-
counts have been provided for early payment. Unfortunately, these 
discounts often are well below the market rate of interest. Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Thailand have provided direct incentives to the collec-
tors - village chiefs, neighbourhood leaders and so forth - who 
participate in the collection process on a commission basis. Alterna-
tively, the incentive might be given to the local government. In the 
Philippines, 10 percent of the total amount collected has been 
returned to the neighbourhood council (barangay) budget. In India, 
for example MCD had introduced various incentives for fast recov-
ery of property tax arrears and also of current demand. As a result the 
receipts on account of property taxes which was only Rs. 3248.19 
lakhs in 1983-84 jumped to more than Rs. 8757 lakhs in 1986-87 
which marks an increase of more than 169 percent within a period of 
just three years. 
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b) The defaulters at the same time, need to be penalised for not making 
payments on time. For this they should be charged a penal rate of 
interest. If, however, the arrears have mounted to an enormous 
extent, the management of arrears would call for some sort of 
defreezing for improving the collection efficiency. The MCD, for 
example has evolved an informal practice of settling disputed cases 
through discussion and mutual understanding rather than taking them 
to a court of law. This way it has successfully sellected, about 22,000 
desiputed cases in one single year, 1985-86. 
c) The employees of the municipal bodies involved in collection need 
to be given some financial incentives so that they are motivated to 
collect the taxes on time. 
d) Taxpayers hesitate in making prompt payments becuse despite the 
fact that payment has been made, arrears are shown because of 
the absence of a proper recording system. The recording system 
therefore needs to be made efficient by introducing pass books for 
taxpayers wherein the tax demand, date and amount of payment, 
arrears, and such other details are recorded. The Visakhapatnam 
municipal corporation has recently introduced a system of accepting 
collection through banks. This has enhanced tax collection remark-
ably (to about 90 percent of the tax demand) in the year 1987-88. 
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National Institute of urban Affairs has worked out the project-
ed yield from property taxes in case special efforts are made to mobilise 
property taxes as per the guidelines given in the preceding paragraphs. On 
a fairly low assumption, we have assumed a 50 percent increase in the 
property tax revenues for both the years, 1995 and 2001, Table E : 6.6. 
This table makes it absolutely clear that if administration is improved 
and collection tightned then increase in property tax would be 
substantial projected figures of 1995 and 2000 make it clear that 
municipalities property tax revenue would be substantial. In other 
words elasticity and buoyancy would improve considerably as a result of 
improved tax administration. 
Improving Taxpayers' Perceptions and Realations Between the Tax-
payer and the Administration 
Because property taxes are generally a local tax and are paid by a 
very large proportion of the population, it is important that they are 
administered in an efficient and fair manner. During recent years local 
governments have placed greater emphasis on improving the administra-
tion of these taxes and on improving the relationship between the taxpay-
er and the tax administration. This section examines briefly ways in which 
these issues can be approached. 
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a) The Political Dimension 
Local politicians are extremely sensitive to the way a local prop-
erty tax is administered. This explains why, in many countries, govern-
ment ensures that they are closely involved in designing changes to the 
system. It also explain why some countries try to involve laymen in the 
assessment and appeal procedures. For example, in Sweden laymen these 
administrative bodies. 
Another issue where local politicians are concerned is the fre-
quency and fairnes of valuation. A system which involves infrequent and 
therefore generally large re-evaluations is unlikely to be favoured at the 
local level. Computerisation of the valuation process is gradually allevi-
ating this problem. 
A similar concern arises on the use of tax reliefs to alleviate 
hardship. Recent years have seen the spread of these measures, which 
include : 
* Possibilities to defer tax (few countries have this provision) 
* Reliefs for family circumstances (some countries have this 
provision) 
* Reliefs for the aged (many countries) 
Although these measures improve the fairness of the tax they can, 
if used extensively, undermine the rational of a property tax. 
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b) Avoiding Complexity 
In comparison to many other taxes, the property tax is a realtively 
simplex tax, though evaluation procedures can be complex. But in any tax 
there is always a trade-off between simplicity, fairness and compliance. 
One area which has been examined by many countries, is the design of 
forms sent to property owners, either during general revaluations or as 
part of the annual tax return. Forms have been reviewed to simplify the 
language, layout and instructions so that they are more readily under-
stood and produce fewer difficulties (and errors) in their completion by 
taxpayers. Another reason for redesigning forms is to make them more 
compatible with computerised processes. An alternative approach to-
wards achieving these same objectives which has been introduced in 
some countries (e.g. Belgium, Canada) is to develop a tiered system of 
forms related to the complexity of the taxpayer's situation. In Denmark 
a Working Group is currently reviewing the "readability" of forms; form 
reforms are under way in Norway; and in the United Kingdom reviews of 
all forms are undertaken every three years. These latter aim to both 
improve comprehension and reduce error in form completion. In Bel-
gium recent steps to simply forms and instructions have been welcomed 
by the public, and a recntly created Royal Commission for tax simplifi-
cation and Harmonisation reached its first conclusions in a 1987 
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report'^. Thus, in India, our endeavour should be to simplify property tax 
structure, so that it is comprehensible to common tax-payers. 
c) Improved communication with the taxpayer 
The aim is to ensure that taxpayers have a better understanding of 
the ways in which their property taxes are calculated and the use to 
which the revenues are put. A wide range of communication techniques 
are used to achieve these objectives : television, radio, newspapers, 
seminars, leaflets, etc. 
Policies for better informing taxpayers (of their rights, obliga-
tions and how their taxes are spent) have also a permanent feature of 
recent years. These policies have been put into practice in a variety of 
ways. In addition to the more traditional methods of disseminating 
information (printed brochures, displays, etc.), much greater use is now 
being made of, for example, telephone services and computerised data. 
A distinction can be made between providing information, guid-
ance and assistance on the tax system, and attempting to improve under-
standing by citizens of the underlying reasons for taxes and the means by 
which they are collected. Leaflets are widely used to explain the system, 
and some countries take advantage of post offices and public libraries to 
help disseminate their literature to the public. 
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More comprehensive and detailed understanding of the tax system 
is being achieved in France using the technique of "information days" 
which are organised on specific themes in collaboration with local 
elected officials and representatives of professional organisations. 200-
300 people attend each such event. 
Denmark provides an original example of how citizens may be 
encouraged to read leaflets. A brochure which brought together meassages 
from some 20 parts of the administration, including tax, was circulated 
to around two million households. Within the leaflet was a competition 
based upon a cross-word which required careful reading of the messages 
in order to be completed. Numerous large prizes were offered and a TV 
show was organised to choose winners from the 6 lakh entries all of 
which were correct this shows that written communication can be effec-
tive if appropriate presentation and language is used. 
The media are also being widely used. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, local radio is used as a form of "tax surgery' for up to 300,000 
listeners at a time. Sweden trains managerial staff in media contact and 
provides seminars on taxation for journalists. 
A more passive but increasingly important means of communicat-
ing with the public in recent years has been the availability of free 
telephone services to answer specific enquiries from taxpayers. In Nor-
CHAPTCR - 6 435 
way, local tax officials participate each year in a call in programme on the 
local broadcasting network. Elsewhere, more use is also being made of 
attendance at seminars and displays at exhibitions where the public can be 
contacted on "neutral ground". This is seen to be important in the activ-
ities of some countries in their attempts to improve public understanding 
of the work of the tax administration. Mobile centres and information 
clinics further support this approach, while the "open day" concept used 
in Sweden seems to achieve similar results by "bringing down the barri-
ers" around the administration. The development of a distinctive "house 
style" which demonstrates a positive and correct approach to carrying out 
duties is increasingly favoured. Above discussed steps taken by certain 
countries, to improve communication between tax authority and taxpay-
ers make it abunatnatly clear that, in our country there is urgent need to 
strengthen 'communication as it will clear many doubts, confusions in the 
minds of tax-payers. 
d) Contact points and Contact Staff 
A key area in communication is the role of contact staff and 
reception areas in dealing with enquiries about property and other taxes. 
Tax officers suffer from the occupational hazards of being resent-
ed by most of the public with whom they come into contact. An important 
motivation for communicating a "service" image is, therefore, to in-
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crease moral within tax administrations. The service component of the 
local tax administration's functions plays a significant role in job satis-
faction. Many staff need to see at least part of their role as providing 
service and this is particularly the case for contact staff since these are 
the people with whom most taxpayers have to deal. Some countries have 
found it useful to have two levels at which tax officials have contact with 
the taxpayer. The first contact point deals with simple enquiries (e.g. 
distribution of property tax returns) and takes note of changes in the 
taxpayers's circumstances (e.g. information on property held; change of 
address). Any further enquiries are directed to a second level contact 
point which is staffed by better qualified personnel. This approach 
reduces the queuing time for taxpayers and increases the efficiency of 
the administration. 
The main thrust of recent efforts have been to make visitor recep-
tion areas more responsive to customers' needs. Thus much attenton has 
been given to the provision of privacy, comfort, better signposting 
(clearer, more consistent, better located), better organised queuing 
arrangements, and counter facilities able to accommodate disabled per-
sons. For example in the United Kingdom, the approach is an "openplan" 
which places no physical barriers between the taxpayer and the tax 
officer. Similarly Sweden's service project is emphasising that each tax 
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office should review its own reception facilities in term such as space, 
design and equipment. And in Canada the "Access to Information Act" has 
led to the provision of a separate room, where complete sets of tax 
documentation on policies and procedures may be consulted. 
Another aspect of improving responsiveness by providing easier 
access is depicted in the shift toward more flexible opening hours of tax 
offices. While many countries have uniform opening hours throughout 
the year and across the country numerous others have adopted an ap-
proach which is much more adapted to local conditions. Thus Ireland's 
White Paper on providing better services calls for adjustable office 
opening hours to facilitate public access. 
e) Improving Taxpayers Rights 
One way in which some governments have tried to improve the 
relations between taxpayers and the tax authorities — and not just that part 
of the administration dealing with property tax — is by setting out clearly 
the rights of taxpayers. One approach is a declaration of taxpayers rights 
(Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and is usually discussed in the 
United Stated); another is a statement of "service policy" intended to 
improve cooperation and contact with citizens within the tax administra-
tion (Sweden), or a "corporate plan" which includes a statement of 
principles (New Zealand). The third approach takes the form of a more 
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general legislation (Administration Acts in Finland, Sweden) or a White 
Paper (on "Serving the country Better" in Ireland). An approach found to 
be helpful in France in improving tax "morality" is the creation of large 
number (Presently some 500 with 800,000 members) of "authorised 
associations" which operate under private law in specific sectors of the 
economy but with the participation of a representative of the tax admin-
istration. France has also recently (May 1986) created a Commission for 
Improving Relations between citizens and the tax administration (and 
Customs). One concern is with simplification, but its main task is to 
propose reforms which will better guarantee the basic rights of taxpay-
ers, representatives of whom are included in the Commission. 
The Candian declaration has been widely promoted to improve 
public trust in the tax system. It emphasises, amongst other things, 
impartiality and courtesy and a number of concrete steps have been taken 
to demonstrate goodwill and encourage taxpayer cooperation. In the 
United Kingdom a set of communication policy guidelines has been 
developed, and the Swedish tax administration's service policy is also 
supported by specific measures which are consistent with its eight stated 
intentions. These latter include easy access to offices; the use of simple, 
easily understood language; good relations with the mass media and other 
representatives of the public; and staff who are well informed, helpful, 
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responsible and who take pride in their work. The zist of the matter is that 
taxpayers cooperation is possible only and only when their certain well 
deserved rights are recognized. 
f) Decentralising the Administration of Property Taxes 
Several countries are now consciously seeking to further 
decentralise their tax administrations, often in the context of providing 
easier access and better service to taxpayers. In Australia, for example, 
the tax administration is accelerating its programme of breaking up the 
larger offices into smaller autonomous units as part of a National 
Decentralisation Plan. It is presently intended to increase the number of 
branch officers from 9 to 16. Dual objectives are cited in support of this 
strategy ; one set relating to improving efficiency, productivity and 
working conditions of staff as well as reducing cost; the other aiming to 
provide more effective service to taxpayers and improve the accessibil-
ity of the tax administration. 
In most tax administrations there are usually two or sometimes 
three tiers of administration, the lowest of which tends to be rather 
extensively dispersed geographically, with sometimes hundreds of dis-
trict tax offices serving local communitites. In Denmark, the ratio of 
central to local full time tax administration employees is 2:7. In France, 
there are 828 local tax centres spread throughout the country, and in 
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Norway, with only 2.7 million taxpayers, there are 454 local assessment 
offices, suplemented by the same number of municipal treasurer's offic-
es which receive and control prepayment of tax, make refunds, enforce 
claims, etc. 
g) The Introduction of New Information Technology 
The introduction of information technology into central and local 
tax offices has been one of the most significant changes in recent years 
in terms of procedures, performance and interaction with clients. 
Computerisation has had an important impact on the speed, accuracy and 
consistency with which information is transmitted. In the case of prop-
erty taxes computers can enable changes of ownership to be speedily 
registered and speeds up revalution procedures. All of this lead to less 
complaints from property owners in addition to improving services to 
clients this has also helped the functions of control and coordination. 
Computerisation has several objectives: easier handling of statistical 
data, more rapid and accurate processing of information, quicker re-
sponse times, better data quality and consistency, faster implementation 
of change, greater facility to combat evasion, and more scope of inter-
departmental coordination may be achieved. And of course, as a result of 
all this there is a better quality of service to the taxpayer. 
One potential negative effect of information technology on tax-
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payers' relations is the "temporary shortfall" which might occur between 
taxpayer expectations of certain service levels, as built up over many 
years of "consistent, automated programme delivery", and the tax sys-
tem's "capacity to absorb massive changes in legislation" as sometimes 
occurs. Another disadvantage is the reinforcement of inequities of dis-
advantaged groups such as the elderly or less literate, who are more likely 
to be intimidated by the modern technology. 
An Experiment in Mechanisation of the Property Tax Department of 
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
It was thought in 1964 to instal an automatic data process machine 
as an experimental measure for partial mechanisation of the processes of 
preparing bills and notices and maintenance of the accounts of the 
property taxes with a view to bring in greater speed, neatness, accuracy 
and economy in the working of the assessment and collection depart-
ment. With the approval of the corporation the scheme was started in 
April, 1967. In 1970 its working was studied and reviewed by the O & M 
unit and in the light of the findings this step had to be retraced. Delhi's 
experience is contrary to the faith that mechanisation always results in 
efficiency in work and economy in expenditure. 
Findings of the O & M Study 
Mechanisation generally leads to simplification of working 
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procedures and reduction of work, increased efficiency and speed of 
work and economy in working costs. So far as the ADP section is 
concerned the position in regard to each of these expected advantages 
emerged as follows 
Work Simplification 
In short, mechanisation did not simplify the work rather process 
become very cumbersome, time consuming and tedious. About 50 
percent of the work involved in preparing bills and notices had to be 
done manually or semi-manually and the machine could do only the 
rest about 50 percent. 
Efficiency 
A study of the working of the machine has also revealed that the 
existing machine suffered from the following major mechanical or other 
defects which had decidely acted to the deteriment of its efficiency. 
Speed 
The chief advantage claimed for the ADP machine was the speed 
with which the bills and notices could be prepared and printed. The study 
revealed that, on an average, the work of mechanical preparation and 
printing of the bills and notices (including the time taken in despatch) was 
done in about one-fourth of the time in comparison to the time taken in 
the manual preparation of the bills and notices (and their despatch) in the 
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non-ADP zones. This advantage had however been offset by the compli-
cations created as a result of the rush that resulted both at the headquar-
ters, and the zones. The advantage, of speed expected to flow from 
mechanisation was, therefore largely lost. 
Other Weaknesses of Mechanisation 
There were some other major weakness inherent in the existing 
system of mechanisation. Duplicate records, such as copies of demand 
and collection registers had to be maintained both in the ADP section as 
well as in the zones, at considerable expense of labour, time and station-
ary, so that the zonal office could refer to them and effectively answer 
any queries from the tax payers who visited the zones for making 
payment, etc. Such duplication of record had, however, hardly helped 
because the zonal bill clerks did not care to keep the posting 
up-to-date, and merely directed the property owners to refer their 
enquiries to the ADP section. 
Economics of Mechanisation 
When the scheme for mechanisation was worked out it was antici-
pated that it would result in a monthly saving of about Rs, 13,000 in 
establishment costs. In actuality, no such saving has materialised. On the 
contrary, staff costing about Rs. 98,000 (including new posts costing 
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about Rs, 42,000) a year has had to be provided for the work of the ADP 
section alone. 
Comparatively speaking, therefore, the cost of handling the work 
relating to a single demand mechanically was twice as high as the cost of 
handling it manually. 
Thus the experiment of partial mechanisation had failed to achieve 
any of its objectives of efficiency, speed or economy. It was thought to 
look for a more efficient and economical alternative which would form 
the basis of a uniform, efficient and economical arrangement for prepa-
ration of bills and notices and maintenance of accounts in all the zones, 
keeping convenience also in view. 
Our above done anlaysis about the effectiveness of mechanisation 
has proven that mechanisation has not led to any kind of efficiency in the 
operation of property tax administration. But, we should not jump to the 
conclusion that computerisation has no utility in the administration of 
property tax. Question is that when it has improved the property tax 
administration in many other countries, then why not in India? We have to 
ponder over it. Actually, it is a matter of attitude. When it was introduced 
in the municipality of Delhi then computerisation was quite new phenom-
enon. There is a natural tendency to resist innovation and thus change, 
though it is not a rational approach. At that time people's preception of 
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computerisation was against it as prevalent belief was that it would result 
into displacement of human workforce. It was situation then. But, now 
people's attitude towards computerisation has undergone perceptible 
change. Now, people have been accepting the utility of computerisation. 
Hence, once again we should try for the computerisation of property tax 
administration. 
Conclusions 
There are three important conclusions. One is that property tax 
structure and administration go hand in hand and can not easily be 
separated when undertaking a reform. A second is that there are four 
critical aspects to administration of the property tax reform - property 
identification record keeping, assessment, and collection. Unless all are 
considered, administrative reform will not necessarily produce a "better" 
property tax. Both of these conclusions point to the need to view the 
property tax as a system rather than as a set of independent activities. 
A third conclusion is that it is important to monitor and if possible 
quantify the importance of the property tax in order to plan for effective 
reform. The major weaknesses in the administrative practices of property 
taxation can be identified by quantitative measurement of such compo-
nents as assessment exemptions, and collection. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion 
• Local governments do play an important part in the development of 
cities. Despite handicaps - population growth, inflation, and resource 
constraint - real per capita expenditure of local governments and autono-
mous agencies increased during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. In 
the 1980s, however, many cities saw real expenditure levels decline signi-
fying fiscal problems and a deterioration of civic services. 
In general, city governments meet about 70 percent of their expendi-
ture out of locally raised revenues. There has however been a decline in the 
share of local revenues in thel980s reflecting greater dependence on 
external sources usually controlled by higher level governments. 
Average based on available data show that about 50 percent of the 
local revenues is derived from taxes, the rest from self-financing services 
but again the pattern in far from uniform. A variety of taxes are drawn upon 
by local governments the property tax being the most common and often the 
dominant tax source. 
Property tax and octroi are the most important components of the tax 
income of the selected municipal bodies and together account for nearly 90 
percent of such income. Although octroi has been an elastic and bouyant 
source of revenue its future is clouded by uncertainty. Octroi has not been 
considered as a source of further tax income owing to the central govern-
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ments commitment to do away with it. In this context, we have to basically 
rely on property taxes for mobilising the existing resources within the 
framework of the Municipal Acts. 
Atleast 70 percent of the income of the municipalities comes from 
taxes, i.e., tax on property, house tax, water tax, lighting tax, drainage and 
conservancy tax, etc. Property tax is not as important in small municipali-
ties as in big ones due to a variety of factors. Whatever may be the policy 
impasse, it is shere incompotence in the system that the per capita property 
tax is no more than Rs. 2.60 per capita per month even in million plus cities. 
This is in cities where even one room apartment in an ordinary localities can 
cost up to Rs. 1000 per month. In smaller municipalities per capita per 
month property tax is just one quarter of a rupee. 
Though the property tax is one of the major sources in the 
municipal revenue. The share of property tax in the total municipal revenue 
is on decline. 
There has been a very increasing evidence over recent years that the 
property tax has not been a buoyant source of revenue. Growth in property 
tax revenue has not been commensurated with the potential that it has, 
keeping in mind the increases in market values of property over the same 
period. Further, the tax is not elastic to increasing service costs and is not 
related to demand for services emanating from different land uses. 
Other criticisms of the existing system of property tax are based on 
broader issues of rising land values which it is unable to keep pace with and 
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serve any urban development objectives. Thus, it is neither serving as a tool 
of resources mobilisation for meeting the increasing demand for services 
nor as an instrument for promoting the urban development objectives with 
the result the property tax has become an inefficient and inequitous tax 
instrument. 
Thus, increasing dormant fiscal role of property tax apart, it is no 
longer an elastic source of revenue. Whereas the elasticity of property tax 
at constant price to propulation is weak in the case of Bombay, Delhi and 
Madrass, it is inelastic in Ahmedabad and negative in Calcutta. In Calcutta, 
it was found inelastic to capital investmjent at the city level and the number 
of holdings. A recent study of property tax in per capita terms has fallen 
behind that of land prices, rents and general cost of construction. The 
buoyancy of property tax per capita with respect to average land price was 
around 0.5, with respect to cost of cosntruction it was around 0.8. It was 
about 0.7 with respect to rents (Delhi Administration 1990 : 22-23). 
In addition to declining revenue performance and inelasticity and 
disparities, serious inequities have come to characterise the property tax 
system in India. These shortcomings of the present property tax system are 
the result of a combination of inherent infirmities in the system itself. These 
infirmities as also the evolution of declining role of property tax, its 
inelasticity, disparities and inequities can be better understood and 
appreceated by looking at the basic feature of property tax system in India. 
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There exists four types of rate structure as provided for in the various 
statutes. These are (1) flat rate system, (2) slab system, (3) graduated slab 
system, and (4) straight line system. 
The corporations of Delhi and Calcutta practice discriminating tax 
rates betw^een residential and non-residential properties. In Delhi, the 
marginal rates of general tax for these two types of properties vary from 10 
and 15 percent respectively on the lowest slab to 20 to 25 percent 
respectively in the slab of Rs. 10-20 thousand. The Corporation of Calcutta 
imposes surcharge on non-residential properties to the extent of 50 percent 
of the consolidated rate. It gives tax concession upto 45 percent of the 
consolidated rate to the newely constructed properties for a period of 
three years. 
Relatively high tax rate in Bombay and Ahmedabad (including 
service taxes) has been brought about by the compulsions of a depressed 
base. Ever increasing local public expenditure commitments and the de-
pressed tax base are compelling factors for the enhancement of tax rate. 
However, the corporations of Madras and Trivandrum seem oblivious to 
such a situation. In the latter, the rate structure has not been revised since 
1967. In the former, it is still pegged at 1972 levels. 
A great deal of variation is found in the tax rates not only between 
different states but also amongst the various municipalities of same state. 
Thus, there is inter-state variation as well as intra - state variation in rate 
structure. The consolidated rate (consisting of property tax and other 
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service taxes) varies from a minimum of 6.25 percent of the ARV in Alwar 
in Rajasthan to a maximum of 20 percent in Ghaziabad in U.P. It thus, 
indicates interstate variations. 
In Haryana all the municipal bodies levy the tax at a uniform rate of 
12.5 percent of the ARV except for the municipal bodies at Faridabad and 
Rohtak. These towns apply a lower rate of 10 percent of ARV. The reason 
for such a lower rate is attributed to the fact that in Rohtak the rates have 
not been revised since 1935 whereas in Faridabad the existing rates are the 
same as in the years prior to 1971. 
In U.R, there exist variations in the general house tax rates as well. 
These vary from aminimum of the 5 percent in Hapur to 10-12.5 percent in 
Meerut. There are two reasons for such variations in the property tax rates 
in Uttar Pradesh. Firstly, the U.R Municipality Act does not provide for a 
fixed limit of property taxes. Secondly the revisions have not been made in 
an uniform manner. Except for Ghazibad all other towns belonging to U.R 
have not revised their rates for several years. 
It is equally important to note that there is a positive relationship 
between the property tax rates and the per capita yield. Ghaziabad which 
has the highest rate of this tax (24%) also happens to be the town with the 
highest per capita yield. As against this, in Alwar the yield is the lowest as 
the prevaling tax rate happens to be only five percent of the ARV. Hence 
there is scope to rationalise the rate structure of property taxes. 
In certain cases, there appears to be a variation in the rate structure 
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of property taxes. For instance, the rate structure in U.P. towns varies 
substantially from one town to other. Similarly from among the Haryana 
towns, Faridabad and Rohtak apply a rate lower (10% of rateable value) 
than all other towns (12% of rateable value). The main reason for such 
variation has been the inability of the municipal bodies to pass a resoultion 
and request the state government to issue a notification for modifying their 
rate structure in accordance with their eligibility. 
Though rental value of land and building constitutes the base of 
property tax, the enabling legislations in all the states have only vaguely 
defined the base. Lack of clarity in the definition of property tax base has 
led to considerable erosion in the base with all its accompanying conse-
quences for elasticity and buoyancy of property tax. Almost all the enact-
ments for constituting the municipal authorities in various Indian states 
define the base as the "gorss annual rent of land and building at which they 
may reasonably be expected to let from year to year". Deductions varying 
from 10 to 15 percent of the gross annual rental value are provided for in 
various enactments towards repairs and maintenance so that the properties 
could be in a state to command that rent. 
Only in Gujarat, the Municipal Acts and Rules provide for the "rent 
actually realised" as the basis for levying of property tax. But it also lays 
down that if the rent realised is a collusive rent, the tax is to be assessed on 
the basis of "reasonable rent". Some of the Acts provide for determination 
of annual rental value by taking some proportion of the capital value of land 
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and buildings. The enactments in the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala 
provide that for government and railway properties are any other type of 
property which are not rented and therefore the rent can not be estimated, 
rental value is to be computed at 6 percent of the price of land and the 
estimated cost of construction at the time of assessment. The law provides 
for depreciation on construction cost varying from 10 to 15 percent. 
The Calcutta Corporation Act provides for 5 percent of the capital 
value of properties used as hospitals, educational institutions, places of 
worship etc. as the gross rental value. However this is 7.5 percent for other 
types of properties for which rental value can not be estimated. The Act has 
an innovative provision in so far as it has included also "service charges" 
within the purview of rentals. 
Property tax apparently, consists of rentals which a property could 
be" reasonably expected" to fetch in the market. Application of such an 
abstract concept in a real live situation has been one of the major problems 
afflicting the property tax in India. 
There is found to be an erosion in the property tax base owing to the 
operation of rent control laws. The operation of rent control laws has 
considerably depressed the base of this tax. The "reasonable annuals gross 
value" is not the market value but the standard rent as determined according 
to the provisions of the rental laws. 
The determination of the base of this tax, that is, the gross annual 
value at which the property is" reasonably let from year to year" is a highly 
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subjective exercise and hence is riddled with corrupt practices. This could 
be minimised by making the valuation objective and explicit. This requires 
the standardisation of rents on a per sq. ft. basis by taking into account some 
of the attributes of the property such as location, quality and type of 
construction, land use, age of building and so on which are instrumental in 
raising property values. The municipal corporation of Delhi already fol-
lows this method in a crude manner by evolving what they call the "rental 
data". Further sophistication has been brought into it in Bombay, Bangalore 
and in all the Urban areas in Kerala. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corpora-
tion has introduced valuation on the basis of carpet area which takes into 
account attributes such as location access to infrastructure, use and struc-
ture of the properties concerned. 
Proposals have been made to replace the base of ARV by alternatives 
like capital value, or site value, or composite bases determined by the 
summation of a number of selected variables, (e.g, location, type of 
building, age of structure, etc.) each with a predetermined weight. It is 
necessary to mention that several countries including Canada, U.S.A. some 
Latin American countries and a few other, have the capital value base. In 
U.K., frofn which our system was borrowed, the Layfield Committee of 
1976 recommended a change over from ARV to capital value, but this 
recommendation has not been accepted by the British Government. 
Although capital value base has advantages like easy determination 
than ARV; flexibility in adjusting rates; inducing better land use by bringing 
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unimproved land under taxation; attaining the desired allocative effects in 
regard to the use of land; and becoming more responsive to the economic 
changes and have an objective valuation of property; in Indian situation 
because of the imperfect property market, the system cannot work. Unlike 
Europe and America where CV system is in vogue, we do not have a well 
developed real estate market in our country, where properties could be sold 
frequently. Even when the properties are sold, the amount mentioned in the 
sale deed is understated. The valuation exercise in the absence of a well 
developed real estate market will prove to be highly subjective. Local 
Finance Enquiry Committee 1951 and Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-
54 were all against the CV system. 
Will it then be worthwhile to switch over to Site Value (SV) system 
? The SV system of property taxation besides serving as an instrument of 
revenue mobilisation, also serves the urban development objectives. Under 
this system the tax is imposed only on the value of the site, leaving out all 
structures. It is, argued that if building are'derated' then building activity 
will be encouraged and unutilised areas fully utilised. 
However, the basic problem of valuation, still remains intact. If there 
is no open and free land market, the determination of site value presents the 
same dfficulty as that of capital value. Leaving the buildings out will mean 
serious discrimination against the owners of residential accommodation or 
small structures. 
This then leaves the scope for reforming the property tax limited to 
CHAPTCR - 7 457 
a system of imposing the tax on the basis of certain area details. Suggestions 
have been made for the replacement of all direct valuation whether of 
rental, or of capital worth, or of site, by some objective criteria, like the area 
of land, the plinth area, the floor area and so on. A more developed variant 
of this 'composite base' or the 'points system' under which the tax is payable 
is determined by the summation of a number of selected weighed variables. 
In fact, the single criterion schemes also include weightage for a few other 
variables and therefore, all this can be discussed together. 
One suggestion has been to levy a land tax and also a building tax, 
both on the basis of area measurement. The rates would vary according to 
zones and there would be additional charges for non-residential use and 
also to meet development cost where applicable. 
A second suggestion is that in addition to land and plinth areas, other 
factors like location, type of construction, nature of use and age should be 
compounded into a standardised formula. 
The system adopted in Orissa had come somewhat nearer to this 
system. However if the property tax is continued with the system of area 
characteristics and valuation of assessment is formalised on the basis of the 
few most important factors giving rise to property values, it may not 
withstand scrutiny by the courts of law after the enactment of new rent 
control law, if it does not delink the property valuation from the provision 
of rent control law. The fair rent or the hypothetical rent to be fetched by 
a property has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as the standard rent 
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determined according to the Rent Control Act. 
The alternatives suggested reveal that there hardly exists any scope 
for changing base. The remedy lies in improving the ARV system within the 
existing system itself, by either computing the rateable value on the basis 
of area of land and built-up value there on or with the application of 
appropriate factors taking into account the location and standard of 
construction. 
A workable suggestion towards reform in specifying the basis of the 
levy of property tax would be to substitute the Municipal Act, the term 
"standard rent" for "reasonable rent". The following factors are to be taken 
in the calculation of standard rent-the user, percentage of cost of land and 
cost of construction. The system of assessment on the basis of actual rent 
should be abandoned and the rates as per the PWD schedule be revised 
according to a new base year. 
Yet another constraint is the valuation and assessment procedure. 
Firstly, a substantial proportion of additions and alterations brought about 
in the properties are not properly reported. Secondly, the distortion of the 
rental market because of underhand practices of pugree (Key money) and 
advances does not allow an assessment of the real rental values of proper-
ties. The base of this tax thus gets depressed further. Thirdly, the valuation 
and assessment of the property tax is not revised as stipulated in the relevant 
acts and by - laws. 
The crux of the problem in resource mobilisation from this tax lies in 
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capturing, as far as possible, the market value of the land and building so 
that increases in property values are constantly mopped up. This calls 
for periodical valuation and assessment as provided for in the relevant 
laws and bye-laws. 
In view of the fact that it is politically as well as administratively 
difficult to revise the property tax demand in retrospect, it is better if the 
selected municipal bodies exercise their powers of quinquennial assess-
ment of property tax demand well in time. This has substantial potential for 
the mobilisation of municipal resources. 
The attempt to improve the buoyancy of the property tax collection 
through a better method of valuation of the properties can be seen in the 
suggestions of CVB. The method suggested by CVB and immediately 
accepted by some of the municipalities indicates that the rateable value of 
properties has increased substantially. In contrast, the property tax of the 
other municipalities, which continue with the old method of valuation, 
remains at a much lower level. It will be useful to point out that the 
difference in the property tax yield between these two groups of municipali-
ties is statistically significant. 
There exists a host of administrative deficiencies in the management 
of financial resources. These deficiencies are : 
1. There is vertually no management information system for an effective 
and efficient tax administration. For example, information on the 
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various property attributes which are very important for property tax 
administration does not exist even in rudimentary form. This makes it 
difficult to identify the problem areas. 
2. The current accounting and budgeting practices do not include the 
factual and actual resource position. 
3. The collection machinery has been lethargic and inefficient with the 
result that the tax arrears have been mounting year after year. 
Further, delay and backlog in finalisation of valuation is on 
rise. There are about 6 lakh properties within the jurisdiction of the MCD 
and this number is increasing every year due to the process of suburbanisation 
and urban growth. The assessment department, however, is not able to cope 
with this magnitude. Thus valuation and assessment is not finalised for a 
very large number of properties. According to a recent study of procedures 
relating to fixation of reteable value of property in MCD, the backlog of 
properties is increasing year after year. 
Non-availability of data on the extent of current demand, arrears and 
collection of current demand as well as arrears do not permit an objective 
analysis of tax collection. 
There has been a progressive increase in the arrars. Hence, much is 
desired to tone up the collection of property tax. 
Thus, yet another factor adversely affecting revenue performance of 
property tax in India is poor collection efficiency of the property tax 
administration. Whatever tax is assessed on a deficient and depressed base 
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by applying the rate structure which itself is not rationalised and reviewed 
frequently, is not collected effectively. The ratio of collection of total tax 
demand in the case of Ahmedabad has declined from around 40 in 1980-81 
to about 18 in 1990-91. During the same period, its accumulated arrear 
demand has increased from about two-third of the total tax demand. 
Trivandrum municipal corporation is able to collect less than one-third of 
the total property tax demand. Only the municipal corporation of Madras is 
able to collect around 70 percent of the total tax demand. But the arrears to 
be collected have mounted to about one fourth of the total demand. 
No amount of perfection in the base, VAP and rate structure will 
increase the yield from property tax unless the increased demand arising out 
of these packages of reforms are collected (Dillinger 1988). Collection 
efficiency presently is very low. Enhancing of efficiency in tax collection 
will call for application of ABC analysis for concentrating the collection 
efforts on the high value properties which involve very high demand. 
Generally, such properties are less in number but account for a high 
proportion of the total demand. Exempting the low value properties will 
also go a long way in enhancing administrative efficiency as it will save the 
frittering away of energies in realising a small proportion of total demand 
from a very large number of such properties. Other areas of reform pertain 
to penalties to be inflicted for non-compliance and incentives for prompt 
payment, in all the enactments, there is a provision to collect property tax 
as arrears of land revenue, if the assessess default in payment of tax. This 
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provision culminates in attachment of immovable properties. The munici-
pal authorites hardly take recourse to this provision. MCD has, however, 
innovated an interesting practice of attachment of bank accounts. This has 
proved much more effective in promoting tax collection than the compli-
cated procedures involved in attachment of immovable property. Charging 
a penal rate of interest is yet another strategy which could be profitably used 
for ensuring tax compliance. 
Raising of exemption limit to Rs. 1000 per annum and a package of 
incentives given in Delhi byMCD led to doubling of property tax collection 
from Rs. 180.96 million in 1978-79 to Rs. 379.52 million in 1983-84 
(Sharmal991 : 34-68). Incentives included a rebate of 25 percent in tax for 
SOPs and properties constructed after 31 March, 1985 if the tax was paid 
within the due date. This for the partially self-occupied properties was 15 
per cent. The municipal staff engaged in collection work were given cash 
awards for enhancing the collection ratio. This provided a built-in incentive 
for the employee to be motivated. If these incentives did not work, the 
penalty included attachement of bank account as also the immovable 
property. Litigation is minimised by providing for in the law itself for 
payment of tax before moving a court for legal intervention. 
Generalization About Property Tax Policy 
1. The property tax should be kept as simple as possible. Exemptions 
should be kept to a minimum and rate structure kept as uncomplicated 
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as possible. Reform should emphasize improving the general property 
tax administration rather than adding special features to affect resource 
allocation or income distribution. 
2. The property tax needs to be viewed as a system, and reforms need to 
be coordinated by all parties involved in structuring and administrating 
the property tax. Decisions about assessment and collection practices, 
exemption policy, and rate structure design may be the responsibility 
of different offices but must not be made independently. 
3. In general, a flat rate property tax on all real estate is not likely to be 
regressive in either the short or long run. 
4. The distribution of property tax burdens will be more progressive if the 
preferential treatment granted to owner-occupants is eliminated. 
5. The exemption of low-value properties or, better yet, granting all 
taxpayers a deduction from assessed value will make the property tax 
more progressive, favour low-income housing development, and ease 
property tax collection problems. The revenue costs will be small. 
6. On balance, it is preferable to tax land more heavily than improve-
ments. Therefore, if increased revenues are to be raised from an 
existing capital value tax, it is worth considering raising the tax rate 
only for land, rather than for land and buildings alike. 
7. If a special tax is to be levied on vacant urban land to speed up its 
development, this tax instrument should be explicitly linked to a land 
use development plan rather than applied indiscriminately to all vacant 
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property in the metropolitan area. 
8. A property transfer tax is likely to interfere with the efficient operation 
of urban land markets and should be replaced by more effective 
administration, and possibly a higher rate, for the general property tax. 
9. A land value increment tax is not likely to be effectively administrated 
in developing countries. Efforts to raise property tax revenues would 
do better to focus on improving the administration of existing 
property tax systems. 
10. The four facets of property tax administration - identification of 
properties, record keeping, assessment, and collection - must all be 
improved to make the property tax more productive. Improvitig collec-
tion efficiency alone will increase revenues in the short run but will not 
provide the broader base necessary for long-run growth. 
Suggestions for Reconstruction of Property Taxation in India 
As the contraints in the existing practices inhibit the optimum 
utilisation of the property tax base, the resources from this source can not 
be substantially mobilised unless these constraints are removed. In view of 
this a set of measures is suggested which can help in removing 
these constraints. 
Nature of Base 
a) Buoyancy of property tax could be restored by restoring the 
competitiveness of the rental market by, among other things, explicitly 
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defining the base and delinking the dampening effects of RCLs on 
property valuation. 
b) The abstract concept of'reasonable rent' needs to be explicitly defined 
in terms of "rent actually received" or "the prevailing rent" so that 
there does not exist any amendment about it. It will have to be 
accomanied by amendment in the RCLs. 
c) Sustainable reform for refurbishing of the base requires to amend the 
RCLs in one of the three ways viz. (i) complete delinking of provisions 
of the RCLs from municipal assessment; (ii) restructing the scope of 
the RCLs for providing protection to the target group for which these 
laws were enacted; and (iii) indexing of Standard Rent. 
Valuation and Assessment Practices 
Timely Revisions 
d) With a view to exploit fully the revenue raising potential of property 
taxes, an attempt should be made to capture the rising market values 
of urban properties by a regular and timely review of property tax 
assessment. In other words, efforts should be made to have a timely 
revision of assessment of urban properties. 
e) To dispense with the existing favourable and liberal assessment of 
SOPs; to review the exemption of Union properties which are not let 
and hence for which there does not exist a rental evidence, by applying 
certain ratio on the market value of land and buildings. 
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f) Collusive rent and concealing of rent could be dealt with by restora-
tion of market rent as the norm for assessment of RV. If, however, it 
is not effective. Rent Standarisation could be put in to the law itself so 
that the rent per unit of floor area could be related to the prevailing rent. 
g) With a view to enable the municipal authorities to have services of 
qualified valuers as also to insulate property valuation from local 
politics, it would be advisable to set up CVO at the state level. 
Rate Structure 
h) The existing diverse type of rate structure (step system, graduated slab 
system, and straight line system) need to be reviewed. Equity consid-
eration and the ability to pay principle of taxation do not have much 
of relevance at the local level. Hence, the progressive rates' need to be 
replaced by a differentiated flat rate for residential and non-residential 
properties. 
i) Increases in the costs of services calls for charging separately for 
financing of specific services. Charging through service taxes is 
simple to administer as they are levied along with property tax on the 
same base. However, as the base of property tax is depressed due to a 
host of administrative and legal factors, service taxes have to be 
delinked from the property tax base. 
Tax Collection 
j) Collection efficiency needs to be improved by using punitive mea-
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sures like charging a penal rate of interest and attachment of bank 
account and also by taking recourse to the existing punitive measure 
like attachment of immovable properties. 
k) A package of incentives has been found to be much more effective in 
promoting tax compliance. Hence, the incentives as tried recently in 
Delhi by the MCD need to be emulated by other muncipal authorities. 
Thus special drives to improve the collection efficiency is warranted 
which will include variety of steps: (i) Introducing the collection 
through identified banks. This include issuing a passbook, giving the 
detailed breakup of tax demand and collection; (ii) attractive rebates 
and incentives for prompt payment; (iii) penalising the defaulters by 
a penal rate of interest on arrears; (iv) solving the huge accumulated 
arrears on the basis of informal discussions with property holders 
rather than taking the mater to court. 
Rationalisation of Property Tax Administration 
Information System for Revenue mobilisation 
1) A comprehensive information system needs to be developed as a 
management aid for mobilisation of resources and management and 
financing of civic services. Details of properties in terms of their 
number, use, assessed value, location, type of construction, tax de-
mand, tax collected and arrears, and so on need to be brought into the 
ambit of such an information system. 
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Mid - Career Training to the Municipal Staff 
m) Improvement in the tax administration (as mentioned earlier under 
mobilisation from property taxes) as also in the information system 
will require a multi-level orientation/ training for the municipal staff 
employed in the financial management wing. This training should 
cover methods of building a strong information base, techniques for 
proper budgeting and performance evalauation and launching effec-
tive collection drives. 
Computerisation 
n) One of the modern means to handle tax collection system is to 
undertake its computerisation. In the case of metropolitan centres and 
large cities it would be advantageous to resort to it, thereby saving 
time and labour required for handling the various procedures involved 
as well as for providing varied data quickly for policy formulation 
with a view to augmenting tax collection. The experiences gained by 
some municipalities in the proper use of computers should be shared 
by other to augment financial resources. 
Improving Taxpayer's Perceptions and Relations Between the 
Taxpayer and the Administration 
o) This important step will include : -
The political dimension ; 
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Avoiding complexity ; 
Improved communication with the taxpayer ; 
Contact points and contact staff; 
Improving taxpayers rights ; 
Decentralising the administration of property taxes ; 
The introduction of new information technology . 
In the end it is to be stressed that property tax structure and admin-
istration go together and must be viewed as such while undertaking reform 
and, adminstration of property tax has four critical aspects, viz, property 
identification, record keeping, assessment, and collection. Attention must 
be paid to all of them if the taxation of property is to show better results. 
Thus, there is need to view property tax as a system and not merely as a set 
of independent activities. There is no doubt a lot of merit in approaching 
property tax administration as a system with four interrelated dimensions 
call for concerted attention. 
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